The Political Education of WOODROW WILSON



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2025

https://archive.org/details/politicaleducati0000jame_h1l1



Copyright Harris & Ewing, Washington, D. C.

Woodrow Wilson

A favorite photograph of the President, autographed for friends shortly after he was inaugurated in 1913.

The Political Education of Woodrow Wilson

By

James Kerney

Editor and Publisher of the Trenton Evening Times

Illustrated

PORTLAND PUBLIC LIBRARY

PUBLISHED BY THE CENTURY CO.
New York and London

Copyright, 1926, by
THE CENTURY CO.

PORTLAND
PUBLIC LIBRARY

PRINTED IN U. S. A.

Without, or with offence to friends or foes
I sketch your world exactly as it goes.

BYRON

06757

INTRODUCTION

This is not an attempt to solve the enigma that was Woodrow Wilson. The purpose is rather to show Wilson's official contacts with every-day human affairs. "Man is by nature a political animal," says Aristotle. Wilson found it necessary to play practical politics, the rough with the smooth. He had his very first glimpse of a political convention when, late in the afternoon of September 15, 1910, he walked upon the stage of the old Taylor Opera-House at Trenton to accept formally the nomination for governor of New Jersey. As student and professor, for upward of thirty years, he had been writing and preaching fascinating sermons on history and politics. To his intimates, from time to time, he had let it be known that his great ambition was a professional political career. But although he had then lived twenty-four of his fifty-four years at Princeton, ten miles from Trenton—capital of New Jersey and county-seat of Mercer County—he had never attended a state or county political convention. Nor was he ever present at a national political convention. Until the day of his inauguration as governor, he never put foot in the State-house. In the political affairs of Princeton Borough he manifested no interest. He did not own any real estate, and he fre-

quently failed to vote, neglecting even Presidential elections. The official records disclosed that he had not voted in 1909, the year preceding his nomination. Rather remarkable conduct for the man who, back in 1902—six months before he had become President of Princeton—had declared, "I was born a politician and must be at the task for which by means of my historical writing I have all these years been in training." That was when Wilson was forty-five, and it was written to a friend with whom he had long maintained affectionate relations, according to a statement lately made in the "Atlantic Monthly" by Dr. Charles William Eliot.

While the September convention, where Wilson made his professional political bow, embraced 1412 delegates and an equal number of spectators, it was actually a three-man show. Colonel George Harvey, president of Harper and Brothers and editor of "Harper's Weekly," was advance-agent and impresario. James Smith, Jr., bank president, newspaper publisher, former United States senator, and overlord of the New Jersey Democracy, was stage-manager and producer. Woodrow Wilson was the star. The political fate of the man who was to become dictator of the world rested that day solely in the hands of Smith, front-row manipulator among the machine bosses of the time. "Jim Smith is the greatest one-man politician in the country," was the admiring tribute of Richard Croker, Tammany chieftain. No other power could have named Wilson

for governor. Theodore Roosevelt, most successful political showman since Napoleon, had pointed the way by capturing the front pages of the newspapers, as well as the public imagination, with his amazing appeals to emotions and sympathies rather than to theoretically perfect solutions. It was the Wilson notion that many of the ills of the world, public and private, were largely psychological; he was the foremost after-dinner orator among the intellectuals. As a spectacular and daring publicity promoter, Harvey was in a class by himself.

America had, for several years, been washing a lot of soiled linen in public. Muck-raking was the favorite sport of the nation. None was immune. Government and business seemed upside down. It was not merely Congress, the railroads, and Wall Street! Everybody and everything, from the philanthropic John D. Rockefeller to the "corrupt and contented" city of Philadelphia, fell under the lash. When the exposures became too hot, many beneficiaries of the old political order ran to cover. Reform was in the air; plans for readjusting both the public and private morals of the country were at hand, ready-made chiefly by the progressives of the West. They had earnest associates in the Eastern country, too, and as their methods and measures grew in popularity, clever politicians proceeded to take them on.

Wilson had spent all his years in comfortable educational seclusion, guarded from the rougher things, and had developed that aristocratic outlook on life

which did so much to enable him to view the troubled world and set it right with ease and assurance.

There were delegates in the nominating convention at Trenton who favored various candidates, but there were no Wilson delegates. On the Wilson issue the delegates were for or against Smith. Scarcely any of the leaders knew Wilson by sight. In that curious gathering, only Harvey, smilingly seated in a proscenium box, had been in anything like reasonably intimate contact with him. Personally Harvey could not influence the vote of a single delegate. But Smith, who controlled a good working majority, accepted Harvey's guarantee that Wilson was politically dependable. Harvey and Smith had played the game together since the days when they helped William C. Whitney, noted traction magnate, first put Grover Cleveland into the White House. In business and politics they had prospected together. While outwardly both Harvey and Smith appeared just then to be riding the crest of fortune's choicest wave, there lurked in the beckoning shadows strong personal needs for a thrilling political success. Wilson, too, although the most talked-of university president in America, realized that his Princeton days were numbered. And so this trio of strange bedfellows blended idealism, ambition, and necessity into one of the greatest of political adventures.

During the busy intervening months, between mid-September of 1910 and the day that the specter of William Jennings Bryan, at Baltimore in 1912,

forced the nomination of Wilson for President, most of the varieties of finesse crowded into the picture. In the practical every-day business of being a politician, Wilson frequently found it necessary to resort to trading. The kind of things he had condemned uncompromisingly in his writings, and as university professor, were put aside in the rough and tumble of affairs. Once in that world, Wilson did not think of applying the inflexible moral tests where he came to believe they did not belong. Little wonder that he could say, as he did say, at the White House, on October 26, 1914, "All the politics that are in me I learned in New Jersey." Wilson frequently remarked that any one who could not in short order learn all the tricks of the political trade in New Jersey would be wise to seek some other sphere of action.

Like many men who accomplish great things, he was disposed to regard the virtues as his own, while the mistakes and conflicts became readily blamable on others. And like most men who get into places of power, he in time came to accept as truth the fulsome praise and personal propaganda of the professional promoters and boosters.

Confident that he was destined to lead, he had converted his own Princeton fight into a war to save the university. In his career there he had a most peaceful prelude. Whether or not there was any connection between his political opportunity and his fight to wipe out the fashionable student clubs, the fact is that it was soon after Harvey first began to

boom him for the Presidency that the bitter fight was launched. As his university war took on an acrimonious personal side Wilson pictured himself more and more among the heroes he was interpreting. Washington was a man of great passions, he pointed out. "No man whom you deeply care for or look to for leadership," he said, speaking of Robert E. Lee in 1909, "is made up altogether of gentle qualities. When you come into the presence of a leader of men you know you have come into the presence of fire—that it is best not incautiously to touch that man—that there is something that makes it dangerous to cross him, that if you grapple his mind, you will find that you have grappled with flame and fire. You do not want sweetness merely and light in men who lead you."

Embittered by losing at Princeton, it was not exactly in a spirit of gentle sweetness that a year later, as governor, he set out to save the people of New Jersey and make himself President in the bargain. At Washington, he was bent on twisting America into the Wilson idea of a democracy when the World War broke and gave him his chance to go out and save civilization. He was a wholesale dealer in uplift. "For the man who has ceased to struggle, life is over," he said in one of the best of his speeches, at Denver, after he had shifted his political base from university conservative to radical liberal. For him the struggle was unending. He hit the line hard and, once he had discarded caution, battled like

a savage. Whatever preliminary wavering there might be, there was no disputing the fact that, when he had been thoroughly aroused, and his flinty temper had been properly stirred, he became a firm believer in the righteousness of his cause and fought relentlessly. He seldom admitted he was wrong; those who differed with him either became "wilful" or they "did not know what they were talking about." He mostly saw man, the individual, in his littleness, and was intolerant, impatient, and disgusted with him. The mental processes leading to his actions were often difficult to understand. His displays of partizanship, and his early abandonment of the policy of pitiless publicity and open counsel, disappointed the idealists. He had enormous capacity for dressing ideas, original or borrowed, into beautiful language and a great army of worshipers came to believe sincerely that the test of right and wrong was always to be found where he stood.

In public all men do more or less play-acting. Wilson was no exception. He wanted to speak for the common crowd, but in private he frequently found it difficult to tolerate them. "He has a bungalow mind," was a favorite description. "I sometimes wish they were not so damned honest and just had a little brains," he remarked to me one day of a dull-minded son of toil who had been accidentally carried through the New Jersey Legislature into Congress, and who was eternally parading his virtues while seeking personal advancement. Wilson was a super-

politician, who, when he had finished using politicians, discarded them. His amazing success was the despair of the professional politicians, who felt that the game could only be kept on a winning basis by organized team-work and the use of a well oiled political machine. Destiny, or luck, played some part at every critical stage of the Wilson political advance. He knew how to seize an opportunity and to make the most of it. He played the game to win; that is the object of every candidate, whether for the office of constable or of President.

Press-agents and political contributors were a necessary part of the equipment. In addition to friends, there are usually plenty of rich men, eager for the glory of the lime-light, ready to finance politicians. The prospect of having a few cabinet officers at a daughter's coming-out party, or of appearing personally in the reflected glory on the front pages of newspapers, is reward enough for many. Into his changing camp came the great and the ungreat, hordes of political prima donnas and flatterers and lovable fakers, most of whom prospered one way or another. There never was a time when there were not at least one or two conspicuous business and political soldiers of fortune on the inside of things. Wilson occasionally became wearied of his cohorts, and was plainly disappointed at the failure of some of his new-found governmental theories. "Many an ardent and burdensome reformer would be put to better thinking," he once remarked, "if he were ob-

liged to express his reform in the exact words of a workable statute."

Wilson's formal addresses and papers, carefully edited by friendly hands, are already available. It is by his Fourteen Points and his League enthusiasm, not by his shortcomings, that history will best remember him. Sentimental hero-worshipers demand a halo at every turn; the uncolored facts of conversations and actions more fairly show the human side of the great man. It has been said that no other occupant of the White House save Jefferson wrote so many letters. Throughout his life, he was fond of writing letters, sometimes dictating to a stenographer, frequently using his own old typewriting machine, and not infrequently having recourse to the pen. He wrote a beautiful, clear hand. When in the fulness of time his unmutilated and uncensored correspondence becomes available, it will help clear up many of the legends and fictions built around him. His was a strange aloofness, and his political fortunes had a strange ascent. Full of the pretty theories he had been teaching the university students, and unfettered with practical political experience or definite plan, he got off to a running start and made the whole distance to the pinnacle of greatest power at a tremendous moment in the world's history. Some of us had front seats for several acts of the amazing performance. Not in the sense that he wholly confided in any one; none was ever in the complete secret of his motives. He was his own favorite confidant, at

heart a solitary man "voyaging through strange seas of thought alone." But those of us who lived in the inner Wilson circle while he was playing the political game saw him change from a conservative Democrat to a very militant two-fisted Radical, and, with the coming of war, into an equally two-fisted Autocrat.

As editor of the "Trenton Times," I saw him start, and through all the years of his public life I got frequent close-ups. During his occupancy of the White House, I spent a great deal of time there unofficially. We at Trenton should have been his neighbors. But he never had neighbors; he was not that kind of man. He did, however, live practically all of his adult life near-by until he entered the White House. And it was here that folks had the best opportunity to see him intimately and to watch the development of the methods that at times made him an unpleasant character but an effective one. "Best minds oft are moulded out of faults," says Shakspere. To the New Jersey narrator, Wilson might well give the admonition of that other old philosopher:

> Praise me not too much
> Nor blame me, for thou speakest to the Greeks,
> Who know me.

The incidents here recorded, without prejudice, may furnish occasional side-lights of illuminative quality when, in the distance, the final verdict is rendered. Several of the chapters have, in substance, already appeared in the "Saturday Evening Post" and the "Century Magazine." The writing and in-

terpreting of political happenings over a period of thirty years has brought association with public men of all shades and of varying degrees of importance. There was no other such endlessly interesting experience as watching the forward march of Woodrow Wilson.

It is my intention eventually to place in the New York Public Library, so that they may be available for future reference, all letters and documents now in my possession bearing on this book.

JAMES KERNEY.

Trenton, New Jersey,
December, 1925.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
I	The Background	3
II	The Mentors: Harvey and Smith	14
III	Culture and Bossdom	27
IV	Rough-and-Tumble Days	43
V	Winning the First Election	62
VI	Cutting Loose from Smith	77
VII	The Political Reformation	97
VIII	Appointments and Side-Lights	115
IX	Showing Him to the Country	131
X	Promoting the Presidential Campaign	146
XI	Capturing Bryan and Losing Harvey	161
XII	Problems that Kept Wilson on the Alert	178
XIII	The 1912 Legislative Session	191
XIV	His Own Southland Fails Wilson	207
XV	Baltimore	220
XVI	Roosevelt Scores	235
XVII	Victory without Peace	251
XVIII	Farewell to Trenton and Princeton	270
XIX	Picking Cabinet Members	283
XX	Playing the Game at Washington	307
XXI	A Fierce and Unlovely Side	333
XXII	Sad Days	347
XXIII	Romance and Reëlection	368
XXIV	The War Plunge	386
XXV	Pershing, Wood, and Roosevelt	397
XXVI	The End of a Cable	413
XXVII	Government by Proxy	429
XXVIII	Frank Views for a Domestic Program	437
XXIX	Party Disaster	450
XXX	Last Talks with Wilson	466
	Index	487

ILLUSTRATIONS

Woodrow Wilson ..... *Frontispiece*
Colonel George Harvey 8
Senator James Smith, Jr. 16
James R. Nugent 33
Princeton, 1910 64
The Campaign of 1910 81
Martin P. Devlin 113
George L. Record 128
Stenographic Letter from Wilson to Calvin N. Kendall and Transcription 132
Letter from Henry Watterson to Wilson 160
Letter from Bryan to Wilson Regarding the Philippines 164
Colonel Edward M. House 176
Mahlon Pitney 193
Letter from Colonel House to Wilson 228
Letter from Walter Hines Page to Wilson 244
Woodrow Wilson and Ellen Axson Wilson on the Morning of March 3, 1913 257
Secretary Tumulty and Tom Pence 272
Letter from Taft to Wilson 276
Letter from Bryan to Wilson 308
United States Senator James E. Martine 337
Lindley M. Garrison 352
Edith Bolling Wilson 368
Letter from Pershing to Sir Pomeroy Burton ... 416
Woodrow Wilson 472

The Political Education of WOODROW WILSON

THE POLITICAL EDUCATION OF WOODROW WILSON

CHAPTER I

THE BACKGROUND

A CONVENTIONAL prelude to Wilson's romantic political leap requires some outline of the conditions and the men responsible for the amazing drama. Born in Virginia in 1856, Wilson spent virtually all of his boyhood in Georgia and the Carolinas until he entered Princeton as a student in 1875. He had never attended a public school, but had gone to private schools, including a few months at Davidson College in North Carolina. His greatest teacher was his father, the Rev. Joseph Ruggles Wilson, one of life's kindly old philosophers, remarkable for his diction, and more remarkable, perhaps, for the fact that, although his salary as a Presbyterian preacher was never in excess of eight hundred dollars a year, he managed to keep Thomas Woodrow at various educational institutions until he was twenty-eight years of age. Following his graduation at Princeton in '79, and his graduation in law at the University of Virginia in '82 Wood-

row—he dropped Thomas when he became a lawyer—had tried practising in Atlanta, but a few months later he was at Johns Hopkins, resuming his studies. While there he married the charming Ellen Axson of Georgia, who played such a great part in his life. For brief periods, he taught at Johns Hopkins, Bryn Mawr, and Wesleyan, and in 1890 he returned to Princeton as professor of jurisprudence. There he remained for twenty years as professor and as president of the university.

His student days at Princeton were among the happiest of Wilson's life, judging from the joyous delight with which he frequently turned back to them. Nomadic wanderings, as a son of the manse, had not brought much in the way of earlier definite hometown leanings. He was rather a Southerner at large. While he was always thoroughly Southern in sentiment, and naturally adhered to the Calvinistic philosophy he had learned in the good old way, it was the undergraduate associations formed at Princeton that furnished his lifelong and enduring friendships; many of Princeton's most famous men were in that group. After he had grown bitter in his hatreds of the latter-day university administration, his face would light up when recalling the old times. The playing or singing of "Old Nassau" always stirred him deeply. "Nothing else gives me quite that thrill," he declared one evening in the White House.

Princeton was a simple place in the late seventies. Wilson liked to recount how the students themselves,

ejected from the Bayard Lane lot where they played baseball, actually did the work of clearing and leveling the bit of farm land that became the present Varsity Field. Sons of rich men and sons of the less prosperous were on a common level. In his first college year Wilson resided directly across from the School of Science on Nassau Street, occupying a room in the home of Mrs. Josiah H. Wright, widow of a former mayor and county judge. In his sophomore, junior, and senior years, he roomed at 7 Witherspoon Hall, quite the most fashionable campus building of the time. Tommy Wilson, as he was then called, was not the prize student, but he was always talking politics and history. In what turned out to be his farewell address to Princeton University, the baccalaureate to the graduating class delivered on June 12, 1910, he said:

> I have lived here now twenty years as a member of the faculty and the work of Princeton has become part of the very warp and woof of my life; but it has never in all those years been for a single moment the same Princeton for me that it was in the magical years that ran their cheerful course from the exciting autumn days of 1875 to the gracious June of 1879. The four years of college life can never be repeated or reconstructed.

While yet an undergraduate he wrote remarkable essays on government and had them published in the "Nassau Literary Magazine." In his senior year he succeeded in selling his first article, "Cabinet Government in the United States," to the "International

Magazine," of which Henry Cabot Lodge was the editor. The fact was frequently recalled, in the rancorous closing days of their lives, that Lodge had been the first editor to accept Wilson's material. Wilson did not have much success in writing for pay in the early days, but he kept hammering away at it and contributed his work to the various college publications. The proceeds of an article in the "Overland Monthly" helped to furnish his room at Johns Hopkins, although it was not until after he was thirty that his writings began to appear with much regularity in the paying magazines. Throughout his life he frequently voiced his affectionate regard for Dr. John Witherspoon, the "great Scotchman" who had first presided over Princeton and had been a signer of the Declaration of Independence; in the course of time he acquired a plot in the lovely Princeton cemetery, called by enthusiastic admirers the Westminster of America, so that he might share the final resting-place of Witherspoon and other noted men who had presided over the college, and some of whom had been conspicuous in American history. That vacant plot, immediately adjoining the plot of Dr. Henry Van Dyke, stands to-day in the name of Woodrow Wilson.

Never was there such prosperity at Princeton as while Wilson was its president—the first layman to occupy that place. Not only did Wilson bring great fame by his influence and character as an educator,

but along with the prestige of his name and the wisdom of his counsel and direction there had come great material success. Carnegie Lake was given by the Pittsburg iron-master. Moses Taylor Pyne, multimillionaire New York financier, of the class of '77, who in 1902 effaced himself from the picture and had been helpful in making Wilson president of the university, grew more generous in his benefactions. Altogether everything was moving up. Millions of dollars were gathered and the number of instructors doubled. Wilson, Pyne, and Grover Cleveland, who had come to Princeton after his retirement from the White House in 1897, were all attracting nation-wide notice for the university; the trio appeared invincible. Wilson was most enthusiastic about the situation.

"It has been one of the best circumstances of my life that I have been associated with you in matters both large and small," he said to Cleveland in a 1906 birthday letter. "It has given me strength and knowledge of affairs." All those who had been privileged to be near Cleveland at Princeton entertained, according to Wilson, the strongest admiration and affection for him. Of Pyne, on the occasion of the celebration of his thirty-sixth anniversary as trustee, Wilson said, in a public address:

> Mr. Pyne has been the ideal friend of Princeton. He has given her money generously, freely and when she most needed it, and what is better than that, he has given her constant service of thoughtful counsel; the energy of

many of the best days of his life and the loyal devotion of a true son. I doubt if there can be found in the annals of American education a finer example of distinguished service.

But the pleasant and peaceful days came to an end. Wilson felt the urge of the crusader and, having bulked so large in the development of a great university, he set out to reform it. He was not made for long honeymoons. Coincident with the shower of riches, there had come an enormous increase in the fashionable eating-clubs at the university. There was a whole street of them, some of them in palatial houses. Membership was confined to the two upper classes. At that there was accommodation for only about 350, less than half of the upper-classmen. Bicker Week, when the annual campaigns were on for election to these exclusive clubs, developed tactics and methods that would make any hard-boiled political manipulator envious. Through their freshmen and sophomore years men anxiously schemed to "make" a club, and when the junior year arrived more than half the students found themselves shut out. Many left college. Wilson, in the spring of 1907, decided to put his extinguisher upon the system. "The side-show is swallowing the main circus," was the manner in which he described the part played by the clubs in student life. He determined to wipe out the clubs and set up the quadrangle or preceptorial system of Oxford. Sure of his power, he began a fight as unrelenting as his subsequent battle

Copyright Underwood & Underwood, N. Y.

COLONEL GEORGE HARVEY

with the Senate over the League of Nations. On it Wilson broke with both Pyne and Cleveland. Out of it came much of the fighting fame that stood Wilson in such good stead in the years to come. It was one of the two biggest fights of his life, and it produced wounds that never healed. Wilson did not relish the final knock-out, and he never forgave the former friends whom he had to relegate to the enemy class.

Many who opposed the drastic Wilson methods felt that he was going about the right thing in a wrong way. They, too, wanted the club evils remedied, but they were not ready for the sudden and savage uprooting planned by Wilson. Some were unkind enough to charge that the movement was merely a part of the Wilson political drama. Harvey had opened up his big guns on behalf of the Wilson Presidential boom in March, 1906. From that time on he had kept up a constant barrage of propaganda until the Wilson nomination for governor in 1910.

"As in every human character so in every transaction there is a mixture of good and evil," says Macaulay. Wilson was human like the rest of mankind. Whatever his promptings may have been, Wilson turned the university contest into a great Battle for Democracy. It was the first time that he displayed those marvelous fighting abilities so conspicuous in his political career. It was no pink-tea performance. Wilson never admitted to himself for

a moment that he might be wrong. He had the true fighter's cold and merciless fury. His arrogant methods alienated many who might have otherwise helped with the reform at Princeton. But it was both his weakness and his strength to take a worthy cause and divert it into a personal quarrel.

Cleveland was one of those with whom Wilson fought and afterward kept eternally at grips. Yet Cleveland's own son refused to accept membership in one of the clubs and led a movement that resulted in keeping other desirable students out. Henry Van Dyke, whom Wilson later made minister to the Netherlands, told an alumni gathering in Philadelphia that the quad plan had been found impracticable by Cleveland before his death. "As Grover Cleveland said," declared Van Dyke, "it has neither reason nor common sense to sustain it. It has produced no such effect at Oxford as is predicted for it here. . . . The old class units that have done so much for Princeton will disappear and be lost and the grand old Princeton spirit will finally evaporate." Wilson took his battle to alumni gatherings in various parts of the country. At Pittsburg he told the alumni, "The universities would make men forget their common origins, forget their universal sympathies, and join a class; and no class can serve America."

It was not the abolition of the clubs that Cleveland had opposed but the diverting of great sums of money from the projected Graduate College for the in-

auguration of the preceptorial or quadrangle system to replace the clubs. Cleveland felt that Wilson had solemnly pledged financial support to Dean Andrew F. West of the Graduate College, who had been largely instrumental in influencing Cleveland to make Princeton his home. As the intimate associate and neighbor of West, Cleveland became chairman of the special committee named by the Board of Trustees of the university for the Graduate College. West had in 1906 refused the presidency of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in order to remain at Princeton and push the Graduate College. Wilson had encouraged West to remain and had contributed a preface to the West prospectus for the Graduate College, unqualifiedly indorsing the project. When subsequently pressed for an explanation of his change of front, Wilson stated that the preface had been written before he had read the book itself. It was later publicly asserted, and not denied, that West had a copy of the proofs of the book itself annotated in Wilson's handwriting. The call to Massachusetts was at double the salary that Princeton was paying West, but the Princeton trustees begged him to reject it and promised West in writing that they would immediately begin helping him to institute the Graduate College. Within eight months Wilson had brought forward his preceptorial plan, which would cost one hundred thousand dollars a year to maintain and must indefinitely sidetrack the Graduate College. That was the shift that provoked the disagree-

ment with West and ruptured so many ties. For more than a dozen years Wilson had been on terms of closest personal friendship and intimacy with Dr. John Grier Hibben, but when Hibben failed to line up on the Wilson side of the university war, the two parted company. Wilson not only never forgave Hibben, but refused to attend his inauguration as president of the university, and expressed his enormous contempt frequently and forcibly. Cleveland at the meeting of the Board of Trustees in June, 1907, attacked Wilson with great vigor and later wrote letters to friends, including one to Dr. Van Dyke, that caused much subsequent uneasiness among Wilson's political friends. "That all sounds very pretty, but just what does it mean?" was the curt manner in which Cleveland disposed of one of Wilson's elaborate visions of a greater democracy at Princeton. He came to regard Wilson as a man with an ungovernable temper and not always too nice about facts. Cleveland felt and said that Wilson would probably go very far in politics, once he determined to enter that field, but when he had finished there would be little left of the Democratic party.

Pyne likewise definitely broke his lifelong friendship with Wilson over the Graduate School controversy. William Cooper Procter had offered a gift of five hundred thousand dollars for the Graduate College, and supplemental gifts of approximately four hundred thousand more had been conditionally tendered by some of the alumni. The big fight was

over the location of the Graduate College, Wilson insisting that it should be a part of the university itself, while the West contingent favored the present location. The upshot of the row was that Princeton divided into rival camps. Wilson professed to see in the new college the possibility of a seat of special privilege, from which poor students would be barred. Procter threatened to withdraw his offer, and Pyne, as chairman of the trustee committee on the Graduate School, issued a public statement that Procter had made every concession to Wilson save "that the building should be placed where they would have room to expand and where the studious life of the college should not be subjected to undergraduate distraction." While the battle was still raging, Isaac C. Wyman, a wealthy alumnus, died, leaving a very great fortune as supplemental to the Procter gift for the building of the Graduate College located in accordance with the West plan.

Wilson realized that he could not hold out against that. His fight, which had developed into a personal war between himself and West, was lost, and the Graduate College could no longer be blocked. The Wyman gift came at the commencement of 1910. It was a thunderbolt to Wilson, but it was music to the ears of Harvey, who had first seriously proposed to Smith, at a conference in Delmonico's in the preceding January, that Wilson should be nominated for governor of New Jersey in the fall.

CHAPTER II

THE MENTORS: HARVEY AND SMITH

HARVEY was no mere chance acquaintance of Wilson. He was President of Harper and Brothers, then publishers of Wilson's books, likewise editor of "Harper's Weekly" and "Harper's Monthly," as well as owner and editor of the "North American Review." In common with other editors, Harvey had a flair for president-making. For some years the big magazines of the country—"Harper's," the "Atlantic Monthly," "Century," "World's Work," and "Scribner's"—had been cultivating a demand for men of higher intellectual and social eminence in public life. The "Atlantic Monthly," under the editorship of Walter Hines Page, friend and guide of Wilson, had been something of a pioneer in the field. When Page became editor of "World's Work," he had followed a like course. The "Century," under Richard Watson Gilder, intimate of Grover Cleveland and favorably disposed to Wilson, was spreading the same doctrine. "Scribner's," with Robert Bridges, who had been a student with Wilson at Princeton, gave encouragement at every opportunity. To crystallize the sentiment there was needed something of the dynamic punch of Harvey, who energetically specialized in

politics. Harvey and Harry Harper, of the publishing firm, were at the inauguration of Wilson as president of Princeton University in October, 1902. Everything about the Wilson environment was calculated to appeal to the business politician. The Wilson inauguration as head of the university was typical of the conservative atmosphere. Cleveland made the speech on behalf of the trustees. The Clevelands and Robert Lincoln dined with the Wilsons, while Harvey, Mark Twain, Editor Gilder, and Speaker Thomas B. Reed, Czar of Congress, all on hand for the event, dined with George Armour. They were the kind of folks that regarded William Jennings Bryan and his associates as light-weight professional agitators without genuine ability or balance and calculated to wipe out the country.

Harvey got his training in practical politics in New Jersey and for many years before the Wilson nomination for governor had been close to Smith. A native of the hard hills of Vermont, where he spent his early years working in a country store, Harvey later became a reporter for the "Springfield Republican" and had come to New Jersey in 1885 to write political news for the "New York World." Being a very acute young man, he quickly developed unusual cleverness as a writer, ingratiated himself with the politicians, and in 1887 gained his military title as aide on the staff of Governor Robert S. Green. In those times governors had large personal staffs of dress-parade colonels, taken from civil life, outfitted

in huge plumes and quantities of gold braid, to look after the entertaining. It was the custom to pick men of means to provide big social functions at the state encampments at Sea Girt and otherwise help make the administration a fashionable success. Governor Green decided to digress from the usual scheme and to name two newspaper men, Harvey and Matthias C. Ely, political editor of the "Newark Evening News." Ely, however, flatly declined. Harvey made such rapid political progress that Green's successor, Governor Leon Abbett, who had opened a law office in New York and was alive to the advantages of newspaper publicity, got the Legislature of 1891 to set up the Department of Banking and Insurance, in order to provide a suitable berth for him. Up to that time the banking and insurance duties had been acceptably performed by a subordinate in the Department of State. Harvey shortly afterward was made managing editor of the "New York World" and resigned as state banking commissioner. Abbett continued Harvey on his personal staff, and at one time Harvey and Smith were engaged together in a Newark newspaper venture.

In the early days Harvey bore the name of a distinguished Democratic son of the State, George Brinton McClellan, who, after his Civil War failures and his losing fight to wrest the Presidency from Lincoln, had returned to New Jersey and had been elected to the governorship. Harvey was born at

SENATOR JAMES SMITH, JR.

the time McClellan was contesting with Lincoln, and he had been named for the Democratic warrior. Like another distinguished Vermonter, John Calvin Coolidge—to say nothing of Hiram Ulysses Grant and those two eminent New Jersey statesmen, Stephen Grover Cleveland and Thomas Woodrow Wilson—Harvey shortened the cognomen in later life. But he always retained the military title that his elevation to the personal staff of Governor Green had brought him. The governor of South Carolina subsequently made Harvey a staff colonel, too, much to the later chagrin of some citizens of that State, where Wilson had spent a part of his boyhood and where he became a political idol.

Harvey, in his newspaper and political work, attracted the attention of William C. Whitney and Thomas F. Ryan, both of whom were friends of Senator Smith. Together with some other New Jersey politicians, Harvey had promoted one or two trust-companies and a trolley-line along the upper Jersey coast. Ryan and Whitney were interested in consolidating and promoting trolley systems on Staten Island, and Harvey was engaged to clean up the job. In this way he came into close association with Whitney and Ryan. The Harper publishing house at the time was not prospering financially. Several other publishing houses had either failed or were on the brink of collapse. It was regarded as desirable by the bankers to come to the assistance of Harpers, and J. P. Morgan advanced four hundred thousand

dollars. Harvey was placed in command, at the suggestion of Whitney and Ryan. Always fond of the spectacular, he immediately built at the publishing house an elaborate dining-hall and magnificent offices and lavishly entertained writing celebrities from home and abroad. He likewise kept at Delmonico's a private dining-room where he entertained in the name of Harpers. Nabobs of the literary and university worlds rubbed elbows with rising statesmen and powerful financiers and captains of industry who had become patrons of the fine arts. While it made for pleasant life, it was not exactly the kind of thing that brought big financial returns. The Morgan debt had tripled and the Harvey methods were rapidly producing at Harpers a situation not unlike that of Wilson at Princeton. Another change at the head of Harpers seemed inevitable.

Smith, who had begun life as a clerk in his father's grocery store, was a very handsome man, of charming manner, then occupying a commanding position in both the business and political life of New Jersey. He was president of a large banking institution, at the head of several leather manufacturing concerns, the publisher of a morning and an evening newspaper, and one of the recognized Irish-American leaders of the country. He had sent three sons to Princeton and had a slight acquaintance with Wilson.

Smith was one of the successful old-time gentleman-bosses who made a business of playing the

political game in a practical way. A man does not enter professional politics without some idea of advantage for himself. Smith first attracted attention as an alderman in Newark, where he showed unusual capacity. Likable and suave, immaculately groomed, standing six feet and with the face of an innocent child, he fascinated both the business men and the common crowd. A generous contributor to civic and charitable movements, he gathered about him a band of loyal adherents in the high-class county of Essex and was soon the acknowledged leader of his party there. Ever ready to do a kindly turn—there was never a day that he did not attend a funeral; and, the best financed Democrat of his time in the State, he soon became the party boss of New Jersey. He gathered funds from the big railroad and utility corporations and others who found control of politics useful, and, in turn, distributed money to various county leaders, most of whom were without means of their own. He was a lavish entertainer, occupying in the summer-time what was known as the Garfield Cottage at Elberon—the seaside mansion in which the wounded President, James A. Garfield, died after he had been rushed there by special train after the shooting at the Washington railroad station by the crazy Guiteau. Like the genuine political boss that Smith was, power was his aim; party and political questions were necessarily secondary. His business was the manipulating of humanity, and he usually stayed on friendly terms with the boss

of the other side. For the benefit of the public the appearance of hostility, of course, was maintained; but underneath there was no personal enmity. Within ten years he had become so powerful that he was able in 1892 to switch the New Jersey delegation in the Democratic National Convention from David B. Hill to Grover Cleveland. That action counted for much in the re-naming of Cleveland.

Then Smith went after the United States senatorship for himself, although the Legislature that had been elected was obligated to Governor Leon Abbett. But as in love and war, all is fair in politics. Senators were picked in the old-fashioned way at that time; and with a crowd of railroad lobbyists besieging the Capitol, and with money as plentiful as ugly rumors, Smith was elected by the Legislature. That was the customary Jersey method. While nominations were not sold outright, as judicial places were under the old French monarchy and commissions in the army in England until 1872, the practice was to parcel out United States senatorships to some well financed politician, agreeable to the corporation interests. The railroad and business leaders kept the political managers sufficiently well in hand to see to it that, regardless of party, property-minded men were sent to the Senate, which always dominated the Government. A great horde of professional lobbyists, known as the Black Horse Cavalry, infested the State-house and handled venal legislators. Lawyers and ex-members of the legislature were among

the lobbyists; and the trafficking became so notorious that after the election of John F. Dryden, president of the Prudential Insurance Company, to the United States Senate in 1902, the whole State was stirred. Dryden was a genius in the world of industrial insurance and had built the Prudential into a financial giant. In the natural course of events, the company had become—and still is—one of the great powers in the Republican organization of New Jersey. Dryden was himself an able business man, but the methods used to advance him politically caused such a stench that it was impossible for him to be returned in 1907, although his managers had spent a vast fortune in electing the Legislature that named the senator. The Dryden scandal produced a period of political unrest and agitation that contributed largely to the Roosevelt and Wilson waves in New Jersey. The lobbyists, mostly lawyers and ex-legislators, continued to hold sway at the State-house, however. Lawyers always exerted the greatest political influence on the bosses. Rarely were the candidates for governor chosen from any other profession. For the thirty years preceding Wilson's nomination in 1910 New Jersey had but two governors who were not lawyers, and the Legislature was always controlled by lawyers, many of them using it as a political ladder for their own professional advancement. In business, too, the opportunities for the lawyer-politician are far greater than in any other field. Advocacy being at the service of the just and unjust equally,

the lawyer is in a class by himself. Having the last word, he is able to make fine-line distinctions. And so the unfortunate and needy layman who accepts money for giving favorable consideration to a candidate, or to a legislative measure, becomes, in the eyes of the law and of the virtuous, a cheap grafter, while the lawyer who is rewarded with a powerful place, which frequently leads to great riches, becomes the eminent citizen, keeping the Constitution safe and, when honor and riches have been attained, devoting much time and talent to revealing and defeating the tricks of the strong-arm politicians who have helped lift him up.

At first on terms of intimacy with Cleveland in Washington, more especially because of his close relationship with Whitney, Smith eventually came in for a bitter scoring by Cleveland. It was in connection with the Wilson (not Woodrow) Tariff Bill. Smith was one of the trio of senators (Brice of Ohio and Gorman of Maryland being the others) who manipulated the bill in the Senate until many of the schedules were scarcely recognizable. A scandal arose, and an investigation was held by a senate committee in the course of which Smith acknowledged "my impression is that I bought a thousand shares of sugar" while the action of the Senate on the sugar schedule was pending.

Although Cleveland denounced Smith for party perfidy, they later made up and were good friends after Cleveland came to live at Princeton. One of

the interesting cross-currents of life is the manner in which men of great power and in great place first elevate and then knock each other off the pedestals. When the effort was made by Tammany Hall in 1904 to head off the nomination of both Bryan and Alton B. Parker for the Presidency, Smith was able to keep Cleveland from withdrawing as a possible candidate until the very last hour. It was well known among the Democratic leaders in New Jersey that Cleveland was pleased at the mention of his name, and his old hostility to Tammany Hall mellowed considerably. Cleveland had accepted the advice of Charles F. Murphy to "do no further declining now." He was willing to remain silent in the attempt to finish Bryan, who had denounced him as "an office-boy in a Wall Street institution" who "had been faithful to the financial interests that made him and had kept him." Ryan, upon acquiring control of the Equitable Life, had made Cleveland one of the three trustees of that powerful insurance company.

Smith, as custodian of the Cleveland boom, was able to make a considerable play at the St. Louis convention. When the time came that David B. Hill had the situation so shaped up that it only needed the support of Smith and a few other insiders to put Parker over, Smith made terms and then blandly produced, from his inside pocket, Cleveland's letter definitely ending all speculation regarding the boom. On the very day of this happening some of the St. Louis newspapers, inspired by Smith, had

Cleveland blazoned across their front pages. In the letter, Cleveland was exceedingly cordial to Smith, expressing appreciation for the favorable opinion entertained of his Presidential candidacy, but asking Smith "as representing the State of my residence, as my friend, to prevent the use of my name" at the convention. Smith coolly told the mystified Jersey delegates, whom he had been keeping off the Parker band-wagon, that Cleveland would not have refused to accept had the convention been ready to demand his nomination with anything like a unanimous vote. It was the irony of fate that in the bitter fight that Wilson made later against Smith's election to the United States Senate the scathing arraignment that Cleveland had made of Gorman, Brice, and Smith was the most frequently used illustration of Smith's demonstrated unfitness at Washington.

It was the habit of Smith to visit me along the Jersey shore at least once each week during the summen of 1910; so I had a fair knowledge of what was going on. Whatever might be the decision about nominating Wilson for governor, Smith more than once declared that he had no idea of personally going out and endeavoring to corral the delegates necessary to nominate Wilson for the Presidency. It had cost Smith's friend, August Belmont, upward of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars to make the fight for Alton B. Parker in 1904, and Smith had no notion of attempting to raise any such fund for a Wilson enterprise. Smith, with Harvey, had sat

in when Whitney named Cleveland, and he knew the enormous cost, in money and effort and manipulation, of putting over a candidate for the Presidency. Even where it is not necessary to expend huge sums directly for delegates, the mere scouting incidental to lining up the necessary machinery throughout the country, together with the army of publicity agents and propagandists that have to be employed, brings the cost to staggering proportions.

There were urgent reasons, however, why Smith should take a chance. He had tried his hand at trolley promoting, leather manufacturing, banking, and newspaper publishing, and in 1910 he was regarded as one of the business leaders of the State, with affiliations in New York and elsewhere that gave him the reputation of a man of first importance. Despite this outward glamour, his personal fortunes were actually in a bad way at the time, and his political situation was such that he sorely needed to win. Since 1895 he had been hand-picking most of the Democratic candidates for governor, and none had ever been elected. There was an increasingly large number of young progressives in the New Jersey Democracy who were clamoring for his retirement. Wilson was known to entertain liberal views in excise matters, he was opposed to the radicals, and he favored party organizations. In an article entitled "The States and Federal Government" Wilson had argued that a system of popular elections like ours could not be operated successfully unless the selec-

tion of candidates were left to a few persons who from one motive or another volunteered to make a business of it. "They are the political bosses and managers," wrote Wilson, "whom the people obey and affect to despise. It is unjust to despise them."

That kind of doctrine was satisfactory to Smith personally. He told me repeatedly that he was aiming to round out his own political days with a winner, preparatory to his definite retirement from the game. He was weary of it all and wanted to make a respectable finish. Not once, but a dozen times, he declared that under no circumstances would he be a candidate for the United States Senate, should the campaign eventuate in a Democratic Legislature. His health and the fact that the Washington life bored him were constantly advanced as reasons for his having put all thought of the Senate behind.

CHAPTER III

CULTURE AND BOSSDOM

HARVEY, like Smith, had a fine summer home along the New Jersey coast, where, one Sunday evening late in June of 1910, after the commencement exercises at Princeton, he gave a dinner-party to Wilson, to meet Smith and Colonel Henry Watterson, the noted Kentucky editor and politician. Wilson was hurried by automobile from Lyme, Connecticut, to the Harvey establishment at Deal Beach. After the dinner, there was a protracted conference over plans, including the possibility that Smith himself might be a candidate for United States senator again, should the November election produce a Democratic Legislature. According to Watterson's testimony, Smith made it very plain that he would not be a candidate for the Senate; Harvey apparently felt that there was no doubt on that point. On another occasion Harvey entertained Bryan with a view of advancing the Wilson cause.

The Wilsons had already left for their customary summer vacation at Lyme, where Mrs. Wilson enjoyed association with artists, and where Wilson might calmly contemplate the future, as he bicycled

over the hills, golfed, and otherwise enjoyed the outdoors. There was a subsequent series of conferences between Wilson and some of Smith's trusted lieutenants in New York, after which the opportunity finally came for Wilson's formal entrance into professional politics.

To be sure, Harvey had been for a considerable period nominating Wilson for President every week. He had even gone so far as to attempt to get the Democrats in the 1907 New Jersey Legislature to give Wilson a complimentary indorsement for United States senator—an empty honor, as the Republicans had the majority. But the Harvey proposal was flatly rejected by the minority Democrats, and Wilson later let it be known that he had sent word to Harvey that the coupling of his name with partizan politics was not doing him any good at the university. Likewise, it is the fact that the "Brooklyn Daily Eagle," ardent champion of the Cleveland type of Democracy, had prepared an elaborate broadside booming Wilson for the Presidential nomination and that Wilson had frowned upon it.

But it was Harvey who induced Smith to accept Wilson and who arranged the meetings in New York in the summer of 1910, where Smith's lieutenants told Wilson that the Democrats of New Jersey were unanimously clamoring for his nomination. There were many things to be ironed out. Smith was state boss, but he must lean on James R. Nugent and Robert Davis for the picking of the delegates in the two

great counties of Essex and Hudson. Without Nugent and Davis, Smith would be helpless. Publicly the Wilson stage was set for any political emergency. Through the fine work of his literary friends, the Princeton University head was ready to be vaulted into the White House.

Incidental to the platform and magazine agitation about political ills and suggested reforms, the atmosphere of the older universities had been mildly crowding into American political life. Thinkers and pseudo-thinkers on public affairs were strenuously moralizing on the downward tendency of statesmen and the general political lassitude. For several generations the bigger colleges of the country had not been represented in the White House until the meteoric rise of Roosevelt had put a Harvard man there. He was the first aristocrat who had been President since John Quincy Adams. Taft of Yale had followed, and now it was Princeton's turn. Or, at least, so argued some of the intellectuals. Since the early Revolutionary heroes, nearly every incumbent of the Presidency had been either without college training or a man from a small and little known college. James Madison had been the only Princeton man to reach the White House. Presidents, as a rule, were rough-hewn chaps, who had forged to the top either as soldiers or as professional politicians or both. In passing, it seems worth noting that this so-called uneducated public era had produced the untutored typical American Abraham Lincoln, whose

increasing fame appears to be setting a lively pace for the best historic figures of all time.

But as mankind is naturally acquisitive, the making of fortunes had chiefly occupied the master minds, more especially with the abounding material prosperity and the development of the West that came in the wake of the Civil War. The grapple with the political and economic problems of the country, with the harsh criticisms that were attendant, was left to the sturdy but usually unlettered warriors commonly designated as bosses by the opposition and as leaders by their adherents. The system developed able men of affairs, who, by careful study and observation, and with a talent for working along with others, administered the public business with skill and with a reasonable degree of rectitude.

There were periodic crusades against corruption, just as there have been in all governments long in power. For the half-dozen years immediately preceding 1910, muck-raking in all avenues of American politics and business raged mightily. Cheap magazines built great circulations on single crusades, and newspapers and political reformers reveled in the upheaval. Out of it all came more serious thinking on the part of the people. In earlier days, with their elders devoting all their energies to the remorseless getting of money, too many of the rich college youngsters gave themselves over to material luxury and ostentation, including an occasional marriage with some titled foreign mendicant. But a newer gen-

eration had arrived, and, for the first time in the history of America, graduates of the strong Eastern universities had begun to assert themselves seriously in the business and political affairs of the country.

New England, of course, was the exception. There the university atmosphere, typified in Senator Lodge and others, had long permeated public life. Senator Boise Penrose, another distinguished son of Harvard, had, as early as 1880, returned to his home city of Philadelphia and attempted to clean it up. Unusually able, rich, and of the socially elect, he helped launch the Committee of One Hundred, whose members bound themselves to accept no personal political advantage but to fight municipal corruption until it was stone-dead. Penrose soon found that Philadelphia was no place for a reformer, who, no matter how useful a factor he may be in society, is somewhat irritating and not always comfortable to have around. Of necessity, if the reformer is to be efficient, his views must lack perspective and his expressions restraint; the evils which he confronts must be the most crying wrong of all the ages, and his remedy the one panacea of all time. Socialism, the single tax, municipal ownership, direct legislation, less democracy, standardization of private morals, more democracy, have all had their devoted champions and will have probably to the end of time. For somehow the issues around which the reformers rage never seem to reach a final settlement.

And so Penrose, after one feeble election, switched

over to the regular organization, becoming ultimately its supreme dictator as well as the recognized master mind of the stand-pat national Republicanism which for so long ruled all branches of government. It came to be his philosophy of life that there was no human perfection and that public affairs could be better conducted through a centralized organization, which would take care of the regular party workers and would jar as little as possible the conservative and settled ideas of the people themselves. William Barnes of Albany, who for a considerable period was the Republican leader of New York State, was another Harvard man with views similar to those of Penrose, although he was not nearly so able. Lodge, Penrose, and Barnes comprised a Harvard trio that long dominated the national councils of the Republican party. All were strongly conservative.

There are many reasons why, on past performances, Smith should accept Harvey's assurance that Wilson, too, was a conservative of a very safe kind. Wilson had been preaching against the "foolishness" of woman-suffrage and saying a kind word for political organizations as well as for corporations. In March, 1908, in a speech delivered at Hamilton, Bermuda, the main subject of which was opposition to woman-suffrage, Wilson had declared:

> I have even wished at times that every fool could be also a knave instead of being, as they often are, people who possess attractive manners and excellent intentions. Take Mr. Bryan for example. He is the most charming

Photo American Press Assn.

JAMES R. NUGENT

and lovable of men personally, but foolish and dangerous in his theoretical beliefs.

Wilson had been outspoken in his opposition to the regulation by the state or federal commissions of public utility and other corporations. In an article in the "Atlantic Monthly" for November, 1907, he had branded the attempts at federal regulation of corporations as based on a theory "compounded of confused thinking and impossible principles of law" and had spoken approvingly of the great body of opinion "which prefers the older and simpler methods of the law, prefers courts to commissions, and believes them, if properly used and adapted, better, more efficacious, in the end more purifying, than the new instrumentalities now being so unthinkingly elaborated"; he declared that he was expressing the thought of the greater body of opinion, with which one or the other of the great parties of the country must stand, "while the other stands with those who burden government with the regulation of business by direct oversight." In a speech delivered November 19, 1907, he said, "I charge the present financial panic to the aggressive attitude of legislation toward the railroads." Governmental control, to his way of thinking, would "merely mean taking the power away from the people and putting it into the hands of political discontent." In another speech, on November 27, 1907, he took the position that it was altogether impracticable to give entire publicity to everything done by corporations and branded the

"rough and ready reasoning of the reformers" as socialistic.

Wilson had likewise been very pronounced in his attitude toward union labor and delivered an address on June 13, 1909, at Princeton University on "Unprofitable Servants" which was a repetition of views he had expressed in magazine articles and elsewhere in preceding years. His objections to unionism were fundamental, and he argued that the labor of America was rapidly becoming unprofitable under its regulation by those who had determined to reduce output to a minimum. It was his contention that under the union labor system individual enterprise and ambition were restrained and discouraged and that ultimately the union man learned to give as little as possible for his wages. Replying to an invitation to speak at a banquet of anti-strike and anti-boycott advocates, Wilson, in a letter dated January 12, 1909, had said, "I am a fierce partizan of the Open Shop and of everything that makes for individual liberty and I should like to contribute anything that might be possible for me to contribute to the clarification of thinking and the formation of right purposes in matters of this kind." Harvey in all his preliminary boosting of Wilson had used as his main argument the fact that Wilson was the antithesis of Bryan. He had induced Joseph Pulitzer to publish in the "New York World" an editorial setting forth that the Democratic party, if it was to be saved from falling into the hands of Bryan as "per-

manent receiver," must turn to a man with the Presidential qualifications of Wilson. Bryan had been the target for Cleveland and had himself said, after his defeat in 1896, that he had been made the victim of the political sins of Cleveland. Bryan was then known to entertain the view that Wilson was a natural autocrat who had spent his life dealing with school-boys and had become unable to meet any one on a basis of equality.

Nugent was reluctant about Wilson's nomination. He was chairman of the Democratic State Committee, and an ardent partizan of the old school, with political views not unlike those of Penrose. He, too, was a college graduate, a natural conservative, familiar with the history of constitutional government, opposed to the new-fangled popular referendum schemes, and a firm believer in the theory that the fathers were wise in vesting all law-making authority in the Legislature, which, no matter how stupid, is never likely to be so ill informed as the general mass of people. Open-handed and warm-hearted, with a reputation for remembering and requiting good turns and ill turns, Nugent was above the level of the ordinary machine politician, a lawyer whose long administration of Newark's affairs as city counsel had caused critics to concede that he had in him the stuff which makes good public officials. In his display of legal acumen, in his interpretation of municipal law, of knowledge of the details of city operation, his superior ability was recognized.

When, during the campaign, Mrs. Wilson one evening sat beside Nugent at dinner, she was amazed and charmed at his knowledge of classical music.

Deeper-rooted than any other characteristic in Nugent was his sense of loyalty. He was the friend and protégé of Smith, who was known to his supporters as the Big Fellow because of his portliness and distinguished bearing. In the early summer of 1910, when the Wilson speculation began to take on a rather serious aspect, I ran across Nugent emerging from his office in the Newark City Hall. At the time I was a member of the State Civil Service Commission, and we were putting the merit system into effect for the municipal employees of Newark. At a referendum, the people of both Newark and Jersey City had adopted civil service, and the state commission was charged with installing and supervising the reform. I asked Nugent if he was committed to the Wilson nomination, which, in common with other independent Democrats of the State, I regarded as undesirable. Perhaps the writer's own personality should not intrude, but as a matter of information it should be stated that I was then, as now, editor of the "Trenton Evening Times," a newspaper that plays no inconspicuous part in the life of the home territory of Wilson. The "Trenton Times" had no interest in candidates, but it had been for years fighting political wrongs. The "Times" regarded Wilson as a man of unusual ability and opportunity who had failed to take any interest in the public life of

the community, and quite naturally viewed with suspicion the plan of Harvey, with his intimate Wall Street alliances, to use the governorship as a mere trial course for the Presidential nomination.

Replying to my query, Nugent declared that he had no interest whatever in Wilson and felt it was a mistake to nominate him at a time when the Democrats appeared to have such a hopeful prospect of winning. "Why don't you talk with the Big Fellow?" said Nugent, referring to Smith. I told him that I had on several occasions told Smith I was certain he was making a mistake, but that, after all, it was not any particular business of mine who was nominated, as I much preferred to keep my newspaper free of any definite obligation to candidates. I added that I felt that Frank S. Katzenbach, now a justice of the Supreme Court, who had been the party's candidate three years earlier, was easily the favorite in Wilson's home county of Mercer. Nugent said that he personally preferred Katzenbach.

"Katzenbach would win this time, but the man who has earned this nomination is the Dutchman over in Jersey City," declared Nugent, the Dutchman being Mayor H. Otto Wittpenn, who had been twice elected mayor of Jersey City after his clean-up of scandalous practices in the Hudson County Courthouse. Wittpenn, however, was in disfavor with Davis, the Hudson County machine boss, as well as with some of the other politicians in his own bailiwick, where political jealousy was not altogether

unknown. Davis, the boss, was one of the lower East-Side New York Tammany stripe, generous to a fault and loved by the poor, who preponderated among the electorate. Beginning life as a gas-meter inspector, he had won the affection of the people and had been elected sheriff; in that capacity the law was not pressed too hard on the needy. He had grown into the absolute dictator, and he hand-picked candidates for county and legislative offices, pandering "a little to the moral sense of the community" when he saw the danger-signal. It was not the custom of Davis, who controlled the biggest Democratic vote in the State, always to harmonize with Smith, but in 1910 he was ill and, at the urging of Smith, had agreed to go along in the Wilson fight.

When I parted company with Nugent in the city hall, he told me significantly, "Of course, I will do whatever the Big Fellow wants." That was his idea of loyalty to Smith. Nugent and Davis were taking a chance on Wilson.

At no time in his career had Wilson ever discussed any specific New Jersey issues before his nomination for governor. When Harvey's boom had taken on reasonably definite shape, Wilson accepted invitations for a few state gatherings. He was a charming after-dinner speaker, having been engaged in that delightful occupation for twenty years. As a story-teller he had few equals, and when occasion offered he could be sharp. At a Lincoln day dinner in Jersey City, Wilson had attracted considerable attention

by an exhibition of his keen and crushing wit. This speech was delivered in the winter after the 1908 national campaign. In that campaign a young Southern orator had captivated Republican audiences by his political eloquence. He had a remarkable gift of language, unaccompanied by any particular ideas, but it pleased the crowd. The officers of the Lincoln Association, being mostly Republicans, secured him as one of the speakers at the Lincoln dinner. Wilson and one or two others completed the program, and Wilson was saved by the committee as the last speaker. The young Virginia orator was introduced about 10:30 o'clock and proceeded to deliver exactly the same speech he had delivered during the campaign. When he had finished it was after 12 o'clock and the audience was thoroughly weary and disgusted. The chairman then called on Wilson, who in a few graceful sentences remarked on the inconvenience to the audience of a speech on Lincoln at that late time, and begged to be excused from delivering his speech, promising to come another year. Even these words so disclosed the charm of Wilson that the audience would not allow him to stop. They arose and cheered and insisted that he go on. Wilson could not resist the opportunity to punish the young Virginian for taking the time of the audience with his irrelevant and mixed speech, which, Wilson said, reminded him of this epitaph he had once read on a tombstone in a country churchyard:

Here lies the body of John Smith, who came to his death by the premature discharge of a Colt's revolver—old style and brass mounted. And of such is the Kingdom of Heaven.

It took a few seconds for the business men composing the assembly to see exactly the parallel between this incongruous tombstone inscription and the young orator's address, from which they had suffered for nearly two hours. When they grasped the point they went wild. They stood up on the chairs and yelled and cheered for many minutes, and the poor young Virginian sat discomfited and embarrassed. The incident helps to explain Wilson's talent in the use of simple and homely illustrations. Whenever he heard a good anecdote it was his custom to repeat it at the next family dinner gathering. If it made a hit with Mrs. Wilson and the girls he dressed it up and added it to his repertoire.

In May, 1910, a few months before his nomination, he addressed the annual meeting of the New Jersey State Bankers' Association in Atlantic City and again scored with his humor. He was not reached by the toast-master until after midnight, following his friend, George Bryan, a Richmond banker. His opening sparkled with fun. "You have n't," said Wilson to the bankers, "had the same motive for waiting so long here as I have had. I have been waiting here with much the same feeling I heard expressed by an old darkey the other day. His master found him in the middle of the morning lying down

in the shadow of a tree, and said, 'What are you doing here, Reuben, resting?' 'Resting? No, sah; I ain't tired; I jes waiting for time to quit work.' I wish I could deceive you with regard to the hour. A fellow-Virginian of mine was caught in an embarrassing situation once. He went home in the small hours of the morning the worse for wear and inadvertently awakened his wife, who said, severely, 'John what time is it?' He said, 'My dear, it is just about midnight.' He had hardly spoken the words when the clock struck three. She said, 'What do you make of that?' He said, 'My dear, would you believe that damn Yankee invention against the word of a Southern gentleman?' I beg you to take the word of a Southern gentleman that it is still early in the evening. I was very much struck with the implicit faith my friend George Bryan put in bankers, though he had seen them intimately and behind the scenes. That was a very handsome thing he said about you. It made me determined to advise you of a suggestion of the late Tom Reed. On one occasion General Gordon, then senator from Georgia, was in the cloak-room of the Senate with Mr. Joseph Choate and Mr. Tom Reed. Mr. Choate was then representing before the Supreme Court, in a trial that was attracting a great deal of attention, a great corporation which was in bad odor, and Senator Gordon said, 'It must be rather trying, is n't it, to be placed in that position just now?' 'Not at all,' said Mr. Choate, 'I think my client is entirely

right. Indeed,' he added, 'I have never represented a client until convinced that his cause was entirely just.' 'My!' said Gordon, 'that is a fine thing to be able to say; I wish I could say it.' 'Well,' said Reed, 'why don't you? Choate did.' That justifies me in repeating the compliment that Mr. Bryan has paid you. George did; why should n't I?"

That was as near as he had ever come to a discussion of a direct New Jersey issue. He had cultivated, through the years, his genius for oratory and his gift for lucid statement. Despite the fact that talking was his chief business, however, he was not completely at ease until he got under way. "I have never been able to overcome my nervousness before speaking," he frequently declared. Yet, once on the platform, he never showed a trace of it in his manner and he could always enjoy a hearty meal before speaking.

CHAPTER IV

ROUGH-AND-TUMBLE DAYS

PRACTICAL politics is mostly a matter of expediencies, and, as Bacon remarked, ascent to high place is "often by a winding stair." Wilson had a real battle with himself before he accepted the offer of the nomination for governor. Despite the fact that on frequent occasions he had made known his ambitions for a professional political career, and despite the further fact that he realized how, after the disastrous fight with West and the faculty, his happy days at Princeton must soon end, he did not at once grab the political bait that Harvey finally induced Smith to hold out. "Caution is the confidential agent of selfishness," he had said shortly before, in a Lincoln speech, and on this occasion he proceeded with considerable caution. His recent savage struggle at Princeton had had its effect.

Wilson wanted to be President of the United States, not governor of New Jersey. In his fascinating "Memoirs of an Editor," Edward P. Mitchell, whose fifty years of editorial work on the "New York Sun" gave him such rarely intimate glimpses of historical characters, relates the story of how Wilson,

in advance of the Democratic National Convention that nominated Alton B. Parker in 1904, had submitted himself to scrutiny as a possible Presidential candidate at the New York home of Dr. John A. Wyeth, president of the Southern Society. Thomas F. Ryan, the Wall Street leader, and William Laffan, publisher of the "New York Sun," were members of the self-constituted committee of investigation. According to the version of Laffan and Wyeth, as recorded by Mitchell, Wilson talked freely and alluringly to conservative sentiment; but the general judgment of the committee, whose aim it was to head off a continuance of the Bryanized control of the party, was far from favorable. Wilson was never seriously advanced publicly as a Presidential candidate until 1906, when the boom inspired by Harvey appeared.

Before making the decision in 1910 to run for governor, Wilson put the problem before his intimate personal friends in and out of the Board of Trustees of Princeton. They declined to take the responsibility, promising, however, that he could rely on their friendship and substantial support wherever he might venture. After the preliminary discussions with Harvey and Smith, Wilson held a conference in New York early in July to get a further line on the atmosphere. The meeting was arranged by Harvey after consultation with Smith.

It was no group of second-string men that Smith

carefully picked to put the finishing touches on the job. Richard V. Lindabury, the State's foremost lawyer and one of the outstanding leaders of the American bar, headed the delegation. Nugent and Millard F. Ross represented the practical side of the Smith machine. Judge Robert S. Hudspeth, Democratic national committeeman from New Jersey, and Congressman Eugene F. Kinkead were the spokesmen for the Davis Hudson County machine. Harvey represented himself and the rest of mankind. It would be difficult to find a better combination in any land. They knew every phase of the game they were playing. Lindabury, long associated with Smith and Nugent, was a master Democrat, the confidant of the great financiers and captains of industry; he was counsel for the Steel Corporation, J. P. Morgan and other giants in big affairs. Soft-spoken and with an unerring faculty for locating the weak spots in human armor, he was most skilful in the art of persuasion. Assertions have been repeatedly published—even in some of the idolatrous effusions that seek to glorify Wilson—that Wilson promised, at the New York conference, to recognize the party organization, and that in his later treatment of Smith and Nugent he had ignored this pledge. To clear up the matter definitely, I asked Lindabury, who always remained on friendly terms with Wilson and Smith, to give me his best recollection of what had taken place, and this is what he wrote in reply:

45 106757

NEWARK, NEW JERSEY, July 21, 1924.

MY DEAR MR. KERNEY:

I was present throughout the first Woodrow Wilson meeting held in New York to which you refer and have a rather distinct recollection of what took place. I do not recollect that Mr. Wilson promised in any way to accept organization recommendations or that anyone asked him to do so. Indeed, he showed a reluctance to enter upon the proposed campaign at all and gave no promise except to take the matter under consideration and advise us in the course of a week or ten days. The whole effort was to induce Mr. Wilson to consent to run and no one, I am quite sure, annexed any condition or attempted to exact any promise. You are at liberty to quote me on the subject if you desire. I am,

Very sincerely yours,

R. V. LINDABURY.

The final decision was made by Ellen Axson Wilson and himself after many anxious days of contemplation at Lyme. At a second conference held in New York on Tuesday, July 12, 1910, Wilson formally declared his readiness to run. No better illustration of the manner in which Wilson wavered is to be had than in the confused statements he issued at that particular time. The newspapers, after the Harvey-Wilson conferences, were saying that powerful political and financial interests had agreed upon Wilson for President and that the New Jersey governorship was to be employed as a sort of convenient spring-board. The reports declared that Wilson besides meeting Harvey and Smith, had been

in conference in New York with Roger Sullivan, Democratic boss of Illinois, and Thomas Taggart, Democratic boss of Indiana, political friends and associates of Smith. These reports were very irritating to Wilson, who had met Sullivan once, but had never met the Indiana leader. Smith and Nugent did confer with the national bosses, but Wilson was not present. Taggart told me afterward that he never met Wilson until he had been nominated for President, when Taggart came with the National Democratic Committee to Sea Girt. "I met him a few times after his election, and he was always very courteous to me," Taggart added.

The "Newark Evening News," leading newspaper of New Jersey, sent Harvey Thomas, a staff reporter, to Lyme, Connecticut to see Wilson, who, despite his known presence at the repeated conferences, insisted that he was not attaching any importance to the mention of his name. Wilson requested the publication of the following, which appeared in the "Newark Evening News" on July 9, 1910:

> The mention of my name in connection with the governorship, senatorship, or presidency, is a matter to which I have never and do not now attach any importance whatever. Make it just as forcibly plain as you can, so that it may, perhaps, put an end to all these stories, most of them absurd, which have made me appear as being a candidate for office.

Three days later the decisive conference in New York was held and the Wilson affirmative answer

given. This information was guarded for another three days, when Peter J. O'Toole, city hall reporter of the "Newark Evening News," learned that Wilson had finally consented. Instead of again interviewing Wilson at Lyme, Thomas called him on the telephone; and while previously Wilson had been non-committal, he now frankly admitted he had made up his mind to seek the nomination. He did n't want anything in print, however, until he had prepared a statement. It was then the middle of the day. Thomas suggested that Wilson prepare the statement at once and telegraph it. Although Wilson indicated that he already knew what he wanted to say, he hesitated. The statement might be long. He was told he could go the limit. Still he hesitated. It would take some time to write it out. It was pointed out that he could facilitate transmission by sending a sheet at a time to the telegraph office, and that the first part would be in the "Newark Evening News" office and in type probably before he had finished writing. There was an audible chuckle over the telephone as Wilson finally yielded, and the statement appeared in the late editions of that afternoon's issue. The only stipulation made by Wilson was that the "News" should relay his message to the old "Trenton True American," a morning newspaper supporter. The statement as telegraphed by Wilson read:

Lyme, Conn., July 15.—There has been so much talk of the possibility of my being nominated by the Demo-

crats of New Jersey for the Governorship of the State, and I have been asked by so many persons whom I respect, what my attitude would be towards such a nomination, that it would be an affectation and discourtesy on my part to ignore the matter any longer.

I need not say that in no sense am I a candidate for this nomination, and therefore, I shall not do anything to obtain it.

My present duty and responsibilities are such as should satisfy any man desirous of rendering public service. They certainly satisfy me, and I do not wish to be drawn away from them.

But, my wish does not constitute my duty, and if it should turn out to be true, as so many well-informed persons have assured me they believe it will be, that it is the wish and hope of a decided majority of the thoughtful Democrats of the State that I should consent to accept the party's nomination for the great office of Governor, I should deem it my duty, as well as an honor and a privilege to do so.

I cannot and do not venture to assume that this is the case, and it remains to be seen whether it is or not. I should not feel personally disappointed if it should turn out otherwise.

There was genuine apprehension on the part of the progressive Democrats at the methods that were being employed to force Wilson's nomination. The foremost Democratic newspapers of the State were set against it. The "Hudson Observer" and the "Paterson Guardian" savagely fought the idea of imposing Wilson on the party at a time when the chance of winning appeared so good. Much was made of the Harvey association with Morgan interests and

of the facts that Wilson's previous public utterances had been largely opposed to the liberal thought sweeping the country, that Wilson had repeatedly failed to vote at important elections, and that he had no identification with the governmental affairs of the State. In a political sense the fight at Princeton was no more important in Trenton than it was in Los Angeles or Asheville. All efforts to get from Wilson any expression as to whether or not his views had undergone a change were fruitless. He pointedly refused to state his position on any pending issue. The Democrats had three candidates who were avowedly committed to liberal legislation. They were Frank S. Katzenbach, now a justice of the Supreme Court; George S. Silzer, who became circuit court judge and, later, governor of the State; and Mayor Wittpenn of Jersey City. They were all openly pledged to legislation favoring a public utility commission with rate-making powers, direct primaries for state and local offices, direct election of United States senators, stringent legislation against big campaign contributions, and adequate employers' liability laws. So that there might be no mistake on Wilson's part as to what the situation actually was, Wittpenn packed his grip and went to Lyme, where he very frankly told Wilson that there were already several progressive aspirants for the Democratic nomination and that in so far as he was personally concerned, he expected to continue his fight to smash

the corporation-controlled machine that was supporting Wilson in Hudson County.

Princeton is located in Mercer County, of which Trenton is the county-seat, and the "Trenton Evening Times" sent return post-cards to 250 party leaders, requesting them to express their respective preferences for gubernatorial candidates. The replies showed that 245 favored the nomination of Katzenbach, who, like Wilson, was a resident of the county. The other five favored Wilson. The canvass had been made entirely among active party leaders and workers of Wilson's home county and included the members of the various local party committees. As a matter of courtesy, the Democratic League of Mercer County sent Wilson an invitation to the annual outing, held on July 27. It was the first time he had ever been invited to a political gathering in his home county, and in declining it he indulged in this bit of facetiousness: "May we not hope that, after this 'outing,' our party may soon have an 'inning.'" A few days later the Mercer County Democratic Committee met and formally indorsed Katzenbach for governor, and he got the solid support of the county in the convention. It hurt the Wilson pride that he could not muster a single delegate from Princeton or from elsewhere in his own county.

The state convention that met September 15, 1910, and finally put Wilson in nomination was very much of a rough-and-tumble one. Smith and Harvey had

arrived in Trenton the previous afternoon and from Room 100 of the Trenton House, immemorial headquarters of the bosses of both parties, had been operating on the delegates. Wilson, with the Harvey assurance that there would be no question about his nomination, came down from Lyme and spent the night at Prospect, the university president's home at Princeton. During the evening preceding the convention, Harvey went by automobile to visit Wilson at Princeton, and when he returned to Trenton he found Smith almost a wreck in his effort to hold the votes in line. Altogether it was a bad night for Smith and Harvey, not the least of Harvey's anxiety being occasioned by his having induced Wilson to travel from Lyme and hang back at Princeton awaiting the call to address the nominating convention. Harvey was plainly concerned by the embarrassment that would be caused to both Wilson and himself by failure to control the convention. It was the busiest night of Smith's political life. Not only did he have Nugent actively at work on the firing-line, but old-timers like William J. Thompson, "Duke of Gloucester" of race-track notoriety, Thomas Flynn, starter at the Gloucester track, and other handy workers were drafted to round up the hungry patriots.

It was a tough job. In that convention there were no hearts aching for the salvation of the world. The impelling and unadulterated motive was the customary desire to pick a man who could carry the election. Uncontrolled delegates, as well as many party chief-

tains, felt that Wilson was not the man. Nugent continued to have his own grave doubts. He told me as he entered the convention hall that there was no sentiment whatever among the delegates for Wilson. "Of all the delegates from Essex County," he remarked, "there is just one for Wilson; that 's the Big Fellow himself." The Big Fellow was Smith. In order to have it appear that Essex, Smith's home county, was solidly with Wilson, it was necessary to throw out a large flock of delegates that had been chosen there in opposition to the Wilson nomination. In a brief speech nominating Wilson, Smith said, "Few of us, myself among the number, have more than a passing acquaintance with the gentleman whose name I propose to present."

John W. Wescott, who subsequently nominated Wilson for President at both Baltimore and St. Louis, made a vigorous attack on the high-handed methods that were being employed by the old-line bosses to force Wilson's nomination. Wescott named Katzenbach as a man who was unbossed and represented all that was desirable in a chief executive. Thompson, owner of the race-track, who, like Wescott, hailed from Camden, arose and shouted, "Two thirds of the Camden County delegation is for Woodrow Wilson." There was considerable disorder. Wescott hammered away with his thrusts at Wilson. "We want a candidate whose wisdom is derived from experience and not from dreams," was one pointed shot. The Wilson deal savored of "bargain and

sale," said Wescott, and, glowering at Smith, who was occupying a seat in the front row, he added, "The sun of demoralizing commercialism in politics is set." [1] A Somerset County delegate who wanted to have a local-option liquor plank inserted in the platform, was greeted with derisive howls of "Give him a drink" and "Throw him out." There were turbulent scenes. When Secretary William K. Devereux, reading off a list of the candidates, announced "Woodrow Wilson of Mercer" there was a lusty demand from the Mercer delegates that Wilson should not be listed from their county, and a wag in the gallery shouted, "Accredit him to Virginia; he isn't a Jerseyman."

After the wrinkles had been ironed out and the nomination assured, Harvey telephoned to Wilson at Princeton and sent an automobile to bring him to address the convention. Wilson had spent the morning at golf, and when the Harvey messenger arrived a quick change in attire was made. He appeared before the convention wearing a dark-gray business suit with a sack-coat, a type which he used almost exclusively. He had a dark felt hat of narrow brim, with a knitted golf-jacket under the coat. It was a bang-

[1] Wescott and Wilson later became warm friends and one day in the Governor's office Wescott related how a block of Camden delegates had been bargained for in the nominating convention. Wilson was so shocked that he expressed a doubt as to whether he could honorably continue to hold an office that had come to him through such methods. But Wescott, who ardently approved of the program that Wilson then stood for, pointed out that the Lord continued to "move in a mysterious way His wonders to perform."

up Democratic outfit. The convention was kept occupied with a variety of bombastic speech-making until Wilson appeared. When he arrived at the theater he was almost mobbed at the stage-door. Police were needed to get him in. Wilson was in fine spirits, and he thrilled the gathering with the punch of his speech. "The time when you can play politics and fool the people has gone by; now it is a case of put up or shut up," was one of his telling shots. Wilson looked the part of one of the romantic figures of American history as he stood before that convention. He was in the pink of mental and physical condition, fresh from the golf-links, with all the color of the outdoors upon him and a general appearance of having been battered by life and of having given it something of a battering in return. Behind him was the background of teacher, writer, historian, and educator. Here was the beginning of the "schoolmaster in politics," a fighting man that touched the imagination, who was to preach a new political philosophy and, within the next few months, to cast into the discard both Harvey and Smith.

That evening Wilson promptly set about softening the ill effects that had come from the pre-convention assaults. Earnest Democrats to the very last had been strenuously urging that the candidate for governor should be chosen in New Jersey and not in Wall Street. In a statement issued by Wilson, on his return from the nominating convention, he said:

It is a humiliating and absurd thing to say that I am a Wall Street candidate for Governor of New Jersey. I never had any affiliation with Wall Street or Wall Street people. If I had perhaps I would be richer—or poorer. . . . While it is true that Senator Smith has been very active in my behalf I will say that neither he nor any other man, corporation, or anti-corporation man, has asked the slightest pledge from me. As for Roger Sullivan, I think I have met him once only and I do not recall that we exchanged a word on politics.

In the next number of "Harper's Weekly" Harvey flatly denied the existence of any promise, agreement, or understanding between Wilson and the bosses regarding either patronage or future obligations. "When Senator James Smith, Jr., in one of the most effective speeches ever made in a political convention," said the Harvey editorial, "declared that practically none of the 240 delegates from Essex County had ever seen Mr. Wilson, that personally he knew him very slightly . . . he spoke the exact truth." Harvey then proceeded to laud Smith and Robert Davis, the little machine boss of Hudson County who had coöperated in steam-rolling the convention. It was leadership of the highest order, according to Harvey, who proceeded editorially: "Mr. Wilson paid due and fitting tribute to the breadth and unselfishness of these two leaders in particular when, in accepting the nomination, he declared without reservation of any kind: 'I did not seek this nomination. I have made no pledge and have given no promise. Still more, not only was no pledge asked but as far as I know none

was desired. If elected, as I expect to be, I am left absolutely free to serve you with all singleness of purpose.' Heartening words, these! It is indeed the beginning of a new era when such words can be truthfully said."

It was necessary to emphasize the lack of any agreement because of the suspicion that Smith had taken Wilson on for the purpose of helping elect a Legislature that would send Smith back to the United States Senate. There had been a great deal of restlessness on the part of the people at the long continued domination of both parties in New Jersey by the corporations. The party leaders were exactly alike, and there was really little difference in the accomplishments. The Democrats played the game in conformity with the New York Tammany idea, while the New Jersey Republicans operated along the lines of the Union League and Pennsylvania Railroad in Philadelphia. The methods varied slightly, but the morals and ideals were the same. There had been growing revolt among the younger men in both parties.

It was the breaking up of an old political order. Smith during his seventeen years of leadership had been closely allied with railroad corporations, public utility corporations, and banking and other business institutions interested in manipulating government. The Republican party was in exactly the same condition save that the corporations usually preferred to carry on with the Republicans as being politically more stable. Until the death of William J. Sewell

a few years earlier, Republican candidates for honor, whether for governor or any other place of importance, made the pilgrimage to the little railroad office in Camden where Sewell held forth. He was an unusually clever Irishman who dominated his party like a czar. Starting as a very humble workman in the railroad-yards, he had come up, through the years, to be a master in both railroad and political circles. As with Smith, the great paid him deference and homage. Mahlon Pitney, afterward an associate justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, did not hesitate, in 1897, to go, hat in hand, to the little railroad office in Camden and solicit Sewell's permission to become a candidate for governor on the Republican ticket. And Sewell, despite the fact that Pitney was then regarded as a powerful factor in the politics of the northern part of the State, did not hesitate to deny permission and to insist that Foster M. Voorhees be the party candidate. John W. Griggs, afterward attorney-general of the United States, sought to be Smith's successor in the United States Senate in 1896, but Sewell said no, and Griggs did not persist further. Sewell was then a member of the United States Senate, and he had decided that John Kean, who had been bounteously financing the party, should be his colleague.

In Sewell's lifetime New Jersey cut a large figure in national Republican councils. He was particularly intimate with those two eminent makers of his-

tory, Thomas C. Platt of New York and Matthew S. Quay of Pennsylvania. When, in 1896, Mark Hanna had forced the nomination of the amiable but unbusinesslike William McKinley for the Presidency, the corporation interests of the East were mollified by naming Garrett A. Hobart of New Jersey, known to his home folks as "Gus" Hobart, for Vice-President. Hobart had been active in all kinds of corporation things, from banks and railroads to United Shoe Machinery. Nearer the Nebraska picture of Wall Street than Wall Street itself, he was the political mentor and friend of Griggs, whom with the aid of Sewell, he translated from governor of New Jersey to attorney-general in the McKinley Cabinet. Hobart was exceedingly fond of the good things of life and lived but three years of his term. In the nature of events, had he survived, he would have been renominated with McKinley at Philadelphia and have succeeded him in the White House, after McKinley's assassination by the insane Czolgosz. What effect that might have had on the political fortunes of Theodore Roosevelt, provides its own field for speculation.

It is a fact that Sewell, at the insistent urging of Quay, lined up his forces for Roosevelt for Vice-President at the Republican National Convention in Philadelphia, the only interest of Quay being to help Platt unload Roosevelt, who was governor of New York and balky at times. Roosevelt had come home from Santiago, gleefully boasting that he had killed

a Spaniard, and was not only New York's favorite political hero but his own. He affected the wide sombrero of the Mexican and Far-Western plains, and successfully made it a campaign issue. I have been attending national political conventions since 1896, but I do not remember anything quite so dramatic as the effective use of that broad-brimmed hat as Teddy rushed madly about Philadelphia, showing his teeth, intimating that he might blow up the show, and altogether having the time of his life, while the old-line bosses were putting the finishing touches on the job that was to remove him from Albany and "kill him off politically" by isolating him in the Vice-Presidency. An earlier incident that played its part in Roosevelt's meteoric advance has not, so far as I am aware, been given to the public. Roosevelt, who was a great politician and usually knew how to get what he wanted, had, through friendly channels, secured for himself from McKinley in 1897 the tender of the post of assistant secretary of the navy, but the Senate was averse to confirmation. Platt, hating Roosevelt on the Republican side, was softened through the intercession of Charles A. Dana of the "New York Sun." But Gorman of Maryland, the most popular member of the Senate, was not so easily won over. Roosevelt, as United States civil service commissioner, had in 1891 gone into Maryland and savagely asailed the political friends of Gorman, who made the blocking of the confirmation a personal matter. Gorman had come up from a senate page and exerted an enormous

influence with Republicans as well as members of his own party. Tammany, however, was eager to get Roosevelt out of New York City, where he was, from the point of view of that organization, a very troublesome police commissioner. Edward H. Murphy, Democratic senator from New York, and Smith of New Jersey eventually succeeded in getting Gorman to relent as a favor to Tammany, and Roosevelt was confirmed. It was as assistant secretary of the navy that Roosevelt got his chance to become a hero. The Spanish-American War provided the opportunity for the Rough Riders, with all the subsequent history leading to the White House. When Wilson came actively on the political scene Roosevelt was battering the tar out of the organization descendants of Quay, Sewell, and Platt—the machine leaders who had brought about his original nomination on the national ticket. Roosevelt's picturesque description of President McKinley as having "a chocolate éclair backbone" will live with Speaker Joe Cannon's piquant observation that "McKinley kept his ear so close to the ground it frequently got full of grasshoppers." Like Roosevelt, Wilson was a bit abrupt and rough in canceling what seemed like obligations to his benefactors—a habit of the more or less idealized politicians, who usually convince themselves that their own human conceptions are infallible.

CHAPTER V

WINNING THE FIRST ELECTION

ON September 19, 1910, four days after Wilson was nominated for governor, I accompanied Smith to Princeton, where I had my first interview with the candidate. Nugent was with us. It was Smith's second political conference with Wilson.

"Jim, can you imagine any one being damn fool enough to give this up for the heartaches of politics?" Smith said to me, as we stood that beautiful September morning on the portico of Prospect, the university president's pleasant old mansion. As we were entering the house Wilson came down the hall to meet us. He was graciousness itself. After greeting Smith and Nugent, the former remarked with a smile:

"This is the Trenton editor who has been making all the trouble for us in your home county."

"There 's plenty of Irish blood in my veins, and I know something of these fighting spirits," was Wilson's laughing retort, as he shook hands cordially and ushered us into the spacious library. The Irish strain was strong in each member of that particular quartet. After the exchange of a few more pleasantries, we got down to the business in hand.

Wilson was frankly concerned about the chances of carrying Mercer County. What were his neighbors likely to do? That seemed the momentous question with the candidate. "The fear of the neighbor is the beginning of wisdom," some humorous philosopher has said. It was a curious kind of meeting with the two politicians who had actually forced the nomination of Wilson. They had taken him on faith. Wilson now knew that the Democracy of New Jersey had not been clamoring for him in any such unanimous way as had been represented at the New York meetings. He informed us that he wanted to retain Sundays, Mondays, and Tuesdays for his work at the university. He did not favor the hand-shaking, house-to-house, Roosevelt style of whirlwind campaign and was against all-day tours. He had not the genial temperament and glowing warmth of manner essential to the knockabout campaigner. One big evening speech in each county was his idea of the way of conducting the fight. He had his own notions about things. A man who had made his way from student to college professor and university president was not likely to be without some good political strategy.[1]

[1] "Wire-pulling and manipulation are as rife in any normal college faculty as they ever were in Tammany Hall or the Quay system in Pennsylvania," says Professor Harry Elmer Barnes in his recently published "History and Social Intelligence." And Professor Barnes adds this rather interesting comment: "The participants in the game of politics in the colleges are in general more intelligent than those in the public arena and hence to that degree more subtle, skilful, invidious and ruthless."

The dual object of the conference was to perfect a general plan of campaign and to discuss ways and means for clearing up the political fog in Wilson's home sector. Immediately after the nominating convention Smith had asked me to prepare a list of the party leaders in Mercer County, and polite letters were sent out by Wilson inviting them to confer with him September 19. Smith, Nugent, and I had, by prearrangement, gone to Princeton in advance, and we spent an hour in discussing the situation. As practically all of the Mercer County leaders were unknown to Wilson we gave him a detailed outline of just how each should be approached. The manner in which he grasped every suggestion was a revelation. When the Mercer leaders had in turn been formally presented by Nugent and had taken seats in the library, Wilson proceeded to discuss local political affairs as if they were the one thing in all the world in which he had been taking an interest. He called the various leaders by name and displayed an apparent familiarity that made them feel very much at home. We spent altogether about three hours outlining the campaign. We were charmed by the reception he had given us. When he unbent he could be the most urbane and delightful of companions.

The perfected plans called for the opening of the campaign in Jersey City on September 28, with a visit to the Interstate Fair at Trenton the following

PRINCETON, 1910

This is the first picture made of Woodrow Wilson for political use and was published at the time of his candidacy for the governorship of New Jersey. It was taken on the steps of Prospect, the home of the president of Princeton University. Standing behind Mr. Wilson is Miss Margaret Wilson. Seated in front of Mrs. Wilson is Miss Jessie Wilson, now Mrs. Francis Sayre. Seated on the arm of Mrs. Wilson's chair is Miss Eleanor Wilson, now Mrs. William G. McAdoo.

day. There had to be considerable modification of the program, and Wilson was compelled to speak to three big meetings in Jersey City on the opening night. Nugent had his own troubles, keeping Wilson in the right mood and keyed up to a stiff campaign. Wilson balked at so many speeches; he wanted to keep an eye on his university work, and he was hard to manage. Nugent brought him to terms by flatly declaring that if Wilson failed to attend any of the scheduled meetings, Nugent would himself speak in Wilson's name. Recognizing the need of local atmosphere in the meetings, Nugent telephoned to Joseph P. Tumulty and invited him to accompany Wilson. Tumulty, who later gave ten years of devoted service to Wilson as his secretary, had been opposed to the Wilson nomination. But he had fallen into line. Nugent felt that with his three years' experience in the Legislature, and his unusual gift of oratory, Tumulty was just the man to use as runner-up for the candidate.

Wilson had opened his campaign with a series of speeches aimed at corporations, turning many pretty phrases such as "guilt is personal" but not getting down to brass tacks on the pressing state issues. Progressive Republicans in New Jersey were already seriously at work in an effort to get better election laws and to rid the people of the corporation yoke. The break-up of the old order was being further accelerated by Roosevelt, who had then just returned

from his big-game hunt in Africa and way-stations and was bumping over the American continent with his message of new nationalism. Old-time Republican benefactors and allies were being ruthlessly uncovered and hurled most vociferously into the Ananias Club. In the 1910 revision of his "American Commonwealth," James Bryce tells of the difficulty experienced because of the transitory experimental condition in which he then found so many political institutions in the United States, such as forms of city government, party nominating machinery, and methods of direct popular legislation, the "variations between one State and another growing more numerous with the emergence of new ideas and new schemes of reform."

It was an excellent time for an outstanding Democrat to become a progressive. And Wilson soon found himself taking advantage of the shifting opportunity. He was whirled over the State by the determined Nugent, who had perfected the best organization that the Democrats had ever put together in New Jersey. Wilson did not prepare his speeches in advance. Nugent had employed a corps of stenographers to accompany Wilson and give him all the advertising that was possible. Not only the state newspapers but many of the New York and Philadelphia papers gave liberal space to the speeches of Wilson. He had the best of the publicity end of the fight. It was Wilson's habit to speak for forty-five minutes, and he made a point of either getting to his home in Prince-

ton by automobile or to the Princeton Club at New York or a hotel in Philadelphia each night after his meeting. He had been importuned to accept the hospitality of leading men in the places he visited, but he let it be known that he preferred not to be under social obligations to any one during the campaign.

Vivian M. Lewis, who had been nominated for governor by the Republicans, had a splendid political record and was recognized as both upright and independent. He had gone far ahead of his party by insisting upon a definite public-utility rate-making pledge in the Republican platform. The northern section of the State, where the commuting element from New York forms a large part of the voting population, had been stirred to anger by a twenty per cent increase in railroad-fares. Lewis by his bold course incurred much bitter hostility on the part of some of the old bosses in his party. Franklin Murphy, former governor and one of the biggest Republican campaign contributors, quit the post of chairman of the state committee as an open protest against the Lewis stand. United States Senator Frank O. Briggs, who, although a lifelong corporation and banking man, felt that railroad domination was ruining the party, was made state chairman in place of Murphy. The disgust on the part of good men, even those affiliated in a big way with corporations, was spreading in both parties. George Werts, the last Democratic governor before Wilson, had attempted to foist the most reprehensible railroad lob-

byist into a high state office; but the nomination proved too much for the servile Senate and was rejected. Nothing daunted, the succeeding Republican governor, Griggs, named the chief lobbyist of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company as state commissioner of banking and insurance, and the nomination was confirmed. This is typical of what went on.

Wilson visited the Interstate Fair, where he first greeted his rival, Lewis, and was whirled through the groups of farmers and others. He did not make a speech, but that same evening, September 29, he took up some of the campaign charges that were annoying him. "I have heard a lot about me since the campaign began," he said. "Those who know the least about me say the most. Now you have probably heard that I said that no one but a college man should be appointed to office, and the two most conspicuous figures in the history of the United States never went to college, George Washington and Abraham Lincoln, and you could go through the list with scores and hundreds of other names." He liked to talk about Lincoln. His disgust for the old friends at Princeton had become so intense that he lost no opportunity to take a dig at university training of the day. "To be studious in the ordinary, conventional sense," Wilson had said in a Lincoln speech at Chicago, "if I may judge by my observation at a university, is to do the things you have to do and not understand them particularly."

As the campaign progressed, Wilson, in an in-

cautious moment, announced a willingness to meet any responsible Republican in debate. George L. Record, transplanted Maine schoolmaster and lawyer, had for a dozen years or more been fighting corporation control in the Republican party. The Republicans had nominated him for Congress, and immediately after the Wilson challenge was issued Record called for a date.

"Gentlemen who have been associated with me in other undertakings have complained of my habit of talking," said Wilson, speaking at Trenton on October 3. "They have complained that I do not regard anything that concerns the public interests as confidential. I do not. I never shall; and I give notice now that I am going to take every important subject of debate in the Legislature out on the stump and discuss it with the people." Continuing he said:

> I am an amateur, and I shall timidly, as standing outside of the ranks of the profession, tackle the profession. I shall insist in every instance that tackling be done in public and not in private, and I welcome any politician in the state to a debate upon the public platform upon a public question.

When Record accepted there was consternation among the Democratic chieftains, who realized that Record was easily the most dangerous man for any Democrat to meet on the platform. They urged Wilson to ignore Record. The State eagerly awaited the outcome. It would have been big-time stuff. The Republican managers soon discovered

that the Record acceptance had caused panic in the rival camp and proceeded to bombard the Democratic candidate. Finally Briggs, the Republican state chairman, called upon Nugent, the Democratic chairman, to have Wilson either meet Record or withdraw the challenge. Meanwhile Lewis was speeding up and making a favorable impression by his frank presentation of existing political evils. Griggs, former governor and McKinley's attorney-general, took the stump and branded Wilson as a decoy duck for the disreputable old race-track and gambling crowds that in other days had disgraced the Democracy and the State.

Republican prodding and the insistence of the Democratic managers that he keep away from Record finally began to get on Wilson's nerves. Quoting a remark of a ward boss in New York City, "There ain't no politics in politics," Wilson, in one of his speeches, scored both of the old party machines, declaring that government under them was an illegitimate and abominable partnership between business and politics. He said that he was not in the least surprised that the politicians were beginning to have "disturbed thoughts" about his candidacy. He could not tell himself what his performances were going to be, but he did know what his intentions were. "You have got to take a sportsman's chance," declared Wilson, "and risk it, but I can promise you this, that it will not be dull; it will be interesting. I doubt if it will be as interesting to you as it will be to me, but it

will be interesting. There is one thing to which the candidate himself can testify. He can tell you confidentially that he knows a thing or two, that he is not as innocent as he looks, and that he is not as young as he looks." He finally took the Record matter into his own hands and wrote Record a polite note setting forth that the state committee had filled all his speaking dates but that he was ready to debate through an interchange of letters. And that 's where the campaign really got under way. Wilson's temper was beginning to assert itself. He was a natural rebel. And he always fought best when he was mad.

Four days after he sent his letter offering to debate by mail, I sat in a box with Smith and Harvey in an Asbury Park theater when Wilson flatly declared that he did not want any one to vote for him who believed that he would listen to a political boss. Smith pretended to regard it as a mere campaign gesture, but the die was cast. One of Wilson's favorite illustrations in the campaign against the bosses was this: "I am like the Irishman who was eating soup with his fork, and some one offered him a spoon, but he waved it aside, saying, 'Oh, it is all right, I am gaining on it.' " As his hammering of the bosses took on increased speed, the enthusiasm of the audiences grew in volume. That tickled Wilson, who felt he had the bosses on the run and meant to keep them there. With telling effect he would repeat one of his choice limericks, likening the bosses to the young lady:

There was a young lady of Niger
Who smilingly rode on a tiger.
They returned from the ride
With the lady inside
And the smile on the face of the tiger.

Wilson paid little attention to charges of inconsistency. He felt there was virtue in flexibility and on one occasion remarked, "I 'll agree not to change my mind, if some one with power to do so will guarantee that if I go to bed at night I will get up in the morning and see the world the same way."

While Record naturally would have preferred to meet Wilson in person, he produced, in response to the Wilson offer to debate by mail, a strong letter in which he asked Wilson to specify whether he meant that he would not be bossed by Smith or Davis; also whether he would fight for laws embodying rate-making clauses for public utilities, direct elections, corrupt practices, and the other progressive schemes then being agitated. The Democratic managers still urged Wilson to soft-pedal his reply.

During the interim Wilson had offered his resignation as president of the university, and the trustees snapped it up with celerity, which did not add to the comfort of the candidate. That was on October 20. The following Sunday evening, October 23, Colonel David Flynn, bank president and ardent admirer of Wilson, telephoned from Princeton that Wilson would like to see me Monday morning. I went to Princeton and spent upward of an hour discussing

the situation with the candidate and Flynn. There was considerable frank talk about the speeches as having been too general, and Wilson candidly asked what would be the effect of a direct attack by him on the whole boss system, more particularly the Democratic overlords. That, I assured him, was just what was needed. We went over the situation in detail, and he said he would send a reply to Record that would clean up all uncertainty, and that he would outline his attack in a speech he was to make that evening in Camden.

"If you follow that course, you should have no further anxiety about what your neighbors in Mercer County will do, nor what will happen in the State," I told Wilson; adding, "You will win hands down, and you won't need to feel under obligation to any of the independent newspapers for supporting you, either." It was merely promising and putting into concrete shape the things that the progressives and the newspapers had been agitating and battling for. At Camden that evening he made the flat declaration that he understood that if he were elected governor he was at the same time to be recognized as having been elected leader of his party. Continuing, he said:

> If the Democratic party does not understand it in that way, then I want to say to you very frankly that the Democratic party ought not to elect me governor. When I was approached with regard to the nomination for the governorship, I understood it to be distinctly represented to me that the purpose of those who asked my

leave to use my name for that purpose was that I should be invited to take the leadership of the Democratic party. If they do not understand it they ought to withdraw the invitation on the eighth day of November.

Next day he despatched to Record a smashing document. Some of the more pertinent questions asked by Record and the replies given by Wilson were:

RECORD: Do you admit that the boss system exists as I have described it? If so, how do you propose to abolish it?

WILSON: Of course I admit it. Its existence is notorious. I have made it my business for many years to observe and understand that system, and I hate it as thoroughly as I understand it. You are quite right in saying that the system is bipartizan; that it constitutes the most dangerous condition in the public life of our State and Nation to-day; and that it has virtually for the time being destroyed representative government and in its place set up a government of privilege. I would propose to abolish it by the reforms suggested in the Democratic platform, by the election to office of men who will refuse to submit to it, and who will lend all their energies to break it up by pitiless publicity.

RECORD: In referring to the Board of Guardians, do you mean such Republican leaders as Baird, Murphy, Kean, and Stokes? Wherein do the relations of the special interest of such leaders differ from the relation of the same interests of such Democratic leaders as Smith, Nugent, and Davis?

WILSON: I refer to the men you named. I mean Smith, Nugent, and Davis. They differ from the others in this, that they are in control of the government of the

State, while the others are not, and cannot be if the present Democratic ticket is elected.

RECORD: Will you join me in denouncing the Democratic "overlords" as parties to a political boss system?

WILSON: Certainly I will join you, or any one else, in denouncing and fighting every and any one of either party who attempts any outrage against the government and public morality.

Then specifically answering a question of Record as to what relationship he expected to maintain with the political bosses who had brought about his nomination, Wilson made this very emphatic declaration:

You wish to know what my relations would be with the Democrats whose power and influence you fear should I be elected governor, particularly in such important matters as appointments and the signing of bills, and I am very glad to tell you. If elected I shall not either in the matter of appointments to office, or assent to legislation, or in shaping any part of the policy of my administration, submit to the dictation of any person or persons, "special interests," or organizations. I will always welcome advice and suggestions from any citizen, whether boss, leader, organization man, or plain citizen, and I shall confidently seek the advice of influential and disinterested men representative of the communities and disconnected from political organizations entirely; but all suggestions and all advice will be considered on its merits and no additional weight will be given to any man's advice because of his exercising, or supposing that he exercises, some sort of political influence or control. I should deem myself forever disgraced should I, in even the slightest degree, coöperate in any such system. I regard myself as pledged to the regeneration of the Democratic party.

That ended the campaign and branded Wilson as a genuinely upstanding radical. He won by forty-nine thousand. It was the biggest vote he ever received in New Jersey. The heavy commuter vote, mostly Republican, never supported him in subsequent elections, and he never again got a majority of the votes of the State.

CHAPTER VI

CUTTING LOOSE FROM SMITH

WITH Wilson's election as governor, there had also been unexpectedly swept into office a Democratic Legislature. In many cases the successful legislative candidates had been chosen without the remotest idea of winning, and, as is usual in such circumstances, the average of capacity and ability was not high. James E. Martine, lovable character and his own torch-light procession, had been running for office of any and every kind for forty years without scoring a win. The Republican Progressives had forced through a primary law intended to give the voters an opportunity to express their preference for United States senator. Martine, against his own wish, had been finally induced to allow the use of his name on the ballot. Vigorous efforts had been made to have other leading Democrats make the race. None would consent. On the other hand the Republicans had very formidable party leaders enter the primary, and the winner was former Governor Stokes. The small prospect of electing a Democratic Legislature, coupled with the general lack of desire to give any possible offense to the powerful Smith, despite his

declarations that he was not a candidate for the Senate, were influential factors with Democrats. Neither of these considerations, however, figured in Martine's desire not to go into the primary; he married late in life, and his reasons were personal. But when it became evident that no other Democrat would stand, William W. St. John, a newspaper man who had long been active in the agitation for progressive legislation, compelled Martine to stand.

There were both comedy and pathos in the transaction. St. John, who with Frank D. Schroth, now publisher of the "Trenton State Gazette," had organized the Trenton News Bureau and was then writing a syndicate political letter for New Jersey newspapers, had a small office at the State-house. He called Martine over to Trenton from Plainfield and, together with Martin P. Devlin, fighting Trenton liberal, told him that it was his duty to run and prevent the battle for progressive legislation from appearing ridiculous. They had the necessary petition ready for signature. Martine was determined not to consent and fought for several hours. He finally went on his knees and declared: "For God's sake, Mart and Saint"—the terms of affection he used for his two friends—"don't humiliate me any further. I am now married to a good woman, and it is n't fair to her for me to permit myself to be regarded as a political buffoon. I 've run for everything from constable to Congress and have often got up at two o'clock in the morning to speak for the

Democratic party, but I won't sign this petition and disgrace my wife." But at the very last minute it was placed on file with Martine's name attached, and he accepted the situation. At the primary Martine got forty-eight thousand votes and was the party choice. Most people were a bit skeptical as to his capacity; none doubted his desire to give faithful and untrammeled public service. He was intensely loyal in his friendships and had solid worth, although it was frequently concealed behind a mask of fustian. His honesty and simplicity of character earned him respect. Wilson felt that he did not size up and was at first inclined to keep his hands off the situation. Almost as soon as it became known that the Democrats had won the Legislature, the Smith forces began to come from under cover and insist that the primary was a joke, and that Smith was the man who had carried the brunt of battle and should have the reward. It required many weeks to win Wilson over and convince him that standing by Martine was a clear issue of good faith and observance of party pledges.

St. John fired the opening gun on Wilson. That was on election day, before the results of the voting were known. He spent the afternoon at Wilson's home in Princeton and went elaborately over the situation, both as regards progressive legislation and Martine. It was too soon to get much result. Wilson did not know for a certainty that the day's polling would put him in the State-house. St. John was an able radical, who had successfully launched a daily

newspaper in Elizabeth, but was forced to give up the hard grind of publishing by a break in health. In March, 1910, Wilson had spoken at a Democratic banquet in Elizabeth, the only public gathering of New Jersey Democrats that he had ever addressed before his nomination for governor. While Wilson had not touched on any state issue, St. John, who was convinced that Wilson was a radical in the making, set about doing his part. Despite broken health, St. John was a philosopher, who refused to be disturbed by the Wilson methods at Princeton and who frequently quoted the words of Paley: "What is public history but a register of the successes and disappointments, the vices, the follies, and the quarrels of those who engage in contention for power?" St. John saw in Wilson the most promising figure the genuine progressives had ever had in America. There was naturally much anxiety on the part of St. John, when the Smith fight was at its peak, lest it be discovered that the signature on the Martine filing-petition was not in the handwriting of Martine. But no investigation was made, and that danger, like so many in the Wilson political passage, was safely rounded.

At the Yale-Princeton football game on November 12, 1910, the Saturday after the election, I sat immediately in front of Wilson in the Princeton grand stand. He had been having a reunion with old classmates and was in high spirits. He told me he had never met Matthias C. Ely, editor of the biggest

Tomlinson Bros., Trenton

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1910

Only picture of Wilson, with his Republican adversary, Vivian M. Lewis (right of Wilson), when he was campaigning for governor. The picture was made at the Inter-State Fair, September 23, 1910, and Wilson is seated in the club-house grand stand watching the horse races.

Democratic newspaper in the State, and suggested that I bring Ely to Princeton for a conference on Sunday, November 20. At the appointed time Ely and I were in the home of the governor-elect at Princeton. We waited half an hour for him to come in, with the family, from church. Wilson was very much interested in Ely's knowledge of election laws and needed reforms, and we discussed the senatorship at length. Smith had not yet announced himself a candidate, and Wilson expressed the belief that he would not, in view of the preëlection statements and the general indignation that had been stirred up even by mention of his name. Both Smith and Harvey were keeping very much aloof. Wilson made it plain that he was likewise not for Martine, whom he regarded as not qualified. It was clear that the expression at the preference primary had not made any particular impression on Wilson. He gave voice to the thought that the Democrats should pick a man of the exceptional type of John R. Hardin, a Princeton '80 man, who had first-class ability and would represent New Jersey with both intelligence and credit. Hardin, one of the great lawyers of the State, is now president of the Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company. Wilson had known Hardin since their student days. To our suggestion that the Democrats had already definitely decided on Martine he gave little weight.

The "Newark Evening News," his stanchest newspaper supporter in the State, was making a most con-

vincing fight against Smith. Edward W. Scudder, editor of the "Newark News," had been a student under Wilson at Princeton, and, like his father, Wallace M. Scudder, publisher of the "News," was a liberal Democrat who saw in the rise of Wilson much promise for the advance of governmental reforms.

"I hope, Dr. Wilson, you are following the telling arguments that the 'Newark News' is putting forth," I said, after we had failed to budge him for the direct primary idea. Both Ely and I were amused at his bland reply. He coolly told us that he did not read any New Jersey newspaper; the only newspaper he found time to read was the "New York Evening Post." He did not even know that Tumulty was not a member of the Legislature. When we quit the house, it was with some despair that Ely and I discussed the apparently hopeless situation of a governor who did not know the politicians in his own party and who did not read the State newspapers. It looked dark for Martine. Then came a remarkable development. St. John had been conducting an intelligent publicity campaign in support of the primary choice. Upon learning that it had been utterly wasted in so far as Wilson was concerned, he promptly made for New York and induced the "New York Evening Post" to enlist and help convert Wilson to stand by the primary expression for Martine. "You old gloom, you are now talking to the New Jersey political writer for the 'New York Even-

ing Post,' " St John told me, with a chuckle, over the telephone the next evening. He at once began an educational campaign in the "Evening Post" aimed solely at Wilson.

With Wilson's utter lack of political acquaintance and his indifference to the state press, there was naturally some concern as to his choice for his private secretary. A New York newspaper man, who had been helpful during the campaign, was regarded as the most likely candidate. With the fight that was ahead, however, it appeared urgent that some one more familiar with the ways of the politician should be chosen. Wilson was on very friendly terms with the retiring chief executive, Governor John Franklin Fort, and they were going to Kentucky together on November 29 for the annual conference of governors. Adjutant-General Wilbur F. Sadler, Jr., accompanied them; and after conferring with some of the others I suggested to Fort and Sadler that they could render a useful service by quietly putting Tumulty over as secretary to Wilson. They were both red-hot for the idea and agreed that they would lose no opportunity to suggest such a course. Fort almost spoiled the plan by telephoning Tumulty in advance to ask if he would accept. Tumulty was not pleased about it; he had a growing family, and he wanted to be prosecutor of the pleas of Hudson County. After some argument and delay, however, he was convinced that he should make the necessary sacrifice and finally consented to await the outcome of the trip. Wilson,

who had heard Tumulty speak many times during the campaign, was delighted with the suggestion. He came home and named Tumulty. To the New York reporter who had sought the place, Wilson expressed his regret at his inability to name him: "It was absolutely necessary that I should be associated with some one, if possible, who was more familiar with the intimate course of politics in the State than I myself." The New York newspaper man in reply wrote Wilson, "Of course I am disappointed at not becoming the secretary to the first man who ever gave me a real thrill in politics, the first man I ever voted for with a feeling of certainty that I was doing something worth while."

Wilson's decision to make Tumulty secretary was a big boost for the Martine cause. Tumulty had already taken an active part in the preliminary discussions and had agreed to serve as the personal manager for Martine. St. John, Devlin, and I, after a number of rather vigorous chats with Martine, in an attempt to halt the indiscriminate issuance of spectacular announcements, had taken him to New York and at Hahn's Park Row Restaurant dined and conferred with Tumulty and a few other Hudson County Democrats. It was no easy matter to keep Martine quiet, and the Smith forces, knowing all his human frailties, had encouraged pilgrimages of newspaper writers to the Martine home. Martine, a New-Yorker by birth, had inherited a farm that eventually was swallowed up by Plainfield—thriving

city of New York commuters—and had been able to live in comfort, devoting much time to politics and delighting in the sobriquet of Farmer Orator. He was full of affection for family and friends. None in need was ever turned away by Jim Martine. Talking, on any subject and at any hour, was his weakness. Interviews published with him, even in friendly newspapers, were a bit disconcerting. At the urging of St. John, I had gone to Plainfield to help induce silence, and on more than one occasion St. John had brought Martine to my home in Trenton and to the little State-house office used by St. John where so much history was made. The office, about the size of a roomy closet, was part of the suite of Vivian M. Lewis, then banking commissioner and Republican candidate for governor against Wilson. Lewis, before entering the law and politics, had been a newspaper writer and was on terms of comradeship with the correspondents. When all other plans of suppressing Martine had failed, St. John hit upon the idea of taking him over to New York and having Tumulty and some other Hudson Democrats train their guns on him and muzzle him. And so, at Hahn's Restaurant, after each had given voice to the wisdom of concerted action by the progressives, if Wilson was to be won over and held in line, the suggestion was made that Martine should have a manager.

"Jim, you should make Joe Tumulty your manager and let him do your talking for you," I declared.

"That 's damn fine," replied Martine, and majes-

tically sweeping around to Tumulty he said, in a voice that could be heard across the East River, "Joe, will you be my manager?"

Tumulty agreed, and Martine interviews thenceforth were compiled by St. John, Devlin, and myself. That was no particular reflection on Martine. Smith had a corps of clever writers who prepared lively statements to be put forth in his name. Devlin and St. John were peculiarly fitted for that type of controversy. In the recent November election, through their joint efforts in managing the Congressional campaign of Professor William Libbey, a Wilson colleague in the Princeton faculty, they had come within a few hundred votes of wresting the strongly protectionist Trenton district from the Republicans. Professor Libbey, a Democrat, was willing to lead the apparently forlorn hope of making the race for Congress, and on the advice of friends he enlisted Devlin to write his speeches and St. John to promote the publicity end. Together they stirred the district with smashing assaults on the tariff. Devlin, ardent Democrat, had refused to go on the stump for Wilson, despite urgent appeals from the front. He had been a bitter opponent of the Wilson nomination, and while he felt that Wilson was swinging around to the liberal cause, he was not a band-wagon climber and was content to await results. He was, however, ready to volunteer to write the Libbey speeches, and his intimate study of tariff conditions, as well as his knowledge of the existing political

psychology, coupled with the publicity secured by St. John, almost landed the university professor in the House of Representatives. While Devlin did not make speeches for Wilson, he did furnish the candidate with much useful platform material, and it was Wilson's desire that Devlin should have accompanied me to the October conference at which the answer to Record was discussed. Devlin, however, declined to go, and on October 29 Wilson sent a letter, in his own hand, expressing regret, and adding: "Better luck next time! I am anxious to know you and hope that I shall have many opportunities of consulting with you." In those days Wilson penned many of his letters. Devlin had worked at the bench as a potter and had been a most intelligent and successful labor-leader, studying law at night.

After the gathering at Hahn's Restaurant hot shot was poured forth by the Martine and Smith strategists and the newspaper protagonists, until the State was fairly aflame. Fearful of possible ill effects on the Wilson political fortunes, powerful friends urged the governor-elect to keep his hands off. Wilson visited Tumulty in the latter's law-office at Jersey City and frankly admitted that friends had advised him to let the matter drift, that Martine was incompetent, and that the State would resent Wilson's interference. Tumulty, full of vim, declared that the State was yearning for leadership, that the decent people were in favor of Martine, and that unless Wilson did lead, some one else would assume the

leadership, very much to the injury of Wilson prestige. That conference was frequently recalled in the after years and played a big part in world affairs when Wilson found himself inclined to hesitate. It was a never-failing illustration with Tumulty.

But Wilson did not yield at once to the pressure for Martine. There was a row on in New York, where the Tammany leaders were attempting to force the selection of William F. Sheehan for senator. The revolt was quite as energetic as in New Jersey. National Democratic leaders began to manifest a lively interest. Cleveland's old law partner, Francis Lynde Stetson, on December 4, 1910, took up with Wilson the critical condition confronting the party and pointed out that whatever choices were made would be taken as decisive of the Democracy's disposition toward the public and public questions. Unless the public was satisfied on this point the result would be immediately to repel the independents, who had helped produce the recent victories, but who were not yet identified with the Democratic party. The condition, Stetson pointed out, was not unlike that of 1892 when Boss Croker of Tammany insisted upon the election of Edward Murphy to the Senate, despite the dissent of Cleveland, who earnestly desired the election of his friend Judge Rufus W. Peckham. It was imperative, in the judgment of Stetson and associated party councilors, that Wilson and other leaders of Democracy, then recently chosen, should express themselves decisively

and place the party upon the highest possible ground. Wilson finally visited both Davis, who controlled the big Hudson legislative delegation and who was on his deathbed at his home in Jersey City, and Smith at his home in Newark, to urge that they desist from attempting to force the election of Smith. Davis said that he had already made a compact to deliver the votes of Hudson County to Smith, and Smith very blandly refused to get out. Smith took the position that his health was now better than it had been in the early summer, at which time he was flatly stating that he would not be a candidate. He likewise insisted that he wanted vindication, inasmuch as he had left the Senate under a cloud due to the sugar trust investigations and the public branding that Cleveland had given himself, Brice, and Gorman. All of Wilson's persuasive eloquence had no effect. Smith was confident that with the support of Davis he could control the Democratic legislative caucus. Wilson returned to Princeton, and on the evening of December 9, 1910, in accordance with notice he had served on Smith, he issued a formal statement in which he said:

I know that the people of New Jersey do not desire Mr. James Smith, Jr., to be sent again to the Senate. If he should be, he will not go as their representative. The only means I have of knowing whom they desire to represent them is the vote at the recent primaries, where 48,000 Democratic voters, a majority of the whole number who voted at the primaries, declared their preference

for Mr. Martine, of Union County. For me that vote is conclusive. I think it should be for every member of the Legislature.

Absolute good faith in dealing with the people, an unhesitating fidelity to every principle avowed, is the highest law of political morality under a constitutional government. The Democratic party has been given a majority in the Legislature; the Democratic voters of the state have expressed their preference under a law advocated and supported by the opinion of their party, declared alike in platforms and in enacted law. It is clearly the duty of every Democratic legislator who would keep faith with the law of the state with the avowed principles of his party to vote for Mr. Martine. It is my duty to advocate his election—to urge it by every honourable means at my command.

The battle that ensued was full of bitterness. As usual, where political opportunity offers, an attempt was made to inject religious prejudice. Many of the legislators who had been unexpectedly elected were members of the Roman Catholic Church. So was Smith. It was not difficult to spread the idea that Wilson, son of a Presbyterian minister, was prejudiced. The situation was fraught with many dangers. Devlin, whose judgment came to be greatly respected by Wilson, suggested that at a big mass-meeting to be held in St. Patrick's Hall, Jersey City, January 5, 1911, Wilson should make a point of singling out several prominent Democrats, who were also Irish Catholics, for a word of praise. Devlin picked as the fairest targets Tumulty, John J.

Tracy, and Mark Sullivan, three able young men who had served in the Legislature, and Wilson in his speech, after mentioning the trio by name, said:

> The whole State knows that this is a roll of honor, and the whole State is heartened by this further circumstance that here is a group of men who illustrate in their lives and conduct not only public morality but the teachings of the great church of which they are members. Men sometimes forget that religious principle is the one solid and remaining foundation. Find a man whose conscience is buttressed by that intimate principle and you will find a man into whose hands you can safely trust your affairs.

The shot told, and Wilson was full of gratitude to Devlin for having guided him. "My own heart went into the passage so that it was mine in feeling and yours in form," Wilson wrote to Devlin. The St. Patrick's Hall speech was to be the big event of the fight, and Mrs. Wilson, who was anxious about the outcome, wanted very badly to go to Jersey City and hear it. Wilson, however, was exceedingly nervous and insisted that the presence of Mrs. Wilson would add to his nervousness. He rather firmly insisted that she must not attend the meeting. But Mrs. Wilson was too much concerned to heed, and she followed on the next train to Jersey City, appearing at the Stevens home in Castle Point with a little hand-bag for the night. Mrs. Caroline Stevens Alexander, later Mrs. H. Otto Wittpenn, concealed Mrs. Wilson in one of the corners of St. Patrick's Hall where it was not possible for her husband to see

her, and she heard the speech. Wilson's university intimates, who had been long familiar with his platform style and who heard the St. Patrick's Hall speech, afterward declared that the Wilson speaking methods had completely shifted that night, and they were amazed at the rough-and-tumble political skill displayed.

In the St. Patrick's Hall speech Wilson made the somewhat reckless assertion that Smith was planning to have himself elected by Republican votes if necessary, and that in furtherance of the scheme Smith had been in conference in Philadelphia with the two foremost South Jersey Republican bosses, David Baird of Camden and Louis Kuehnle of Atlantic City. This statement was promptly challenged by all the persons named, and upon investigation it was found to be without basis. But Wilson never retracted. There was more of the same kind of extravagant assertion. In that campaign, truth, which of old was said to hide in a well, was more often to be found in a twilight zone between the opposing propagandas. Bitter sarcasm was used freely, and each side was in a state of feverish anxiety until the election finally took place. On the eve of the election Smith's forces brought a train-load of camp-followers to Trenton; and, headed by a band, they paraded through the streets, passing in review before the majestic Smith himself, who stood on the steps of the Trenton House. This stage-play sent shivers down the backs of some of the Wilson forces, and

Harry E. Alexander, editor of the "Trenton True American," prepared a statement, to be issued by Wilson, warning the people of the State that the members of the Legislature were about to be coerced by the strong-arm methods of Smith's forces. Wilson cut out some of the high-sounding phrases and was about to issue the statement for publication when saner heads convinced him that such action would be a mere confession of the panic existing in his own camp. When the ballot was taken the next day, January 24, Smith got but fourteen votes; most of the Irish Americans in the Legislature did not vote for him.

Tumulty, Devlin, Record, and St. John doubtless had more to do individually with getting Wilson to insist upon the election of Martine than had any others in the picture. At a later time, in the White House, Wilson declared that he had probably permitted Devlin more than any other person to influence him. Wilson mostly tried to convince himself that no one really influenced him very much. Devlin was born in Scotland, and this created something of a bond with Wilson, who was fond of his own Scotch blood, which, like Devlin's was diluted with Irish. Wilson delighted to exchange yarns about Scotland with Devlin. He loved nothing better than to bicycle alone through England and Scotland on his vacations. One of his best tales had to do with an amusing experience he had had in Scotland, illustrating the deep reverence felt for Sunday in that country.

While bicycling in the south he arrived one Saturday evening at the town of Hawick, famous for its tweed cloth, to find that the bag containing his clothes had not arrived. In Hawick, as in most of Scotland, men go to church in plug-hats and frock-coats. Wilson appeared for service in his rough bicycle knickers, and an indignant pass-keeper—as the church ushers are there known—halted him at the door and asked what he wanted. The distinguished president of America's foremost Presbyterian university explained that he would like to attend divine service. After eying him closely and hesitating a bit, the pass-keeper finally led Wilson to a dark spot in the nave of the Church and told him to stand there where no one could see him until services were over.

Record, who regarded Wilson as a hopeless reactionary, was very much amazed when Wilson answered his public letter during the campaign. Soon after the election Joseph A. Dear and his brother, Walter, publishers of the "Jersey Journal," alumni of Princeton and friends of Wilson, had urged the new governor to take Record into camp. For years Record had been hammering at corporate domination in the State and through his intelligent agitation had forced many election reforms. As early as 1901 he had got a Republican governor to put forward a law bringing the primaries, which had previously been the football of the railroad, banking, and other corporations, under the control of the election law. Record had served on a commission to

draft the bill, along with two other conspicuous Republicans, Edward C. Stokes, who became governor and state chairman, and Joseph Munn, an expert on election machinery. While Record could not get the commission or the governor to take a stand for wiping out the old convention system, he did manage to slip into the new law a provision permitting any candidate for delegate to a convention to have printed on the official ballot, opposite his name, the name of the candidate he would favor in the convention. Record and his progressive Republican associates made use of the provision and forced the nomination of rich and able radicals like Edward B. Osborne and Everett Colby in Essex County. That law was really the beginning of the break-up of the absolute domination of the Republican party by the corporations. Other modifications of the primary law followed, including one providing for the expression of a preference for United States senator. The Martine experiment was the first one tried under the law.

Cutting loose from the bosses who nominated him was the beginning of the real contest that landed Wilson in the White House. From that time forward he was the most successful amateur politician of his generation. It may be that he will take rank as the foremost amateur politician of all time. The fight on Smith increased Wilson's confidence in the power of his own eloquence. At Princeton he had been speaking with the cold detachment of one engaged in an academic analysis of human motive, not

with the sharp conviction of the politician faced by an actual condition. He found it necessary to get down to earth, to take off the gloves and speak roughly. Politics in the abstract may be polite, but never in the actual working. Henceforth he was a fighting candidate, and he took on all comers. Newspapers of all shades vied with each other in spreading his fame.

CHAPTER VII

THE POLITICAL REFORMATION

WHILE the knock-out blow that Wilson dealt Smith attracted nation-wide attention because of its unexpected decisiveness, Wilson's preaching of a new philosophy served to make him a great national figure overnight. Between the time of his election in November and his inauguration in January, he found himself discarding most of the pretty political theories he had been teaching to his students. Within three months he had completely shifted from the conservative that Harvey and Smith had so gleefully nominated and was fitting into his program much of the radical political doctrine of the day. In less than a year he was publicly apologizing for having been wrong in his university attitude against the initiative, referendum, and recall. The political doctrines he had been uncomprisingly condemning in his writings and in the class-room were put aside. As in the Martine case, the four Jersey men who had figured most conspicuously in reversing his policy with reference to direct legislation and other advanced ideas were Tumulty, Record, Devlin, and St. John. They had come up out of the rough and knew human nature.

Wilson had never attended a public school; he had lived the cloistered life of properous colleges and universities and was in theory a great liberal—he preferred that term to progressive. "The men on the make are the men to whom to go for your judgment of what life is and what its problems are," had become part of the new Wilson philosophy.

Like Wilson, so also Tumulty, Record, Devlin, and St. John were natural political rebels. But unlike him they had for years been studying the workings of progressive legislation under William S. U'Ren of Oregon, and they were chock-full of that sort of information. Senator Jonathan Bourne, Jr., also of Oregon, shortly afterward came on the scene, as did many of the other Republican radicals of the time. The views of Wilson toward Bryan and La Follette began to soften very fast. Instead of regarding them as a danger to democracy, Wilson now sounded their praises. Out of it all he evolved a certain uncharted political reformation of his own design. It was in strange contrast with the position he had taken in his previous writings, notably in an article in the "North American Review" of May, 1910, on "Hide-and-Seek Politics." His old political friends could not understand the conflict with his lifetime of earlier political principles. If he would simplify the governmental machinery, why add to it the complexities of direct primaries and election? It was one of his amiable failings, or foibles, to discover some ambiguity which permitted an escape. And, as some philosopher has

said, a knowledge of history is "very convenient to the politician—a plausible parallel makes him feel surer of his ground." Wilson now took the position that the methods of peaceful representative government were in private hands. He would therefore introduce, instead of the amateur political revolt which Samuel J. Tilden had used, methods of organized popular revolt such as the initiative and referendum, and, possibly, the recall, with the intent to storm the fortresses wherein private privilege was intrenched. This accomplished, the militant régime might be succeeded by a truly representative government, under which the popular army might be disbanded and a regular and intelligent police force instituted under a few heads authorized by the voters. It was this kind of argument that shifting friends employed as broadly revealing no real inconsistency in the Wilson policy during a state of political war, changed though it were from the policy under conditions of political peace. Record, Devlin, and St. John were perfectly willing to leave the fine-line distinctions to professors and theorists. They were interested in results. They convinced Wilson that the thing for him to do was to negotiate directly with the people, and that instead of allowing the politicians to use him, he should use the politicians. The waves of intense public indignation and disgust at the government, as stirred up by Roosevelt, Bryan, and La Follette, fitted admirably into the situation. Wilson was in a frame of mind to take on the quarrel. The enmity

of powerful Princeton alumni, who had been in the habit of meeting university deficits, had been incurred by his savage fight over the Graduate College. That encounter and the Smith battle proved the preliminaries to his great combat for a new Utopia.

During the senatorial fight, Wilson had, at the suggestion of the Dears, Jersey City newspaper proprietors, invited Record to Princeton, and an interview of several hours ensued. At this meeting Record suggested that inasmuch as Wilson must, if he hoped to gain national attention, cut adrift from the party machine that had nominated him, it would be well to get around him a kitchen cabinet of men whom he could trust. They could settle upon policies and then assign the actual drafting of bills to those who seemed most competent for each task. Wilson agreed to this, except that he thought it was necessary to take into the group the recognized party spokesmen in the Legislature. The party legislative caucus had already been held and the leaders agreed upon, and Record pointed out that to ask some among them would be equivalent to asking James Smith himself to the conference. Wilson, however, felt that it would be unwise to ignore them, and they were included in the list. The conference, it was agreed, should frame the legislative program, and Wilson sent letters of invitation calling the meeting for the Hotel Martinique in New York the day before his inauguration as governor. The editors of the four chief independent newspapers of the State were invited; and the others

asked, in addition to Wilson and Record, included Democratic leaders known to have progressive tendencies, and the legislative floor leaders. In the letter fixing the Martinique meeting for January 16 Wilson, writing from Princeton on January 11, had said, "I think it would be to the common advantage to have a little conference of a few gentlemen particularly interested in formulating bills for consideration of the Legislature before my actual entrance upon my office as Governor." When the gathering assembled, Record promptly produced a very comprehensive memorandum outlining the program which he had discussed at length with Wilson at Princeton. Save for the initiative, referendum, and recall, it embodied what had come to be known as U'Ren's Oregon plan of direct legislation, which plan Wilson was to indorse unqualifiedly in his inaugural message.

U'Ren, who was the organizer of the People's Power League, and who had managed to get the primary and election laws and the initiative and referendum into the Oregon statutes, had visited Wilson at Princeton a few weeks earlier and spent considerable time explaining the character of the laws and the experience which Oregon had had in their actual operation. Born in Wisconsin, U'Ren had been a fruit-grower and lawyer in the West, and was an ardent single-taxer. All his activities were directed toward establishing the single tax in Oregon. His plan was to get the Legislature to adopt the initiative and referendum and then have the single-tax law enacted by

direct vote of the people. The direct primary was merely a part of a general plan of popular government. He controlled a sufficient number of votes to become a decisive factor in the contest for the United States Senate. A practical man, like Roosevelt, he traded his votes in the election of a senator for the support of the initiative and referendum law. Then he began his single-tax, direct-vote fight by filing an initiative petition signed by the requisite number of names as required by the new law. To his great surprise, he learned that the people are not radical and are not disposed to accept new ideas, and that it is an enormous job to reach them and educate them. His single-tax law has been submitted to the people several times, and it never has received anything like a majority.

When Wilson was elected governor, U'Ren was in the midst of his activities, and happened to be in New York. A few days later, encouraged by the switch that Wilson had made in the closing days of the campaign, U'Ren visited Princeton, and Wilson later told us that U'Ren had made a great impression on his mind with the argument for the direct primary and the initiative and referendum. Like Bourne, U'Ren helped greatly in stiffening the revolutionary spirit that the New Jersey radicals had been instilling. Bourne was of Wilson's own age, a Massachusetts Yankee, Harvard '77, who had quit college to go to sea—an ambition that Wilson once entertained in the days of youthful romancing. Bourne had been ship-

wrecked off Formosa and was picked up and taken to Portland, Oregon, where, in a few years, he was admitted to the bar and grew rich. He engaged in farming and mining, and in commercial enterprises, including the Bourne Cotton Mills of Fall River, in his native Massachusetts. Like the business leaders of his time, he went actively into Republican politics and became national committeeman from Oregon, as well as a delegate to numerous national conventions of his party. He occasionally played golf with Roosevelt, and under the tutelage of U'Ren he had temporarily turned radical, eventually becoming president of the Republican National Progressive League. U'Ren and Bourne appealed to Wilson; they talked his language; but later Bourne went back to the regulars.

At the Martinique Hotel conference in New York, Record took command and presented the essentials of a primary and election law, and of a corrupt practices act, as well as recommendations for a public utility bill, fashioned on the Governor Hughes bill of New York, and an employers' liability bill, to be based on the report of a recent New York commission. There was some protest that we were proceeding too fast and that the people of a conservative State like New Jersey were hardly ripe for all the Oregon theories. Wilson, however, sided with Record, and the conference headed for everything that Oregon offered. To Record was allotted the task of framing the primary bill as well as the blanket ballot and corrupt practices

bill. The shaping up of the other bills was subdivided, and the meeting adjourned with the understanding that it was to be called together again when the bills were ready for discussion.

Telling attacks in Smith's "Newark Star" caused some change in the program. That meeting provided the Smith forces with their most damaging ammunition. Smith's newspapers lampooned the gathering, emphasizing the point that Wilson had taken a group composed largely of unofficial citizens to New York to frame a program and dictate terms for a Legislature that had been chosen by the people. Wilson, who was still innocent in the ways of politics, had an idea that the conference would be treated as a confidential gathering. It was an all-day session, and as we were riding down town in the subway that evening, on the way to our Jersey homes, I told Wilson that it would likely provide new fuel for the Smith forces, who were battering away at "Wilson the ingrate" and who had not then given up all hope of capturing the senatorship.

"Of course every one will respect the fact that it was purely a private and confidential gathering," was the astonishing reply of the man who was to become governor of the State on the morrow. It seemed almost brutal to have to tell him that the Smith camp had doubtless been getting hourly bulletins from the meeting. Smith in his newspapers, for upward of a week, daily published very clever cartoons showing Wilson as a sharp-visaged schoolmaster surrounded by

a group of flatterers labeled the "editorial chorus." In screamer head-lines the conference was rapped as a secret and reprehensible thing, and Smith directed savage onslaughts at Wilson for having apparently surrendered the leadership to Record, who had been so disturbing an influence to Smith's old friends in both parties. These attacks had their effect on Wilson. Record was side-tracked for the time being. In a letter Wilson sought to soften the blow by saying to Record, "We are working for the same end though along somewhat different lines which policy dictates and principle does not condemn." Record had been accustomed to taking political punishment, and he never flinched. On the contrary he effaced himself, and Wilson expressed gratitude to Record "for exercising the good taste you have exercised, in view of the unreasonable, but nevertheless, very mischievous representations recently made by the Star."

But while Record felt a delicacy in thrusting his services forward he did not quit the fight. Upon ascertaining that after the Smith attacks and the general disorder and hubbub incidental to the senatorial scrap, nothing was being done about framing the bills, Record proceeded to draw up a primary and election act, a corrupt practices act, and an employers' liability act. These bills he left at the governor's office, asking the executive clerk to give them to Wilson. They were introduced into the Legislature exactly as Record had drawn them, except in the case of the employers' liability bill. A special commis-

sion, named by the preceding Republican governor, had been investigating existing employers' liability legislation and had prepared a report and framed a bill. Walter E. Edge, who later became governor and United States senator, had served as a member of the Employers' Liability Commission and was then the Republican state senator from Atlantic County. He gave Wilson intelligent coöperation in his legislative progam, as did likewise Joseph S. Frelinghuysen, then state senator from Somerset County and later United States senator. When Edge and Frelinghuysen, in the after-years, failed to support the Wilson peace plan, they fell into the enemy class.

Soon after his inauguration as governor, Wilson invited Edge into conference on employers' liability, and it was Edge who handled the subject in the Legislature, although the credit went largely to Wilson. Edge displayed a deep interest in the problem, and when, at the conclusion of the session, disgruntled manufacturers threatened to take advantage of the first accident and have the law declared unconstitutional, Edge suggested to Wilson that "a man like Mr. Louis Brandeis or some other equally well known attorney on these matters should be retained by the state in order that the fullest and ablest defense possible could be made." That ended the threats.

The public utility bill which had the Wilson indorsement was substantially a copy of the Hughes New York bill. The election bill, drawn by Record, became the keystone of the Wilson arch. It was a

voluminous document, Record feeling that it was advisable to take the cumbersome election laws, which had grown up through a long series of years, and fit into them the new devices so as to preserve, as far as possible, the existing election machinery. The bill was duly presented to the Legislature, and when it came up for discussion the practical politicians got in their work. Many amendments were offered. Several were proper enough, while others would have defeated the main purpose of the bill. Wilson, who knew little about election machinery, readily accepted some of the dangerous amendments. They were becoming so numerous that eventually Record went to Wilson and protested vigorously against a score of amendments that had been accepted, and Wilson had them stricken out. The insertion of proper amendments proved to be a difficult job, owing to the fact that a change in a paragraph would require changes in numerous other paragraphs. Unless one was familiar with the whole structure of the act, it was not easy to make the changes. In the mutilation of the bill there had been changes in many of its important features, particularly with reference to the choice of election officers. Record personally protested to Wilson and convinced him that the taking of the election officers away from the machine was the most vital part of the bill. The bill after being buffetted about for several weeks was finally put into the charge of two of Wilson's Democratic friends to be remodeled in an attempt to serve various political needs. Wil-

son found himself in difficult waters in his efforts to satisfy the conflicting elements in his own party.

At a conference he held with the Democratic leaders, one of the machine men remarked cynically, "The author of this bill would wreck the organization that nominated him." Without hesitation, Wilson, who assumed authorship, replied: "It is true that the organization nominated me, but fortunately it was the people who elected me. Does the gentleman charge that this bill attacks the interests of the people?" This conference, which had been called as a caucus of the Democratic members of the Legislature, was held in the Supreme Court Room at the State-house. The Smith forces in the Legislature were battering the election reforms rather successfully, and Wilson had boldly announced that he, as the Democratic leader of the party in the State, would go to the caucus. At first there was violent criticism, and much was made of the theory that the legislative and executive branches of government were entirely distinct. At the gathering itself Smith men challenged the right of the governor to be present and intimated that such a course might make him the proper subject for impeachment proceedings. Wilson stood his ground and in his best fighting spirit declared:

> You can turn aside from the measure if you choose; you can decline to follow me; you can deprive me of office and turn away from me, but you cannot deprive me of power so long as I steadfastly stand for what I believe to be the interests and legitimate demands of the people

themselves. I beg you to remember, in this which promises to be an historic conference, you are settling the question of the power or impotence, the distinction or the ignominy of the party to which the people with singular generosity have offered the conduct of their affairs.

When the election bill came up for final passage after weeks of tinkering, it was full of verbal inaccuracies and imperfections and was an absolutely unworkable document. Opponents of the bill, in the final debate, pointed out upward of a hundred palpable errors and mistakes. They were mostly technicalities and could have been avoided if Record had been allowed to rewrite the bill when all the amendments had been agreed upon. The politicians were seeking to defeat the measure by emphasizing the wholesale flaws. Most of the Smith Democrats in the Legislature had been lined up against the bill, and when the vote was forced the opposition to Wilson seemed confident that they had it killed. Record learned that the Essex Democrats were to bolt, and he quietly prevailed upon Assemblymen Jackson and Layden of Passaic County, Republicans, to support the measure, and they, in turn, got a third Republican to vote for the bill. With these votes the measure, in its imperfect shape, was put through the House on final passage by a total of thirty-two votes, one more than the necessary majority. It was a narrow squeeze. By common consent the Wilson program depended upon the passage of the primary bill. Had not

Record been able to get the Republican votes the measure would have been defeated.

When it reached the Senate the bill fell into the hands of a committee composed of Joseph S. Frelinghuysen, James F. Fielder, later governor and vice-chancellor, and William J. Bradley. In due time this committee gave a hearing, at which the opponents of the measure made some very telling arguments against it. Record, who was in the background, felt obliged to go to the defense of the bill. At the conclusion of a brilliant argument he pointed out that the substance of the measure had really been the great issue upon which Wilson had won. Inasmuch as the people had already passed upon the question, if the Republicans now killed the bill they would be merely providing material for Wilson for the next election, and Record declared that the progressive Republicans could be depended upon to join in helping to elect a Wilson Legislature on such an issue. Frelinghuysen and Bradley, the Republicans on the committee, saw the political force of this. Then, too, they were weary of the newspaper hammering and were glad of an excuse to go to work in good faith upon the bill. After Record's argument before the senate committee, Wilson sent for him and thanked him for the help that he had given. From that time the whole attitude toward Record changed. Next day Fielder, the Democratic member of the committee, told Record that he had been authorized by the Republicans to join in a conference for the purpose of

making the bill over into the very best election law that could be written. For several days and nights Record worked with this committee, whipping the bill into shape. Record suggested to Wilson that he personally enlist former Governor Stokes, active in the leadership of the Republican party. Stokes became helpful at the time, and he sent frequent messages of encouragement to Wilson in his later fights.

Meantime, while the primary bill was being perfected, Senator John D. Prince, later minister to Denmark and to Serbia, sat around the committee-room waiting for Record to get to work on the corrupt practices act. Prince, eager for the distinction of having a corrupt practices act bear his name, had already introduced a bill which was a copy of the English statute. Record had framed his corrupt practices bill on the Oregon statute. After he and his committee had finished their work on the primary bill, Record sat up all night with an assistant from the attorney-general's office and, with paste-pot and shears, hastily put together a new corrupt practices act, containing all the drastic provisions of both the English and the Oregon statutes. Next day Prince reported it out of committee as the amended Prince bill, and it went through both houses of the Legislature with no substantial changes.

With the election bills out of the way, Wilson asked Record to sit in with Senator Harry V. Osborne of Essex and Frank H. Sommer, who had long been a political associate of Record and had already framed a

public utility act. Like Record, Sommer gave much time to the Wilson program, and like Record he was regarded by most old-line politicians as a bit eccentric, because he was a lawyer who took a livelier interest in ideas and ideals than he did in fees. Record found that Sommer and Osborne had done a good job on the proposed utility law, and he was unable to contribute anything to their work. This bill and the workmen's compensation measure went through, backed by the Wilson punch. Many of the Republican leaders in the Legislature, notably in the Senate, gave Wilson splendid coöperation. Two other measures of first importance were put through the Legislature in the closing days. One had to do with a complete reorganization of the complicated school system, aiming to eliminate political manipulation. Another provided the commission form of government for cities. Wilson's aid for the latter bill was only obtained after it had been urged upon him that the commission idea had taken firm root in the West and that his advocacy of it would help greatly in his campaign for the Presidency.[1] When convinced of the political wisdom of throwing his support to the plan, he tacked upon the school bill message that he had prepared for the Legislature three paragraphs calling for the enactment of the commission government bill. Once won over, he took hold with great vigor. He flatly

[1] A detailed account of how commission government, now so firmly established in the leading cities of New Jersey, was actually brought about is to be found in an article prepared by Arno Dosch for the "World's Work" of July, 1914.

Photo Fritz Studio, Trenton, N. J.

MARTIN P. DEVLIN

Trenton lawyer who helped make Wilson a progressive.

declared himself in favor of the initiative, referendum, and recall as having proved efficient and necessary and added that the changes proposed in municipal government had been tested by abundant experience.

"I am sure that it would afford all thoughtful persons," he said, "cause for serious disappointment if the Legislature should not avail itself of this opportunity to show itself allied in this matter, as in all matters, with the impulses of progress now so handsomely manifest in our bodies politic." Backed by the Wilson steam-roller, both the educational and commission government bills went through the Legislature. At that hour he seemed to have acquired so much momentum that it was unsafe and politically unwise seriously to oppose anything he advocated. He was treated generously by the newspapers, and he was in fine fighting trim. At the close of the session he publicly acknowledged the fine coöperation that had been given him by the Republicans in the State Senate. It was only an artificial process after all, he said, that divides Democrats from Republicans. The essential in politics to-day, he added, is the difference between liberals and reactionaries. Expressing his complete gratification at the work, he declared that the Legislature had proceeded with singular absence of party feeling and party contest. "It has had about it," he said, "the freedom which characterizes men who are acting in the public interest and without regard for private connections or personal interest."

In those short few months Wilson had unlearned most of the things about politics that he had been learning and teaching in the class-room. And he had not yet assumed the attitude of bitter partizanship that brought subsequent disaster.

CHAPTER VIII

APPOINTMENTS AND SIDE-LIGHTS

IT was during the three months of that first legislative session that Wilson gave his chief working service to the State. In his subsequent two years as governor, he was largely occupied with his campaign for the Presidency and was mostly on the wing. In the matter of state appointments he had little interest. Wilson was concerned in placing one or two of his friends of the Princeton faculty who had stood by him in his fight there; otherwise it mattered little with him. The choice berth of state commissioner of banking and insurance, which had been created in the earlier days for George Harvey, Wilson gave to Professor Henry Jones Ford, who had never taken a hand in New Jersey politics and was entirely unknown to the state leaders. His confirmation by the Senate was delayed until there had been an inquiry into his fitness. Professor Winthrop More Daniels, another intimate in the faculty, was placed on the State Board of Utility Commissioners.

There was no sense of obligation by Wilson to those who had rendered political service to him or the cause. In view of the fact that Record had given three months to framing and carrying the Wilson legislative program, it was suggested that he should get

some public recognition. The most desirable place, and the one where Record's talents might best be employed, was the utility commission. But Wilson had determined to give that berth to his friend Daniels, and the only other appropriate post open for Record was membership in the State Board of Assessors, with supervision over railroad and corporation property. Wilson, however, was still fearful of possible adverse newspaper criticism, and he sent for James G. Blauvelt, an ardent progressive Republican who had been giving much help, and offered him the place. Blauvelt not only declined it but rather vigorously expressed his opinion of Wilson's conduct in taking advantage of Record's experience and help and then being ashamed to reward him for it. Wilson afterward said that nobody in his lifetime had ever talked to him quite so bluntly as Blauvelt did. The upshot of it was that Wilson named Record.

There were plenty of amusing incidents during that first term. After the election of Martine was out of the way and the program was moving along, Tumulty appeared at my house one evening and laughingly remarked, "Here is the most remarkable assignment you have ever had." From a leather bag he produced a bundle of typewritten sheets and informed me they contained a list of all the state appointments that the governor had to make, adding, "He wants us to go over it and suggest names." Every kind of job, from justice of the Supreme Court to the most picayune non-salaried state commissioner,

was included. Wilson was thoroughly disgusted with the recommendations that were pouring in upon him and the weird character of some of the applicants. He had never encountered the practical, every-day political aspirant. To him, the idea of a candidate's sending in a personal request for appointment, accompanied, in some instances, by a photograph, was repulsive. With name and place deleted, the following is a copy of a bona-fide letter, accompanied by photograph in band uniform, that Wilson received from a candidate who occupied the dual office of city clerk and superintendent of waterworks in one of the smaller cities of the State:

To the Honorable Woodrow Wilson,
Governor Elecl-
State of New Jersey,

Honored Sir,

I am not an office-seeker.

If however in the course of the exigencies arising in the selection of persons to fill offices you should need a man to fill some position where righteousness is considered superior to party interests, when sobriety and good morals are above the pecunities of commercialism; and the transaction of public business in the interests of the people as superceding any party obligations or reward, then I should be glad to receive any appointment where the salary is above what I am now receiving viz. $1,000 per year.

For character, standing and reputation I beg leave to refer you to any of the machine workers and henchmen of both the political parties whose nefarious methods I have always most strenuously opposed.

Have lived in . . . since 1882.

Age 55.

A member of the Board of Education.

SectY. of the Board of Health.

If you should seriously consider this I should be pleased to have a personal interview.

Wishing you every success in the position to which you have been selected, and assuring you of all possible assistance in good works,

I am yours very truly,

———

Democrat.

Tumulty and I made a sincere effort to pick men who would be a credit to Wilson and who furthermore had rendered party service and would not be offensive to the organization. Needless to say, not all the recommendations were followed. As usual in political appointments, the exigencies of the situation rule. Wilson did not know many of the possible aspirants, and he despised the making of appointments. Even after they were named he knew but few of them with any degree of certainty.

"What have we been doing for Blank that he has been in here thanking me so profusely?" he asked one day, and was much amused to find that Blank was occupying a snug berth in the State-house under Wilson's appointment. He was particularly anxious that no lawyers desiring to retain affiliation with corporations should be named as prosecuting attorneys. Lawyers, as a class, did not rank very high with him.

It had long been the practice in New Jersey to favor corporation attorneys with the best judicial and other legal plums. Wilson earnestly desired to end this kind of thing. When a very distinguished Democrat, for whom Wilson had a high regard, was put forth for prosecutor of the pleas in one of the larger counties, Wilson after expressing tacit approval of the recommendation told the candidate's sponsor, "It would be absolutely necessary, if he were appointed to that office, that he should give up retainers from, for example, the Public Service Corporation, and disconnect himself with definite engagements of that sort altogether." It was useless for the candidate's friend to draw the attention of Wilson to the case of distinguished jurists who when they had been prosecutors had defended negligence suits for railway and other corporations. That was the very thing that Wilson sought to break up, and inasmuch as the candidate declined to give up his corporation retainers, Wilson refused to appoint him. This candidate had exerted considerable influence in helping nominate Wilson for governor. It was the Wilson idea that the people could only have good government when the better part of mankind regarded public service as an end in itself with its own peculiar rewards and privileges.

When it suited the business in hand, however, Wilson sometimes played practical politics in the most approved fashion. He reappointed, as a matter of

course, to the honorary position of trustee of the Trenton School of Industrial Arts, Herman Mueller, a manufacturer of ceramics, who was born in Germany. Shortly thereafter Wilson invited Mueller to the State-house and in the course of conversation inquired whether Mueller could suggest some outstanding leader to interest the German-Americans of the country in Wilson's Presidential campaign. Mueller replied that most politicians who professed to lead particular racial groups really carried very little sail and that in his estimation it would be a waste of time to bother with that sort of thing.

Wilson, prompted by Tumulty, was determined to inject some new blood into the higher state courts. This led to the decision on his part to retire Supreme Court Justice Alfred Reed, who was seventy-two years of age and had served continuously on the bench since 1875. The state courts had a well organized fraternity of their own, and great pressure was brought to bear to have Reed continued. Wilson, however, determined that he should be retired, and he appointed Samuel Kalisch, the first Hebrew to be named in New Jersey to the higher courts. Wilson's predecessor, Governor Fort, had named the first Roman Catholic to the Supreme Court. When it became evident that Reed was not to be reappointed, machinery was promptly set in motion to provide an annual pension at the rate of one third of his previous salary. The handling of the matter was left to Chancellor Mahlon Pitney, who had been a classmate of

Wilson at Princeton. Pitney, who knew all the inner arts and ways of legislatures, framed an amendment which would provide pensions for all judges who might be retired by reason of failure of reappointment and who had reached the age of seventy years. Wilson cheerfully aided in speeding the measure through the Legislature.

Wilson made a personal matter of the selection of the new commissioner of education, for whom a ten-thousand-dollar berth had been created by reorganizing the public school system. For this place he picked a friend, Calvin N. Kendall, who was superintendent of schools at Indianapolis. They had lectured together and had known each other in educational work. There was mild criticism of Wilson for going outside the State with the appointment. While the educator-politicians were endeavoring to convince Wilson that there were many capable school men in the State, Wilson had been quietly canvassing the outside field. Kendall was on a lecture tour in New York State when Wilson hit upon him for the job. Wilson sat down and wrote a telegram in his own firm hand offering the commissionership to Kendall. In the telegram he set forth the salary and the fact that the commissioner had the widest powers for the purpose of creating a new and efficient educational organization in the State. "You could count on my most cordial support, and I wish to urge it upon you with the utmost cordiality," wired Wilson. Kendall sent word back that he would be at the Hampton In-

stitute giving a series of lectures the following week and requested Wilson to write him there and name a day when it would be convenient for Kendall to come to New Jersey for a conference. It was Wilson's habit then, as always in his public life, to write out his messages and some of his letters stenographically. He followed this course in preparing a reply to Kendall. Wilson wrote the Graham system of shorthand but had modified it into a system of his own. He studied it when he was sixteen years old and was in the habit of saying that it had saved him ten years of time with his various other college and university studies. It was his custom to write his stenographic copy with the greatest care, although there were times when he found it difficult to read when it got "cold." Charles Swem, who was with him as his confidential stenographer through the years of the Presidency, never could read the Wilson notes, but Miss Ida Phillips, Executive stenographer at the State-house at Trenton, had little difficulty in making them out. Frequently Wilson would himself transcribe the notes on an old typewriter, and then, after making such corrections as he desired, read the perfected document to his stenographer. He was extremely punctilious about his state papers and took great pains with his diction and style. An amusing incident occurred in 1921, after Wilson had left the White House and his friend Kendall was dead. The New Jersey Democrats, at a conference in Newark, had passed resolutions declaring that Wilson's policies were still the

party policies in the State and expressing their warm friendship for Wilson, then in retirement in his S Street home. Edward I. Edwards, as governor, was designated to despatch the greetings. In his note of acknowledgment, Wilson coldly intimated that if the Democrats were still carrying out the Wilson policies, Kendall would not have been removed as commissioner of education. Wilson had discovered in some way that a new commissioner had been named but was unaware that Kendall had died in office. Edwards replied good-naturedly, setting forth that Kendall had been removed by Providence and not by the Democrats.

An illustration of the manner in which Wilson conserved his strength was furnished by an incident of the closing night of his first legislative session. There was much of the usual hubbub that seems to be the accepted method of winding up the work of law-making bodies. Many of the important bills were still in the senate hopper. Record and Wilson, with a few others, sat in the outer office of the governor's suite chatting and waiting for the final batch. At ten o'clock Wilson declared that it was his habit to go to bed early, that he required at least nine hours sleep; and, calmly walking into his private office, he stretched out on a couch, covered himself with a slumbering robe, and was soon in the land of dreams. The fate of the program that was to help vitalize his Presidential boom did not interfere with his comfortable rest. Record kept vigil and saw that there was no serious

tampering with the measures. An earlier incident shows Wilson's lack of acquaintance with the affairs of his office. The day after his inauguration Wilson arrived long before most of the attachés of the State-house. As he rambled in alone he met James F. Dale, a newspaper man he had known at Princeton, and asked him for a few pointers on his new job. "You know, Dale," he said, "I don't even know how to go about appointing my secretary." And so Dale started him on the routine a good hour before the regular force put in an appearance.

The campaign speeches he delivered, after his decision to cut loose from the New Jersey machine that had nominated him, were doubtless among his best. By his hammer-and-tongs methods he made an enormous hit with every audience. He was in the prime of physical and spiritual condition. The first Mrs. Wilson, too, was a very considerable politician, providing stimulation and inspiration for the battles. Her wise counsel and steadying influence were great factors in Wilson's early political successes. Wilson was always a lonely figure, little inclined to the companionship of men, and he liked the society of the loving and admiring women of his family. He was fond of saying that it was the Irish in his blood that kept him fighting. Once his temper was aroused he was a great fighter. Being human, he fought better when the prospects of winning seemed good. He was rarely a pleasant loser. There is no question that Wilson regarded his study of history and his writings

as a part of his training for public life. Although he had so persistently failed to vote before his nomination, he later preached very frequently on the obligation of the electorate to go to both the primaries and the polls. "When a man belittles politics and politicians," he remarked, "and says politics is a dirty business, or complains because conditions are bad, I say to him, 'Did you vote in the last primaries of your party?' and if he says, 'No,' then I invite him to shut up."

Wilson and Roosevelt despised each other thoroughly, but they confined their honest opinions largely to private conversations. Save where his temper overmastered him, Wilson rarely indulged in personalities on the public platform. He always sought to keep his remarks there on a high plane. Privately, however, he frequently found it difficult to tolerate some of the reformers who supported him in his fights. While governor he saw and talked with more people than at any time during his public career. It was a part of the open-door policy he was then pursuing. Once when a delegation of Jersey women was calling on him, one of the number observed that it must be trying to have constantly to meet so many people. Wilson flashed back, "Particularly when so few people are really worth meeting."

The adverse use that had been made of quotations from his historical writings when he entered politics was a source of much irritation and some mortification to Wilson. He found himself in the position

described by Lord Rosebery, that the only reason a statesman's speeches are ever read is that they are "explored for untimely quotations" against himself. The fact that Wilson's "History of the American People" had not attained much of a place as an authoritative work in the history departments of universities was a cause of no little disappointment. It was, however, rated as one of the best popular histories ever put out in America, and it had a particularly large sale after Wilson's entrance into politics. When he began his speaking tour through New Jersey and his refreshing methods found space on the first pages of the metropolitan newspapers, a corps of canvassers was sent into the field, and after Wilson's appearance in any city, town, or hamlet, the enthusiastic populace was earnestly urged to buy a set of the "History of the American People." The work continued to have a wide sale, a year's subscription to "Harper's Weekly," then the foremost Wilson Presidential boomer, being given away with each set.

After his election as President, he suggested to Harpers that he might have more favorable royalty terms, which suggestion was acquiesced in, the publishers advising Wilson that it was their belief that his "History of the American People" had brought a larger financial return to the author—many times larger—than any similar number of words ever written by any historian anywhere in the world. He was in a hurry when he wrote the history, and it was full of inaccuracies. Several years later, when Wil-

son was in the White House, Clinton T. Brainard, who had succeeded Harvey as the head of Harpers, had the popular history revamped and revised, and the work had a big sale on the Wilson name.

While the agitation for many of the reforms accomplished during Wilson's first legislative year had been long carried on by progressive Republicans, it was under Wilson's leadership in responsible office that they were actually brought about. To him must go much of the glory. Wilson, after his natural liberalism had drifted into radicalism, had a fairly clear field for the enactment of those sweeping reforms which large elements of the public had been demanding for more than a decade. During his years as a university professor and as president at Princeton, he had been suggesting that some constitutional and conservative way might be found to lessen those contacts between great business interests and the government, which had existed, now weaker and now stronger, ever since the days of Mark Hanna. In his university days he had preached a doctrine showing him to be an admirer of the British system which gives the Cabinet the direction of legislation, and during his term as governor he had put into practice his theory that the executive, even under American constitutional forms, not only could but should be the actual director of the policy of the dominant party in legislation as well. At the outset he was inclined to be cautious. His long struggle with antagonistic influences in Princeton, while it had brought him great

publicity, had resulted in defeat—and defeated men are usually cautious.

There was nothing in the career of Wilson that so vastly expanded his reputation as his fight on Smith. It became increasingly spectacular because of the fact that Wilson was giving battle to the very machine which had nominated him. Like his conflict at Princeton, it made him famous and won him outside of his own State hundreds of supporters for every one he lost at home. This fight once settled, it was easy to set him before the public as a sort of tribune of the people who conceived it his duty to interpose his influence wherever other officials showed a tendency to disregard the popular will. The press of the State gave him most enthusiastic support. Everywhere he was acclaimed and he was able to drive through any measure for which his support could be enlisted. The country was filled with reformers, but Wilson had demonstrated that he was a successful reformer and that he had not been cut from any standardized pattern. His victories over the professional politicians of the old school had removed much of the latent fear about the scholar in politics.

Like many great reformers who had never been personally concerned about such sordid things as tax-paying, the cost never cut much figure, and New Jersey became the pathfinder in many fields of reform. Of the beneficial results of the political emancipation there are varying opinions. Even the proponents of the direct primary admit that it is not



Copyright Underwood & Underwood, N. Y.

GEORGE L. RECORD

Political radical who framed the Wilson program in New Jersey

quite as perfect as they had expected. In the fifteen years since Wilson assumed command, every successful candidate for governor and for United States senator with the single exception of Martine had already been in public life under the old dispensation.

Hughes, who was in Congress, and who won the senatorship with the Wilson backing in 1912, would in all probability not have captured such an honor had the old order continued, but Edge, Frelinghuysen, and Edwards would have had quite as much chance as any others. The cost of winning nominations under the direct election system became so extravagant that in 1921 a law was passed limiting the expenditures for each candidate for United States senator and for governor to $50,000 for the primary and $50,000 for the regular election, or a total of $100,000 for each candidate. But even this liberal provision is evaded, and the 1924 senatorial primary ran into figures that were scandalous. In common with other States, after the spending sprees incidental to the war, the cost of government has mounted enormously. The total appropriations for state government in 1910 were $4,576,791, as against appropriations of $19,209,762 for 1925; and there is now a bonded debt of $88,000,000, whereas the State had no bonded debt whatever in 1910. The same relatively great increases in governmental cost have occurred in the cities. Frank Hague, who has had himself elected and twice reëlected mayor of Jersey City, has a completer control over the state Demo-

cratic machinery than Smith or any other old-line boss ever enjoyed. Hague, who is the State's representative in the National Democratic Committee and vice-chairman of that body, has built up a powerful one-man show, absolutely dominating the party organizations of the State, and is able to dictate the nominations. The forms have changed, but the master politicians in both parties still pilot the government.[1]

[1] Clinton W. Gilbert, author of "The Mirrors of Washington," in a recent survey of the Hague methods, declared that they were based on efficiency in dealing with government combined with efficiency in dealing with the human side of life. "If the reform side of him is twice as efficient as reform itself ever was," says Gilbert of Hague, "the Tammany side is twice as efficient as Tammany ever was."

CHAPTER IX

SHOWING HIM TO THE COUNTRY

BEFORE the close of the first legislative session the campaign for the Presidential nomination had been greatly accelerated. Friendly editors of magazines began to give Wilson generous attention. The "Independent" asked him to write an article summarizing his first legislative session, and he suggested that I be commissioned to do it. He was always a bit chary of writing for publication after he got into politics. He preferred to let his messages and public papers speak for him politically. Good friends had gone to work on William Jennings Bryan with the idea of softening the ill feeling that had been engendered by Wilson's earlier onslaughts. Spurred on by the "New York Evening Post," then under the direction of Oswald Garrison Villard, the intellectuals were flocking to Wilson. Next to Harvey, Villard had perhaps given the greatest nation-wide impetus to the boom. No candidate for the Presidency ever fared so well with the literary folks. Walter Hines Page, afterward ambassador to Great Britain, and a friend since the "Atlantic Monthly" days, had William Bayard Hale do a series of articles for his newer magazine,

"World's Work." Page in characteristic fashion said: "The Evening Post still praises you and I observe that the Commoner decorates you. These are bad omens and I think it is high time some corrective influences were set at work." He guaranteed that what would appear in the "World's Work" was "warranted to keep the witches off and to restore a proper balance." Hale did a first-class publicity job and became the successor of Harvey as chief of the Propaganda Section. Charles Reade Bacon of the editorial staff of the "Philadelphia Record," who had accompanied Wilson throughout the campaign for governor, compiled a volume of the Wilson speeches and these were published by Doubleday, Page & Company. Page, together with Cleveland H. Dodge, Walter L. McCorkle, and a few others, decided to raise the funds necessary to promote the boom. A good advance agent was picked and sent across the country to arrange speaking-dates before agreeable non-partizan bodies in order that Wilson might be seen and heard all over the land. Job Hedges, the New York political philosopher and wit, once remarked, "The man who hires the hall is the man who makes public opinion."

Wilson and Page with a few other friends got together in New York in March, 1911, and it was agreed that Wilson should make his test flight. It was the Page idea that many of the erroneous impressions regarding Wilson as an impractical theorist might thus be removed. He insisted that when the

Mr Calvin N. Kendall,
% Hampton Institute
Hampton, Virginia.

[illegible] Indianapolis [illegible]

Miss Phillips: Please send him the summary of the new school laws. W.W.

Mr. Calvin N. Kendall,
c/o Hampton Institute,
Hampton, Virginia.

My dear Mr. Kendall:

I was away when your letter of the 30th came, and have only just now returned to my desk.

Your letter gratifies me very much. My own judgment is clear that you are the man I am looking for. If you feel as your letter indicates, that you would like to speed the appointment, a conference upon that point is not necessary. We can wait until your engagement at Hampton is finished and meet as soon as possible in New York.

I suggest this because [I find] myself entangled with many things which make my movements uncertain.

May I suggest also that you write the school authorities in Indianapolis ascertaining whether they would be willing to release you at this time? I take it for granted that they would, but realize what you, of course, owe them in the circumstances.

Your letter put my mind very much at ease. I shall look forward with genuine pleasure to our work together.

I am sending you a summary of our recent school legislation under another cover.

With much regard,

Sincerely yours,

Woodrow Wilson

people came into direct contact with Wilson and heard him talk they would be convinced that he was not only a great man but likewise quite human. Out of these plans of Page came the Western trip, which produced so many effective telegrams at the right moment at Baltimore. Page entertained strong hope for a new order in public affairs under Wilson; he had been struggling to improve, particularly in the South, both by education and scientific agriculture, the conditions of the "forgotten man."

Shortly before Wilson started across the country, William F. McCombs had, with Wilson's consent, opened small headquarters in New York for the purpose of answering such political correspondence and carrying on such preliminary work with political organizations as Wilson did not feel he could personally handle at Trenton. This New York project, quite crude at first and always very amateurish politically, was financed by a few of Wilson's university and personal friends. Page selected Frank Parker Stockbridge, a capable writer of varied experience, to manage the Western trip and, as some one facetiously remarked at the time, show Wilson to the trade. It was planned that all the speaking engagements should be before civic organizations of the so-called non-political variety. In this way the Wilson movement might be kept free from the nation-wide Democratic factional quarrels and likewise get the biggest return on Harvey's previous years of propaganda. Wilson was first-page copy every-

where. Leading magazines and magazine writers were eagerly seeking material. The character study Hale had done for the "World's Work" was most stimulating. Hale was an expert in dressing up statesmen. When Roosevelt was President, Hale had spent a week by his side in the White House and produced charming publicity. Wilson had readily given Hale a similar opportunity to live with him in the exercise of his duties as governor of New Jersey, with like satisfactory results. After the break with Smith, to whom Harvey felt under very deep personal obligation, the Wilson support in "Harper's Weekly" had moderated considerably. There was no backing-up of the newly found Wilson policies, and when a friendly correspondent wrote Wilson that he had sent a letter of indorsement to "Harper's," he added, "I am afraid that Colonel Harvey may ignore it as he has been ignoring your case against misrepresentative government in New Jersey." Wilson's reply is significant in that it was given almost a year before the actual break came with Harvey. Outwardly "Harper's Weekly" was still supporting Wilson, and Harvey was going over the country still making enthusiastic speeches about him. But despite all this, Wilson on January 19, 1911, said: "I dare say that you are right in anticipating that Harper's Weekly will not publish the letter that you enclose. I think I am not pleasing them very much at the present time. Certainly your letter was worth printing." The correspondent had

attempted to prove that the initiative and referendum did not mean the destruction of representative government. It was an answer to the attack "Harper's" was then making on the initiative and referendum.

Wilson, under the tutelage of Record, Bourne, U'Ren, St. John, Devlin, and other radicals, had then been converted to the initiative and referendum. He had not, however, specified these reforms in his first inaugural and had only publicly shown his position in connection with the milder commission government law. But when he got out into the Western country, aflame with the political and evangelical movements that had descended directly from Bryanism, he cut loose and in his very first big speech, at Kansas City on May 6, 1911, shocked his conservative Eastern supporters by a friendly discussion of the initiative, referendum, and recall.

Wilson had never prepared any of his political speeches in advance. It was his practice to outline the arguments in his own mind, but the speeches were not actually written out. He would sometimes practice on a friend who happened to sit alongside him in a train or elsewhere. In order to get the full benefit of the publicity, as he was traveling West, he was prevailed upon by his press-agent to prepare the Kansas City speech in advance. Because of its startling revelations it was never incorporated in the campaign text-books. With the support of rich conservatives in the East and radicals in the West Wil-

son found himself with managers headed in opposite political directions.

The Kansas City speech was delivered before the combined civic organizations there. Governor Herbert S. Hadley of Missouri, a progressive, and a candidate for the Republican Presidential nomination, was present. Wilson declared that a new political era promising much for the welfare of the nation was dawning for the American people. The movement was one of reform—marked by a process of restoration, rather than that of a revolution—he said. The greatest iniquity calling for correction was the control of politics and of American life in general by great combinations of wealth. Coming to the real subject, he said:

Among the remedies proposed in recent years have been the initiative and referendum in the field of legislation and the recall in the field of administration. These measures are supposed to be characteristic of the most radical programs, and they are supposed to be meant to change the very character of our government. They have no such purpose. Their intention is to restore, not to destroy, representative government. It must be remembered by every candid man who discusses these matters that we are contrasting the operation of the initiative and the referendum not with the representative government which we possess in theory and which we have long persuaded ourselves that we possessed in fact, but in contrast with the actual state of affairs, in contrast with the legislative processes which are carried on in secret, responding to the impulse of subsidized machines

and carried through by men whose unhappiness it is to realize that they are not their own masters, but puppets in a game.

If we felt that we had genuine representative government in our State legislators no one would propose the initiative or referendum in America. They are being proposed now as a means of bringing our representatives back to the consciousness that what they are bound in duty and in mere policy to do is to represent the sovereign people whom they profess to serve and not the private interests which creep into their councils by way of machine orders and committee conferences.

The most ardent and successful advocates of the initiative and referendum regard them as a sobering means of obtaining genuine representative action on the part of legislative bodies. They do not mean to set anything aside. They mean to restore and influence, rather.

The recall is a means of administrative control. If properly regulated and devised it is a means of restoring to administrative officials what the initiative and referendum restore to legislators, namely, a sense of direct responsibility to the people who choose them.

The recall of judges is another matter. Judges are not lawmakers. They are not administrators. Their duty is not to determine what the law shall be, but to determine what the law is. Their independence, their sense of dignity and of freedom, is of the first consequence to the stability of the State. To apply to them the principle of the recall is to set up the idea that determinations of what a law is must respond to popular impulse and to popular judgment.

The speech caused a sensation. Roosevelt had come out for the whole works, including the recall

of judges. This radical departure by Wilson gave his business supporters great anxiety, and some hastily wired him to slow up. In his second big speech, at Denver on May 8, he was pressed to make it clear whether or not he might favor the recall of judges, as Roosevelt did. "I would not say," Wilson finally admitted, "that I am absolutely against the recall being applied to judges. My feeling in the matter is this: the duty of a judge is the interpretation of the law. He does not make the law. If the application of a law be against the wishes of the people and a judge bases decision thereon, that is no reason why a judge should be recalled."

Eastern friends rather quickly convinced him that if the initiative, referendum, and recall were put into the national platform, the party might as well give up the fight. He was reluctant to surrender but heeded the advice of his managers and never again returned to advocacy of the measures. Another issue that gave Wilson great concern on the Western trip was woman-suffrage. He had all along been very much opposed to women in politics. It was his idea that a woman's place was in the home, and the type of woman who took an active part in the agitation for suffrage was quite abhorrent to him. To his associates he frankly expressed his aversion to the "masculinized women," as he termed them. Suffrage was to be voted upon at the next election in California, and to those who were persistently pressing him for a public statement he finally declared that

it would not be becoming for the governor of another State to say anything that might influence the election one way or another. Suffrage was a local issue for each State to settle for itself, he said. "Politics," says Morley, "are neither an art nor a science but a 'dodge.'" The Western trip as a whole was a great success. Wilson covered some eight thousand miles and made twenty-five speeches on his try-out tour.

When he returned to Trenton, he was considerably shocked and not a little annoyed at the discovery that there was no legal way by which the State could pay his salary while he had been on the wing. His pay-check for the month of May was $50 instead of $880, his regular salary. He likewise discovered that the State could not pay him for the three days in June that he had been away. His Western political tour had occupied approximately a month. Edwards, the Democratic state controller, afterward governor and United States senator, held that he had no authority under the Constitution to make payment to any one not performing the duties of his office. Wilson contended that he had been elected by the people of the State for three years and that there was no way that he could be prevented from receiving the full salary. Edwards, though politically friendly, stood pat. He referred Wilson to Section XIII, Article V, of the New Jersey constitution, which specifically provides that in the absence of the governor from the State the emoluments as well as the powers and duties of the office devolved upon the president of the Senate.

Wilson was not particularly familiar with the state constitution. Senator Ernest R. Ackerman, president of the Senate and later a member of Congress, had been duly sworn in as acting governor on May 4, and had proceeded to administer the government for twenty-eight days in May. He likewise served the three first days of June. He had been sworn in on a previous occasion when Wilson had gone off campaigning for the Presidential nomination. That was on April 13, 1911, but no deduction had been made in the Wilson April pay-check. When the controller insisted that the law required him to pay the May check to Ackerman, the latter very graciously indorsed the check over to Wilson, who was profuse in his thanks.

I want to express my personal appreciation of the thorough and thoughtful way in which you have fulfilled the duties of the Governorship during my absence. [Wilson said to Ackerman]. It gives me comfort to feel that the office was in such safe hands, and I hope that you did not find the duties of the month burdensome. I should not like to feel that I had imposed upon you.

The papers are entirely wrong in stating that I intend to make another tour. It is my expectation to be in the office as often as necessary for the performance of the duties from now until Autumn. I add this because I know your plans for going abroad and should not like to have you feel in any way anxious or doubtful about them.

Wilson did not again leave the State for any considerable period during the summer, but carried on

the campaign from the official residence at the Sea Girt Encampment. Ackerman next assumed the office on October 25, when he was acting governor for about a week, and again in the middle of November, when he served another week. On all of these occasions he indorsed the pay-checks over to Wilson. During 1912, both before and after the convention that nominated him for President, the campaigning made it necessary for Wilson to be out of the State much more frequently, and John Dyneley Prince, president of the Senate for that year, was actually sworn in as the acting governor of New Jersey on eleven different occasions. Like Ackerman, Prince indorsed over to Wilson all of the pay-checks.

Radicals of the Bourne type, unaware that the initiative and referendum had disappeared from the Wilson campaign, were inclined to overlook Wilson's failure to declare flat-footedly for the recall of judges and to encourage him in the fight. Senator Bourne wrote from Washington, on June 22, 1911:

> I often look back with pleasure on the two hours visit we had together in New York and am greatly gratified at the verification up to date of my political analysis made at that time. You are steadily growing in strength and popularity before the American people. The greatest mistake, I think, you have made has been your criticism of the recall of judges. . . . The same logic applies to the Recall as applies to the Initiative,—if, as I am convinced, the people cannot legislate against general

welfare it must be equally true that they will not recall a public servant, judge or other officer, who serves the general welfare. . . .

I am pleased with the growing confidence you are enjoying from the American people. Your personal and political development is beneficial to the nation. . . . I believe Senator La Follette can defeat you providing you two gentlemen are the nominees of the two great parties, but I have not hesitated to generally express my opinion that if you continue to grow and make no serious mistake between now and the time of the election, and that if you are nominated you can defeat any other man the Republicans might nominate except Senator La Follette.

After his meetings with the radicals, Wilson had come to have a very high regard for La Follette and in a speech at Wilmington had expressed his own mortification at not having joined with them earlier. "I have sometimes thought of Senator La Follette," said Wilson, "climbing the mountain of privilege . . . taunted, laughed at, called back, going steadfastly on and not allowing himself to be deflected for a single moment, for fear he also should harken and lose all his power to serve the great interests to which he had devoted himself. I love these lonely figures climbing this ugly mountain of privilege. . . . I am sorry for my own part that I did not come in when they were fewer."

Bourne, who later returned to the stand-pat Republican field, becoming head of the Republican Publicity Association at Washington, was then under the spell of U'Ren, and his frequent letters to

Wilson proved stimulating. After the first primary held under the Wilson radical legislation, at which the Smith-Nugent machine had won in Essex County, Bourne wrote, on September 28, 1911:

Have watched with interest result of yesterday's New Jersey primary. In view of the situation, first trial of corrupt practices law, your prominent advocacy of the popular doctrine of government, which by the way I think is your main source of strength, I consider you have won a victory. The machine dies hard. I know by experience, having run them, beaten them and disintegrated them. I feel very confident of a rapid crystallization of sentiment all over the country favorable to a presidential primary. . . .

As I sense public opinion you are daily growing in popularity and in the confidence of the people and Taft is losing ground. You are by all odds today the strongest man in the Democratic party before the people. Should you and Taft be nominees Taft will be the worst beaten presidential nominee in American history. The issue is not tariff, reciprocity, arbitration—these are but shingles. The real issue is whether General Welfare or selfish interest shall be the dynamic force controlling government; whether public servants shall be responsible to the political boss and largest campaign contributor or to the composite citizen, individual unknown; whether this shall be a truly representative government or misrepresentative; popular or delegated. I am a Republican but I am for a principle ahead of party. I firmly believe you will be the Democratic nominee if you make popular government fundamentals the main theme of your discourses and take the Democratic leadership for the presidential primary. I believe La Follette could

beat you if you both were the nominees, but I desire to see both parties nominate their best men. I fail to see any clear line of demarcation as between the two parties. To my mind the line of demarcation is between popular and delegated government and there are advocates of both in both parties. I have admired your acumen and wisdom thus far demonstrated in not making the tariff the main issue. Tariff at best is but selfish legislation of the lowest order. The only fundamental is whether a man believes in direct or indirect taxation. There is no distinction between tariff for revenue and tariff for protection; all tariff must necessarily be protective tariff. Let 's have honest discussion and drop sophistry and verbal soufflé.

I enclose copy of my speech on the Recall of Public servants delivered August 5th and urgently request you to carefully read my analysis of the composite citizen contained on pages 10 and 11 where I think I conclusively demonstrate all forces which control human action. If you concur, any doubts in your mind regarding the recall of judges or any public servant or any of the popular government fundamentals must be immediately eliminated.

Expect to be in New York in near future. Can't tell just when. Suggest you write to your friend Mr. McCombs, 96 Broadway, that I shall probably call him up for purpose of conference when I go over.

In his attempts to meet the political needs of the hour, Wilson had frequent occasion to readjust his views. He did what any successful politician does when his followers split: he found things on which they might agree. Radicals and Wilson conserva-

tives were united in a common dislike of the way the government was being operated and of Roosevelt's attempts to grab it, and all were interested in the uplift of mankind in general.

CHAPTER X

PROMOTING THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN

WILLIAM F. McCOMBS of New York, a graduate of Princeton, had come to the State-house shortly after Wilson's inauguration as governor, to discuss pending legislation in which some client was interested. He volunteered to produce funds and to carry on an independent organization for the advancement of Wilson's Presidential candidacy. As the session of the Legislature was closing, Wilson, who apparently had some misgivings, suggested to Tumulty and me that we go to New York and look over what McCombs was doing. There began to flood into the governor's office at Trenton a great mass of correspondence of a political nature, and Wilson finally agreed that such of it as could not be handled personally should be forwarded to McCombs. It fell to the lot of Tumulty and me to sit in and help dispose of much of the intimate personal side of the campaign work. The political and general correspondence incidental to the Presidential campaign went to the McCombs headquarters from that time until the nomination was made at Baltimore some sixteen months later.

It was the misfortune of McCombs that he was not a rugged man physically. He was likewise very

much of an amateur in politics and at times easily imposed upon. A native of Arkansas, after his graduation at Princeton he had opened a law-office in New York, and he did what so many Southerners do there: he attempted to identify himself actively with the Tammany organization. Some of them have innocently thought of it as merely the Democratic party in New York to which they naturally wished to transfer their allegiance. Others, more ambitious or more astute, have seen Tammany Hall opening the doors of opportunity to them for political advancement. Quite out of proportion to their numbers, they have been pushed forward, first for minor offices, and often for more important posts. A long list could be made of the Democrats from the South who have risen to more or less public prominence in and through the amiable Tammany.

From start to finish McCombs gave unstintedly of his time and efforts to the Wilson cause. If he did not always proceed in the most approved manner and get the best results, he did at least the very best that he knew how. McCombs's first Wilson headquarters were located at 42 Broadway, New York, and attention at the outset was devoted to distributing the speeches of Governor Wilson and to answering letters. Maurice F. Lyons, energetic assistant to McCombs, carried on most of the work. McCombs devoted himself largely to begging money. Stockbridge, who had accompanied Wilson on the Western trip, continued to have direct charge of the propa-

ganda for newspapers. As the work increased in volume, Walter Measday, a newspaper reporter, was engaged to accompany Wilson on all his speech-making tours and to see that he got plenty of personal publicity. When McCombs appealed to William Gibbs McAdoo, another Southern lawyer who had attracted attention by his promotion of the first rapid transit railroad tubes under the Hudson River, McAdoo not only made a modest contribution but manifested a readiness to come aboard. McCombs gladly accepted him. McAdoo at the time knew Wilson casually, but the McAdoo railroad promotion had many New Jersey political angles. At McAdoo's suggestion, Byron R. Newton, head of McAdoo's publicity, who later became assistant secretary of the treasury and collector of the port of New York, was added to the Wilson New York headquarters propaganda staff. McAdoo, McCombs and Oswald Garrson Villard later met regularly to plan the general promotional campaign.

No opportunity was lost to get for the cause the maximum amount of publicity. After the Western trip, the next good chance that came to the expert press-agents resulted from an indiscretion on the part of Nugent, who had continued as chairman of the Democratic State Committee. On the night of Tuesday, July 25, 1911, Nugent, with a small party of political friends, was at Neptune Heights, a seaside resort popular before the days of Volstead. In the course of the hilarity he sent a bottle of champagne

to a near-by table where some National Guard officers were seated. One of the officers, who was a meddlesome Republican politician and enjoyed seeing the Democrats at each other's throats, returned to the state camp at Sea Girt, where Wilson and his family were summering, and reported that Nugent had toasted Wilson as an "ingrate and liar." The feeling at the time between Nugent and Wilson was very tense. It was not difficult for Wilson to work himself into a condition of passionate resentment toward his enemies, and he naturally aroused in them a corresponding hatred. According to the Republican who had come back to Sea Girt, Nugent, after sending the bottle of wine to the guardsmen, who were likewise all active Republicans, had stood up and raising his glass said:

"I propose a toast to the governor of New Jersey, the commander-in-chief of the militia. He is an ingrate and a liar. I mean Woodrow Wilson. I repeat, he is an ingrate and a liar. Do I drink alone?"

The bearer of the tale insisted that Nugent did drink alone. Others, however, subsequently related that none of the wine had gone to waste. Be that as it may, the indiscretion of Nugent provided the big news feature for the Wilson propaganda service for many weeks. Members of the Democratic State Committee were summoned to Sea Girt, and a movement was started to oust Nugent as chairman. It did not prove an easy task. While the committeemen were naturally eager to please Wilson, there

was a good deal of personal affection for Nugent, who for years had been keeping the party organization together. After a few days, during which the committee members were kept very busy and the newspapers continually hammered at Nugent, a request was formulated and signed by ten of the twenty-six members calling upon Nugent to resign. Nugent declined to quit or to call a special meeting but announced that there would be a regular meeting at an early date. Difficulty was found in getting any one to agree to accept the chairmanship. When Nugent finally did call the meeting for August 10 at Asbury Park, ten members remained away. There was a stormy scene, so acrimonious in fact that police were summoned. While the storm was on, Nugent left the meeting accompanied by Charles H. Gallagher, state committeeman from Wilson's home county of Mercer. Gallagher had been the sole Democratic leader of prominence in Mercer County openly to favor Wilson's nomination for governor. That had been done out of a sense of loyalty to Nugent, and when Wilson kicked Nugent overboard, Gallagher alone stuck by his old political friend. Representatives of the larger counties like Hudson, Passaic, Atlantic, and Middlesex were not in attendance at the meeting. The fourteen members of the committee remaining proceeded to declare the state chairmanship vacant, and ten days later, on August 24, Edward E. Grosscup of Gloucester County, who

had been appointed to the State Tax Board by Wilson, was prevailed upon to accept the place.

The incidental publicity did not materially benefit the New Jersey Democrats. Nugent was still in control of the party in Essex County, despite a stiff fight by the Wilson friends to capture the legislative nominations under the new primary election act. In the November election the Democrats lost control of the Legislature. This had a somewhat depressing effect, particularly on the contributors of money. Shortly after the election, however, the resourceful McCombs had luncheon with Frederic C. Penfield, who had married the largest property-holder in Philadelphia. Penfield had been in the Cleveland campaign and in the diplomatic service. He made a contribution of ten thousand dollars to McCombs and was later appointed ambassador to Austria. It was before the Wilson open break with Harvey, and Penfield was brought into camp by Colonel Watterson. Colonel John B. McGraw, Democratic state chairman of West Virginia, was also enlisted about this time by McCombs, after two or three months of hard work. Louis Wiley of the "New York Times," who had been likewise interested in Wilson by McCombs, introduced Tumulty and me to Andrew Friedman, old-time Tammany friend of Croker. Friedman subscribed five thousand dollars besides getting other rich New York Democrats to lend a financial hand. Wiley found many ways of being helpful.

Wilson himself lost no opportunity to make friends and supporters. He frequently referred to the fact that there was considerable Irish blood in his forebears, and soon after he became governor he made application for membership in the American-Irish Historical Society. He was very much elated when Thomas Z. Lee, the president-general, acknowledging the application, wrote him on January 24, 1911:

> Great enthusiasm was manifested when I read your letter asking if you might become a member of the Society and in the evening I had it read at the banquet when the entire assemblage could hear it and gave Colonel Flynn the proper credit for his part in the transaction; so that you are now not only an active member of our Society, but a beloved one as well.
>
> If you were a candidate last Saturday evening for the votes of the brilliant assembly of ladies and gentlemen in the grand ballroom of the Waldorf Astoria, you would have been their unanimous choice.

About this time there began to be set up throughout the country independent organizations to give impetus to the Presidential boom. Some of these movements were acceptable; others were frowned upon by Wilson. He did not think, for example, that anything of the kind should be attempted in Ohio, which had a favorite son in Judson Harmon. To Henry S. Johnson of Cleveland, who occupied an important position in the business world, he intimated that other ways might be found to accelerate good

will. The method proved effective, and Johnson informed Wilson that he had taken occasion to so tell Newton D. Baker, "the dominant factor in the Cuyahoga County Democratic party—and a Harmon man." Baker in return had said that such an attitude was in keeping with the high Wilson ideals, and Johnson significantly added, "It was the best ground into which to drop the seed, in accordance with your desire in the matter." Baker proved to be a helpful factor at Baltimore and later was rewarded with a place in the Cabinet. Wilson followed the same course in Indiana, where Thomas R. Marshall, then governor and protégé of the resourceful Thomas Taggart, was being boomed for the Presidential nomination. Marshall's enemies sought to use Wilson's name, and in order to head off trouble Wilson set forth that he did not care to have any special effort made by his Indiana friends, as it was only natural and right that Marshall should be supported. The Wilson letter was duly published in Indiana and helped considerably in cementing Marshall's friendship.

Wilson's uncertainty about the organization of political clubs gave his managers much bother. McCombs took the position that it was through such means that delegates were sent to national conventions and that if organizations were discouraged the Wilson leaders in the various communities would feel rudderless. "The mass of letters that I am receiving from day to day, from all over the country, from men who

are favorable to you," wrote McCombs, "contain the idea that they should be working through local organizations, partisan and non-partisan, the press and other instrumentalities that make for the instruction of delegates for you. My idea is that in each case they should be discreetly encouraged and that I and others of your friends be in a position to render them coöperation." This plan of McCombs was eventually put into effect.

The vast amount of publicity that the Wilson campaign was getting, coupled with a somewhat extravagant outlay for promoting organization work, by McCombs and others, caused speculation as to the sources of the Wilson financing. Even in Democratic papers editorials were beginning to appear asking where the "Wilson money" came from. The editorials also contained the charge that large numbers of paid agents were traveling about the country in the effort to bring about Wilson's nomination. Some newspapers intimated that the cost of the campaign had already run into millions of dollars. Page urged upon Wilson that it should be understood by everybody who gave money that the contribution and the contributor were to be made public as well as the purpose for which it was spent. Page insisted that, apart from the "openness" and therefore the rightness of this, it was also the best possible tactics and the best method of getting money. It was the idea of Page, as well as of Stockbridge, that the refreshing novelty of perfectly frank financial statements, frequently is-

sued, would be a tremendous political factor in Wilson's favor.

This did not, however, always fit in with the McCombs plan of helping various needy political organizations. Eventually Stockbridge and McCombs disagreed, and Stockbridge retired before the close of the year. McAdoo's publicity man, Newton, was then placed in charge of propaganda work at the McCombs headquarters. By the end of the year the headquarters had so spread out that McCombs was finding great difficulty in making ends meet. On January 6, 1912, Wilson delivered a very inspiring address on the Jews, in Carnegie Hall, New York. Henry Morgenthau, later appointed ambassador to Turkey, at once enlisted under the Wilson banner and agreed to subscribe four thousand dollars a month to the cause from that time forward. Wilson's campaign financing was carried out a bit loosely, as were all his political undertakings. By the end of March, 1912, funds were so low that Wilson was forced to take a personal hand in their solicitation. Needless to say the job was repugnant to him. Without waiting for the 1912 Legislature to finish its session, Wilson had been prevailed upon to make a hurried trip to Illinois early in April, with the object of carrying the Presidential primaries. Illinois enthusiasts were confident that if he would come for a two-day whirlwind campaign he would sweep everything in sight. Wilson made the dash to Illinois, where he bitterly denounced the state bosses who were backing Champ

Clark, and where at the primaries on April 9 Clark won by a majority of one hundred and forty-two thousand. Subsequently, at Baltimore, Roger Sullivan, then in control of the party in Illinois, switched from Clark to Wilson and played a decisive part in helping nominate the Jerseyman who had gone West in early April to exterminate him.

As he was leaving for Chicago, Wilson received a doleful message from McCombs, who had just returned from an unsatisfactory trip that included Augusta, Atlanta, New Orleans, and Chicago. McCombs wrote:

> It is an old story at this time to tell you that the popular sentiment of the country favors your nomination, but unfortunately that is entirely inadequate. The great difficulty with your campaign is the aloofness of a great many of the men in the various districts who do things. These are the men the people follow and are the men who in the main select the delegates. They have an impression of you in a large degree that you are austere and dictatorial and that you will not have a due appreciation of what is to be done for you. It is hard to convince the hundreds of men who really control things that this is not so. It is hard to see them and tell them. Another thing I hear much of, particularly throughout the East, is that you are unreliable. All these things the Smiths, Wattersons, Pynes, etc., have accomplished.
>
> There is no use disguising the fact. I have suggested that you have your strong friends in Congress and elsewhere as far as possible come and see you. I think it is vital. The human contact is more valuable than anything I know. These people will be greatly pleased to

come and see you. It is a valuable thing to give people attention and notice whether you take their advice or not. Furthermore, I regard it as of the essence of things at this time that a strong group be organized to further your candidacy. This group should include eight or ten strong men in Washington. They are easy to select. You alone can get them to work.

I have been exerting every ounce of energy and influence for almost a year in furthering the idea of your nomination. I have abandoned my practice entirely. These sacrifices I have been quite willing to make. I have sought coöperation in all quarters. I have raised $122,500 and have spent most of it. At present I don't know where I am going to get much more, although I am personally obligated to the extent of $30,000 for future expenses. The foundation is well laid. We must go further.

I write you all these things, Governor, to give you the facts of one side of your candidacy to which we must pay the strictest attention. I am not in the slightest discouraged over the general situation. Neither does the great burden under which I am laboring depress me in the slightest. We have an easy road to victory if there is general coöperation and no crosscurrents and undercurrents are permitted to prejudice our situation.

With this gloomy information in his possession, Wilson on the train going to Chicago sent an urgent appeal for funds to Harvey Thomas, then editor of the "Atlantic City Review." Wilson frankly declared that the crisis of the campaign for the nomination had arrived and that it would break down unless considerable money was speedily forthcoming. Thomas, who was one of the leading political writers

of the State, had gone to Atlantic City to conduct a newspaper campaign intended to clean up some of the evil alliances then besmirching the good name of the resort. The crusade was financed by owners of large beach hotels who found that vicious conditions were injuring business. Wilson had given Thomas excellent support, including several good appointments for the hotel men. He had placed one of their number on the Court of Appeals. In return Thomas got the hotel men, although Republicans in politics, to proffer financial help. When Wilson found himself in desperate straits he made his appeal to Thomas, who gathered six thousand dollars from the hotel men and turned it over to McCombs, and Wilson personally sent letters of thanks to the donors.

It would be difficult to estimate the exact amount that the prenomination campaign actually cost the friends of Wilson. McCombs directly collected and expended about a quarter of a million dollars before the triumph at Baltimore. Enormous amounts were put into other channels by admiring friends. The "Trenton True American," a newspaper that was kept alive for the purpose of helping to stimulate the campaign, provides one good illustration. Harry E. Alexander, publisher of the paper, was one of the earliest of the Wilson enthusiasts, and he gave his newspaper over to reprinting the laudatory Wilson editorials that appeared throughout the country. He eventually arranged with McCombs to issue the paper

once a week as the "Woodrow Wilson Weekly." He printed from five to ten thousand copies of this number and mailed them to a selected list of good Democratic prospects all over the country. Alexander, in his Wilson ardor, neglected everything else, and it was not long before his newspaper became financially embarrassed. Support was enlisted from Cleveland H. Dodge, but eventualy the property had to go into a receivership. It had liabilities of $221,000 and at the sale brought $47,000, just sufficient to pay the first and second mortgages. Dodge's part in the venture was large. It fell to my lot to figure innocently in an amusing incident shortly before the passing of the fine old newspaper. After all the nominating conventions had been held in 1912 I happened to be at the Bull Moose headquarters in the Manhattan Hotel, New York, talking with George W. Perkins, and he said he understood that there was a great flood of Wilson money in New Jersey. When I told him that as nearly as I could observe the Wilson supporters were having their own troubles and that Dodge was already supposed to have been let in for a round fifty thousand dollars on the "True American" enterprise alone, Perkins, who was guiding the Roosevelt campaign, pricked up his ears and said that he had seen no accounts in the official reports of contributions of that kind from Dodge. Just then Congress was making the usual Presidential campaign investigation. This time, as a result of Roosevelt's attacks, it was election contributions that were being

probed. Perkins brought Senator Joseph Dixon of Montana from an adjoining hotel room and told him that "our man on the committee at Washington" ought to call Dodge and find out whether he was subsidizing newspapers all over the country.

In a few days Dodge was taken to Washington, appeared before the committee, and admitted that he was putting up money for the "True American." And then a strange thing happened. When asked if any one was associated in the enterprise, Dodge declared that George W. Perkins had coöperated on one occasion. Perkins himself was summoned to Washington a few days later, and it developed that he and Dodge were neighbors at Riverdale and likewise had adjoining camps in the Adirondacks. Dodge had no particular first-hand information about the Trenton newspaper but had been informed by some of the Wilson entourage that the "True American" was really suffering financially because of its progressiveness and that it was a first-class risk. One evening at the camp he had told a part of the story to Perkins, who was just then in the clouds with enthusiasm over the Roosevelt war on Taft. Perkins, without paying close attention to the details, had authorized one of his secretaries to advance Dodge a share of the loan. Perkins had forgotten all about his own part in the transaction when he had so quickly grabbed at the idea that Dodge was subsidizing newspapers for Wilson and had his old neighbor taken to Washington to be quizzed.

It is too early to attempt any forecast of 1912. There will be more "politics" in the next national Democratic Convention than in any body of the kind since 1852. Assuredly Bryan will have to be reckoned with; but I doubt whether his influence will finally predominate. He is a vindictive as well as an ill-judging man, potent only for mischief. Yet it would be folly needlessly to antagonize him. I shall treat him kindly, rather as an unruly boy than a marplot, not intending to break the friendly personal relations established in 1908.

Regard to Mrs Wilson and the young ladies

Sincerely
Your friend
Henry Watterson

Mrs
Hon Woodrow Wilson
etc.

CHAPTER XI

CAPTURING BRYAN AND LOSING HARVEY

MRS. Ellen Axson Wilson played the biggest card in the preliminary skirmishes for advantage in the Presidential scoring up. She was a delightfully wholesome old-fashioned wife and mother, who had been on the firing-line with Wilson through the days of his early struggles. Every sacrifice was made by her to push him forward in his profession as an educator. She remained at home and reared the youngsters while he went to Scotland or Bermuda on vacation trips. Her whole thought was of his career, and there were times when she proved to be very much of a balance-wheel and when in her modest but effective manner, she helped him safely over treacherous spots. They had a mutual liking for history and biography and read much together. She had some misgivings about his going into politics. General Sadler and I were chatting with her at the inaugural reception in the evening of the day that the governor was sworn in, when Mrs. Wilson rather sadly observed: "This is all very glorious, but somehow I feel that it is the end of our happy home days. Woodrow loved to play the piano and to sing with our girls in the evening; I am afraid

that kind of joy is largely over for us." Mrs. Wilson rarely came to the State-house after the inauguration, but she was much interested in her husband's rising fame in politics.

It was Mrs. Wilson who brought about the first meeting between her husband and Bryan. While the now celebrated letter that Wilson had written to Adrian Joline expressing the hope that Bryan might be "knocked into a cocked hat" had not then been made public, it was well known that Wilson had been vigorously opposed to Bryan, had failed to vote for him, and had declined to sit on a public platform with him. Harry E. Alexander, editor of the "Trenton True American," had convinced Mrs. Wilson that it was absolutely necessary to capture the Nebraskan if the Presidential nomination was to be won. Tumulty, too, felt that Bryan alone could send terror into the hearts of the old-line machine bosses. Wilson was in Georgia on one of his political flights when announcement was made that the Rev. Charles R. Erdman of the Theological Seminary, now moderator of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, was bringing Bryan to Princeton Sunday afternoon, March 12, 1911, for his first appearance in that place. Princeton was the only university town of importance in the United States where the Commoner's voice had not been heard, and Wilson had never come into personal contact with him. Mrs. Wilson found that it was possible for her husband, who was speaking with President Taft in Atlanta,

March 10, to get back home in time for the meeting. She sent a telegram urging him to speed to Princeton. The Erdmans arranged to have Bryan take dinner with the Wilsons. Thomas H. Birch, later minister to Portugal and a sturdy friend of Bryan in the lonely '96 days, was also invited to the dinner. To accommodate all who wished to hear Bryan it was necessary to have the meeting in Alexander Hall instead of the seminary.

"It was surely the first time that these two men met, and the meeting was due entirely to the desire and planning of Mrs. Woodrow Wilson," Dr. Erdman recently wrote me. And he added, "Mrs. Wilson in later years said to Mrs. Erdman, 'that dinner put Mr. Wilson in the White House.' "

The dinner was held at the Princeton Inn and proved pleasant enough. Bryan was cautious and non-committal. Birch invited Wilson and Bryan to Burlington for a Democratic rally on April 5th, 1911. At the Burlington meeting Wilson made a bold bid by this public declaration: "Mr. Bryan has borne the heat and burden of a long day; we have come in at a very much later time to reap the reward of the things that he has done. Mr. Bryan has shown that stout heart which, in spite of the long years of repeated disappointments, has always followed the star of hope, and it is because he has cried 'America, awake!' that some other men have been able to translate into action the doctrines that he has so diligently preached." This handsome tribute mightily pleased

Bryan and was in marked contrast with the earlier utterances of Wilson. While Bryan was much elated by the Wilson speech, he was not by any means instantly won over.

In early May, Wilson got a cheering message from "Marse Henry" Watterson, who had been spending the winter in the south of France, sizing up the situation as the famous Kentucky editor saw it. "It is too early to attempt any forecast of 1912," wrote Watterson from the château country on May 1, 1911. "There will be more 'politics' in the next National Democratic Convention than in any body of the kind since 1852. Assuredly Bryan will have to be reckoned with; but I doubt whether his influence will finally predominate. He is a vindictive as well as an ill-judging man, potent only for mischief. Yet it would be folly needlessly to antagonize him. I shall treat him kindly, rather as an unruly boy than a marplot, not intending to break the friendly personal relations established in 1908."

During the summer of 1911 Colonel Edward M. House of Texas was enlisted in the Wilson cause. House had been attempting to make a Presidential candidate out of Mayor William J. Gaynor of New York, but Gaynor had taken himself out with a few of his irascible moves. There was always considerable mystery as to just how Colonel House came aboard. McCombs claimed credit for the introduction, but Page probably had most to do with it. House, with his soft ways, appeared immediately to

fascinate Wilson and fitted admirably into the Wilsonian scheme of things. House was on intimate terms with Bryan, and it at once became his particular mission to convince Bryan that the Wilson shift from conservative to progressive was genuine. Soon after Bryan and Wilson had been brought together at the Erdman dinner, Wilson had issued a strong message urging the Legislature of New Jersey to adopt the federal income tax amendment. Bryan sent Wilson a generous letter of congratulation. Like Wilson, Bryan did not hesitate about giving advice. He was always keen about independence for the Filipinos; Wilson was not. Wilson took the position that they were not prepared for independence, and a letter to that effect written by Wilson on August 15, 1911, fell into Bryan's hands. Bryan promptly wrote to Wilson: "I wish you would read the Democratic platforms of 1900, 1904 and 1908, and my speech on Imperialism in 2 vol. of my speeches. I think you will on reconsideration be willing to endorse our platforms. I am anxious for you to speak out against the 'rule of reason' decisions; they repeal the criminal clause of the anti-trust laws. President Taft has taken the trust side. I think Congress will take the other side."

These messages of friendly advice were sent to Wilson long before Bryan had in any way committed himself. It required several months of the very best efforts of House, supplemented and accelerated by other close friends and supporters of Bryan, to effect

anything like the desired result. The first genuine encouragement came to Wilson when he was campaigning in November in his native State, Virginia. "I have been with Mr. Bryan a good part of the morning," said the House message, dated November 18, 1911, "and I am pleased to tell you that I think you will have his support. The fact that you did not vote for him in '96 was on his mind but I offered an explanation which seemed to be satisfactory. My main effort was in alienating him from Champ Clark and I believe I was successful there. He sent you several messages which he asked me to deliver to you in person which I shall be glad to do sometime when you are in New York provided you return before I go South around December first. I have been keeping in close touch with the Harmon situation and it seems to me that he is practically out of the race. They are, as you know, centering upon Underwood but I feel that there will be no more difficulty in dislodging him than Harmon if your speech upon the tariff has the effect which I believe it will. I am inclined to congratulate you and felicitate with the Party over your nomination which I am sure will come provided no mistake is made between now and the Convention."

House frequently gets full credit for having swung Texas into line for Wilson at Baltimore. He doubtless had a great influence in the Texas situation, but while House was still flirting with Gaynor and otherwise getting his political bearings, friends of Wilson

had made great headway in Texas. Lindley M. Keasbey, a native Jerseyman, who like Wilson had been a professor at Bryn Mawr College, was professor of political science at the University of Texas. Soon after Wilson's election Keasbey had set about spreading Wilson propaganda in Texas. He early enlisted the sympathy of that able Texas politician, Colonel Thomas B. Love. Like House, Love was a close friend of Bryan, and as early as February 7, 1911, Love informed Wilson that he had had a personal conference with Bryan at Austin and had taken advantage of the opportunity to urge the availability of Wilson as a Presidential candidate.

"While he did not in any wise avow his position in the matter," wrote Love, regarding Bryan, "but insisted that it was his purpose to keep an open mind on the subject for some months to come, I was convinced that I made some impression upon him, and that there is a fair prospect of his taking definitely the position which I am very sincerely desirous of seeing him take. . . . I am more and more convinced as time passes, of the existence of a general sentiment in this state favorable to your nomination for the presidency, which, by proper effort and organization can be so developed as to assure the sending of a delegation to the next national convention favorable to your nomination." Love at once set about the work of organization and had Texas well in hand by the time House joined the Wilson group. In all sections of the country university friends of Wilson were bus-

ily engaged in the work of pushing him for President.

Each week brought its new crop of problems. The organized political machines usually win against the independent political movements because the machines through their leaders and captains are working 365 days in the year.

The most desperate blow of all to the Wilson cause came as the year 1911 was drawing to a close, when Wilson rather abruptly cast Harvey into the discard. While there had been a certain coolness between Wilson and Harvey, since almost immediately after the election in 1910, they continued to be outwardly friendly, and Harvey's weekly publication carried at its masthead: "For President, Woodrow Wilson." It was repeatedly charged that "Harper's Weekly" was controlled by the banking house of Morgan, and these reiterations were having a rather disastrous effect, particularly in the Western States, where Roosevelt in his wild dash to ruin Taft had been banging "the great metropolitan press edited under the shadow of Wall Street." Harvey in an interview he had with Wilson and Watterson at the Manhattan Club pointedly asked Wilson if he felt that the support of "Harper's" was hurtful. Wilson bluntly replied that he did and left the conference somewhat unceremoniously. There was all kinds of newspaper speculation as to what had taken place, and when an announcement appeared in "Harper's Weekly" setting forth that "the name of Woodrow Wilson as our candidate for President was taken down from the

head of these columns in response to a statement made directly to us by Governor Wilson to the effect that our support was affecting his candidacy injuriously," the opposition press indulged in a torrent of abuse of Wilson.

The developments gave Wilson personally a very bad time. He was candid enough to say later that no one had ever described him more nearly as he would like to believe himself to be than Harvey had done. Harvey, during the four years immediately before Wilson's formal advent into politics, had seeded the ground that bore such abundant fruit. In season and out of season Harvey had kept hammering at the idea that Wilson was not only a practical educator and accomplished scholar but a statesman of breadth who sanely stood for every sound and progressive ideal, at the fullness of his power in age and experience, with profound convictions and the courage of fearless expression, and possessing to an unequaled degree that undefinable quality known as personal magnetism. While the storm was beating around his head, Wilson wrote to Harvey one of his characteristically gracious letters. In it he said:

Every day I am confirmed in the judgment that my mind is a one-track road and can run only one train of thought at a time! A long time after that interview with you and Marse Henry at the Manhattan Club, it came over me that when (at the close of the interview) you asked me that question about the Weekly I answered it simply as a matter of fact, and of business, and said never

a word of my sincere gratitude to you for all your generous support, or of my hope that it might be continued. Forgive me, and forget my manners!

Harvey replied in kind, and one or two other letters filled with pleasantries passed between them. By mutual consent the entire correspondence was published. Tom Pence a resourceful Washington newspaper friend, turned the tables in favor of Wilson by getting publicity for a story that the break had actually occurred because Wilson had refused to accept the financial support of Ryan, Harvey's friend, and other Wall Street interests. Watterson replied with a declaration that at Wilson's instance he had undertaken to assist Wilson's managers to raise campaign funds, and that Ryan had not unnaturally come into his mind, as Ryan was both a Democrat and a personal friend. Watterson declared that Wilson's managers were delighted with the suggestion. Wilson made a flat denial, declaring:

So far as I am concerned the statement that Colonel Watterson was requested to assist in raising money in my behalf is absolutely without foundation. Neither I nor any one authorized to represent me ever made any such request of him.

In a rejoinder Watterson suggested that inasmuch as the issue seemed to be one of veracity between himself and Wilson, he was willing to submit the proofs to a court of honor or to Senator Ben Tillman and

to abide by the decision. Wilson referred to Watterson as a "fine old gentleman" and stated for publication that he declined to discuss the matter further, and on the following day Watterson declared:

> The sole issue is whether I have lied as Governor Wilson says I have, or he has lied, which I have engaged conclusively to show. He dare not face the facts.

Wilson did not reply. Measday, Wilson's personal press representative, had promised that a statement would be forthcoming from Wilson upon his return to Trenton from Michigan, where he was making a hurried campaign trip. On Wilson's arrival at the State-house there was a bevy of newspaper reporters awaiting him. It was a day of intense excitement. Wilson kept sparring with the reporters, who hammered away in their efforts to get some expression. Wilson insisted that he did not mean to be interviewed. When the "New York Evening Sun" reached the State-house that day it contained a vigorous story quoting Wilson as saying, in response to a suggestion that the Cleveland trouble would be heard from next: "I sided with the poorer boys while Cleveland sided with the richer ones. Bring on the letters." Wilson was angry, and when the reporters gathered for their evening interview he ordered the "Sun" man from the office. At first Wilson wanted to make a detailed denial, but John P. Dullard, Associated Press correspondent and afterward state librarian, suggested that if Wilson went into it too

elaborately he would simply magnify the incident. Wilson contented himself with issuing a statement that the reporter was guilty of a "genuine outrage" and sent to the editor of the "Evening Sun" this telegram:

> I wish to protest warmly against the alleged interview with me published in this evening's "Sun." It is absolutely false from beginning to end and the man who wrote it ought to be discredited. I, of course, hold him and and not you responsible.

The "Sun" reporter insisted that his account of the meeting was correct and wired his newspaper that Wilson was angry "because I have that story of his not sending congratulations to Hibben when he was elected President of Princeton." The "Sun" printed both the Wilson telegram and the reporter's explanation. Without getting further into the controversy Wilson found opportunity to denounce existing evils in Wall Street, and he rather stopped Watterson by referring to him as "a fine old gentleman."

This incident, with the blame pinned on Ryan, an innocent bystander, had good results for Wilson, and the campaign again proceeded smoothly until the sudden appearance in the newspapers, on the eve of the Jackson day dinner at Washington on January 8, 1912, of Wilson's letter to Adrian Joline, in which was expressed the hope that something might be done "to knock Mr. Bryan once for all into a cocked hat." Joline was a prominent alumnus of Princeton and

president of the Missouri, Kansas, and Texas Railway Company. When Bryan had returned from Europe in the spring of 1907 and delivered, at Madison Square Garden, New York, his first big speech advocating government ownership of railways, Joline had assailed the views of Bryan before the directors of his railroad and had sent a copy of the address to Wilson. It was in acknowledging the address, which Wilson said he had read with "relish and entire agreement," that the reference was made to knocking Mr. Bryan "once for all into a cocked hat." Subsequently Joline was beaten for membership in the Board of Trustees of Princeton University, and Wilson was given the credit for Joline's defeat. Wilson and Bryan were scheduled to speak at the Jackson day dinner at Washington, and the unexpected appearance of this letter, written five years earlier—it was dated April 29, 1907—produced a panic in the Wilson camp assembled at Washington. Bryan was on his way north and was stopping over for a visit with Josephus Daniels at Raleigh, North Carolina. Pence, in charge of the Wilson publicity at Washington, undertook the job of telephoning to Daniels and getting him to straighten out the newest tangle with Bryan. When Bryan reached Washington he was in excellent spirits about the whole affair, and at the dinner that night Wilson went out of his way to sing his praises again.[1]

Bryan was very much pleased by the manner in

[1] See Chapter XIX.

which Wilson had praised him both at Burlington and at the Jackson day dinner in Washington. Wilson declared at the latter function that "one of the most striking things in recent years is that with all the rise and fall of particular ideas, with all the ebb and flow of particular proposals, there has been an interesting fixed point in the history of the Democratic party, and that fixed point has been the character and the devotion and the preachings of William Jennings Bryan. I, for my part, never want to forget this, that while we have differed with Mr. Bryan upon this occasion and upon that with regard to the specific things to be done, he has gone serenely on pointing out to a more and more convinced people what it was that was the matter. He has had the steadfast vision all along of what it was that was the matter, and he has not, any more than Andrew Jackson did, based his character upon calculations but has based it upon principle." A few weeks later Bryan issued a public statement indorsing Wilson's attitude in the Harvey controversy and branding as absurd the assertion of Harvey's friends about Harvey's having brought Wilson to the front. He declared that even though Harvey had been doing all he could for Wilson, his conspicuous support was not only of no advantage but had become actually a disadvantage. It did not bring to Wilson the class for which Harvey spoke but alienated men just as honest as Harvey's friends who could not understand why Harvey praised Wilson personally without indorsing the things for which

Wilson stood. Bryan made the point that it was impossible for Wilson and Harvey to keep company because they were going in opposite directions.

Wilson's literary friends, too, were happy over the outcome. They felt that as Harvey had put to Wilson a candid question, it was necessary for Wilson to make a candid reply and that there was nothing discreditable to Wilson in the incident. Walter Hines Page told Wilson on January 22, 1912:

As I read the public mind the Harvey incident is having a good effect, and will continue to have. Harvey enabled you to speak out on Wall Street without you having to attack Wall Street. Everybody by this time is asking himself, "Well, ought Governor Wilson have lied to Harvey by evading the question or by softening his answer?" Then, too, it 's pretty generally understood, except in boss—and poker—circles, that it is necessary to incur Marse Henry's rhetoric if you have any positive value or character. You 've put him precisely where he belongs—"a fine old gentleman." That is friendly. Yet, to those who know, the area of inference is large. Leave him there. Nothing can vanquish him like silence. It 's the one thing he can't understand or tilt with.

And, of course, the main matter, which old Watterson has tried to obscure, has n't been forgotten—the popular inference about Harvey's backing. You 've answered that suspicion, or fear,—of having the support of Wall Street—without making any attack on anybody in Wall Street.

I think the incident is working good results. And, so far as I can see, it is a positive asset. You are even saved the trouble of making any explanation!

Again, as often, the right sort of enemies turn out to be more valuable than the wrong sort of friends.

The Harvey-Watterson storm likewise helped to bring into closer relationship Wilson and House, who had intimated that Harvey's methods were harmful. Late in January Wilson wrote House at Austin, expressing a high regard and a wish that House in the future should be very near him. House was not reluctant to accept the proffered friendship and declared that he expected to be soon doing his full share of the heavy work. "I hope that your recent experience," said House, "has not made you altogether distrustful of friends and that you will believe there are some who are entirely unselfish in their devotion to you and the cause that you represent." House kept energetically at his task and informed Wilson on February 2 that Byran was then on his Rio Grande farm and that he had invited him to Austin before Bryan left for the north. "Please let me know if there is anything you would like to have suggested to him," said House, "for there can be no better place to do this than by the quiet fireside." By that time the friendship between Bryan and Wilson had been considerably advanced. House was putting the finishing touches on the job that Mrs. Wilson had begun at the Princeton dinner a year earlier. Like Harvey, the ingratiating House had acquired his military title by serving on the staff of a governor. In Texas, where he lived in comfortable style and quietly enter-



Photo Brown Bros.

COLONEL EDWARD M. HOUSE

tained the politicians, he had considerable reputation for his noiseless methods. Soft-spoken and soft-moving, he was almost reverential in his attitude toward Wilson. House was a pleasant calm after the cyclonic Harvey, whose methods were restless and aggressive. Impatient of inaction and high-strung, Harvey worked in the open, a fighting man who addressed the candidate familiarly as 'Wilson" and treated him as an equal. The deferential House was not like that. He not only had the Harvey experience to light his way, but by nature he was gentle and readily accommodated himself to the Wilsonian mind.

CHAPTER XII

PROBLEMS THAT KEPT WILSON ON THE ALERT

WILSON, and the amateur forces operating his show, had many hectic days during the fifteen months intervening between the close of the legislative session and the opening of the Baltimore convention of 1912. They were being constantly disturbed by new disclosures on the part of astute enemies who were determined to block the nomination for President. The Princeton and Smith fights had left many scars, and the victims saw to it that every possible weakness in the Wilson armor was duly and adequately exposed. His views on liquor and labor, as well as the Princeton controversy, all came in for exploitation by the country-wide opposition, and the problem of meeting some of the charges kept Wilson on the alert.

Soon after his election as governor he had applied to the Carnegie Foundation, of which he had been a trustee from the time it was established in 1905, for a retirement allowance. Having decided to leave the teaching profession, he also tendered his resignation as a trustee. Matters of this kind are usually treated as confidential by the Carnegie Foundation, but accounts of the Wilson application were soon aired in

the newspapers. Although Wilson was a poor man, some critics did not hesitate to make it appear that he had large earnings from his writings and otherwise. The best indication of his actual financial worth was the fact that for the half-dozen preceding years his total taxes at Princeton averaged less than thirty dollars a year. The only real estate he owned was his lot in the cemetery. As president of the university his salary was the same as he received as governor, ten thousand dollars a year. There was much sympathy for Wilson, and it was shared by some of the trustees of the Carnegie Foundation; they felt that he was clearly within his rights in view of an existing regulation, adopted that year, providing retiring allowances for educators whose twenty-five years of service included noteworthy presidential or other administrative work in a college or university. President J. G. Schurman of Cornell University, who under the Harding and Coolidge régimes was minister to China and ambassador to Germany, strenuously objected to any alteration in the regulations of the Foundation unless the claims of Wilson, based on expectations created by this legislation, should be entirely satisfied. During the year 1911, after the application of Wilson, the executive committee of the Foundation decided to recommend the rescinding of the regulation under which Wilson had applied. President Schurman insisted that inasmuch as the board had established the system of service pensions in exceptional cases for administrative officers, and

as no exceptional case could have been found more meritorious than that of Wilson, the Foundation was morally bound to vote a pension, especially as Wilson had resigned the Princeton presidency before the wisdom of the policy had been questioned. But despite the determined stand taken by Schurman and other friends of Wilson, the Trustees of the Foundation on the recommendation of the executive committee at the meeting held November 15, 1911, repealed their 1910 resolution which authorized the granting of retiring allowances to educators with the status of Wilson. This barred the Wilson pension.

A source of much greater anxiety was the constantly recurring rumors that the Board of Trustees of Princeton University, now unfriendly, was considering making a complete breast of all that had gone on under Wilson's presidency at the institution. There were many slants to this story, Wilson's partizans stoutly defending him at every turn, while his adversaries circulated a great deal of unpleasant and ugly talk. When the threatened political use of the Princeton material had reached the danger-point Wilson communicated his fears to friends in the board and requested that they join with him in publicly meeting the situation. One of the pro-Wilson trustees, under date of December 19, 1911, dispelled much of the anxiety by making the following written statement to Wilson:[1]

[1] The original is in the author's possession.

You can, of course, safely count upon your old friends on the Board to do anything which may be found to be possible to contradict any false statements that may be made with regard to your conduct as president of the University. When you speak of being ready, in a joint statement, to meet the counts as an indictment against you, you probably do not mean the actual preparation of such a joint statement, as I do not see how we could frame a statement which would meet counts of an indictment until we know what those counts are going to be. I shall be glad to coöperate very promptly with others of your friends as soon as those counts have taken any tangible shape. You are in better position to judge than I am as to the probability of their formulating any such counts in the near future. I myself very much doubt whether they will formulate any charges unless and until you shall be nominated for the presidency. Even then I have doubts whether these charges will actually be made in a form which calls for contradiction. I rather doubt whether any of the Princeton men would be willing to drag the University into a public controversy, and think that any charges that will be made will be by way of insinuations, and by irresponsible newspaper paragraphs, which you can well afford to disregard.

As to any letter of Mr. Cleveland's which they may have, it will have to speak for itself when it is published, and the chances of its containing any personal reflections upon you are so remote as to be negligible.

The other matter you mention, namely the controversy in the Board over West's book on the Graduate School, is more definite, and if any attack is made, I should guess that it will be on this ground. The statement has been made quite persistently that West had in his possession a copy of the proofs of his book annotated in your hand

writing. I think the statement first appeared in the "Alumni Weekly" under the authority of Jesse Lynch Williams. We could not, of course, deny the existence of any such proofs, and I do not suppose that you could go any further than to say that you have no recollection whatever of having revised any such proofs. If they should charge you with having stated to the Board that you wrote the introduction to the book before you had read the book itself (presumably after conversations with West as to what it would contain) that statement could not be denied, nor is it, in my judgment, seriously damaging. I felt at the moment you made the statement that it would have been much better for you to say that you had learned a whole lot from observation of West in action since you wrote that introduction, and that you had been driven to a modification of your own views. But I cannot take a very serious view of that matter, and if any references are made to it in public, I think it would be very easy to commit the blunder of giving to the incident an exaggerated importance by entering into controversy over it. I am not a politician nor the son of a politician, but I feel sure that it would require more damaging statements than I think your enemies will make to draw me into any public controversy over the matter, and that if I were actually forced into controversy I would waste very little time on the defensive, but would boldly charge that the hostility to you in connection with your administration of the affairs of the University arose out of your determination to stamp out what you believed to be exclusive privileges which had begun to show themselves in the University, and which threatened injurious consequences to the University. The whole pack would then "give tongue" on this new and larger issue, in which the public would be with you, and such relatively insignificant matters as the West book would be lost sight of.

Eventually the university tempest subsided and so far as I know the only reference to the war on the Princeton clubs that was ever printed with anything like Wilson sanction was contained in the approved sketch of his life prepared for the 1912 Presidential campaign. That authorized sketch has the following paragraphs:

> President Wilson made up his mind that the system was undemocratic and destructive of everything that an American University ought to stand for and inculcate. Yet he did not attack the clubs; he came, in 1907, with a proposal to substitute a better system for them. His idea was the division of the whole University into "Quadrangles," each "Quadrangle" or "Quad" to be composed of a certain number of students from each class with a preceptor or two living with them.
>
> The "Quad" suggestion had hardly been made when it brought down on the head of the president a storm the fury of which furnished one of the most astonishing things in the history of American colleges. The scheme was misrepresented and derided and the man who had dared propose it was assailed as a "leveller"; a "Socialist"; a man who "wanted to make a gentleman chum with a mucker." The Trustees, who had approved the "Quad" plan by an unanimous vote, were frightened into withdrawing their approval and the idea had to be, for the time at least, abandoned.

Wilson's attitude toward organized labor, as expressed in the numerous addresses and writings during his career as a teacher and as president of Princeton University, was another cause for concern. The baccalaureate address on "Unprofitable Servants"

was given wide circulation by the Underwood and Clark camps. The situation finally became so critical that it was necessary for Wilson to take a public stand that would soften his previous declaration that he was "a fierce partizan of the open shop." This he did on January 31, 1912, in the form of a reply to an inquiry that had been prearranged. In this statement he said:

> I have never been opposed to organized labor; on the contrary I have often championed its right of organization. The utterance from which you make a partial quotation was contained in a Baccalaureate address (virtually a sermon) delivered to the graduating class of Princeton University. I spoke from the text "We are unprofitable servants; we have done that which was our duty to do." I drew examples not merely from the field of labor but from every other field, of the truth of the text, namely, that those who do only their duty, who do not strive to put a spirit of generous service into what they do, are apt to become unprofitable servants. It was a moral homily, not a political address.

He then referred interested inquirers to Assemblyman Cornelius Ford, president of the New Jersey State Federation of Labor. Wilson had throughout his term as governor, by his attitude and actions, demonstrated complete friendship for the labor organizations and had used his office to assist the unions in passing laws favoring labor. In the first legislative session sixteen such measures were enacted, placing New Jersey in the front rank of States in the protection of workers. When Wilson reached the White

House he rewarded Ford by making him the nation's public printer. Incident to Ford's selection a little human side-light is worth recording. Ford, who was a type-setter in a Hoboken newspaper office, did not aspire to be public printer. He was the father of a large family and sought a place as assistant in the giant government establishment. On the morning that Senator William Hughes, Tumulty, and I were to discuss Ford's application with Wilson, word came that a ninth child had been born in the Ford household. This appealed strongly to Tumulty's sentimental side, and when we were in the President's office, urging Ford's political and technical qualifications to become an assistant in the Government Printing Office, Tumulty warmed up to the point of suggesting that Ford's increasing family obligations would seem to make it desirable that he should be named to the highest place. Wilson had a kindly feeling for Ford, and, before we left, Tumulty's persuasive eloquence had set up a new public printer. Ford, despite his lack of administrative experience, conducted the business of his department exceptionally well and without any breath of scandal.

The liquor issue was still another perplexing problem that at times threatened disaster for the ship. The Anti-Saloon League, who were very active in the politics of the State, had felt confident of Wilson's support in their fight for the passage of a local option law—the particular form of legislation professional drys were then seeking in order to redeem the State

"from the thrall of the liquor bosses." Their expectations were increased because of the fact that G. Rowland Monroe, counsel and most active leader in the cause, had been a student at Wesleyan when Wilson was teaching there. The wet vote in New Jersey was a powerful factor in the Democratic party and the source of much anxiety to the Republicans. Sewell, undisputed master of the Republicans for a generation, had laid down the dictum that all that was necessary to bring party disaster was to inject local option into a campaign. Local option was very much of an issue in the 1910 campaign. Wilson was lucky in being able to avoid taking a stand. Lewis, his opponent, was less fortunate, however. At a big meeting in Newton, the county-seat of Sussex, Lewis was heckled by a minister of one of the near-by churches, who insisted on knowing whether the Republican candidate was for or against local option. Lewis answered that while the proposed legislation might be regarded by some as a solution of the liquor problem, it would simply result, in his judgment, in segregating in three or four counties all of the saloons, with their attending evils. The clergyman announced that he would put the same question to Wilson the following night. Nugent, then the escort and political adviser of Wilson, took good care to prevent any such misfortune from befalling his candidate. When, next night, at the close of the Wilson meeting in Newton, the same minister arose to ask the candidate's views on local option, Nugent gave the signal

to the band, which belched forth a medley of noisy tunes, while Wilson, arm in arm with Nugent, disappeared from the scene.

After the election, Monroe, on the strength of an interview he had had with Wilson at Princeton during the campaign, pressed for a local option recommendation to the Legislature. Monroe felt that he had been encouraged by Wilson to believe that there would be some favorable action. The fact was, however, that Wilson never had any great personal sympathy for the drys. He used liquor himself in moderation, liked wine with his meals, and did not believe in prohibition.

The Presbytery of New Brunswick, which included Wilson's own church at Princeton, passed resolutions urging upon the governor and Legislature their renewed prayers for the enactment of local option. When the pressure became serious Wilson sent Samuel Swackhammer, former assemblyman and an active Democratic leader in Somerset County, to the officials of the Anti-Saloon League with the request not to jeopardize the Wilson program of reform legislation by injecting local option. The Anti-Saloon League, in order not to impede the Wilson program, agreed to wait. Not only the Anti-Saloon League and the Presbytery of New Brunswick but the Presbyterian Synod of New Jersey passed resolutions directing the moderator to petition the governor in favor of a law giving the people "the power by vote to abolish the saloon." When, with the legislative pro-

gram finished, the issue could no longer be evaded, Wilson, in response to a strong personal letter of appeal, wrote to the superintendent of the Anti-Saloon League declaring that while he favored local option he would never consent to have the matter fought out as a political issue. He did not make it very clear just how it could be otherwise solved. "I am in favor of local option," Wilson said in his public statement. "I am a thorough believer in local self-government and believe that every self-governing community which constitutes a social unit should have the right to control the matter of the regulation or the withholding of licenses." Wilson did not point the way in which the right might be secured. The questions involved, he said, were social and moral, not political. They had always cut the lines of party organization and party action athwart when they had been made the subject of party contests and had thrown every other question into the background. "So far as I am myself concerned, therefore," he declared, "I can never consent to have the question of local option made an issue between political parties in this state. My judgment is very clear in this matter. I do not believe that party programs of the highest consequence to the political life of the state and the nation ought to be thrust to one side and hopelessly embarrassed for long periods together by making a political issue of a great question that is essentially non-political, non-partisan, moral and social in its na-

ture." Thus the Anti-Saloon League found Wilson declaring himself in favor of their pet scheme, but unalterably opposed to having his Legislature do anything that might help them get it.

The letter created a great stir among Wilson's church friends as well as among ardent temperance people. Wilson himself was very much distressed by expressions that he had not been candid. There was much criticism of his position that the liquor issue involved questions "social and moral, not political"; and some former admirers insisted that Wilson the historian should not have made such a statement, inasmuch as every social and moral problem down through the ages had been made the subject of political action. All of the local optionists and churchmen insisted that the only way local option could be written into the statutes of the State was by political action. The churches continued to adopt resolutions, and the Anti-Saloon League forces did not give up hope of eventually winning Wilson over. To the very end of his term as governor, however, Wilson succeeded in heading off any conference with the professional drys. He invariably took the position that his recommendations to the Legislature should be confined to what he designated as the party program. After more than two years of effort the state superintendent of the Anti-Saloon League wrote Wilson on January 17, 1913, that his organization, representing twelve hundred churches of the State, felt it was

time for Wilson to realize that he was not "the Governor of the Democratic party, but the Governor of all the people," and added:

> I have written many times requesting an interview in behalf of a committee of citizens representing religious organizations to place before you, as their Governor, some sorely needed legislation. The answers which I received postpone the possibility of such appointment each time one week further into the distant future. Of course, Mr. Wilson, I would like to have this committee call on you at the State House and not at Washington.

But Wilson successfully eluded the interview. His local option stand resulted in the disappearance of that burning issue from the Presidential campaign, although it did threaten trouble at one time in Texas. His rhetoric brought recalcitrants into line, and he was seldom handicapped by issues. He picked them up when he felt like it, and scrapped them for the bigger things of saving mankind. As President he later vigorously opposed the passage of war-time prohibition and vetoed the Volstead Act.

CHAPTER XIII

THE 1912 LEGISLATIVE SESSION

A PRETTY side-light on Wilson's strong affection for the olden days at Princeton, and of his very human side, was the part he played, during the stirring hours of the 1912 legislative session, in having Chancellor Mahlon Pitney, his old classmate, confirmed as an associate justice of the United States Supreme Court. This, too, notwithstanding that Pitney, who had been elevated to the New Jersey judiciary to get him out of the active political field, typified in public life much that Wilson, with his new-found radicalism, was savagely seeking to exterminate. When, in the early part of 1912, Associate Justice John M. Harlan decided to retire, the Republican leaders of New Jersey made a united effort to have Francis J. Swayze of the New Jersey Supreme Court named to the place. President Taft was induced to come to the State and dine with several of the leaders and judges at the Newark home of former Governor Franklin Murphy, New Jersey member of the Republican National Committee. United States Senator Frank O. Briggs, then Republican state chairman, had urged Taft to name Swayze. The Roosevelt hammering was already beginning to

tell on the Taft forces in New Jersey, and it was the idea of Briggs that it would be helpful to Taft if the State were given some signal recognition. Swayze was an outstanding jurist of profound legal learning and on more than one occasion had been mentioned for the United States Supreme Court. At eighteen he had graduated with high honors at Harvard, and he was one of the overseers of that university. Never much of a politician he had served most of his life on the bench. Taft had made it rather plain to Briggs that he would probably go elsewhere to fill the Harlan vacancy. However, in his amiable way, and doubtless with an eye to cultivating better political conditions in New Jersey, he consented to come to the Murphy luncheon. Swayze, reticent almost to the point of bashfulness, and conscious of the fact that he was under inspection, was little calculated to show to advantage with the affable Taft. Pitney, a natural charmer, and free of restraint, had recently become a golf enthusiast and fascinated Taft with his experiences. Golf was a topic that always interested Taft. Briggs was a bit nonplussed when Taft subsequently declared that Pitney was the man New Jersey should place on the bench of the United States Supreme Court. The suggestion was one that Briggs could not turn aside, and Pitney was named in February, 1912.

Then began the struggle for confirmation. In the midst of the gloom Wilson publicly commended the appointment. There immediately developed a vio-



Lewis Historical Pub. Co.

MAHLON PITNEY
Associate justice of U. S. Supreme Court.

lent opposition because of harsh rulings against labor that Pitney was charged with having made in New Jersey. Pitney's father, Henry C. Pitney, who had earlier served as vice-chancellor, entertained unfriendly views toward organized labor, and his hostile decisions were confused with those of his son. The feeling between Taft and the progressives in the Senate was anything but good, and some of the Democrats joined with La Follette in blocking confirmation. When the situation became critical, Wilson got Culberson of Texas on the telephone and had some of the rest of us go to see Martine to urge confirmation. He summoned me to the State-house where, with Pitney, he was busily engaged with the long-distance telephone. They were occupying the inner office of the governor and were calling each other Tommy and May—reminiscent of their days together at Princeton. "You can do more with Martine than any of the rest of us," Wilson told me, and I got on the telephone to Washington. At my suggestion Martin P. Devlin was also put to work on Martine, and Pitney later sent us autographed photographs of himself in his judicial robes. Not only were labor decisions that had been rendered by Pitney's father as a vice-chancellor operating to Pitney's disadvantage, but his own judicial conduct was being most carefully scrutinized. Pitney was of the type known at the time as "straight-goods Republicans." Roosevelt had so stirred up and divided the Senate that there was a very strong demarcation be-

tween the group that felt loyalty to Taft and the group that either was hostile or indifferent. Martine, with all his faults, was recognized and respected as an honest liberal, and he finally won the Senate over to accepting Pitney. Briggs told me afterward that if it had not been for Martine's earnest efforts with the Senate, Pitney could not have been confirmed. And so Princeton '79, golf, and Martine all played their part in making an associate justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. Before he retired as chancellor, Pitney reciprocated most graciously by calling a special session of the Board of Pardons, over which he then presided, and securing the parole of an unfortunate saloon-keeper who had killed his wife in a drunken quarrel. For years the man had kept the down-town rendezvous of the newspaper fraternity of Trenton, and the public felt that he was innocent of any deliberate attempt at murder. Pitney, as a justice of the Supreme Court, had presided at the trial—his first murder case—and he had so persistently opposed any parole that the prisoner had given up all hope of release.

Pitney was sworn in at Washington on Monday, March 18, 1912, at noon, and earlier in the morning of that day, in order to accommodate Wilson, who had not appointed a successor as chancellor, he signed decrees, orders, and other papers needed to keep the Chancery Court a going concern. The judges of the State immediately combined to have one of their own number made chancellor—the highest judicial officer

in New Jersey. Associate Justice Charles G. Garrison, whose brother afterward became secretary of war, was unanimously indorsed by the State Judiciary. Garrison's selection was blocked by Devlin. A decision that Garrison had rendered upsetting a verdict of eighty-five hundred dollars against the Public Service Corporation, and in favor of a girl who lost a leg as a result of being run over by a trolley-car, on the theory that the jury did not "give due weight to the skill with which mechanical surgery adapts artificial limbs in a favorable case such as this," proved his undoing. Garrison had been bitterly scored for his view that a cork leg could be a sufficient substitute for a natural one. Devlin, while agreeing that Garrison was an able jurist, pointed out that such a hard, cold construction of a statute was well calculated not only to bring about popular distrust of the law and the courts but to increase the bitterness of the attacks that William Randolph Hearst was then making on Wilson. Hearst was supporting Champ Clark.

"What do I care about Hearst?" Wilson asked, a bit irritated.

"Well, you are a candidate for President, and you certainly don't want to go out of your way to provide Hearst with additional ammunition," said Devlin. "Don't you think it is foolish to invite attacks from such powerful opposition?"

"Devlin has floored me on that Garrison thing," Wilson declared a few minutes later, as he emerged

from his private office. Together with Devlin, Tumulty, and the writer of these lines, he discussed the need of humanizing the courts, and I urged that he name Edwin Robert Walker, a sound lawyer, with no corporation alliances, who was already making an excellent record as vice-chancellor. Walker was scarcely known to Wilson, but the suggestion of his name met with the hearty approval of Devlin and Tumulty. On the evening of the day Pitney was sworn in at Washington Wilson nominated Walker as chancellor, and he was promptly confirmed by the Senate.

Among other powers, the chancellor has the picking of his associate vice-chancellors, who correspond in dignity and emoluments with associate justices of the Supreme Court. Wilson asked that Fort, who had preceded him as governor, be named to the vacant vice-chancellorship resulting from Walker's promotion. In view of repeated disagreements that Fort, when an associate justice of the Supreme Court, had had with some of the judiciary, Walker convinced Wilson that the selection would not do. I suggested that it would be a very gracious thing to name Lewis, who had been Wilson's Republican opponent for the governorship and who had served as banking and insurance commissioner. This was acceptable to the chancellor. Lewis was a man of wide knowledge and experience and extremely likable. He was in no sense a candidate and had tentatively accepted a bank presidency carrying with it a

salary considerably larger than that of the vice-chancellor. The idea of the bench, however, appealed to him. Wilson at first hesitated, expressing fear that the appointment of his political adversary might savor somewhat of a deal. While the matter was still pending Wilson carried the Wisconsin primaries, and, in the rejoicing of the hour, the dramatic Tumulty exultantly remarked that it would be a very handsome thing for Wilson to give his approval of the Lewis appointment. Wilson consented, and Lewis was named and accepted. Ever afterward it was a favorite pleasantry among friends of both men that the Wisconsin primaries had not only put new life into the Wilson boom but had also put Lewis on the chancery bench.

The foremost question before the legislative session of 1912 was the abolishing of railroad grade-crossings. For many years the issue had been acute, especially in North Jersey cities like Paterson and Passaic, where the main tracks of the Erie and Susquehanna railroads ran through the middle of the streets in the business center. As a result of the agitation in these communities an organization had been perfected which not only included the mayors and public officials, as well as chambers of commerce and other civic bodies, but large elements of the public. Railroad domination of both old political parties had become arrogant. In 1912 the Democrats, then freed of boss control, had inserted a radical plank in their platform calling for the elimination of the railroad grade-

crossing. Wilson was in attendance at the convention and thoroughly acquiesced in this plank. The Republicans had likewise adopted a plank in favor of wiping out the railroad grade-crossings, and they determined to do their part in ending the bitter controversy. After much effort, legislation was finally evolved resembling very closely the act that Connecticut had adopted twenty years earlier. It was more drastic than the Connecticut statute, which compelled the removal annually of one crossing for every sixty miles, for the New Jersey statute required that one crossing must be removed for every thirty miles of track. The Connecticut statute, too, was a bit more elastic in that it permitted the State authorities to exercise discretion where the financial condition of a railroad company did not warrant grade-crossing removals. In the case of the New Jersey statute no such discretion was provided. The magnitude of the problem brought a swarm of railroad lobbyists to the State-house. The regular corps of lawyers, making a business of handling legislators, was augmented by the hiring of politicians and "lame-duck" statesmen. The State organization of mayors kept diligently on the job, and more than once in that session the presiding officers were compelled to order the flock of railroad lobbyists from the legislative halls. Ugly charges flew thick and fast. Out of the turmoil, however, there eventually came the bill that would compel railroads to wipe out the grade-crossings at the rate of one each year for every thirty miles of line.

It was a composite which sought to retain the best features of bills that had been introduced in the Senate by Pierce of Union County and in the House by McCran of Passaic County. While Wilson had throughout the session been giving his time largely to his campaign for the Presidential nomination, there was not the slightest doubt among those who were supposed to be in his confidence that he would sign the measure. There was genuine consternation in his camp when, upon his return from a speaking engagement, he announced that it was his conviction that such drastic legislation was entirely unfair to the railroads and he would veto the measure. All of the heads of the great railroads operating in New Jersey —and many of the big railroads have their terminals there—had bombarded Wilson with arguments, including the delicate intimation that by boldly vetoing a railroad grade-crossing bill in New York Charles Evans Hughes had greatly increased his standing as a national political figure. Henry S. Drinker, soon afterward the distinguished President of Lehigh University, and equally eminent in the legal councils of the Lehigh Valley Railroad, spent a great deal of time with Wilson at Trenton. James McCrea, president of the Pennsylvania Railroad, and W. H. Truesdale, president of the Delaware, Lackawanna, and Western, both of which systems had been abolishing grade-crossings, especially in the larger cities, were as violently opposed to the new act as were the railroads that had been shirking their public obliga-

tion. McCrea contended that the Pennsylvania Railroad would be required to remove crossings at an estimated cost approximating a million dollars annually. "While the Legislature felt that they had to do something in performance of the party platforms," Truesdale declared, in a long presentation of his case to Wilson, "they have in their zeal overlooked the necessity for constructive statesmanship and safeguarding of all interests which are affected, not only by this problem alone, but by the enormous financial outlay which it entails." The railroad officials strongly commended the existing Public Utility Commission, which had pointed out that a great difference existed in the financial ability of the different railroads to provide funds for eliminating grade-crossings, and that as a state-wide proposition the cost would be very great. The railroad officials quoted freely from the report of the Utility Commission, and Wilson in his veto message was equally liberal in quoting from that report. The arguments of the railroad men were condensed and adapted into the veto, and their insistence that the matter should be left with the Board of Public Utility Commissioners with power to push the elimination of such crossings as fast as possible "without bringing hopeless embarrassment upon the railways" was completely indorsed by Wilson. "In this way," said the Wilson veto, "all the results that could possibly be attained by the present bill would be attained without the risk and perhaps the discouragement and discredit of at-

tempting a thing, in itself inequitable and impracticable." When the Wilson veto finally reached the Senate it was found that the bill accompanying it enfolded one of the letters of the railroad men embodying arguments almost identical with the Wilson veto. The letter had been inadvertently left in the jacket of the bill, and although the Republicans at the time were indignant at Wilson's action, they did not make any political use of the incident. McCran, later attorney-general of the State, had the largest personal and political interest in the wiping out of the grade-crossings. He had always lived in Paterson, the city which suffered most from the evil, and the people there were naturally the most keenly stirred up. When word had reached the legislative halls that Wilson was going to veto the railroad grade-crossing measure and that he had decided to send the veto message to the Senate, McCran went at once to the desk of the secretary of the Senate and there awaited the coming of the governor's veto. When the bill accompanying the veto was opened, the railroad official's letter fell out. Several of the senators who gathered about McCran agreed with him that the contents of the letter were hardly intended for publication, and so without attempting in any way to embarrass Wilson's Presidential candidacy, they magnanimously returned the letter to him.

As this is written, more than a dozen years after the veto, Paterson and Passaic are still patiently fighting the railroad grade-crossings which Wilson in his mes-

sage recognized were threatening life and interfering with the convenience of the communities. At the time the situation was somewhat befogged by the fact that Wilson and the Republican legislators were muddying the political waters by personal hostilities. Wilson had the advantage in newspaper favor. Wilson had spent so much time, during the 1912 session, in work on the Presidential campaign that there had been a great deal of confusion, and toward the end the Republican members had issued a statement declaring that the public business was sadly demoralized. Wilson's temper was stirred, and he rejoined with a tart defense. "Ordinarily I would remain entirely silent under partisan attacks of this kind," said Wilson, "but I feel that it is due to the people of the state that I should speak my very emphatic protest against an uncalled for and grossly discourteous attack upon my official career, proceeding as a manifesto from a conference of the Republican members of the Legislature. . . . The statement that I have by frequent absences from the state in any degree neglected my duties as Governor, is absolutely false. No important matter of business has been allowed to fall in arrears in my office. . . . Almost all the bills of capital consequence were reserved until the last. Among them none were more conspicuous than those which attempted to break down at one point or another the best legislation of the session of 1911 to the maintenance of which both parties were explicitly pledged in the campaign of the autumn of 1911. . . .

This, that, and the other door of loose practice was deliberately opened. It was my duty to stand guard against these things and I have done so. Against the bills to this effect which have been passed over my veto, I wish to utter my earnest protest in the name not only of party obligations—an obligation fairly resting upon both parties—but in the name of the people of the state. The session has been fruitful of nothing so much as of legislation tending to impair rather than to increase the efficiency of the laws of the state."

Wilson had been otherwise so much occupied that he did not follow his practice of the first legislative session, when he had kept up a constant prodding by issuing special messages. Judge William P. Martin of Essex County made a careful study and analysis of the various pending legislative measures. Many of the Wilson veto messages were written by Judge Martin. Wilson sought to justify his failure to follow in 1912 his course of 1911 by declaring: "I did not deem it wise or courteous to avow, as the session advanced, by repeated messages that the great matters were to be ignored and that the whole force of the session was to be spent upon measures of another sort and of questionable expediency. If the session has been barren and disappointing, as it has been, the people of the state will know where to bestow the blame." As a matter of fact the session of 1912 had been given over very largely to consideration of the measure compelling the railroads to abolish grade-

crossings. Wilson's hurried trips over the country, attempting to corral delegates, kept him on the jump. These engagements occupied so much of his time that he had little opportunity to keep in close personal touch with the Legislature. When the session adjourned he spent considerable time filling speaking engagements throughout the East. Renewed attention was called to the bitter factional feeling at Princeton when Wilson failed to attend the inauguration exercises of his old friend John Grier Hibben as president of the university on May 11. The governor of New Jersey is ex-officio president of the Board of Trustees of Princeton University, but instead of attending the ceremonies Wilson went to New York.

The generous and sympathetic interests that the Republican leaders of the State took in Wilson's struggle is illustrated by the frequent messages that he received from such men as former Governor Stokes, who had become state chairman. A typical note of this character was sent to Wilson by Stokes, February 14, 1912, reading:

> I heartily congratulate you upon the outcome of the Oklahoma primaries. It is a very significant evidence of public sentiment and must be very encouraging to you. You are certainly making a courageous fight and cannot fail to arouse the admiration of your fair-minded opponents.

At the same time that Wilson was getting this form

of indorsement from old-school Republicans like Stokes, a banker, he was getting cheering letters from such liberals as John Brisbane Walker, some of whom had been fighting the so-called capitalistic group for forty years or more. Walker, in commending Wilson for recanting the things he had written as history, wrote on February 19, 1912:

> Your environment was such as to prevent you from thinking. I would not have believed that I could have regard for a man who could write so ignorantly and with so much prejudice of place and class. But I do believe in you. You have been awakened to do the work of a Lincoln. I forgive the past and pin my faith not only to your honesty and integrity for the future but that you can see clearly all that the battle for humanity means.

From these excerpts it will be seen that Wilson appeared to be doing the almost miraculous thing of capturing the imagination of thinkers who belonged to diametrically opposite groups.

Frequent attempts were made to establish social intimacy between the members of the Republican Legislature and Wilson. When he set out to be companionable, Wilson told delightful stories and displayed a spirit of good fellowship that was in strong contrast with his stern official side. It was difficult, however, to have him mingle much with the politicians, and he did not get any joy out of jokes where he was the target. It is a practice of the New Jersey State Senate to give a dinner for the governor in the closing weeks of each legislative session. The menu-card

arranged for the dinner given March 22, 1912, in Atlantic City took the form of a railroad time-table and was very cleverly done. It caricatured Wilson's flights over the country chasing the Presidential nomination. It made no great hit with Wilson.

CHAPTER XIV

HIS OWN SOUTHLAND FAILS WILSON

VIRGINIA, his birthplace, and Georgia, where he had spent most of his boyhood days, likewise the home State of Mrs. Wilson, were sore spots in the pre-convention fights. Thomas F. Ryan, the New York financier whose name had been conveniently dragged into the picture to help soften the Harvey incident, set to work to prevent Virginia's giving encouragement to the cause. Virginia lost a great chance by turning her back on a great Virginian. Ryan dominated the old leaders who controlled the Virginia political machine at the time and had himself sent as a delegate from that State to the Baltimore convention. Wilson's shift to the initiative and referendum was the chief card used to frighten the conservative voters of Virginia. And when the situation became menacing, Wilson set to work by another shift to ease the blow. Public life is necessarily full of inconsistencies, and success is mostly achieved by somersault. Politicians of all grades are wont to temper their acts and words to meet the prevailing winds. "What is history but a fable agreed upon?" observed the experienced Napoleon.

In Wilson's native State, Dean R. H. Dabney of the University of Virginia, afterward president of the University of Cincinnati, carried on almost single-handed for several months, and did more for the cause than any other individual. John Stewart Bryan, publisher of the "Richmond Times-Dispatch," joined Dabney in advocating Wilson, but they got a chilly reception from Senators Martin and Swanson and Representative Flood, the political masters of the State, who, training with Ryan, were violently opposed to Wilson. The machine backed Oscar Underwood. Dabney and John Stewart Bryan sought to appeal to the pride of Virginia by pointing to the fact that no son of the State had been elected President in sixty-one years, although in the first half of the history of the United States seven native Virginians occupied the Presidential chair. The Martin-Swanson combination made much of the fact that Virginians were a conservative people and that Woodrow Wilson came near being a radical demagogue who was either insincere in character or intellectually too vacillating to be trusted as a political guide. The fact that Wilson, after disapproving for years, in his Princeton lectures, of the initiative and referendum, had now expressed approval of those measures, gave color to the charges of the Virginia bosses. After a vast deal of correspondence, Dabney prevailed upon Wilson to let him publish a letter showing that his approval of the initiative, referendum, and recall was of qualified character. Dabney

and Wilson had been fellow-students in the law department of the University of Virginia, and they addressed each other as "Dear Woodrow" and "Dear Heath," Heath being Dabney's middle name. Like most university men, Dabney was keenly interested in Wilson's step from the class-room to the throne of power.

Wilson had written Dabney giving his latest views, and into this letter some additional material was incorporated by Wilson when the time came for publication. Dabney accompanied the publication of the Wilson letter with a letter of his own, setting forth that he knew that it was in accordance with Wilson's own deliberate advice that the New Jersey Democrats excluded any reference to the initiative, referendum, and recall from the platform adopted in their 1911 state campaign. The letter to Dabney was written by Wilson while campaigning at his old home in Staunton, Virginia, on November 16, 1911, and the subsequent changes, before publication, were made in Trenton. The letter as it finally appeared in the "Richmond Times-Dispatch" of December 18, 1911, was as follows:

STAUNTON, VA., Nov. 16, 1911

MY DEAR HEATH:—

We did not have a chance when I was with you to have our talk out about the initiative, referendum and recall; it may be worth while, therefore, in view of the importance of the subject for me to summarize somewhat more formally what I said to you in scraps.

In the first place, with regard to my own state of mind. I surrendered to the facts, as every candid man must. My whole prepossession—my whole reasoning—was against these things. But when I came into contact with candid, honest, public spirited men who could speak (with regard, for example to Oregon) from personal observation and experience, they floored me flat with their narration of what had actually happened. I found in the men who had advocated these things, who had put them into operation, and who had accomplished things by them, not critics or opponents of representative government, but men who were eager to restore it where it had been lost, and who had taken,—successfully taken—these means to recover for the people what they had unquestionably lost—control of their own affairs.

In short, they are not trying to change our institutions. The initiative, referendum and recall were in their eyes (as they are in mine) merely a means to an end—that end being the restoration of the control of public opinion. Where opinion already controls, where there is now actual, genuine representative government, as I believe there is in Virginia and in the South in general, they are not necessary. Each state must judge for itself. I do not see how it could be made a subject of national policy. The people will, in my opinion, demand these measures only where they are manifestly necessary to take legislation and the control of administrative action away from special, hopelessly entrenched interests. They are no general or universal panaceas!

The recall of judges I am absolutely against, and always have been. It is a remedy for a symptom, not for a disease—the disease being the control of the system by influences which general opinion has ceased to control.

It interested me very much to find that even in Oregon

literally no one thought of these new methods of action as a substitute for representative institutions, but only as a means of stimulation and control. They are as devoted to the idea of our representative institutions as we are—and are bent upon realizing these ideas in practice. That is their conscious object.

As for the recall, it is seldom used outside of the municipalities. I do not remember an instance of its use on a state officer. It is merely "a gun behind the door."

Faithfully yours,
Woodrow Wilson.

Wilson found it desirable to issue a warning to enthusiastic Virginia friends, especially among the university folks, cautioning against criticism of Bryan or La Follette. Dabney had rather mildly attempted to show that Wilson did not belong to the radical group that included Bryan and La Follette. What Dabney had written had been reprinted outside of Virginia and was calculated to make trouble. It was intended to convince constructive Democrats that while Wilson was not unwise enough to make himself offensive to Bryan, he nevertheless did not indorse the Bryan policies of government ownership of railways. "The fear that you would be under Bryan's thumb," Dabney advised Wilson, "is one of the bugaboos that scares the conservatives in Virginia."

Largely through the efforts of George Bryan, a brother of John Stewart Bryan, Virginia friends had Wilson invited to Richmond to address a joint meeting of the City Council and the General Assembly of

Virginia on February 1, 1912. To give added zest to the event hundreds of residents of Staunton, Wilson's birthplace, were brought to Richmond by special train. Wilson made an exceedingly happy speech. He did not refer directly to the initiative and referendum, but he skirted close to the border-line, illustrating his talk with his best stories. "Do you remember the quaint story of the Scottish Highlander who went into the market of Edinburgh, followed by his dog?" He continued: "He went to a fishmonger's stall, and the dog incautiously dropped his tail into a basket of lobsters, and one of the lobsters nipped his tail. Whereupon the dog went yelping down the street, with the lobster bouncing after. The fishmonger said, 'Hoot, mon; whussle to your dog.' 'Hoot,' said the Scotchman, 'whussle to your lobster.' Now if you think some of your leaders are going too fast a pace, don't whistle to them. Whistle to the spirit of the age. Whistle to the questions that have whipped their consciences and dominated their understandings." And he took some quiet digs at the Ryan-Martin-Swanson-Flood combination that was fighting him, saying among other things:

> No group of men less than a majority has a right to tell me how I have got to live in America. I will submit to the majority, because I have been trained to do it, though I may have my private opinion even of the majority; but, being a dyed-in-the-wool Democrat, I am proud to submit my judgment to that majority of my

fellow-citizens. I know there are some gum-shoe politicians in both camps who do not agree with that theory at all. . . . Not that I am an insurgent, because I believe in organization; I believe that party success is impossible without organization; but I make this distinction between organization and the machine—organization is a systematic coöperation of men for a common purpose, while the machine is a systematic coöperation of men for a private purpose. I know what I am talking about because we have a perfect specimen in New Jersey. Now I know what supports the machine because I have seen them eat out of a spoon. It is a golden spoon and I have seen the nurse that fed them and I have seen that nurse absolutely impartial as between the Republican machine and the Democratic machine and the price of food is that the machine will be good, that it will see that nothing is done that will hurt the nurse, that nothing is done which will interfere with the private understanding that is established in the nursery. . . . No man that I know of and trust, no man that I will consent to consort with, is trying to change anything fundamental in America. But what means have we of change? Suppose that every time you try to change your government you have the experience that the enterprising people of New Jersey had for sixteen years together, when to choose between one ticket and another ticket was to choose between tweedledum and tweedledee. . . . I never saw this as I see it now until I came into actual, practical contact with the administration of a great state. I thank God that I have learned something in the last eighteen months, and what I have learned is this—that you have got to choose between two courses, either constructive leadership which you will stand behind to the limit, or else a resort direct to the people themselves. There are no other ways.

Wilson's rapier-thrusts at the Virginia bosses were roundly applauded; he produced more hearty laughter by taking friendly pot-shots at the Republicans, declaring, however, that, in the "delightful expression" of Horace Greeley, "You know we have got to forgive them, damn them." But all the efforts of Dabney and John Stewart Bryan were fruitless so far as lining up a solid Virginia delegation to Baltimore was concerned. Ryan, who became one of William Jennings Bryan's chief targets in the convention, was put on the delegation, and fourteen Virginia delegates remained against Wilson at Baltimore until the final lap. The State, originally for Underwood, kept shifting back and forth between Underwood and Clark, twelve of the votes going to Clark on the thirty-fifth ballot. Wilson's friends were able to corral nine and a half votes for him in Virginia, but that was all. Recalling the amount of labor that Dabney and John Stewart Bryan had given in the attempt to cultivate sentiment for Wilson, I asked Bryan in later years whether Wilson had ever manifested any appreciation of their efforts. Bryan smilingly answered: "I do not know whether you recall your New Testament, but if you do, you will appreciate the profound truth: 'Verily, I say unto you, They have their reward' "; and then the Richmond publisher added:

"Down to Gehenna, or up to the throne,
He travels fastest who travels alone."

Georgia was even more disappointing than Virginia and refused to give Wilson a single vote. That State likewise refused to switch to Wilson when his nomination at Baltimore seemed inevitable, and did not actually go to him until the forty-sixth—and final—ballot, after the name of Underwood had been withdrawn. That is true of Mississippi, also. South Carolina, alone among the States where Wilson had resided in the old Southland, stood solidly by him. He had a good working majority in the North Carolina delegation, but could only muster three out of the eight delegates from Tennessee. Wilson's initiative and referendum switch had given intimate friends among his old classmates much concern.

Cyrus H. McCormick, liberal contributor to the cause and always an ardent Wilson supporter at Princeton, warned Wilson of the enthusiastic reception that had been given to Underwood, campaigning in Chicago, who had declared that any amendment establishing the initiative and referendum would destroy the very fabric of the Constitution of the United States. Wilson, during the early campaign, had made a number of radical speeches. At Harrisburg he savagely attacked Wall Street which resulted in charges from both the "Springfield Republican" and the "New York World," before and afterward among his most consistent supporters, that Wilson had misrepresented the money situation. He was saddened by these criticisms, as he was firmly convinced that

the banking interests in Wall Street were deliberately manipulating stocks for their own immediate advantage.

After his futile attempt to win his native Virginia in February, he went to Kentucky to address the Legislature, and from there to Chicago, making rear-end speeches as his train traveled through Illinois, only to fail again. With the disaster at the Illinois primary, there came a series of chilling events. Ten days later, on April 19, Nebraska, where the Bryan influence was hopefully counted on to save the day, was instructed for Clark. Bryan split the delegation, however, between Clark and Wilson. Massachusetts and Rhode Island went overwhelmingly for Clark. On May 6, the Maryland State Convention indorsed Clark, and a few days later both California and Iowa were instructed for him. The chief bright spots were Pennsylvania and Texas, which had indorsed Wilson, and the Wisconsin primaries, which gave him nine thousand plurality. On May 28 the Wilson supporters were beaten in Essex County, New Jersey, and while in the total vote Wilson carried the state by sixteen thousand, he only had twenty-four out of the twenty-eight delegates instructed for him.

Despite the jolt that had come in the Essex County primaries of May 28, Wilson the next day sent a letter written in his own hand to Judge John W. Wescott asking "if you will do me the honor of plac-

ing my name in nomination before the Baltimore convention."

I know of no one who could do it more impressively or convincingly, and it would give me great personal gratification to have you do so," Wilson said to Wescott. The letter, dated at Princeton, was signed "Affectionately yours."

Replying, Judge Wescott wrote:

CAMDEN, N. J.,
May 31, 1912.

MY DEAR DR. WILSON:

Yours of the 29th instant received. Your request at once abashes and humiliates me. It is a big job you ask me to perform. My response is a quotation from myself long since uttered:

"I would rather nominate Woodrow Wilson at the Baltimore convention than be president of the United States."

JOHN W. WESCOTT.

The hope of Wilson now rested on Bryan. There was much uneasiness as to what Bryan might do. It was but natural that he should hunger for the nomination for himself. Three times he had been defeated, and now there appeared to be a certainty that the Republican warfare would hand the White House over to the Democrats. Being human, Bryan, who had, through affection and fear, dominated the party for a longer period than any other

man in all its history, undoubtedly hoped the lightning might again strike him. Politics was his business, and the White House was his long cherished goal. Since 1876 he had been attending Democratic National Conventions, and his nomination for the Presidency at Chicago in 1896 was in pursuance of a well organized plan. The intervening years had seen him grow in fame and material things. It is one of the pleasant political fictions that financial rewards are few and that men serve, or aspire to serve, in places of great power at the sacrifice of their personal fortunes. That seldom happens.

In an article in the "Atlantic Monthly" in July, 1897, Wilson declared there are few things more disconcerting than the fact that we must continue to take our executive policy from Presidents given us by nominating conventions, adding: "We might have had Mr. Bryan for President, because of the impression which may be made upon an excited assembly by a good voice and a few ringing sentences flung forth just after a cold man, who gave unpalatable counsel, had sat down. The country knew absolutely nothing about Mr. Bryan before his nomination and it would not have known anything about him afterward had he not chosen to make speeches."

"It has become a commonplace amongst us," he continued, "that conventions prefer dark horses—prefer those who are not tested leaders with well-known records to those who are. It has become a commonplace amongst all nations which have tried

popular institutions that the actions of such bodies as our nominating conventions are subject to the play of passion and of chance."

Wilson was now in the position where he must depend largely upon "the play of passion and of chance." The propaganda campaign that had been carried on, at such great cost and with so many close financial calls, had been effective in stirring much unorganized sentiment for Wilson throughout the country. Every angle, from the fight to democratize Princeton to the battles against the Jersey bosses and for the regeneration of that State, had been duly spread before the whole country. By long odds Wilson had the advantage in the matter of publicity, while Clark, with the aid of William Randolph Hearst and most of the old-line political organizations, had a majority of the delegates. It was disheartening to Wilson that, in addition to his defeats in the South, Clark had won over him by upward of two hundred thousand majority in the States where there had been direct primary contests. In the first big test under Wilson's newly found direct primary idea the people had signally failed to rally to his standard.

CHAPTER XV

BALTIMORE

WHEN the National Convention assembled at Baltimore in June, 1912, there was more of hope than of confidence at Sea Girt, where the Wilsons were occupying the State's gubernatorial summer cottage. Wilson had less than one third of the delegates. In common with the rest of us he felt that the Baltimore nomination was for him equivalent to an election, in view of Roosevelt's terrific battering of Taft and of the Republican organization leaders. Just what he might do if the convention did not nominate him or some outstanding Progressive, he was not ready to say. His friend Record was on intimate terms with the radicals surrounding Roosevelt, and he played no small part in helping frame their program. He was one of the leaders in the primary fight to carry New Jersey for Roosevelt and was one of the delegates to the Chicago convention that year. The old Republican organization in New Jersey had supported Taft, who was snowed under in the primary. Record and Governor Fort, who headed the delegation to Chicago, were very much in the inner councils throughout the convention week. When I returned from Chicago I

spent considerable time at Sea Girt with Wilson, and he was much interested in what transpired there. His nomination was still in grave doubt, and he made no secret, at least to his friends, that the naming of an out-and-out reactionary at Baltimore might cause him to bolt as Roosevelt was threatening to do. Francis J. Heney and Charles R. Crane were sure that if Wilson was nominated Roosevelt would not fight him. Crane, multimillionaire, who had been named by President Taft as minister to China and had been hastily recalled as he was about to embark at San Francisco because of alleged indiscreet talk, and Heney, who had made a reputation as a prosecutor of criminals in California, were typical of Republican Progressives wavering between Wilson and Roosevelt. Wilson at the moment was as full of the crusading spirit as Roosevelt.

The first work planned by the old guard was to smother the Bryan influence in the Baltimore convention. As a preliminary it was decided to pick Alton B. Parker, who in the eyes of Bryan was most conspicuously identified with the reactionary forces of the country. Bryan, on his way East from the Republican National Convention, where he had again been serving as newspaper reporter, drafted a telegram which he sent to all four of the leading candidates for the nomination—Clark, Wilson, Underwood, and Harmon. In this telegram Bryan declared that in the interest of harmony he had suggested that the temporary chairman, who was to

sound the key-note of the campaign, should be a progressive, but that eight of the members of the subcommittee of the Democratic National Committee had, over the protest of the remaining eight, decided to recommend Parker. "I shall be pleased to join with you and your friends in opposing his selection by the full committee or by the convention," the Bryan telegram concluded. Bryan had played one of his master political strokes. The test on this fight would demonstrate whether or not the conservatives could unhorse Bryan.

Some of the Wilson forces were badly frightened. Wilson was in the market for votes, and a misstep might prove disastrous. The progressive forces were in a disorganized state, and there was considerable uncertainty whether or not Bryan could marshal them. Before the receipt of the Bryan message, Wilson, in answer to a question from the "Baltimore Evening Sun," which was supporting him with great vigor and which played a very considerable part in stiffening the Wilson delegates and winning converts during the hot and trying days of the convention, had stated that his friends were on the people's side in everything that affected the organization of the convention and that they were certain not to forget their standards. It was the idea of some of the Wilson supporters that this published statement was sufficient, but both Tumulty and Mrs. Wilson were convinced that their real hope was Bryan and that the thing to do was to take a bold stand. Wilson came

to this view himself, and discarding the suggested telegram that McCombs had framed for his approval, he wrote one of his own, addressed to Bryan and beginning, "You are quite right." He then set forth that inasmuch as the Baltimore convention was to be made up of men who were progressive in principle and by conviction, it must "if it is not to be put in a wrong light before the country, express its convictions in its organization and in its choice of the men who are to speak for it." Bryan, Wilson pointed out, was entirely within his rights in doing everything to bring about that result, and "no one will doubt where my sympathies lie."

This message, resulting largely from the firm stand taken by Mrs. Wilson and Tumulty, heartened the progressives and gave Wilson a place of leadership that helped materially in the days to come. It also served to stiffen Bryan's faith in Wilson as a progressive. The friends of Clark urged that the National Committee substitute Senator Ollie James for Parker, and although Wilson supporters expressed a willingness to accept James, the National Committee insisted on presenting Parker for temporary chairman. Bryan, on the floor of the convention, failing to induce any one to stand in opposition to the National Committee's choice, was eventually forced to permit his own name to go before the delegates, and on the roll-call he received 508 votes for temporary chairman, Parker getting 579 votes. The Clark forces stood by the National Committee and threw

their votes to Parker, while the Wilson votes in Pennsylvania, Texas, Wisconsin, New Jersey, and elsewhere supported Bryan. That, of course, also played a considerable part in strengthening the Wilson position with Bryan. For permanent chairman of the convention, James, a Clark man, but likewise a friend of Bryan, was selected.

On the first ballot, taken June 28, Clark received 440½ votes, while Wilson received 324, at least twenty votes more than had been counted upon by the Wilson managers. There was much manœuvering, but Clark continued to pick up until the tenth ballot, when he had 556 votes, ten more than a majority, while Wilson's total was but 360½. Ollie James, who was a Clark adherent, in announcing the result, declared that no nomination had been made, "although a majority of the delegates have voted for Champ Clark." This observation badly frightened the nervous Wilson managers, who recognized the grave likelihood of its effect upon the convention. A. Mitchell Palmer, from the Pennsylvania delegation, promptly challenged the right of the chairman to show any such partiality. "Billy" Hughes, who was on terms of close friendship with James, suggested that the matter be left in his hands. He made his way to the rostrum, where he informed James that the convention was in a state of great unrest anyhow, and that several suggestions had already been made to unseat James as permanent chairman. James, who despite his great size and powerful voice was an

exceedingly timid man, never again showed partiality in his rulings during the remainder of the convention.

There was apprehension that the Underwood strength, totaling ninety-four votes, would shift to Clark and produce the stampede that would insure his nomination. But under the leadership of Alabama, tenacious in its loyalty to Underwood, Georgia, Mississippi, Florida, and Louisiana held firmly in line and did not break to Wilson until the forty-sixth ballot, when the nomination was assured. Bryan was in frequent telephonic communication with Wilson at Sea Girt, as was likewise McCombs, who was in direct command of the Wilson forces. The switch of the seventy-six votes of New York to Clark gave Bryan his opportunity to offer a resolution prepared by his brother Charles, demanding the "withdrawal of any delegate under any obligations to J. Pierpont Morgan, Thomas F. Ryan, August Belmont, or any other member of the privilege-hunting and favor-seeking class." Belmont and Ryan were both on the floor of the convention as delegates, and their friends began howling shouts of vociferous denunciation at Bryan. While Virginia had refused to send a Wilson delegation to Baltimore, it did furnish Bryan a good target by sending Ryan. Belmont and Ryan, both generous contributors, found stout defenders, the debate turning chiefly upon the right to demand the withdrawal of delegates whose credentials had been approved by the convention. Just before the vote was taken, Bryan withdrew that portion of the

resolution demanding the unseating of Ryan and Belmont, but by a large majority the resolution, as adopted, declared the convention "opposed to the nomination of any candidate for President who is the representative of or under any obligation to J. Pierpont Morgan, Thomas F. Ryan, August Belmont, or any other member of the privilege-hunting and favor-seeking class."

When the fourteenth ballot was called, Bryan, who had been voting for Clark under the instructions he had received in Nebraska, found his chance to bolt. The excuse he gave was that as long as New York—which he described as Ryan's agent—recorded its vote for Clark, he would not continue to vote for him. The convention, Bryan pointed out, had by a vote of more than four to one adopted his resolution, pledging itself not to nominate any man who was under obligations to Ryan, Morgan, or Belmont; and any man accepting the support of New York, whose votes were controlled under the unit rule by Tammany, could not have his support. Clark's willingness to take the nomination at the hands of Tammany was sufficient justification to depart from the instructions Nebraska had given, and Bryan switched to Wilson. Nebraska, which on the thirteenth ballot had stood thirteen for Clark and three for Wilson, under the Bryan influence changed on the fourteenth ballot to twelve for Wilson and four for Clark. While the bold action did not bring Wilson within hailing distance of the nomination, it did result in call-

ing forth an immense flood of telegrams from people all over the country urging the delegates to stand with Bryan. McCombs's propaganda work, carried on for Wilson, began to bear fruit.

Clark's managers realized that the "folks back home" had been deeply aroused by the fight Bryan had made and that Clark had been given a bad wound. They hurriedly summoned Clark to Baltimore with the idea of having him go personally before the convention and attempt to bolster up his wavering cause. No candidate who had ever received a clear majority of all the votes in any Democratic National Convention had failed, on subsequent ballots, to secure the two thirds necessary to give him the nomination. When Clark reached Baltimore in the early hours of the morning the convention had adjourned, and saner heads among his supporters induced him to return to Washington without asking to be heard. It was pointed out that no candidate for the Presidency had ever appeared before a convention, and his action might be misunderstood by the country. Clark issued a challenge to Bryan for "proof or retraction," to which Bryan replied that his criticism was not that Clark "had acted wrongfully but that he had failed to act," and that in the contest between the progressive Democracy and the reactionary Democracy it had been clearly Clark's duty to take one side or the other.

Bryan had never taken kindly to the two-thirds rule, and his switch from Clark, after Clark had a clear majority of the convention, convinced many old-

line leaders that Bryan was endeavoring to force a deadlock that would insure his own nomination. Roger Sullivan of Illinois sent George Brennan and other scouts to talk things over with Bryan, and while he professed not to be a candidate, he pointed out that if the convention should regard his nomination as necessary, the regular party leaders would find him easier to deal with than Wilson. The feeling that Bryan was jockeying to force his own selection continued to grow, and the fear that he might be nominated had much to do with the final switch of Sullivan and his allies to Wilson. Bryan kept his own counsel and appeared before the convention whenever the opportunity for telling dramatics offered. When a leather-lunged Clark adherent during one of Bryan's theatrical speeches yelled, "You 're not a Democrat," Bryan shot back, "Three times more than six million Democrats of America have said I was; hand me up your name and I 'll have it stricken from the roll."

Whereas on Friday night the situation looked so dark for Wilson that he was actually on the verge of preparing a message of congratulation to Clark, the reaction that came on Saturday was so favorable that the Wilson camp changed from one of despair to one of renewed hopefulness. Sixteen ballots were taken on Saturday, and on the final one Clark had dwindled to 463½, while Wilson had advanced to 407½. I went from Baltimore to Sea Girt on Sunday and found that the spirits of the Wilson home had been greatly improved by Saturday's change in the tide.

"Things are looking up and we still have a chance," Wilson said to Tumulty and me. McCombs had remained at Baltimore and on that particular Sunday labored diligently with the delegations from Kentucky, Virginia, West Virginia, and Maryland, whose leaders had been keeping them out of the Wilson column. Some progress was made, and on Sunday night Roger Sullivan held a caucus of the Illinois delegation and agreed to have it shift to Wilson at the proper time. Harvey, Smith, and Nugent vainly tried to convince Sullivan that he was making a grave blunder, but Sullivan preferred Wilson to Bryan and took along Thomas Taggart of Indiana, who had been keeping alive a boom for his agreeable protégé, Thomas Riley Marshall, whom Taggart named for Vice-President. It was subsequently reported that Sullivan and Taggart were willing to join in a movement to nominate Palmer of Pennsylvania, but Pennsylvania would not switch from Wilson.

When it became known that Illinois and Indiana were to fall in line, the Wilson cause speeded up very fast. On the last convention day Sullivan arose and announced that Illinois, under the unit rule, would cast its solid fifty-eight votes for Wilson. Virginia trailed along. On the forty-sixth ballot Underwood's name was withdrawn, and thereupon the Clark delegates were released. Wilson received 990 votes, and the nomination was made unanimous. Clark issued a formal statement to the public calling attention to the fact that he had had a clear majority of the

convention and had led the candidates for thirty ballots. "I lost the nomination solely through the vile and malicious slanders of Colonel William Jennings Bryan of Nebraska," declared Clark.

It was Tuesday, July 2, and both the managers and delegates were badly worn by the long hours of dickering as well as the extreme heat of Baltimore. In his labors among the sweltering delegates, McCombs had worked himself into a mere shadow. Despite the fact that he was desperately ill, however, McCombs arrived at Sea Girt on July 3 and was given an affectionate greeting by Wilson, who expressed in strong terms his gratitude for the faithful labors that had been rendered both before and at Baltimore. McCombs had fought a brave battle under many discouragements. He kept up a bold front, but as he later said, in speaking of the Baltimore convention, "There never was a time when I did not know that the next ballot might see our end."

Among the inner circle of Wilson friends, there was much opposition to the selection of McCombs for chairman of the National Democratic Committee that was to manage the campaign. Some of this doubtless was due to the ambition of others who were eager to take over the show, and some of it to the sincere belief that it would be little short of a tragedy to impose upon a man in McCombs's desperate physical condition the harassing details of another campaign. Even among Wilson's Princeton associates, where McCombs naturally had his best backing and

where there was apprehension lest the Wilson management might now fall into the hands of the distinctly professional politicians, there was feeling that it would be a mistake to pick McCombs for chairman. In this group McCombs had his most powerful adherents, who were confident that in the event of victory Wilson would not fail to give him adequate recognition. But for the chairmanship these admiring friends felt that McCombs did not quite measure up either in equipment or experience, to say nothing of the condition of his health. One such old friend, who had kept up his intimate touch with Wilson since the days when they were at college together, wired, "I have seen much of McCombs, admire his capacity in some directions and appreciate his superb loyalty to you, but I fear he is not big and strong enough for this important task of driving a tremendous team of all sorts of horses."

Most of the old political leaders themselves felt that the only thing Wilson could properly do in the situation was to pick McCombs. Any other course would stir up afresh the old charges of ingratitude that had followed the casting off of Harvey, Smith, and Nugent, as well as serve unpleasantly to revive the fight at Princeton. McCombs was popular with Princeton men everywhere, and, as is usual in such cases, many pretty legends had been built around him. There was a feeling, too, that as a result of the manner in which Roosevelt and Taft were hammering each other, the management of the Wilson campaign

might not prove so onerous. It was Wilson's own feeling that McCombs was entitled to the chairmanship if he cared for it, and in accordance with the Wilson plan Robert S. Hudspeth, New Jersey representative on the Democratic National Committee, placed the name of McCombs before that body for chairman. McCombs was unanimously chosen and empowered to select, with the advice of Wilson, a campaign committee with full power to conduct the fight. A few days later, while McCombs was attempting to recuperate in the White Mountains, Wilson telegraphed him that it was of first consequence that he should at once notify McAdoo that he was to serve as vice-chairman of the National Committee. The campaign produced many delicate situations because of the ill-humored rivalries between the McAdoo and the McCombs groups. McCombs seriously contemplated resigning but was induced to hold on to the end. While during the days of his continued ill health McCombs made many statements the accuracy of which was questioned, he declared on the eve of his retirement from the national chairmanship in 1916 that in neither the pre-nomination nor the election campaign of 1912 had there been any promises made "placing the President under obligation to have in his Cabinet, or in any other official capacity about him, any of the men most active for his nomination or election."

The big pre-convention job that House did for

Wilson was the part he played in bringing Bryan into line. While the desperate fight was on at Baltimore, House was comfortably sailing the high seas aboard the *Laconia*. A cablegram notifying him of the nomination was despatched July 3, and the next day he sent word from Liverpool, while he was still aboard the ship, that he had never been so happy.

"I did not know until then how deeply the personal equation had influenced me. It is to rejoice that the party has come under your leadership, and no one knows better than I what this will mean to our country," said the House message. He assured Wilson that he knew how bad the management of recent Democratic national campaigns had been; more than anything else what was needed now was a complete and exact organization. "Our friends who urged your nomination most strongly, must not force upon you or your committee the usual incompetent political aides," declared House; who added, "There is something more at stake than the mere satisfying of the appetite for office." And he concluded by saying, "I shall turn homeward now very soon, my dear Governor, for my heart is with you and all that you so splendidly stand for." Wilson replied in equally enthusiastic fashion. Such wholesome admiration as House was ready to give proved delightful to the Wilson ear. From London, House, acknowledging Wilson's very grateful letter, declared, "It is a joy to work for such an appreciative friend," and wound up,

"Your election means so much to our country that I shall have no peace of mind until I can address you as 'Mr. President.'" House, however, did not return for several weeks, and because of his lack of physical endurance he had little part in the campaign. He did not get on well with McCombs.

It was Bryan and Sullivan who did the trick at Baltimore. McCombs and the others worked patiently and with great industry, but the fight that Bryan made to drive Ryan off the convention floor ended the chances of Clark and made possible the selection of Wilson. This was thoroughly understood by Wilson. Many of Bryan's adoring friends were apprehensive about Wilson's attitude toward Bryan. Those on the inside knew that Bryan now felt that Wilson was sound on all of what he called the fundamentals. Bryan likewise did not blind himself to the fact that Wilson had a dictatorial and dominating habit, but he felt that Wilson could be elected. With Roosevelt's third party fight, the election of Wilson was a foregone conclusion. He did not need any particular manager outside of Teddy. The campaign text-book issued by the Democratic National Committee contains many of the interesting passages between Roosevelt and Taft as well as famous letters that passed between Roosevelt and the Bellamy Storers. Future historians may find much to interest them in that text-book.

CHAPTER XVI

ROOSEVELT SCORES

THERE was great joy at Sea Girt in those happy July days after the Baltimore convention. When definite news of the nomination was received, Colonel Flynn, acting as aide to the governor, was despatched to a near-by fashionable hotel for a "box of good cigars," and the campaign was in full swing. "That 's the first box of cigars Woodrow ever bought," said Mrs. Wilson gleefully. The gay throngs that flocked to the Jersey shore included many big guns of the party and many hopeful aspirants for favors to come. Wilson was like a school-boy. He managed to get in a round of golf daily, as had been his custom. And as one who occasionally defeated him on the Spring Lake links, I can testify that he was not a low-score man. He was a seasoned player, however, and could be found on the links even when the ground was covered with snow. He was likewise fond of automobiling, although this taste was not frequently indulged, as he did not possess a machine. On such occasions as he traveled in the motors of friends between Trenton and Sea Girt, he delighted to sit alongside the chauffeur and nap. He was always a ready and sound sleeper and en-

joyed bicycling and long walks, which, along with the simplicity of his living, doubtless accounted for his exceptional mental and physical trim in his New Jersey political days.

The enthusiasm of his personal friends over the Baltimore result was a source of particular delight to both himself and Mrs. Wilson. The intellectuals who had supported Wilson with their time and means were in ecstasy at the prospect of the new order of things promised by the Wilson political ascendancy. "After the failure of Cleveland to lead and of Bryan to see," Walter Hines Page wrote, "I had almost despaired of seeing these things wrought out in our working-day; and now it is to come true. Your leading gives new hope and a profound joy to all men like me—all who have ever seen the fair vision of a real Democracy—and having once seen it could never escape from its radiance." Page, who had known Wilson for thirty years, was exuberant over the prospect of a sincere effort to work out Democratic ideas in government and to have the Democratic philosophy of society worthily formulated and fitted to present conditions. "Sound economics, right social ideals, even an impulse toward sincerity and human sympathy in literature," declared Page, "all these will have a new impetus under your leadership. This will give a new impulse to work, a new zest to life. Surely it will give me a new impulse and all other men whose work is to try to think clearly, to keep the old

Democratic ideals always in view, and to tell the people the whole truth as we see it."

The messages that Page sent Wilson were most heartening, as were messages in similar vein from other literary friends. They took the position that Wilson's "applied morality" as exemplified in his administration in New Jersey would encourage men everywhere to higher political ideals and that the more practical business folks might even be induced to feel that it was good for real prosperity. Letters of affectionate greeting, reviving pleasant memories of the younger days, were especially comforting to Mrs. Wilson, who had come up through the struggle, and who had suffered much while the Wilsonian Battle of Princeton raged. A fair example of the warmth of these missives is the letter that Robert H. McCarter, '79, one of the outstanding Republicans as well as one of the foremost legal lights of New Jersey, sent after the Baltimore convention. McCarter, who had been attorney-general, wrote:

My Dear Tommy:

Two years ago when you were nominated for Governor, I took occasion to recall the old days and evenings at Mrs. Wright's when you manifested your early interest in public affairs in the discussions we had. Now that you have nobly won the greatest possible honor, I join in the proud acclaim and congratulate you from the bottom of my heart. The mild persistence of the public demand for you is unconquerable; you are selected with obligations to no one except your own sense of public duty.

You will, I believe, be elected, and have opportunity to give full swing to your own ideas. May God bless you and keep you!

Ever sincerely,
ROBERT H. MCCARTER.

Cleveland H. Dodge, Princeton '79, addressed Wilson affectionately as "dear old Chap" and declared the victory "unique in American politics—character and brains against money and power. You alone, against the greatest combination the country has ever known." And Dodge proceeded to pay handsome tribute to McCombs. "One lone lame manager against the shrewdest politicians in the country. The fear of God and righteousness have prevailed against all the sordid and debasing influences in the party . . . I am so happy I can hardly think. All (or nearly all) my friends have been telling me that I was putting my money on the wrong horse, but, by jove, they have slowly been coming around until most of your old detractors are now your ardent admirers. There has never been anything quite like it and countless generations will be better for it." There were other equally enthusiastic messages of delight from Dean Henry B. Fine of Princeton and President Harry A. Garfield of Williams. Robert Bridges, another old college chum, who had become editor of "Scribner's," addressing Wilson as "dear Tommy," exultantly exclaimed, "You have always more than fulfilled the dreams I have had for you—and finest of all, the noblest way." Wilson's class-

mate, Mahlon Pitney, whose confirmation as an associate justice of the Supreme Court had been brought about by Martine at Wilson's instance, now indulged in the more formal salutation of "my dear Woodrow," rather than "Tommy," in sending felicitations. "You will not, of course," wrote Pitney, "expect me to wish for your success in the election; but if the fates decree that Mr. Taft must be defeated, it will be a gratification to see a Princeton '79 man in the White House."

Wilson spent the latter part of July writing his speech of acceptance. He divided the time between the comfortable home of Melvin A. Rice in Atlantic Highlands and the yacht *Corona* owned by Dodge. The whereabouts of Wilson at the period was known to but few. During 1910 and 1911 the Wilsons had been accustomed to go with the Dodges for jolly little sails aboard the *Corona.* Rice had been a supporter of Wilson both politically and financially, and his home at Atlantic Highlands provided an excellent place to get away from the public gaze. Wilson spent five days in preparing the speech, which, according to his usual custom, he wrote out in shorthand. He kept the Rice family busy providing him with Harry Lauder phonograph records. When he returned to Sea Girt on August 2 he regaled the reporters with stories of the uncertainty of his sea-legs while aboard the *Corona,* and he recited this limerick:

I wish that my room had a floor;
I don't care so much for a door;

But this walking around
Without touching the ground
Is getting to be a damned bore.

Wilson had special copies of his acceptance speech prepared and autographed for Dodge and Rice. In a letter to me, Rice gives the following account of the July days after the Baltimore nomination:

The President spent about a week at my home at the time, but the actual getting together of the material took him less than a day. In this I have the corroboration of Edward S. Gallagher. Mr. Gallagher seems to remember clearly the substance of the President's conversation at the dinner table after he had spent the greater part of the day in seclusion in my library—to the effect that he had finished his speech that evening. Mr. Gallagher was my guest during the entire period of the President's stay, and acted in a semi-secretarial capacity to the President.

I had the original shorthand notes for probably more than a year before Mrs. Wilson asked for them—a request of course, that I could not and would not refuse. The work was actually completed in my library. Mrs. Wilson and Miss Margaret came down to my place the day after, and together they went down to the pier to meet Cleveland Dodge for the "Corona" trip.

As a sidelight, I remember how greatly the President enjoyed the singing of Caruso and of Harry Lauder. Mr. Gallagher went out and bought up all the Lauder records he could find, and kept himself busy feeding the phonograph and gratifying the President's repeated demands for "more."

Some of the state leaders felt that Wilson should re-

sign the governorship, particularly as with the split in the Republican party his election as President in November appeared to be a certainty. Wilson hesitated for a time. He recognized the wisdom of the argument that he had fared handsomely at the hands of the Democratic party of the State and that there was an excellent chance to elect a successor as governor in the fall. He was reluctant, however, to let go, and some of those around him readily fell into agreement that he should continue. He remained on the pay-roll as governor until Saturday, March 1, 1913, two days before his departure for Washington.

That election was a walk-over for any Democrat. Roosevelt's onward-Christian-soldier enthusiasm was sweeping Taft off the face of the political map. Being the creature or creation of such circumstances, Wilson had less need for playing the political game than is ordinarily the case. He moderated much of his radicalism, becoming in effect the middle-of-the-road candidate, a sort of conservative liberal. He was an amazing master of mob psychology and came to know all the arts and tricks of getting the best out of political situations. During the campaign, when the conservative East was disturbed at his apparent surrender to the extreme radicals of the West, he tempered his New England speeches. "I believe that the ancient traditions of a people are its ballast," he told the Yankee audiences. "You must knit the new into the old. If I did not believe that to be progressive is to preserve the essentials of our institutions, I

for one would not be a progressive." This was in rather marked contrast with the way he had hammered the old order of things on some of his Western speech-making tours. Wilson likewise made a dead set to win the favor of conservative Republicans, who were following Taft in that campaign, but who were much alarmed over the prospect of Roosevelt's carrying the day. From his summer home at Beverly, Massachusetts, soon after his return from abroad late in August, House had sent word that "the greatest asset that we have is the scare that Roosevelt is giving the conservative Republicans, and I have found that my efforts in proselyting prominent Taft adherents has been successful whenever I have been able to show that a vote for Taft is a half vote for Roosevelt."

The battle was fought entirely around the Roosevelt vendetta to jettison Taft. While Henry Morgenthau and the National Committee raised approximately a million dollars for the Wilson campaign, the results show that the bitterness engendered by the Taft-Roosevelt fight would have led to the election of Wilson without any particular political management.

No national campaign had divided Republicans into such bitter rival camps. The Taft and Roosevelt forces were amply financed. When the Roosevelt blows began to sting too hard, Taft retaliated by pointing to the fact that the financial genius of the Roosevelt machine was George W. Perkins, who was a director in the harvester and other trusts that had been indicted under the Taft régime. "I am up

against the wall and am being hit," Taft declared. "I am being hit below the belt and I am here to fight." Taft directed attention to the fact that another big contributor to the Roosevelt performance, Dan R. Hanna, son of Mark Hanna, was under indictment for rebating. Roosevelt had taunted Taft by claiming that he had made Taft President and savagely charged him with having sold out to the big business interests, and this brought from Taft the declaration, "I was a man of straw, but I have been a man of straw long enough; every man who has blood in his body and who has been misrepresented as I have been, is forced to fight." Declaring that it would be a very dangerous thing to put Roosevelt in the White House for a third term, Taft ironically referred to the extravagant political millennium which Roosevelt was promising. "Suppose Mr. Roosevelt were wafted to the skies in a chariot, like the prophet of old, and were to disappear from sight, how do you suppose the country would get along anyhow?" Taft asked. He declared that Roosevelt "likens himself to Abraham Lincoln more and resembles him less than any man in the history of this country." After the Republican National Convention the Taft headquarters at Chicago produced affidavits from several colored ministers, who had been delegates from Southern States, asserting that they had been offered one thousand dollars each to change their votes from Taft to Roosevelt. It was charged by Taft that Roosevelt had prevented the prosecution of the Harvester Trust

after Perkins had asked that it be not taken into the courts. This sort of disclosure, together with the reprinting of Roosevelt's appeal to Edward H. Harriman, the railroad magnate, to come to Washington and discuss governmental matters, as well as Harriman's letter setting forth that he had raised two hundred and sixty thousand dollars for Roosevelt in the 1904 campaign, were hard jolts for the Progressive ticket. There was also a revival of the disclosures of life-insurance scandals, showing that Perkins was reimbursed from the treasury of the New York Life Insurance Company in the sum of $48,702 for money contributed to the Roosevelt national campaign fund of 1904. Roosevelt's assaults on Taft were likewise most damaging. Charging Taft with all the political crimes on the calendar, Roosevelt declared: "I do not think that Mr. Taft means ill; I think he means well. But he means well feebly and during his administration he has been under the influence of men who are neither well-meaning nor feeble. It is this quality of feebleness in a thoroughly amiable man which preëminently fits such a man for use in high office by the powers of evil."

Wilson in a dignified manner took up some of the charges against Roosevelt's elaborate promises and declared that no public man had a right to go so far afield. "You have no right to promise Heaven," Wilson declared, "unless you can bring us to it, for, in making promises you create too much expectation and your failure brings with it only disappointment

and sometimes despair. As a candidate for the Presidency, I do not want to promise Heaven unless I can bring you to it. I can only see a little distance up the road. I cannot tell you what is around the corner. The successful leader ought not to keep far in advance of the mass he is seeking to lead, for he will soon lose contact with them. No unusual expectation ought to be created by him." Of his own plans Wilson declared, "There are no old scores to be paid off; there are no resentments to be satisfied; there is no revolution to be attempted."

Wilson was always chary about getting into any open public tilt with Roosevelt. When during the campaign Roosevelt dealt Wilson some jarring blows and Wilson was urged to make answer, he flatly declined, declaring, "That 's just what Roosevelt wants." He then told the story of a Southern county boss who was running for sheriff and who had been tempted into a joint debate by the other candidate. "In the debate," said Wilson, "the boss was getting decidedly the worst of it when one of his adherents in the rear of the hall, yelled, 'Aw, hell, Bill, call him a liar and turn it into a fight.' " At another time when asked for an expression regarding Roosevelt, who had just made a savage attack, Wilson declared that Roosevelt "is always spurning things with one hand and surreptitiously taking them with the other hand."

At Boston, on August 17, when some enthusiastic supporter yelled, "Tell us about Taft," Roosevelt shot back, "I never discuss dead issues." Roosevelt

had gone about the country charging that the fight was honesty against dishonesty and that Taft represented the political thieves. "Thou shalt neither steal in politics nor in business," was the burden of this attack on Taft, whose nomination he charged had been accomplished by theft and fraud, with Taft's encouragement. While Roosevelt was hurling these fiery charges against the regular Republican nominee for the Presidency Wilson defended Taft, saying, "I do not believe that any man in the United States who knows his facts can question the patriotism or the integrity of the man who now presides at the executive office in Washington." Wilson left Roosevelt largely to La Follette, who had taken the position that the fight that Roosevelt had made against Taft at Chicago was not in any sense for Progressive principles but was merely the spiteful attempt of Roosevelt to regain control of the Republican party because of his intense hatred of Taft. La Follette frankly charged that nobody had been more ready to "steal than Roosevelt," and he added that Roosevelt had "as great an opportunity to serve the Progressive cause as Bryan had at Baltimore, but would not accept it because he was serving himself only."

Louis D. Brandeis, recognized as one of the foremost of the Progressives and who had been a supporter of La Follete, came out openly with an appeal to all progressives, irrespective of party affiliation, to stand by Wilson. The manner in which Bryan had forced the situation at Baltimore made Wilson's

nomination, in the Brandeis estimation, rank "among the most encouraging events in American history." The masterful and masterly leadership of Bryan had caused the ideal of American Democracy to triumph "over the reactionaries and their money-bag." Concluding his appeal to the Progressives, Brandeis declared:

> But the struggle of privilege is unending and omnipresent. That struggle is as subtle as it is determined. The struggle will not close when Wilson is elected. We may be sure that every effort he may make as President to carry out the Progressive policies will meet with stubborn resistance from the possessors and apostles of privilege. Without loyal support from the Progressives of the country Wilson's war upon unjust privilege must be futile. The Progressive cause can succeed only if it has loyal support from the Progressives. It can fail only if the Progressives fail in their duty of giving to Wilson that full support.

The La Follette help was of much importance in the campaign, and the Roosevelt appeals to discontent and class hatred so badly demoralized the Republican vote that the election resulted in Wilson's receiving 435 electoral votes, while Roosevelt got 81 and Taft but 15. In the popular vote Roosevelt ran more than six hundred thousand ahead of Taft.

The personal dislike between Wilson and Roosevelt was very great. It increased as time went on. But Wilson usually refrained from giving public expression to it. When on October 15, 1912, Roosevelt, while greeting a cheering crowd in Milwaukee, was

shot by a crank, Wilson proceeded to cancel many speaking engagements and waited until Roosevelt was again ready for the stump. In his own restless way Roosevelt could not restrain the impulse to give voice to his feeling, and he said many bitter things about Wilson, whom he regarded as much too soft for the political game. Perhaps the most striking example of his general feeling toward Wilson's later handling of the war was his remark to Sir Geoffrey Butler, who had charge of the newspaper end of the Balfour propaganda mission in 1917, "Butler, you 'll be damned sorry one day you ever trafficked with those Y. M. C. A. banditti in Washington."

Smith undertook to make a political come-back by offering himself as a candidate for the Democratic nomination at the 1912 primary election for United States senator in New Jersey. At the outset Wilson was disposed to keep silent and let Billy Hughes, who had been agreed upon by the Wilson forces, make a dignified contest against Smith. Devlin, who loved the scent of battle, urged upon Wilson that inasmuch as Smith had nominated him for governor, the decent thing to do was to let Hughes, as the Progressive candidate, wage the fight on Smith, who was then subjecting himself and his record to the voters of the party, and was almost certain to be beaten anyhow. In the earlier fight, in which Devlin had joined with Wilson, much had been made of the fact that Smith was unwilling to go before the people and give them a chance at the verdict. For Wilson to renew the as-

saults on Smith, while he was himself a candidate for the Presidency, would, in the expressed opinion of Devlin, smack strongly of personal vindictiveness and needlessly intensify the suspicion that Wilson wanted to dictate who should or should not submit themselves to the judgment of the people in a primary contest. Wilson, however, subsequently felt that the political exigencies required vigorous action on his part. "I think you cannot realize," he wrote Devlin, "how confidently it is expected throughout the country that I will act with my accustomed directness and boldness in opposing the naming of Senator Smith. The advisabilities of the situation are not the same nationally and locally." After the Presidential election, Wilson, in a message to Devlin said:

> It has touched and encouraged me that New Jersey responded so generously to my appeal to be supported by a team. I want to express to you and to all the friends in New Jersey with whom I have been so closely associated the feeling of pride and hope that the campaign in this state has given me.

Hughes defeated Smith at the primaries almost two to one, the plurality of Hughes being 29,042, while the total vote Smith received was but 33,490. That definitely retired Smith as a factor in the politics of the State. For those who talk of the political ingratitude of Wilson toward Smith it may be said that after Wilson was in the White House and a great misfortune had overtaken Smith, Wilson rendered him a personal service of the first magnitude, the tell-

ing of which would serve no particular public good. But inasmuch as I was the emissary sent by Smith to Wilson, I am informed as to the facts. Wilson did the big job handsomely and without a murmur.

CHAPTER XVII

VICTORY WITHOUT PEACE

ALMOST immediately after the election the Wilson family made off to Bermuda, where they remained upward of a month, returning to America on December 16. Until that time nothing had been decided about cabinet selections. Since retiring from the university, when it became necessary to quit Prospect, the lovely mansion of the president, the Wilsons had resided in the home of Parker Mann on Cleveland Lane, which they rented furnished for $150 monthly. They had no home of their own. To this modest little house a few of Wilson's friends had come immediately after the election. Walter Hines Page found Wilson non-committal, and there was something that caused Page to hesitate, to entertain doubts, to wonder how, after all, the experiment was to end. Page, as he left the cottage, had "the feeling of the man's oppressive loneliness," and believing it to be the duty of Wilson's real friends to volunteer help, he began sending memoranda on men and governmental subjects with which he was familiar. Wilson, in his own hand, acknowledged the notes but never gave an inkling of what was in his thoughts. One of the Page suggestions was that Wilson should return to the old custom of having the President deliver his

message to Congress in person, to restore a feeling of comradeship in responsibility and bring the legislative and executive branches closer together. This suggestion Wilson adopted.

In the absence of the President-elect, hosts of hopeful aspirants made frequent pilgrimages to Trenton, where Tumulty kept vigil. Tumulty likewise frequently saw House and McAdoo in New York. McAdoo was the outstanding politician of them all. His hard experiences in financing the tunnel project in New York had stiffened him, and he used masterful tactics in politics. McAdoo had both boldness and finesse and never hesitated to go after what he wanted. There was no other such adroit political manipulator in the Wilson camp at any time. McCombs and his friends had succeeded in creating an attitude of watchfulness on the part of Wilson toward McAdoo, in the early days of the pre-nomination campaign, but McAdoo patiently bided his time. He took a cottage along the Jersey shore, close to Sea Girt, for the summer of 1912 and did not unduly crowd McCombs in the open. After the election Wilson kept him on the anxious bench for a considerable period. He did the same thing with Tumulty, however, who was apparently on the inside, and who, as a matter of fact, was one of the two immediate confidential counselors of Wilson on cabinet selections, House being the other. But the McCombs contingent did effective work in holding off the selection of Tumulty as Presidential secretary, discreetly spreading the poison that a man

of national acquaintance was needed and that Tumulty had already been well provided for by Wilson in his appointment as supreme court clerk. Numerous candidates were quietly in the field for secretary to the President, some of them men of national prominence. It was not until February 3 that Wilson finally gave Tumulty the word that he was to go to Washington. McAdoo, during the months after the election, put on a heavy bombardment to land the secretaryship of the treasury, and Wilson, very reluctant at first, finally capitulated.

As soon as he got back from his Bermuda vacation, Wilson set about preparing for the coming session of the New Jersey Legislature, accepting a few invitations to speak before moving into the White House, and meeting the party leaders and cabinet candidates. Many secret meetings were held at the apartment of Colonel House in New York and at the home of Wilson at Princeton. Mrs. Wilson was usually present at the conferences in Princeton. Tumulty attended nearly all of the Conferences. McCombs, unfriendly to House and Tumulty, rarely got a chance to see the President-elect.

Until the very end Wilson was occupied with a few state political quarrels. He had come home from Bermuda, determined to prevent the election of Edward I. Edwards, afterward governor and United States senator, as state treasurer. Edwards was then state controller, and while they had always been on friendly terms, there had been a feeling on the part of

Wilson that Edwards had gone out of his way in refusing to turn over to him the monthly pay-checks at times when he was out of the State and the respective senate presidents had been acting governors. In the 1912 landslide, the Democrats had again elected the Legislature, the Smith-Nugent forces having control of the big delegation from Essex County. Smith and Nugent were friendly to Edwards for state treasurer, and this gave Wilson his excuse to make the fight. Edward E. Grosscup, who had succeeded Nugent as Democratic state chairman, was put into the contest for state treasurer with the Wilson backing. Edwards was extremely popular personally, had proved a good state controller, and was president of a large banking institution in Jersey City. The fight got warm. Wilson had considerable advantage, of course, in that he not only had some good patronage left in New Jersey but was on the brink of his career at Washington. Edwards put the situation squarely before Wilson at a meeting in the governor's office and finally forced Wilson into the open by issuing a public statement in which he said that in his personal interview with Wilson he had asked if there had ever been a time when he was not a good Wilson man and that Wilson had replied that there was no question that Edwards had always been a persistent and consistent Wilson man. "I wanted the governor," said Edwards, "to tell that to the press representatives, but he did not do so. I think it is cowardly in him not to do it." This forced Wilson to a public position

in the fight. On January 6 Wilson gave out a statement in which he said:

> I feel very strongly indeed that it is unwise and inexpedient that a banker should be elected to the post of Treasurer of the State, no matter what his personal integrity.

It sounded well, although of course the bankers, both before and since, have invariably managed to keep such a valuable political office as the State Treasury in hands that are entirely friendly. Edwards was beaten but later had himself elected to the State Senate, the governorship, and the United States Senate.

A curious angle of that fight was the effect it had on the election of the next governor of New Jersey. Edwards was extremely popular in his home county of Hudson, which had twelve votes in the House of Assembly. A majority were adherents of Mayor Wittpenn, who had fought the old Davis machine and who had gone to Lyme and bluntly told Wilson that he would not retire from the race when the Harvey-Smith combination was forcing Wilson's own nomination in 1910. Wittpenn, however, was an out-and-out progressive. He had effectively supported every Wilson policy. When Wilson insisted on defeating Edwards for treasurer, Wittpenn fell into line and reluctantly had his friends vote against Edwards, although they were on terms of personal friendship and the sentiment of Hudson County strongly favored the

Edwards candidacy. The Legislature elected the state treasurer. Until that time the naming of Wittpenn as the Democratic candidate for governor for the full term to succeed Wilson was a foregone conclusion, and with the Roosevelt revolution still existing, that nomination was equivalent to election. Edwards was for Wittpenn. When the Wittpenn votes in the Legislature blocked the Edwards ambition, however, a war of reprisal was at once declared. Edwards and Nugent arrayed their political forces behind James F. Fielder, who, by reason of the fact that he was president of the State Senate, became acting governor. Fielder, at first had been but a mild supporter of Wilson but eventually had done excellent work in connection with the framing of the primary and election laws. There was a lively fight. Some of the party leaders in the State induced Katzenbach to permit the use of his name as a candidate for the nomination, with a view to ending the bitterness. When the fight became hot Wilson wrote a letter to Wittpenn from the White House setting forth that he was forced to "make a practical political choice as between friends" who had been of great service to him personally as well as to the public. That was July 23, 1913, four months after Wilson had left the State. He declared that a three-cornered fight would be most unwise and that Fielder should be supported. "I am sure you will not think the conclusion I have come to as the leader of the party is in any way a subtraction from my cor-

Photo by Orren Jack Turner

WOODROW WILSON AND ELLEN AXSON WILSON ON THE MORNING OF MARCH 3, 1913

Leaving their modest little home on Cleveland Lane, Princeton, accompanied by secret service men, they walked to the railroad station to take the train for Washington for the first inauguration.

dial personal regard or from my acknowledgment of the distinguished services which you have rendered the party," Wilson said to Wittpenn. Wilson did not fail to express his obligation to Wittpenn. "Your generous friendship for myself and your aid, again and again, rendered in effective fashion, have won not only my deep admiration, but my appreciation," declared Wilson.

While Wittpenn, by reason of his legislative followers, had been an important factor in helping the original Wilson program to success, Wilson had never whole-heartedly warmed up to him. Nor had he ever entirely forgiven Katzenbach for having been a candidate against him in 1910, and capturing the entire convention vote of Wilson's home county of Mercer. It was the Wilson way; Katzenbach and Wittpenn, once candidates against him, were marked. The irony of the situation was that Fielder, beneficiary of the Edwards-Nugent vendetta on Wittpenn, had voted against Wilson's choice for state treasurer and in favor of Edwards, whom Wilson had so ardently opposed. Politics is frequently brutal. Edwards and Nugent had their revenge. But it was only a temporary kind of revenge. When Fielder was assured of the nomination he took a shot at Nugent and Smith, and, following the Wilson precedent, proceeded again to read them out of the party on September 30, 1913. He likewise tried to beat Wilson's man, Grosscup, for reëlection as chairman of the Democratic State Committee. In the kaleidoscopic shifts,

it was Nugent who came to the rescue and saved Grosscup. Nugent personally nominated Grosscup —the man who in the bitter days of 1911 had taken the chairmanship away from Nugent—and the Fielder candidate was beaten five to one. But Fielder, with a Bull Moose candidate in the field and the old Roosevelt sores still open, was elected governor. Three years later Wittpenn was nominated for Governor but fell by the wayside in the 1916 election when the Republicans swept the state for President, governor, and United States senator. Wilson made Wittpenn naval officer of the port of New York.

A rather costly type of reform that Wilson put through in the 1913 legislative session, although it brought him considerable personal fame, was the enactment of the Seven Sisters laws to curb trusts. Roosevelt had bitterly chided Wilson, during the Presidential campaign, about his failure to take any action against the big corporations chartered by New Jersey. In one of his rhetorical flights, Wilson had threatened to hang certain heads of corporations, if they did certain things, "higher than Haman," and on another occasion Wilson had declared:

> We want to see to it that, though there is control, it is control of law and not the discretionary control of executive officials. We want to see to it that while there is a restraint of abuses it is persons who are restrained and not unnamed bodies of persons. There is only, historically speaking, one possible successful punishment of abuses of law, and that is, that when a wrong thing is

done you find the man who did it and punish him. You can fine all the corporations there are and fine them out of existence, and all you have done will be to have embarrassed the commerce of the country. You will have left the men who did it free to repeat it in other combinations.

It was expressions such as this that led Roosevelt to make his pungent assaults on Wilson during the 1912 campaign charging that Wilson in his two years at Trenton had failed to do anything to curb the operation of the big trusts chartered by the State of New Jersey. These campaign taunts were the inspiration of the Seven Sisters laws. Wilson, upon his return from Bermuda, called in Chancellor Walker and Bennett Van Syckel, a retired justice of the Supreme Court, for the purpose of framing a series of seven regulatory laws that were largely patterned after the California corporation statutes. In some of his utterances at this time Wilson became very radical and produced a rather panicky feeling in business circles that were disposed to be friendly. Speaking before the Commercial Club of Chicago on January 11, 1913, he noticed that he was getting a rather cool reception for his attacks on business and for some of his program to set government free of every feature of monopoly. "I notice you did not applaud that," he said in a fit of irritation. He was not in a particularly happy frame of mind. Wilson's election had brought to business circles a feeling of at least some relief that there had been no reëntry into the White House of the Rough Rider, with his gift for sting-

ing phrases and a following in which the "lunatic fringe" was disproportionately large. Wilson was saddened by the adverse reception his Chicago speech attacking big business had received, and on his return to Trenton he gave out a telegram for publication, without any further comment on his part, reading: "Don't be such a fool. Use your brains and keep your mouth shut. Don't be a silly ass and make the whole country ashamed of you." This message had been addressed to Wilson by a New-Yorker who signed the name of Williams, and Wilson apparently felt that its publication, without any accompanying explanation on his part, would be understood by the country. Mrs. Wilson, who knew how to handle annoying situations, came with him from Princeton to the State-house that day, January 15, and spent several hours watching the performance there.

The Seven Sisters laws were passed reluctantly but with practically no amendments. Some of the Senators predicted that the only thing the laws were calculated to do was to destroy the profitable corporation business that the State had been getting. And that is all that happened. Several other States, notably Delaware, had been making a strong effort to have corporations seek new charters there. Delaware had copied not only all the attractive features of the New Jersey law, but had greatly reduced the filing-fees as well as the annual franchise taxes. Immediately after the Seven Sisters laws were enacted, a number of big industrial corporations, which had

maintained legal domiciles in New Jersey, surrendered their charters and reincorporated in Delaware. The amount the State received in filing-fees, which in 1901 had gone as high as $687,479, dwindled to $86,510 in 1914. They had actually begun to shrink considerably in 1913, and by 1915 the total receipts in filing-fees for chartering new corporations slumped to $78,023. After earlier attempts by other States to underbid New Jersey for this character of business, there had been considerable fluctuation in the receipts. But there had been no such alarming conditions as those which followed the enacting of the Seven Sisters, and no attempt was ever made by the attorney-general or any other official to force any prosecutions under the laws.

The Legislature in 1915 began a tinkering process, and on April 9, 1920, the then Democratic governor of the State, Edwards, signed bills, which had passed the Legislature, repealing all of the so-called Seven Sisters laws which had not theretofore been amended. It would be difficult definitely to estimate the money loss which the State of New Jersey sustained in taxes by reason of the enactment of these laws, but it is no exaggeration to say that it would run into the millions. The enactment of the Seven Sisters not only caused a number of large corporations to surrender New Jersey charters and go elsewhere for existence but naturally prevented many new corporations from coming to the State because of the fact that the Wilson laws had never had any judicial interpretation. New

Jersey had been a pioneer in the field. It was the stability of the corporation laws and the fact that there had been a complete line of court decisions construing the laws, quite as much as the wide latitude that the laws themselves provided, that caused the big industrial corporations to come to the State. In common with all States, New Jersey suffered a falling off in corporations organized during the war period when Congress set up the Capital Issues Committee to discourage the formation of corporations not for war purposes. With the abolition of this committee, the repeal of the Seven Sisters, and the enactment by the Legislature of a law authorizing corporations to issue stock without par value, New Jersey's business began again to pick up. The filing-fees for the granting of charters in 1920 were back to $366,175, and by 1924 they had mounted to $445,458.

In the closing days at Trenton the President-elect displayed unusual irritation at the newspapers. It was at this juncture that there began the amazing transformation from the Wilson pitiless publicity policy to that of the Wilson closed door. The man who had been so accessible to the newspaper men and to the great and ungreat in his office as governor closed up like a clam about the selection of his officers at Washington. Speculation in the press angered him. The propaganda campaign kept up by some of the candidates for the Cabinet annoyed him immensely. Perhaps McCombs, who had done the best he knew for the Wilson cause, suffered most from this form

of crusade. McCombs wanted to be attorney-general or secretary of the treasury. He was broken in health and spirit. He had quarreled bitterly with most of the friends of McAdoo. McCombs felt strongly that some of those who had kept the Wilson ship afloat in the dark days should be rewarded. He especially wanted Morgenthau, without whose financial support it would have been impossible to carry on, put in the Cabinet. None that McCombs recommended landed in the Cabinet. It was soon evident that Wilson had become wearied by McCombs; he did offer to make him ambassador to Paris, but McCombs declined the post.

As good an illustration as any perhaps of Wilson's irritability occurred shortly before he left for Washington, when the newspapers were naturally eager to learn the names of the new cabinet officers. Bryan had been brought to Trenton on December 21 and tendered the portfolio of secretary of state. There were other selections on the slate, but throughout the month of January Wilson kept insisting that no decision had been made. Talking with the reporters on Monday, February 3, 1913, he expressed emphatic resentment at persistent questioning.

"Damn it, man, can't you take me as you find me?" he shot at one over-zealous newspaper correspondent, and in a moment he came to himself and added, "Pardon me for blowing up. These stories about cabinet appointments are all false, and to keep on questioning me about it is to doubt my veracity."

In his earlier dealings with the Trenton newspaper men, Wilson had been friendly, although it took him some time to accommodate himself to being interviewed. He was in no sense a shy man, but he was not a confiding man. He frankly did not want to be bothered. At both Trenton and Washington Tumulty was the shock-absorber in handling the press. At Tumulty's suggestion Wilson frequently wrote handsome letters of appreciation to newspaper editors. "May I not thank you for the generous support the Trenton Times has been giving me," came more than once to our office. Until he became governor, Wilson had never been much of a reader of daily newspapers. As president of the university he largely controlled the news situation at Princeton. There was little difficulty in having matters published in a most pleasant way. He could not tolerate adverse criticism and occasionally gave a sharp lecture to some innocent reporter for editorial comment appearing in the newspaper he was representing. Notwithstanding constant references to his retiring nature and his shrinking from publicity, he was at heart as keen about being praised as any other public man. There never was one who lived who did not love it.

The Trenton newspaper correspondents frequently strolled along the river-bank with Wilson, and he delighted them with his yarns. It was in his political race through New Jersey that Wilson had his fling with the common crowd. Next to his student days, he doubtless got more real happiness out of being

governor than in any other job, but in the closing days he became less communicative. Speculation about Bryan was especially annoying. On the assumption that Wilson was telling the truth when he kept insisting that no decision had been reached with Bryan, critics of the Nebraskan naturally felt encouraged to keep up their adverse bombardment. Rather than admit the perfect understanding with Bryan, Wilson repeatedly denied that any tender of the secretaryship of state had been made and branded the skeptical attitude of the press at his own departure from the truth as contemptible.

Wilson kept the list of his first cabinet selections an official secret until he reached Washington. He did not disclose, even to the press representatives who accompanied him on the train from Princeton, the complete list. As a special favor the definite selections had been made known to representatives of the "Newark News" and "Trenton Times," both of which had been in rather close relationship with the Wilson camp, so that these newspapers were enabled to print, on March 3, pictures and sketches of all the new cabinet officials. These two newspapers, however, did not have the exclusive information for more than one early edition. Tumulty did not go on the train with Wilson but took his family by another train from Jersey City. In the car with the Tumultys was Frank Ward O'Malley, of the "New York Sun," with a habit of turning up where good news stories are found. Tumulty gave O'Malley the cabinet list, and

the story appeared in full in the "Evening Sun" of that day.

Wilson was as reticent with the statesmen who flocked to Trenton in those last days. Burleson and Palmer, members of Congress and candidates for cabinet posts, spent much of January 6 at the State-house. This provoked wide-spread newspaper speculation, but Wilson persisted in his declaration, "I have not divulged my plans to any one." There was some doubt whether the recommendation for the Federal Reserve plan should be put into the first inaugural address. Carter Glass came to Trenton and spent a considerable period at the State-house, as well as at Princeton with Wilson. Out of these conferences grew Wilson's ardor for the Federal Reserve System and the currency reform fight that he so successfully led in his early career at Washington, producing the most constructive domestic legislation of the time. Before the visit of Glass, Wilson had said that he had not decided whether his message to Congress would include any recommendation on the currency issue. He had seen Glass during the campaign and admitted that he was depending on Glass to keep him informed and guided in the matter. Wilson put Glass in touch with House, who in turn was conferring with the great Wall Street bankers and getting their views.

Wilson's time with the Congressional representatives who had been visiting him was given over largely to listening. The Washington correspondent of the

friendly "Newark Evening News," writing of the situation at the national capital, on January 23, 1913, said, "To sum up the congressional attitude towards the new President, some of those who have been over to Trenton are disappointed because the Governor did not take them into his confidence, and, on the other hand, many of those who have not been invited are peevish because they were not asked to a consultation." He did write to Palmer, a month before he left Trenton to be inaugurated, flatly repudiating the single-term plank that had been inserted in the party platform at Baltimore making the President ineligible for reëlection and pledging "the candidate of this convention to this principle." The Roosevelt agitation for another term had provoked wide discussion of the matter, but Wilson, who always insisted on being his own platform, ignored the pledge entirely during the campaign. Palmer was not only a member of Congress but vice-chairman of the National Democratic Committee, and the party representatives at Washington were planning to carry out the platform program by introducing a resolution proposing the constitutional change. "A fixed constitutional limitation to a single term of office," Wilson wrote Palmer, from Trenton, February 13, "is highly arbitrary and unsatisfactory from every view. . . . Put the present customary limitation of two terms into the Constitution, if you do not trust the people to take care of themselves, but make it two terms (not one, because four years is often too long) and give

the President a chance to win its full service by proving fit for it." Wilson added that he would "most cheerfully abide by the judgment of my party and the public as to whether I shall be a candidate for President again in 1916," and his letter ended any further attempt by the Democrats to offer a one-term resolution.

Included among Bryan's pet hobbies was independence for the Philippines, and shortly after his visit to Trenton to accept the post of secretary of state he began to bombard Wilson with suggestions on this score. Aguinaldo, leader of the armed resistance in the Philippines, was regarded by Bryan as the most influential man in the islands. Bryan submitted to Wilson a letter he had recently received from Aguinaldo and a copy of his proposed reply for correction and approval. "It is my first 'state paper' as it were," Bryan wrote Wilson. And although Bryan had succeeded in putting into the Democratic platform at Baltimore a reaffirmation of "the position thrice announced by the Democracy in national convention assembled" favoring an immediate declaration of the nation's purpose to recognize the independence of the Philippine Islands as soon as a stable government could be established, the first "state paper" was intended, as Bryan himself expressed it, to restrain Aguinaldo's eagerness a little, first by showing him that Wilson did not win by a majority but only by a plurality; and secondly, by putting Aguinaldo to work advising others against impa-

tience. But neither Bryan's frequent declarations in the party platforms nor his direct appeals changed Wilson's attitude toward the Filipinos. He did not feel they were ready for self-government and took the position that it was our duty as trustees to set up the rule of justice and right and to make whatever arrangement of government would be most serviceable to their eventual freedom and development. In his inaugural address he did not make any reference whatever to the matter.

CHAPTER XVIII

FAREWELL TO TRENTON AND PRINCETON

WILSON, who frequently remarked, "I have enough Scotch in me for business purposes," determined to remain governor of New Jersey until the last possible moment. He did not want to relinquish the office until the end of February, four days before he would become the White House tenant. That necessitated having the ceremony of swearing in the acting governor, Fielder, fixed for Saturday—ordinarily not an active business day in public buildings. Wilson kept himself occupied with his preparations for Washington and his incidental interest in the Legislature. He asked Tumulty and me to go to Washington and "get the lay of the land." Charles D. Hilles, secretary to President Taft, met us at the Union Station, with a luxurious limousine, driven by a handsomely liveried chauffeur, and as we were riding down Pennsylvania Avenue he remarked to Tumulty: "This is the car for your personal use; they are specially built for the White House at Buffalo. They are very comfortable; but of course there is no obligation to continue this type if you prefer some other make." Whereupon Tumulty, a merry twinkle in his Irish eye, intimated that for the present at any rate the car

would answer his immediate needs. The President had a still more handsome car, and there was another for the secret service men who accompanied him and still others for Mrs. Wilson and the family for shopping and calling. Simple democracy was coming into its own. Like Wilson, Tumulty had never owned an automobile.

Luncheon at the Metropolitan Club afforded the opportunity for much solemn talk about the business of running the White House, and the next day we spent an hour with President Taft, who appeared not quite so serious. "This is a very generous government," said Mr. Taft, "and you can tell Governor Wilson that it provides every possible creature comfort for the President." A house physician, a valet—all the regal equipage of a great palace was at hand. Mr. Taft regaled us with amusing anecdotes, and we toured his private apartments, where limitless quantities of loving-cups seemed to fill the shelves and odd spaces. He liked to entertain and be entertained, and official luncheons and dinners were daily events, as they had been in the Roosevelt régime. We were duly shown the routine workings of the White House offices, where, under the guiding hand of Rudolph Forster, the unchanging business of government proceeds in orderly fashion.

A few days before the end at Trenton, the Legislative Correspondents' Club held its annual dinner, with plenty of horse-play and fun, and Wilson relaxed and had a gay time. At the first of these

functions that he had attended Wilson had a very bad evening. A vaudeville actor resembling his political enemy, Smith, had been made up as an exact counterpart of the old New Jersey boss and quietly seated at a comfortable distance but directly in Wilson's line of vision. Wilson was plainly disturbed throughout the entire dinner, and he had such an altogether miserable evening that he did not entirely regain his composure even when the pseudo-Smith was revealed in his true colors. But there were no unhappy incidents at the dinner given in the last week of Wilson's New Jersey official life.

Shortly before quitting the State-house, Wilson addressed a big gathering of Sunday-school workers and rather vigorously scored the singing of what he termed meaningless hymns like "The Beautiful Isle of Somewhere." He was himself deeply religious, but his beliefs were the simple and stern Calvinistic ones. He despised any attempt of politicians to capitalize or commercialize religion, and no man could more strongly feel that government ought to have nothing to do with churches, and churches nothing to do with government. He was himself most tolerant in his church views, passionately deploring the recurring racial and religious outbreaks and the manner in which professing Christians elude the methods of the Original Model. While not much concerned about sectarianism, he was very strong in his love for the Bible, and in speaking to the Trenton

SECRETARY TUMULTY AND TOM PENCE

Warwicks of the first cabinet. Pence converted the Harvey break into a row with Wall Street.

Sunday-school convention he gave expression to this thought:

> The opinion of the Bible bred in me, not only by the teaching of my home when I was a boy, but also every turn and experience of my life and every step of study, is that it is the one supreme source of revelation, the revelation of the meaning of life, the nature of God, and the spiritual nature and need of men. It is the only guide of life which really leads the spirit in the way of peace and salvation. If men could but be made to know it intimately, and for what it really is, we should have secured both individual and social regeneration.

It was a quaint gathering that, in the New Jersey Capitol witnessed the final surrender of the seal of the State by Wilson to Fielder on that February Saturday morning. To punish Wittpenn, the slated candidate for the Democratic nomination for governor, for having supported Wilson in the fight against Edwards over the treasurership, the Nugent and Edwards forces combined in a "demonstration" that would definitely make Fielder the party candidate for the full term as governor. Political followers of the Jersey City and Newark machines marched to the State-house and cheered Fielder as he took over the reins of government. Wilson had few real friends in the assemblage that saw him formally give up the governorship. The purpose of bringing the crowd together was to prevent Wittpenn from becoming the candidate for governor.

In Chapter XVII reference has already been made to the result.

Wilson spent Sunday and Monday quietly at Princeton, putting the finishing touches on his Washington program, and getting ready for his departure on Tuesday morning, March 3. No action, of course, was contemplated by Princeton University. The relationships there were of such an unhappy character that any attempt to heal them would have been futile. A formal minute was adopted by the Board of Trustees; but it did not come until January 9, 1913, two months after Wilson had been elected, and it was of a somewhat perfunctory kind, reading:

> The Trustees of Princeton University offer to the Honorable Woodrow Wilson, one of the distinguished sons of the University, some time its President and now President of the Board of Trustees, their congratulations on his election to the Presidency of the United States and their wishes for his health and happiness and for the large usefulness and high distinction of the Administration of the great office he is soon to occupy.

Wilson, of course, had never attended any Trustees' meeting while he was the governor, by virtue of which office he was ex-officio president of the Board of Trustees. As no farewell had been arranged in university circles, Colonel Flynn, bank president and Wilson enthusiast, felt that the townsfolk must fittingly observe the occasion. He took Mrs. Wilson into his confidence and was told that "no one has ever given Woodrow a loving-cup." And so

the best that money could buy was forthcoming and the trophy duly presented on March 2, in the name of the citizens of the little borough.

There was considerable pathos to this last night in the university town where half his life had been spent. With Mrs. Wilson, the President-elect stood on the porch of the modest little home. "I have never been in the White House, and I shall feel very strange when I get inside of it," he declared. "I shall think of this little house behind me and remember how much more familiar it is to me than that is likely to be, and how much more intimate a sense of possession there must be in the one case than in the other. One cannot be neighbors to the whole United States." And with some emotion he related the mortification he had experienced at the hands of a neighbor. "I went into a shop one day after I became president of the university," he explained, "and said, 'Won't you be kind enough to send that up?' I had made a purchase of a man with whose face I had been familiar for many years, and he said, 'What name, sir?' That was my single mortification, and that is the keenest kind of mortification; because if there is one thing a man loves better than another it is being known by his fellow-citizens."

Wilson's statement that he had never been in the White House was intended to mean that he had never been in any part of it other than the public offices.[1]

[1] His correspondence with the White House had been most formal. In view of the endless volume of letters Wilson wrote as the official head of the government, a communication he received from President

A few days earlier, in a talk with newspaper men at the State-house in Trenton, he had told them that he had once passed with a line of sight-seers through the offices and shaken hands with Grover Cleveland. He deplored the custom of public men shaking hands with crowds of people. "Some one would confer a great blessing," Wilson said, "if he could invent a set of steel fingers or a steel glove. I remember going through a long line to shake hands with Mr. Cleveland. I did not want to add myself to the list, but the only way out at the moment was to join the line. Mr. Cleveland was pulling people by him like a trolley with one hand and mopping perspiration from his face with the other." Discussing the reception plans for his inauguration, he wrote to the committee of arrangements at Washington:

It seems to me that it would not be wise to include Mrs. Wilson in this general reception, so far as the handshaking is concerned, because I should fear that she would be quite exhausted by it. I am used to handshaking.

When the President and Mrs. Wilson left for

Taft, while he was governor, may be of passing interest. New Jersey and New York City were agitated over plans for docking the transatlantic steamers at Southampton, the easterly end of Long Island, and commissions had been named to devise ways and means for keeping this enormous business centered in New York Harbor. These commissions, one appointed by each State, in attempting to provide adequate pier facilities for the giant ships that Germany and England were then building, needed the coöperation of the War Department, which exercises supervision of all waters as a national emergency precaution. Wilson wrote to Taft suggesting that he name a federal commission to act with the two state commissions, and received the reply reproduced here in fac-simile.

Washington on the morning of March 3, they walked from their home on Cleveland Lane to the railway station, a distance of about half a mile. They never spent a night in Princeton again. While the heads of the university took no part in the farewell to Wilson, the student body did participate. The undergraduates had invited Wilson to be their guest on the trip to Washington, and they provided a special train of seven day-coaches and two parlor-cars. On the morning of the departure the students had a gay lark, singing and cheering and indulging in the other pleasantries characteristic of healthy college boys. Upward of five hundred of them crowded into the day-coaches, the parlor-cars being reserved for the Wilson party. As the train pulled out they sang "Old Nassau," and Wilson, standing on the platform of the last car, joined in the singing and waved a smiling farewell to the university town.

This was the last big demonstration that Wilson ever received in Princeton with the single exception of the June day he returned, in 1914, and paraded with his class of '79 in its thirty-fifth reunion exercises. He always maintained his legal voting residence in Princeton, using for that purpose a room at 10 Nassau Street, formerly occupied by his brother-in-law, Stockton Axson, and directly over the meat-market of John M. Lyons. His last appearance in the college town was at the November election of 1917 when he returned to vote, spending less than an hour in Princeton. Until that time he had re-

turned for both the primary and general elections each fall but never remained overnight in Princeton. Wilson had but few intimate friends among the townsfolk. Soon after he entered the White House he sent an autographed photograph of himself inscribed "To my old friend Dave Flynn." Another photograph bearing the words, "To my old friend Will Durner, affectionately, Woodrow Wilson, March 13, 1913," was sent to the Nassau Street barber whose shop Wilson patronized for years. Wilson sent copies of these photographs to several of his friends in other parts of the State.[1]

Wilson did not hesitate to express his complete disgust with the manner in which the university was operated after his retirement from the presidency. Dr. Hibben always kept up the practice of inviting Wilson to use Prospect, the home of the university president, when he returned to Princeton to vote. Wilson's feeling, however, was so intense that the invitations rarely brought forth even so much as a formal acknowledgment and declination. The shattered relationship made it difficult for the university to become officially identified with the Woodrow Wilson Foundation when that plan to award an annual peace prize was set afoot by Wilson admirers. The result was that the New Jersey organization, which had been allotted a quota of fifty thousand

[1] Wilson expressed such delight at a photograph taken for the "Newark Evening News" showing the departure from Princeton that Arthur J. Sinnott of the editorial staff of that newspaper had a dozen prints made, and the President sent these to his close friends.

dollars for the fund, found the task a hard one. The final twelve thousand dollars was eventually gathered together, in about equal parts, by Nugent, the old Essex leader who had been so many times the target for Wilson blasts, and Frank Hague, mayor of Jersey City, who had become supreme dictator of the Democratic organization in the State.

Wilson did, on one occasion, have the surviving members of his Princeton class at the White House for dinner, and he retained an interest in men whom he had known in his student days. Soon after the Wilson inauguration, when the Democrats began a tariff revision, John A. Campbell, Princeton '77 and president of the Trenton Potteries Company, suggested to Wilson that it might be well to have the new law prepared with some idea of giving a proper measure of protection to American industry. Wilson, who had always admired Campbell, occasionally dining at his home in Trenton, wrote across his own personal card, "Mr. Campbell is an old friend of mine and a good one." I was at the White House that day, and Tumulty asked me to take Campbell to Senator Ollie James of the Finance Committee, who had come to be regarded as close to the President. We found the amiable Kentucky senator spread out over two of the roomy leather chairs of his senate office, busily occupied with racing dope-sheets. It was a bad hour to disturb James, even with a personal card from the President. James, Senator Hughes, and Dr. Grayson were great

patrons of the tracks, one of the pleasant occupations of many branches of government service. James scanned the Wilson card, listened for a brief moment to the story of the interest that both capital and labor had in seeing the tariff handled with intelligence, and returned to the dope-sheets without giving Campbell any encouragement. Thus does government, in a democracy, function.

Another incident showing something of the human side of Wilson happened the following year, when the State of New Jersey and the veterans who had served with General Phil Kearny participated in the unveiling of General Kearny's statue in Arlington Cemetery. As Kearny was a Jerseyman, the committee in charge was eager to have Wilson speak, but he declined. The chairman induced Thomas Kearny, grandson of the famous soldier and son of General John Watts Kearny, to intercede. At a dinner given to the President's daughters sometime before, Mr. Kearny had been seated next to Miss Eleanor Wilson, who married McAdoo, and he telephoned to her at Washington. She took the request of Phil Kearny's grandson to the President; and when the party, including New Jersey's governor, arrived at Arlington Cemetery, they found Wilson awaiting them. The train had been delayed more than an hour, and Wilson had spent the time loitering about, looking over the various graves and reading the inscriptions—always a favorite diversion with him.

He delivered a very feeling eulogy on General Kearny that day.

All attempts at keeping alive in Wilson anything like an old home spirit for New Jersey proved fruitless, in so far as getting him to return to Princeton or Trenton was concerned. His undying disgust for the university authorities created an impossible situation. Even when the borough of Princeton celebrated its hundreth anniversary in the summer of 1913, he refused to come back. "My affection for Princeton draws me very hard," he said to Colonel Flynn, but he entered his usual convenient plea that his public duties demanded all his time. "The stout little borough is to be congratulated upon its history of slow and peaceful development and of growing distinction; will you not convey to my friends and neighbors these greetings that come direct from my heart?" was the message he sent through Flynn. Trenton had the same experience whenever attempts were made to be neighborly and to bring him back.

"All the politics that are in me I learned in New Jersey; I have been so near Trenton all my life that I have always felt that deep sense of identification with it," Wilson told a delegation of citizens who called at the White House on October 26, 1914, to urge that he return to the State and participate in a Wilson Old Home day. But he never came to Trenton after the Saturday he quit the State-house on the eve of his inauguration as President. A New

Jersey reception at the White House was planned for Febuary 13, 1914, and invitations were despatched to several hundred admirers and friends of Wilson, male and female. When the guests appeared it was announced that the President had a cold and it would not be possible for him to come down-stairs for the reception. Mrs. Ellen Axson Wilson, guardian angel of her eccentric spouse, charmed the visitors, and Vice-President Marshall and the cabinet officers, with their wives, provided the window-dressing. The Jersey folks had a gala night in the White House despite their natural disappointment at not seeing the President. It was the last attempt at social entertainment for the people from back home.

CHAPTER XIX

PICKING CABINET MEMBERS

WILSON'S extraordinary method in selecting cabinet officers—or permitting them to be selected for him—will occupy a unique place in American history. Like many Presidents, he counted on finding a superman or two; but chiefly he wanted best minds that would travel along with his own. A coalition Cabinet of outstanding men was out of the question. Published letters and books of former cabinet associates plainly indicate that Wilson ran a one-man show. Time will have to assay the precise nature of his idealism. After his physical collapse on the Western trip in behalf of his League of Nations, Wilson never went to his office in the White House. During that protracted period he rarely saw his cabinet officers or even his secretary. He found the world out of tune, and was holding hands with posterity.

In "The Making of a Nation," published in the "Atlantic Monthly," July 1897, Wilson had rather adequately diagnosed his own case in the following words:

It has not often happened that candidates for the presidency have been chosen from outside the ranks of those who have seen service in national politics. Con-

gress is apt to be peculiarly sensitive to the exercise of executive authority by men who have not at some time been members of the one House or the other, and so learned to sympathize with members' views as to the relations that ought to exist between the President and the federal legislature. No doubt a good deal of the dislike which the Houses early conceived for Mr. Cleveland was due to the feeling that he was an 'outsider,' a man without congressional sympathies and points of view,—a sort of irregular and amateur at the delicate game of national politics as played at Washington; most of the men whom he chose as advisers were of the same kind, without Washington credentials. . . . Members resent such appointments; they seem to drive the two branches of government further apart than ever. . . . These appointments make coöperation between Congress and the Executive more difficult, not because the men chosen lack respect for the Houses or seek to gain any advantage over them, but because they do not know how to deal with them—through what persons and by what courtesies of approach.

But he apparently overlooked this analysis when he came to his own selections.

Wilson was personally very eager to have Louis Brandeis in his first Cabinet. He had been making use of the Brandeis philosophy and had a great admiration for the work that the Boston lawyer had done in exposing Secretary of the Interior Ballinger, as well as in unearthing the scandals in the New York, New Haven, and Hartford Railroad. Brandeis likewise had much to do with letting the light into the United Shoe Machinery Company. The big financial interests of New England, victims of the Brandeis

exposures, were successful in blocking his selection by Wilson, who always regretted this; and when opportunity later came, he put Brandeis on the Supreme Court bench. He had a very high regard for the opinions of Brandeis, and when during the war he was reluctant to name McAdoo as director-general of railroads it was Brandeis and Tumulty who convinced him that McAdoo was the man for the job.

Dodge, Princeton classmate and friend of Wilson, was used by the New England financiers in undermining Brandeis. Dodge was a somewhat unconscious figure in the situation. His purpose was rather to prevent Wilson from making grave blunders than to influence the appointment of any one to office. Henry L. Higginson of Boston, who was on terms of intimacy with Dodge, and whose partner, James Storrow, had prepared a pamphlet entitled "Brandeis and Brandeis," was the medium who filtered the onslaughts through Dodge to Wilson. The attacks on Brandeis included serious charges, and Richard Olney, for whom Wilson had a considerable regard, was drawn in to settle the matter.

Higginson had been a supporter of Wilson in the election, and he had much to do with convincing Wilson that Brandeis was a dangerous man. Higginson declared that many of the stanch Republicans voted for Wilson because they thought so highly of him and trusted so much in him. "Nobody has that opinion of him more strongly than I," Higginson wrote Dodge. "I am not presuming that you have

any more power than you have; you are a friend and supporter of Mr. Wilson, and he trusts you; you have aided him in the present case and have done good service." Pressure was brought from many other angles. The personal affection existing between Dodge and Wilson was an influencing factor in keeping Brandeis out of the Cabinet.

The first party chieftain actually summoned to Trenton for the formal tender of a cabinet place was William Jennings Bryan, who came up from his winter home at Miami on December 21, 1911. Bryan spent nearly four hours closeted with Wilson in the governor's office, and when they emerged to go to lunch Wilson told the reporters, waiting in an outer office, that Bryan had not been tendered a place in the Cabinet. So far as the formal tender was concerned the statement was literally true, although a bit evasive. It was hardly necessary to make the formal offer, as House had been to Florida to discuss the coming administration with Bryan, and so what actually took place at the four-hour session in the governor's private office was a consideration of general plans for the future. The actual tender of the post of secretary of state was made at the Hotel Sterling a little later that day. Wilson and Bryan lunched there together.[1] The visit of Bryan to Wil-

[1] Bryan, in his memoirs, relates that at this meeting he told Wilson he was concerned regarding the excluding of intoxicating liquors at diplomatic functions given by the secretary of state, and that Wilson assured him he was perfectly free to do what he thought right. Subsequently Bryan's serving of grape-juice attracted wide attention, but

son created a great stir, and the newspaper speculation added immensely to Wilson's irritation. To the press representatives he insisted that he had reached no decision. Champ Clark, who after the Baltimore fiasco was naturally in a condition of intense hatred toward Bryan, came to Trenton three days after the Bryan visit and spent the greater part of Christmas eve in an effort to head off the Nebraskan, but he got no satisfaction.

Tumulty and House, from the outset, were enthusiastic friends of Bryan. They recognized that it was Bryan's work at Baltimore that had given Wilson the nomination. On the other hand, Mrs.

Wilson did not offer any criticism. Bryan, himself a gourmand, was fanatical on the subject of alcohol. Former United States Senator R. F. Pettigrew of South Dakota relates that some time early in 1912, in response to a telegraphic invitation from Bryan, he went from Washington to New York for a conference with George Fred Williams of Boston. Pettigrew spent the entire day with Williams and Bryan at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel. "Bryan was very anxious to know," says Pettigrew, "what we were going to do in the Democratic Convention of that year. He was desirious that we should secure uninstructed delegates from our States and cast our votes for him. I told Bryan that we had supported him three times for President; that we did not think it wise for him to be a candidate that year, and that we would not support him, but that we would undertake to carry our States, as well as the State of Nebraska, for Champ Clark of Missouri, who was really a progressive Democrat. Bryan immediately attacked Clark, and stated that Clark was addicted to the excessive use of alcohol. I told him that while Clark did use alcohol and might at times have taken too much of it, that he was a far more temperate man than Bryan himself. Bryan thereupon indignantly resented my statement. Then I told him that it was my observation that very many more men were killed by overeating than by over-drinking, and explained to him the physiological reasons for my statement. I said also, 'Mr. Bryan, you are exceedingly intemperate. You eat immoderately, and when you get a little older you will suffer serious consequences from your intemperate habits in this respect.' Of course this made Bryan very angry."

Wilson, who likewise fully appreciated that they were under heavy obligations to Bryan, was opposed to Bryan's coming into the Cabinet. She had remarkable political intuition, as well as a splendid working knowledge of her husband's slant of mind. It was her idea that to have Bryan in the Cabinet was unnecessarily inviting trouble. She insisted that a split between Bryan and Wilson was inevitable and that when it came it would alienate most of the Nebraskan's followers, while the appointment itself would antagonize the conservative Democrats at once. It was Mrs. Wilson's notion that some great honor should be found for Bryan, but she had come through the heartbreaking and nerve-racking struggle at Princeton and knew how difficult it was for her husband to get along with individuals. Wilson, on the other hand, spurred by Tumulty and House, took the position that he owed Bryan so much for his work at Baltimore, particularly in view of the disclosures in the Joline letter, that he could do nothing but tender him the first place in the Cabinet. He felt, too, that Bryan would not be a trouble-maker and that he would "work well in harness."

Had Wilson desired to escape naming Bryan as secretary of state, he might have readily found a way out. Immediately after the election there had been started a movement on the part of some American interests in China, under the direction of Bishop J. W. Bashford of the Methodist Episcopal Church at Peking, to have the American representative

raised from minister to ambassador, and to have Bryan sent out there. Bryan himself was greatly complimented by the plan to have him go as ambassador to the Chinese Republic. He felt that it was his Christian duty to help the new republic in its critical hour. Bishop Bashford did not lose sight of the fact that Japan's foreign trade was increasing fast, and he held out the hope that if America gave the proper help, China would grow commercially and industrially, and the new republic would flourish like a green bay-tree. Bryan's appointment as secretary of state ended the matter. Bryan's evangelistic spirit was much perturbed when Wilson offered to send Dr. Charles W. Eliot, a Unitarian, to China; but Dr. Eliot declined the mission, as he likewise declined the court of St. James's.

A few days after Bryan's December visit to Trenton there appeared in his 'Commoner" an editorial criticizing the practices of the United States Senate under the caption, "The Blight of Seniority." This caused a mild storm in the Senate, where there was already some restlessness. Even senators who were friendly to Wilson were not much in sympathy with the methods he had employed in riding roughshod over the legislators at Trenton. Wilson handled New Jersey Legislatures much as he had handled undergraduates at Princeton. By insisting on attending the caucus he had virtually arrogated to himself the legislative as well as the executive branch of the government. Bryan recognized the embarrass-

ing position of attempting to be a free editor and at the same time part of the Administration, and he wrote to Wilson that "The Blight of Seniority" had been written before his visit to Trenton and that it had never occurred to him that he would be accused of speaking for Wilson. This raised the question of the propriety of Bryan's conducting the "Commoner" while secretary of state and of the danger that anything printed there might be mistaken for the views of Wilson. Bryan retired from the active conduct of the "Commoner," and it was subsequently discontinued altogether.

It was understood between Bryan and Wilson that the Nebraskan should continue to do a certain amount of Chautauqua lecturing each year. Wilson himself, while president of Princeton, had supplemented his income by lectures and writing. The possibility of criticism was foreseen, and Bryan suggested that this might be minimized by providing that no admission charge should be made for his specific lecture. "I think the advantage," Bryan wrote Wilson, "which the Chautauqua would derive from the sale of season tickets would be sufficient to justify a reasonable compensation for me." Bryan urged Wilson to place some Roman Catholic in the Cabinet and recommended John McGraw of West Virginia, who had joined the Wilson forces when the sky was dark, and who was a candidate for postmaster-general. He likewise recommended Martin H. Glynn, then lieutenant-governor of New York, as

"a good man." He advised Wilson that he was being deluged from the West with copies of the "Menace," savagely attacking Wilson for even considering the naming of a Catholic. "I hope, however," Bryan continued, "that you will not allow these protests to prevent the appointment of a Catholic to some position in the Cabinet." He also looked with favor upon the naming of Lewis Nixon of New York for secretary of the navy—"a very intelligent fellow" who would follow Wilson's views in the matter of building battle-ships. Nathan Straus was another recommendation of Bryan, and early in January he urged upon Wilson the cultivation of closer relations between the President and the Vice-President, calling attention to the fact that Vice-President Marshall had not been invited to Trenton to confer.

Bryan's army of friends among "deserving Democrats" promptly began to suggest themselves for diplomatic appointments, and within a fortnight of the time of the visit to Trenton, Wilson wrote Bryan suggesting that it would not be wise to send any man back to his home country as the American diplomatic representative. Bryan agreed with this rule, but he thought exception might be found, and where there were no objections he looked upon it as "a good way of pleasing the foreign-born element in the party." Elaborating this point he declared:

I am anxious that your administration shall strengthen our party and we have been weak with the foreign element

in recent years. I believe you have it in your power to so strengthen the party as to keep the party in power for a generation. And, while on foreign affairs, let me say that I found our missionary cause embarrassed by the immoralities of American and other representatives of the "Christian nations." I suggest for your consideration the propriety of selecting men of pronounced Christian character for China and Japan—these nations furnish the most encouraging missionary fields.

The selection of the other members of Wilson's first Cabinet had many curious angles. Meetings to pass upon the various prospects were held at the Wilson home in Princeton, at the apartment of House in New York, and in Tumulty's Supreme Court offices at the State-house in Trenton. In the preceding spring, when the outlook for the Presidential nomination appeared dubious, Wilson had named Tumulty clerk of the Supreme Court, which paid a better salary than the secretaryship to the governor, and was intended to provide against the possible evil political day. Tumulty continued to serve as secretary without pay. When they were leaving the White House in 1920, Wilson wanted to place Tumulty in the Court of Claims, or in any good berth available, but Tumulty decided to quit public office and returned to the practice of law.

Josephus Daniels an ardent Bryan follower was picked for secretary of the navy in the dingy old railroad station at Trenton. His ultimate selection was due to the persistency of Thomas J. Pence, Washington correspondent for Daniels's Raleigh

newspaper. Pence had the tenacious and unwavering loyalty of Tumulty, who made and blocked more cabinet appointments than any other man of his time. House, without whose last word of approval none could enter that first Cabinet, was not unfriendly to Daniels. But he had numerous candidates of his own to place, and, besides, he was not given to fighting it out, once the Wilson jaw seemed set. House at one stage of the conferences had Walter Hines Page on the slate for secretary of the interior, but Wilson decided that House was picking too many Southerners and eliminated Page.

Daniels wanted to be postmaster-general, but House felt that he did not measure up to the place. Subsequently the President was pleasantly surprised at the ability and sterling qualities of Daniels, and was enthusiastic over his handling of the Navy Department during the war. Pence, who had, in the popular mind, shrewdly twisted the Harvey knockout into a righteous war on Ryan and Wall Street, was thereafter in high favor. Pence had been in charge of the publicity work in the Presidential campaign, which brought him closer to Wilson, and in his fight to land Daniels he not only had the support of Tumulty and Bryan but likewise the ardent backing of Senator Hughes, one of the rough diamonds among the President's intimates. If Hughes had cared for it, he could have had the post of secretary of labor, but he declined it and succeeded in having his old colleague and friend, Representative William

B. Wilson of Pennsylvania, who was personally unknown to Wilson, named in his stead. Until he went to Washington to be inaugurated as President, Wilson had not seen three members of his Cabinet, and a fourth—Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison—he had met but once.

Daniels had rendered a service of telling import at a delicate moment in the Wilson candidacy. It was at the Jackson day dinner, on January 8, 1912, when Wilson was to appear in competition with Bryan, Champ Clark, and other Presidential contenders, and the Bryan cocked-hat letter had appeared. There was a panic in the Wilson camp. To add to the confusion, a cheering-section of New Jersey Democrats had been taken to Washington, only to find that James R. Nugent, enemy of Wilson, had corralled all the banquet tickets assigned to Wilson's home State. Bryan, on his way to Washington, stopped off at Raleigh to see Daniels, and Pence successfully undertook the job of having the North Carolina editor soften the blow of the Joline letter. Wilson, at the chief Jackson day banquet in Washington, spoke in a diplomatic way of Bryan's steadfast vision, and Bryan behaved handsomely about it all. Two Jackson day banquets were held that evening. Henry Morgenthau, rich New York real-estate operator, who had been helping to finance the McCombs-Wilson show to the tune of four thousand dollars a month, was nominated by acclamation to

give a separate banquet to the visiting Jerseymen who had come to root for Wilson. The work of Daniels on that eventful occasion was repeatedly pressed home on the President-elect. Finally, one morning in the railroad station, Tumulty grew so earnest that Wilson surrendered.

Pence and Tumulty accelerated many other cabinet selections. Together with House they landed Albert S. Burleson as postmaster-general. Few reached the Cabinet without the support of either House or Tumulty or both. It was House who suggested the amiable Franklin Knight Lane of California for secretary of the interior. Wilson had never seen Lane, who was a Roosevelt Democrat and who had attracted attention both on the Pacific Coast and as a member of the Interstate Commerce Commission, where he had been placed by Roosevelt. Lane was early in the field for a cabinet appointment, and his campaign was cleverly handled. He was an old newspaper man, made charming speeches, and wrote well. Wilson liked him very much, especially in the early days, although he felt that Lane did most of his brave talking outside of cabinet meetings. There was a decided notion at the White House that Lane had urged Lansing to resign. He wanted to be secretary of state. He was a perennial candidate for promotion; it was always a source of disappointment to Lane that Wilson did not name him an associate justice of the Supreme Court. When Lane

quit, John Barton Payne was named secretary of the interior, on the recommendation of Edward N. Hurley, chairman of the Shipping Board.

During the Wilson administration there was an irreconcilable difference of opinion between the Lane idea of conservation and the Josephus Daniels idea. The Daniels idea followed the Pinchot plan, and there arose a tense situation out of the attempt of the Hawaiian Oil Company to procure a lease, which Daniels hotly opposed. Wilson remained in the background, watching the combatants warm up. When it eventually appeared that Lane might consent to the lease, Wilson notified him that if he did so his resignation would be demanded. But Wilson never imputed anything but the highest motives to Lane's work as secretary of the interior.

Single-handed, House put James Clark McReynolds of Tennessee over as attorney-general. Wilson had never seen him. McReynolds was a strong force in the Cabinet and early got into a difference with McAdoo over the erection of the new Department of Justice building. McAdoo said that the construction of the building, like other public buildings used by the Department of Justice, should be handled by the Treasury Department; any other course would result in dislocating the authority that properly rested with his department. McReynolds insisted upon the right of the Department of Justice to erect its own building, and he offered to quit if necessary. The situation grew tense,

and the President soon eased it by naming McReynolds as associate justice of the Supreme Court. House at once picked another Southerner, Thomas W. Gregory of Texas, for attorney-general, and he served until 1919.

David Franklin Houston of Missouri, but formerly of Texas, owed much to the irrepressible House. Wilson regarded Houston, who served first as secretary of agriculture and later as secretary of the treasury, as easily the biggest man in the Cabinet and the best fitted for the Presidency among his associates. Houston wrote the Wilson veto of the budget bill passed by Congress, as well as several of the other Wilson messages. When Carter Glass, who had served as secretary of the treasury after the McAdoo resignation, decided to go to the Senate, Wilson named Houston as his successor and picked Meredith for secretary of agriculture. Glass was a personal selection of the President.

That was also true of William C. Redfield, who was made secretary of commerce at the outset of the Wilson régime. Redfield had served a term in Congress and won attention by his serious speeches on the tariff. He represented a Brooklyn district, and the Democratic organization there decided to side-track him by nominating him in a strongly Republican district in 1912. Wilson had shown a great deal of interest in Redfield's tariff views, and Redfield had displayed much interest in Wilson. This did not rest well with the political machine in New York. I

recall the warning that Senator Hughes issued to a group of Brooklyn leaders on the day the Democrats of the nation went to Sea Girt to hear Ollie James of Kentucky formally notify Wilson that he had been named at Baltimore as the party standard-bearer.

"You fellows are making a martyr out of Redfield, and if you don't send him back to Congress from his old district you 'll land him in the Cabinet," said the disgusted Hughes. And that 's exactly what happened. Redfield and Houston were consulted frequently by Wilson on the tariff during that campaign. Redfield was put forward as a successful business man who was a profound student of the tariff and could demonstrate the falsity of the gospel of protection. It was Wilson's intention to name Redfield as postmaster-general, but on Tumulty's representation that the solid Brooklyn citizen had a mind more given to business than politics, the shift was made to the Department of Commerce.

It is remotely possible that the Tumulty suggestion was slightly influenced by the desire of House, Pence and himself to place Burleson as postmaster-general, which they did. Several of the original Wilson supporters frankly expressed opposition to Redfield's selection for any post, on the ground that his course at Baltimore might have seriously endangered the Wilson chances. Redfield, in view of the generous newspaper and magazine publicity that had been given his tariff speeches, had become an active candidate for Vice-Presidential nomination. Poster

pictures of his now widely known and bewhiskered countenance were plastered over the streets of Baltimore, much to the annoyance of the Wilson forces, who indignantly protested that Eastern Vice-Presidential booms were not likely to help an Eastern Presidential boom. Wilson was much impressed with the business capacity of the solemn Brooklyn Congressman, however, and insisted on having him recognized. When Redfield retired from the Cabinet it was Tumulty who picked Joshua W. Alexander of Missouri to finish out the work as secretary of the Department of Commerce.

McAdoo did not sail into the Cabinet on smooth waters. Next to Daniels, he had the biggest odds to overcome. McCombs, Morgenthau, and others put up a stiff fight to prevent his getting the treasury portfolio. Morgenthau was a candidate himself, and McCombs had come to regard McAdoo as his most powerful enemy. Personally Wilson always had a regard for McAdoo, who was one of the earliest men of affairs to attach himself to the Wilson Presidential boom. The argument chiefly used to head off the McAdoo appointment was that he was a promoter, whose one great accomplishment was the building of the Hudson Tubes, and that he would be regarded as a Wall Street agent. The attacks caused Wilson to ponder long, and much work was needed to overcome the opposition. Tumulty vigorously went to the defense of McAdoo. House likewise was ardently for McAdoo. It was a great battle, and Wilson

finally capitulated. While McAdoo, after his marriage to one of the daughters of Wilson, grew very close to the President, Wilson never got entirely over the early impression created by the critics of McAdoo that he was a Wall Street promoter. When McAdoo wanted to become director-general of railroads, it required strenuous efforts to bring about the appointment.

Wilson tendered the post of secretary of war to A. Mitchell Palmer, who had been largely instrumental in getting and keeping the Pennsylvania delegation unbroken at Baltimore. The firm stands of Pennsylvania and Texas had given heart to the Wilson forces. Palmer had been the close friend of Senator Hughes, with whom he had served on the Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives, and it had been taken for granted that because of the mighty service he had rendered Wilson he was certain of a place in the Cabinet. Palmer met with Tumulty, Hughes, and Wilson at the apartment of House in New York, ten days before the first inauguration, and was tendered the war job. This he promptly declined on the ground that he was a Quaker, and there was considerable speculation at the time as to whether or not the post had been offered with advance knowledge that his religious beliefs would make it impossible for him to accept. After every inauguration there are romantic yarns about party leaders who have refused cabinet places; in the case of Palmer the refusal was genuine. Tumulty and Hughes urged

him to reconsider and accept the post, which they contended had nothing in particular to do with fighting, but really demanded a lawyer because of the problems in the Philippines, which were certain to continue throughout the Wilson term. Palmer, however, stood his ground and sent this letter to Wilson:

Committee on Ways and Means,
House of Representatives.
Washington, D. C., February 24, 1913

Hon. Woodrow Wilson, Trenton, New Jersey.

My Dear Governor Wilson: I have, as you requested, given further consideration to your offer to make me the Secretary of War.

I deeply appreciate the great honor which you have done me in tendering the appointment to this high office, but feel that I cannot accept. The more I think of it, the more impossible it becomes. I am a Quaker. Many generations of my people have borne strong testimony against "war and the preparations for war."

Of course, as a Representative in Congress, I vote for the great supply bills to maintain the military and thus, in a sense, participate in the work of preparation for war but I do this in response to the sentiment and opinion of a vast majority of the people whom I represent. My mind, however, revolts at the prospect of filling an executive position where my time and thought and energy would be almost wholly devoted to the details of the improvement of our military establishment as an adequate preparation for possible war. As a Quaker War Secretary, I should consider myself a living illustration of a horrible incongruity.

I hope you understand. I am as patriotic as any man

who ever lived. In case of a foreign invasion of our soil, or in case our country should come to armed conflict with any other, I would go as far as any man in her defense but I cannot without violating every tradition of my people and going against every instinct of my nature planted there by heredity, environment, and training, sit down in cold blood in an executive position and use such talent as I possess to the work of preparing for such a conflict.

I shall hope that my continued service in the House will afford me many opportunities to show that my declination of this high honor is not caused by any lack of desire to serve you and the cause you represent.

With assurances of my high personal regard and best wishes for the entire success of your administration, I am

Yours very truly,

A. Mitchell Palmer.

The popular notion that the Wilson mind never budged, once it was set, is erroneous. No better illustration is needed than the circumstances surrounding the ultimate naming of Palmer as attorney-general in February, 1919.

After a cross-play of cables between Washington and Paris, Wilson instructed Tumulty to meet him at Boston with the official commission designating Sherman Whipple, distinguished Massachusetts lawyer, as attorney-general of the United States. The President was coming home from the Peace Conference for a brief visit, and it was at Tumulty's suggestion that the dramatic landing of the *George Washington* was fixed for Boston. I spent con-

siderable time at the White House offices that winter, watching with interest the attempt to run the United States Government by cable, and observing the difficulties that the President appeared to be having, chiefly with the press. During Wilson's previous public career Tumulty had served as the go-between in handling the publicity end of the Administration. Without him at Paris, Wilson found the work rather rough.

When Thomas W. Gregory, who had been put in the Cabinet by House, tendered his resignation as attorney-general on January 12, 1919, it was with a strong recommendation that Carroll Todd, assistant attorney-general, and later Mr. Gregory's law partner, should be named as the successor. Gregory was from Texas and Todd from Virginia, and Tumulty immediately cabled the President that the issue of Southern domination under the Democrats was growing more acute each day.

"This vacancy gives chance to realign independents who have been critical of Southern domination," cabled Tumulty. "Recognition of Palmer, who stands before country as antagonist of Penrose, would be most helpful and cheering to young men of party. Palmer our friend in 1912 and has been loyal throughout. He is most accessible and democratic. His ability as a lawyer beyond question. You will make no mistake if appointment is made. It will give us all heart and new courage. Party now in need of tonic like this."

Cable messages to Vance McCormick and Grayson, who were in Paris, were promptly despatched, urging them to work for Palmer. There was a lively contest between Tumulty on the one hand and the Gregory forces on the other, which culminated in the cablegram from the President directing Tumulty to meet him at Boston with the commission for Whipple. Tumulty proceeded to carry out orders; but, nothing daunted, he also took a commission that would make Palmer attorney-general. Soon after the *George Washington* reached port Tumulty got the ear of the President, and when the argument was finished the Palmer commission was the one that was signed.

The definite refusal of Palmer to accept as secretary of war did not come until the week before the inauguration in 1913. The sketchy framework that had been built up around the war job to show that what was actually needed was an able lawyer, capable of judicially and equitably handling the affairs of the Philippines, rather than a man who was to deal with fighting and fighters, did not fit any of the other avowed cabinet candidates whom Wilson might consider. When they had failed to convince Palmer that he could accept the post without doing violence to his Quaker tenets, Tumulty came forward with the suggestion that one of the recognized and outstanding equity judges of the country resided right in his home town of Jersey City. It was Vice-Chancellor Lindley M. Garrison. Wilson did not remember ever having heard of Lindley M. Garrison. But on

the Tumulty representation he summoned Garrison to the State-house next day. Garrison had no inkling of the reason for his being invited. When Wilson, after a pleasant introduction and a brief sizing up of the man, tendered him the portfolio of secretary of war, Garrison was stunned. He pointed out that he was not in touch with political affairs and that he was occupying a pleasant judicial place for which he had fitted himself by long years of work. Furthermore it was just the kind of berth that suited both his ambition and his personal tastes. Wilson proceeded to argue that there was a larger duty in life than mere personal inclination and comfort and that Garrison owed it to his country to make any financial or other sacrifice involved. Garrison hurried back to Jersey City, packed his bag, and went with his wife to Atlantic City to think it over. Next day he accepted and three days later was on his way to Washington to assume command of the War Department.

Garrison rendered first-rate service to the Administration and won many friends by his frank and fearless method of dealing with public questions. In his younger days he had been a newspaper reporter in Philadelphia, and he knew that the surest and safest way to get the truth to the world was to tell the truth to those whose business it is to disseminate information. When the World War broke out, he became an outspoken advocate of preparedness for America. His position and his keen intellect, together with his enormous energy, soon brought him into a place of

distinct leadership in the fight. Wilson was not yet ready, however, for such aggressive action as Garrison put into the preparedness fight, and notwithstanding the fact that he had previously committed himself to it, Wilson later refused to support the secretary of war's program for a larger army, as outlined in his 1915 report. Garrison tendered his resignation and went back to the practice of his profession. He was succeeded by Newton D. Baker of Cleveland, Ohio, who came to have a very high place in the Presidential favor. Baker could have been secretary of the interior in the first Cabinet, but he preferred to finish the program of municipal reform that he had helped Tom Johnson map out for Cleveland, Ohio.

CHAPTER XX

PLAYING THE GAME AT WASHINGTON

DURING the two years he spent at Trenton, Wilson had found that the great bulk of his correspondence had to do with office-seeking. His experiences in connection with the picking of his Cabinet, and the many suggestions that came to him from intimate friends who had never participated in the traffic in public jobs, prompted him to make a declaration, immediately after he had assumed the reins of government at Washington, that he would not personally permit seekers for place to interview him. On the evening of March 3, which he spent at a Washington hotel as the guest of his cousin, John Wilson of Washington, Pennsylvania, he was besieged by friends of McCombs and others, and he was disgusted with the whole aspect of patronage. One of his first acts on the day after his inauguration sent a chill down the backs of the hordes of hungry aspirants who had flocked to Washington. He issued a statement on March 5 announcing that he regretted to be obliged "to decline to see applicants for office in person except when he himself invites the interview." Wilson went on to say in his statement, which was written in the third person, that he knew "from his

experience as Governor of New Jersey—where it fell to him to make innumerable appointments—that the greater part both of his time and of his energy will be spent in personal interviews with candidates unless he sets an invariable rule in the matter. It is his intention to deal with appointments through the heads of the several executive departments." Like so many Wilson resolutions this proved to be quite flexible.

From the beginning Tumulty and House were the chief patronage dispensers, with McAdoo as the runner-up. Many of Wilson's fights with the Senate over patronage were brought about by attempts to force into office men selected either by McAdoo himself or by friends who were suspected from the outset of attempting to set up a political machine that would eventually land McAdoo in the White House. Shortly after his marriage to the President's daughter, McAdoo's power over the patronage began to spread out. His position of intimacy gave him opportunity which he would not otherwise have had and which made it difficult for any man either in the Cabinet or in Congress to oppose McAdoo without very soon finding himself also in opposition to Wilson. It was not of Wilson's making. He sought to keep himself free from family influences and at times appeared to be leaning backward in his intercourse with McAdoo. But it soon became evident that the McAdoo policies were the administration policies, and it was not possible to criticize McAdoo without criticizing Wilson.

In the first two years of the Presidency, Wilson played considerably at organization politics. It was not to his liking. But every President finds he must be a politician in one sense or another. The Scotch and Irish blood in Wilson's veins kept him quarreling most of the time, and yet he never learned to take political punishment gracefully. The prospect of losing fretted him and sometimes resulted in embarrassing shifts. With all his idealism, he was usually cautious about the likely effect of a course of action on his own political fortunes, though at times he would appear to be utterly indifferent to political considerations or consequences. When the timid Democratic Congressman from Wilson's home district suggested the name of a faithful party man for postmaster at Princeton, Wilson dismissed the matter promptly, with the remark, "Chip Cottrell always handled my mail well when I was there, and I am going to reappoint him." And so William H. Cottrell, the Republican postmaster, was continued.

Occasionally Wilson would unearth an old supporter at the university, or a personal friend would make a recommendation that led to amusing difficulties with the Senate. "I don't know where in hell you dig up some of these people unless you go to a Swedish employment agency," Senator Hughes remarked to him one day. Hughes, who was the Wilson spokesman in the Senate, frequently found himself at a loss when called upon to explain nominations sent there for confirmation. He was very blunt

in his speech and was one of the men whom Wilson thoroughly enjoyed and admired. He had spent his early days as a mill worker in Paterson. A night school course had developed Hughes into a first-rate court stenographer, from which he graduated into law and was elected to Congress. There, by hard work, he had become a leading member of the Ways and Means Committee. With Wilson he had a great deal of influence, although dealing in jobs was distasteful to Hughes. He was responsible, however, for the appointment of James W. Gerard, as ambassador to Germany. Gerard had contributed on a lavish scale to the Wilson election fund, although in the pre-primary fight he had supported Champ Clark and was understood to have given forty thousand dollars to that cause. He no doubt wanted a place in the Cabinet, and an elaborate publicity campaign was operated through his friends in New York, but Wilson would not have him. At the urgent recommendation of Hughes, he finally made Gerard the diplomatic representative to Germany, thus unexpectedly providing Gerard with the opportunity to write war memoirs that reimbursed him for his political investments.

In the matter of filling diplomatic posts, Wilson, aside from remembering a few intimate friends, followed the customary procedure of rewarding those who had made contributions of service or money to the cause. Rich and ambitious wives have been

known to guard against possible contingencies in the diplomatic trade by making liberal contributions to both political parties in the same campaign. The selections of Walter Hines Page for Great Britain and of Thomas Nelson Page for Italy were personal with Wilson. McCombs could have had Paris or any diplomatic post outside of the court of St. James's. Dean Henry B. Fine, who continued to the end to be Wilson's closest friend in the faculty at Princeton, declined to take the German post or any appointment in the Government. It was but natural that Wilson should remember his Princeton friends. Professor Edward Capps, eminent Greek scholar, became minister to Greece, and Professor Henry Jones Ford, whom Wilson had made state banking commissioner of New Jersey, was sent on confidential missions to the Philippines and elsewhere. Professor E. G. Conklin was another loyal Wilson adherent who was not forgotten, and Professor Winthrop More Daniels, whom Wilson had appointed public service commissioner in New Jersey, became a member of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Professor Henry Van Dyke, who had never made public the unfriendly Cleveland letter, was the only Wilson adversary at Princeton to be rewarded; at the suggestion of Ellen Axson Wilson, Dr. Van Dyke was sent as minister to the Netherlands. Other intellectuals, who had played some part in promoting the Wilson fortunes, were afforded a chance at foreign service,

where the war provided unusual opportunities for the writing of books that brought not only fame but, in many cases, big financial returns.

Hale, the friendly biographer who had written so usefully of Wilson after Harvey's exit, was sent to Mexico on a special mission. Hale not only wrote the story of Wilson's life but put together, from stenographic notes of speeches, "The New Freedom," which had a great vogue among Wilsonian literature. Like many others, Hae fell out of step, however, and in his later years was a sharp critic of Wilson, publishing, among other works, "The Story of a Style," which caustically analyzed Wilson's use of words and was the subject of much annoyance. At Bryan's suggestion, John Lind was sent as "confidential agent" to Mexico, but his mission did not turn out to be one of the most brilliant, and Wilson's Mexican policy of watchful waiting was a tender spot until we entered the World War.

The ambassadorship to St. Petersburg, although the court was at the time regarded as one of the finest in Europe, became a sort of dumping-ground for financial and political contributors, with few takers. Pindell, who had been with Sullivan of Illinois in the Baltimore fight, declined it. There was wide-spread and harsh criticism of Wilson's lax methods in picking diplomats when the correspondence of James Hamilton Lewis, senator from Illinois, urging Pindell to take the job as a sort of lark for a year, became public.

On account of his effective work for Wilson's nomination and election, Morgenthau was naturally disappointed over his failure to land in the Cabinet; and when, a few months later, Wilson decided to name him as ambassador to Turkey, Morgenthau showed considerable hesitation. He would have preferred some post in Western Europe. But the President took the position that Constantinople was a point on which the interest of the American Jews in Palestine was focused and that it was indispensable to have a Jew in that post. There had been successive Jewish appointments to Turkey, and Morgenthau insisted that he had been urged by many of his coreligionists not to accept because of the feeling that Constantinople was the only field open to Jews in the diplomatic service. Wilson, by way of attempting to impress Morgenthau with the importance of Turkey, said he regarded that post and China as the two demanding the very highest order of equipment in our representatives. Morgenthau at once expressed a preference for China. Wilson met this request with the Bryan argument that our Chinese interests were largely in the form of missionary activities and our minister should be an evangelical Christian. He had previously offered China to Dr. Eliot, who was not evangelical in the Bryan sense. Morgenthau accepted the Turkish post and, like so many non-professional American representatives, acquitted himself with credit.

Another untrained diplomat was Thomas H. Birch

of New Jersey, who served as minister to Portugal throughout the Wilson régime and was continued in the office by the Republicans for a year. Birch was an intimate friend of Bryan. His father, James H. Birch, a prosperous wagon-builder, had stood by the Nebraskan in 1896 when Eastern business men, big and small, trembled at the mere mention of the Bryan name. A few weeks before his retirement from Trenton, Wilson, as a matter of compliment, had named the younger Birch as personal aide-de-camp on the governor's staff, giving him the title of colonel. The only opportunity that Birch had to function as aide was at the inauguration of the President on March 4, 1913, when, although Wilson was no longer governor, Birch appeared at Washington resplendent in a uniform patterned after the gorgeousness of the Philadelphia City Troop. Birch wanted to go to Brussels as American diplomatic representative. Bryan urged the selection, but Wilson balked and offered to name him to Persia. Birch declined, and they finally compromised on Portugal. There was nervousness among the permanent staff of the State Department at the discovery that before leaving Washington Colonel Birch had stationary embossed "American Embassy, Lisbon," instead of "American Legation, Lisbon," but the incident only provoked a smile at the White House. When he was formally presented to the Portuguese Government Colonel Birch again donned his impressive uniform, and this assured his diplomatic success. He was the ideal rep-

resentative at an old-world capital, out for a good time and ready to share it along the way. Fond of life, handsome and gracious, well groomed, equipped with fine horses and a magnificent four-in-hand coach, there was none gayer, none more popular, in the diplomatic set of Lisbon. Wars might come and governments might change, but Colonel Birch was the friend of them all, entertaining lavishly at his mansion, minding his own business, and not interfering in Portuguese politics. He had the uncommon sense to recognize that the economic and political future of the world so clearly belonged to America that there was nothing to worry about or to hurry about. He not only proved a useful representative for his own country, but his good business judgment was exceedingly helpful to the Portuguese Government, which did the very unusual thing of formally requesting that he be continued indefinitely. But exigencies of politics made it necessary eventually that he give way to a needy Republican.

There came a bright day when Colonel George Harvey was slated for ambassador to France, a post around which centered so much of world history in the ensuing years. Tumulty and I spent an hour chatting with Harvey at the University Club. On our way back to the White House it was agreed that we should frankly suggest to the President that Harvey's hard work in the early days entitled him to a diplomatic post, which was then about the only kind of place into which he would fit. McCombs had re-

fused the Paris embassy, and it seemed the best one for Harvey. We waited until the President had finished a cabinet meeting and then discussed at length the wide-spread unrest at the treatment that had been given Harvey. Wilson agreed that he owed much to Harvey and that it would be gracious and right to give him some distinguished recognition. The situation was well in hand, and Tumulty took Senator James A. O'Gorman of New York into camp so that Harvey might be properly acquainted with what was doing. But a stiff blast at Wilson from the Harvey pen, written several days earlier, was published before the President made the appointment, and that ended the matter; Wilson could not reward an unfriendly critic, and Harvey lost the chance of being on the inside of things at the very heart of the war.

In place of Harvey, William G. Sharp, former Congressman, manufacturer of wood-alcohol at Elyria, Ohio, who had been a liberal contributor to the campaign fund, was, through the influence of Senator Pomerene, made ambassador to France. Sharp never lost his complete sense of loyalty to America.

Some of Wilson's hit-or-miss methods of selecting diplomats resulted from the easy-going Bryan, who had many friends to reward and who was not greatly concerned about foreign entanglements. No one foresaw the war, with its possibilities; and, besides, Wilson felt that in House, who loved to rove the

world, he had a complete foreign service of his own. Wilson did not have any particular regard for the diplomatic agents of the country, and when he desired information he never hesitated to send his own personal agents. House was recognized abroad as the voice of Wilson, having the confidence of the President as none other, save Tumulty, ever had it, and superseding American diplomats wherever he turned up. Personally Wilson, like many men of genius, was not a glutton for work, and he was glad to turn over foreign problems to House, just as he let Tumulty carry much of the domestic political burdens. Making the speeches and inditing the messages was his part of the great program.

It was Wilson's habit to write out important state papers himself and to have Bryan sign them. The frequent storms that broke over the head of Bryan apparently disturbed Wilson very little. He recognized that without the support of Bryan's friends and influence it would never have been possible for him to have reached the White House or, having arrived there, to get the currency, tariff and income tax measures through Congress. And that was his outstanding domestic achievement. Wilson had from the outset let it be known that he would be his own secretary of state in matters of importance. And he always was. Bryan was a believer in the political theory that to the victor belongs the spoils, and while Wilson had long been a civil service reformer, he was now quite indifferent to the practice, especially where

he desired to repay services rendered to him by personal friends at the university. Political obligations did not fare so well. And he sometimes displayed the rough methods of the hot and heady Jackson in his treatment of political enemies. An amusing situation came to light when Wilson ordered an investigation of scandalous charges that the collection of customs in Santo Domingo had been attended by many financial irregularities under the Wilson administration. In the investigation a letter turned up that Bryan had written to Walker W. Vick, who had been sent by Wilson as American receiver of Dominican customs, which said:

> Now that you have arrived and are acquainting yourself with the situation, you can let me know what positions you have at your disposal, with which to reward deserving Democrats. Whenever you desire a suggestion from me in regard to a man for any place there, call on me. You have had enough experince in politics to know how valuable workers are when the campaign is on; and how difficult it is to find rewards for all the deserving.

Bryan's notion of the foreign service was extremely practical. The so-called career men were mere Republican bureaucrats who, having attached themselves to the public pay-roll, through political, social, financial, or other influence, were anxious to hold on. Bryan, whatever his faults, was a firm believer in the capacity, the integrity, and the sound common sense of the average American. He was never carried away by the high-sounding and well organized prop-

aganda of the professional diplomats and was quite content to trust our affairs abroad to every-day folks. Wilson's own view was not so very different, although he did hold to Roosevelt's executive order keeping consuls under the civil service. However, like Roosevelt and many energetic reformers, Wilson's conduct in office did not always square with his out-of-office preaching. Presidents, as well as others in places of power, frequently find it necessary to set aside ideals in meeting the needs of the hour. They are human and deal with human affairs. Results count. The Wilson-Bryan selections were quite up to the average. There was never a time when our representatives abroad were put to a harder test than during the World War. And the work, in the main, was well done.

Perhaps it was because Wilson, Tumulty, and McAdoo had all lived so long in the shadow of New York politics that the attempts to control things there bulked so large in the first two years at the White House. Once the inauguration was out of the way, there began an intense struggle over the naming of the collector of the port of New York. It sounds like a petty sort of thing, but the collector is the most important federal official in New York, and the incumbent had been regarded as the spokesman there for the White House. For months the combat drifted.

Senator James A. O'Gorman, for the Democratic organization, which is Tammany Hall, had a list of

several candidates that the President might choose from. McAdoo, already in the fence-building trade, wanted Frank L. Polk, who subsequently became under-secretary of state. O'Gorman successfully blocked that, not that he had anything against Polk, but he did object to McAdoo's making off with the choicest plum. When the month of May rolled around and the warriors had somewhat wearied Wilson, he decided to take matters into his own hands. I suspect the decision was gently accelerated by Tumulty; Wilson's political decisions usually were. Be that as it may, I was asked by telephone, on the afternoon of May 5, 1913, to run down from Trenton to Washington for a little chat with the President. When I arrived, the President, Tumulty, and I met in Wilson's private apartment in the White House, and he told me that it was not his desire that either Tammany or McAdoo should have any political control over the custom-house. He had therefore decided to appoint John Purroy Mitchel, a young Irish-American and a Catholic, which would bar the organization crowd from repeating their silly charges of religious bigotry. He wanted me to go to New York and name Mitchel, then under the tutelage of William R. Hearst, who was training him to beat Tammany for mayor. There were no strings to the appointment, and I was to assure Mitchel that he might go on with his political ambitions. Wilson then wrote, in his own hand, a letter authorizing me

to speak for him and setting forth that whatever I promised would be fulfilled. "It seems a pity to employ so much secrecy about appointing a man to an office, but I can't think out loud down here without some one putting it in the newspapers," the President said.

I saw Mitchel at his office in New York next day, and we discussed at length the possible advantages and disadvantages that the much-coveted honor might bring him. He not only had the powerful Hearst support but he was flirting with Colonel Roosevelt, and it looked as if he might be the fusion candidate against Tammany in the fall Mitchel did not want to take any chance of losing, and asked twenty-four hours to discuss the affair with his business partner. While the President was in his room at the Capitol next day, Senator O'Gorman drifted in and began a discussion of the collectorship and, to Wilson's amazement, stated that, if he could not land one of his own recommendations, Mitchel would not be objectionable to him. Whether any one leaked in New York I don't know, and it matters little. Without waiting for the final word from Mitchel the President at once sent the name to the Senate, and it was confirmed. The President wrote me that the developments quite took his breath away, and he said that he was very happy about it. "It was a most astonishing outcome," Wilson told me, and he was profuse in expressing his appreciation. He subsequently as-

sisted Mitchel to secure the nomination for mayor. McAdoo did not always play in luck with his favorites. The news despatches of July 16, 1913, contained the very definite announcement that Oscar Terry Crosby of Virginia, like McAdoo engaged in railway promotion, had been agreed upon for governor-general of the Philippines. McAdoo, a personal friend of Crosby, had secured the recommendation of the secretary of war, under whose jurisdiction the governor-general operated. The President's family was in New Hampshire, and Cary Grayson, the President's physician, was discreetly sympathetic with the courtship of McAdoo. Wilson was living at the White House with Tumulty. Bryan had been out on his Chautauqua work and, after a bitter attack in the Senate, had been forced to cancel his platform engagements.

Among other ventures Crosby had recently come to Trenton and taken over the trolley system after a rather acrimonious local war. Out of the trolley controversy had grown the first agitation for a change in the form of municipal government, and, with the aid of Wilson, the New Jersey Legislature had enacted the commission government law. There was no considerable improvement in the operation of the trolley system under Crosby, and on the day Washington announced that Crosby had been picked for the Philippines, the "Trenton Times" published an editorial blast at the performance.

Bright and early next morning Tumulty telephoned from the White House and laughingly declared, "Crosby 's over the ropes." He added that Wilson had read the "Trenton Times" editorial and would have nothing further to do with the matter. Later Representative Francis Burton Harrison of New York was sent to the Philippines as governor-general, and when the war came on, McAdoo made Crosby an assistant-secretary of the treasury in charge of foreign loans where he showed marked capacity.

At the proper time, in the late summer of 1913, and by Mitchel's request, the word was sent out from Washington that he had the administration support against Tammany for mayor of New York. He swept everything before him and at the opening of Congress, after his election, he was a luncheon guest at the White House. But he did not make a particularly good impression on Wilson, and no tears were shed when he subsequently lost favor with Hearst and was beaten by Tammany. Wilson, for once, was inclined to agree with Roosevelt who had remarked that the trouble with Mitchel's administration was that it contained "too much Fifth Avenue and too little First Avenue." Dudley Field Malone, son-in-law of Senator O'Gorman, was named as Mitchel's successor as collector of the port, but the appointment was largely personal and was not favored by Tammany. In fact the Malone and Mitchel forces went

to work with great zest to drive Tammany off the face of the earth. Somebody is always putting Tammany out of business. But Tammany, with its genial neighborliness, its helpful understanding of the great human urge, its broad tolerance, somehow manages to give America's greatest city the safest and best-natured municipal government in the world —and with the minimum bother to the comfortable citizen who pays most of the taxes.

The ensuing poltical year proved very busy for Wilson. The feud between Tammany and the so-called friends of Wilson was at white heat. Mitchel had deserted Hearst and was with Roosevelt, and there was talk of the Independent Democrats and the Progressives fusing. Finally Mitchel and Malone and McAdoo's friends got back of an anti-Tammany slate consisting of Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt for United States senator and John Hennessey for governor. Tammany was backing Gerard, ambassador at Berlin, for United States senator, and Martin H. Glynn for governor. McCombs kept urging Wilson not to interfere, and the Congressional delegation from New York City issued a bitter broadside against McAdoo's meddling.

They were hectic days for Wilson. By attempting to outwit Tammany in making Mitchel mayor he had started something in New York. And he could not very gracefully get from under. When the primary was held the Tammany candidates walked away

with the nominations. A few days later I was asked by the President to go to New York and make a survey of the land, with a view of healing the breach. Thomas F. Smith, secretary of Tammany Hall, and some others told me that the organization had no particular quarrel with Wilson, although everything had been done to humiliate them. The possibility of the appointment of a Tammany man as postmaster, the only good-sized plum yet to be filled, was not overlooked. Congressman Patten, an organization man, subsequently was made postmaster, after the President had failed to name Joseph Johnson. Stuart Gibboney, who was professing to speak for McAdoo, and who apparently had the confidence of the secretary of the treasury, was stirring up unnecessary trouble. Even the Democratic state chairman, William Church Osborn, an anti-Tammany leader, had come out with a blast that Wilson was not to blame for the demoralization, but that it was caused by "three or four self-interested little busybodies." It was agreed that Wilson should give his complete support to the organization ticket and that there should be an end to further meddling so far as the White House was concerned. Wilson wrote me a letter expressing his satisfaction at having the situation adjusted.

The President despatched a cordial message to Governor Glynn voicing the hope that he would win "with an emphatic majority." This bridge hav-

ing been safely crossed, the President went into the campaign with great earnestness. The effect of the 1914 Congressional elections was likely to have considerable bearing on 1916. Already Illinois and New Jersey had indorsed Wilson for a renomination, and the work of placating disturbing elements occupied the White House attention. An armistice was declared between the President and Colonel Harvey, and Harvey spent an hour at the White House on Sunday afternoon, October 4. Colonel Watterson was also bidden to return to favor, and he made the pilgrimage on October 18 and buried the hatchet. Even Nugent, mechanician of the steamroller that made Wilson governor of New Jersey, and who had subsequently got into the enemy class, was sharing in the peace and good will that was being spread around. Walter I. McCoy, Nugent congressman from New Jersey, was appointed associate supreme court justice of the District of Columbia. Renomination campaign headquarters were taken at Trenton for a period of twenty-five months. Harvey and Nugent issued appeals to stand by Wilson, and the best speakers in the Cabinet were put on the stump in New York and New Jersey. Secretary of War Garrison carried a message to the President's home Congressional district urging the neighbors to uphold Wilson, and the President himself made a personal appeal for the reëlection of the Democratic congressman, declaring that he was returning to vote

for him in person at Princeton. McAdoo and Garrison battled in New York, and the President sent a last-hour message. In the primary fight on Glynn the up-state New York Democrats had bitterly assailed him on account of his being a Catholic, showing that religious issues are strictly non-partizan. Wilson, in his final appeal, read before a great meeting in New York, declared, "An American citizen should never vote as a sectarian but always as an American citizen."

Most cheering of all in the apparent certainty of victory was the fact that Colonel Roosevelt was again battering away at the Republican candidates and urging support for his Progressives. Three nights before the election Roosevelt came into Wilson's home Congressional district and, at Princeton and Trenton, made smashing attacks on the Republican candidate. Parenthetically it should be noted that the university authorities, who had no sympathy with the attempt to destroy the Republican party, declined to permit Roosevelt to speak on the campus, although the custom was, and is, for important political gatherings at Princeton to be held in Alexander Hall. And so the hard-hitting and immortal Teddy had to send forth his thunderous volleys against the malefactors of great wealth from a hotel balcony. It looked like a certain victory for the Democrats in New York and New Jersey anyhow. But when the ballots were counted the discovery was made that the

Eastern Progressives, typified in Roosevelt, had disappeared from the face of the earth. The Democratic ticket in New York lost by 145,507; the President's home district returned a Republican congressman by nearly 3500, and there was a landslide over the whole Eastern section. The Progressives had quit Roosevelt and gone back to the Republicans. And that is about where Wilson's personal interest and participation in old-fashioned practical politics ended. From that time forward he was content to write letters of indorsement or appeals in the interest of the party; he was induced to write the blundering call to arms for a Democratic Congress while the war fever was yet at high pitch in 1918; but he otherwise remained very much aloof from the practical gentry.

Wilson found his disgust for the newspapers on the increase, after the wide-spread publicity that came with the sudden announcement early in 1914 of the engagement of the elderly McAdoo to his daughter Eleanor. Soon thereafter Mrs. Wilson had collapsed in her bath-room, and she never fully recovered. Naturally there was much mystery and gossip about the family affairs. Announcement that another daughter of the Wilsons was soon to wed so incensed the President that he threatened to decline to meet representatives of newspapers that indulged in family speculation. Despite the fact that he had deliberately chosen a public career, he could never understand why the public should be interested in his

personal matters. His failure to give the newspaper men his confidence even in public affairs had produced an atmosphere of suspicion. There was a feeling of genuine sympathy for him on the part of the newspaper men themselves, however, when he met them on March 14 for his daily conference and solemnly unburdened himself of the following speech:

Gentlemen, I want to say something this afternoon. In the first place, I want to say that I know that in saying this I am dealing here in this room with a group of men who respect and observe the honorable limitations of their own function, but there are some men connected with the newspapers who do not. I am a public character for the time being, but the ladies of my household are not servants of the Government and they are not public characters. I deeply resent the treatment they are receiving at the hands of the newspapers at this time. I am going to be perfectly frank with you. Take the case of my oldest daughter. It is a violation of my own impulses even to speak of these things, but my oldest daughter is constantly represented as being engaged to this, that, or the other man in different parts of the country, in some instances to men she has never even met in her life. It is a constant and intolerable annoyance. These things are printed without any attempt to verify them by communication to the White House, and when explicit denials are received from persons who are known to tell the truth and to feel bound to tell the truth, those denials are not respected in the least. On the contrary, they are represented as avoidances.

Now, I feel this way gentlemen: Ever since I can remember I have been taught that the deepest obligation

that rested upon me was to defend the women of my household from annoyance. Now, I intend to do it, and the only way I can think of is this. It is a way which will impose the penalty in a certain sense upon those whom I believe to be innocent, but I do not see why I should permit representatives of papers who treat the ladies of my household in this way to have personal interviews with me. They are entitled to all the news there is, and so far as even the ladies are concerned they are welcome to all that is true, but beyond that there is something that I cannot and will not endure, so far as I can handle it. My daughters have no brother whom they can depend upon. I am President of the United States; I cannot act altogether as an individual while I occupy this office. But I must do something. The thing is intolerable. Every day I pick up the paper and see some flat lie, some entire invention, things represented as having happened to my daughters where they were not present, and all sorts of insinuations. When they are told that the person who is nearest to me in all the world is not seriously ill and is steadily recovering from a fall, they go about to create rumors that something is being concealed.

Now, if you have ever been in a position like that yourselves—and I hope to God you never will be—you know how I feel, and I must ask you gentlemen to make confidential representations to the several papers which you represent about this matter. I do not want to take any action, particularly an action which will embarrass you gentlemen, and I am perfectly honest in saying that I do not believe you are in the least degree responsible for these things; yet I would not respect myself if I permitted this thing to go on. Every day in my own household we

have to recite to each other with embarrassment and resentment things that have appeared in the newspapers that are utterly false. I know you would like to cooperate with me in preventing that, for in some way it must be prevented. If you will resort to us whenever you hear rumors of any kind, we are perfectly willing to tell you anything that is true. For it is not a household in which there is anything to conceal. You would be welcome, so far as anything in the house was concerned, to see the inside of all the correspondence that goes in or out of that house. And some men have tried to see the inside of that correspondence. Now, put yourselves in my place and give me the best coöperation in this that you can, and then we can dismiss a painful subject and go to our afternoon's business.

The death of Ellen Axson Wilson in August, 1914, was a terrible shock to the President. Mrs. Wilson had made a deep impression upon those with whom she had come into contact in her husband's career. She was recognized as having given the best years of her life in unselfish devotion to his advancement. While she was a quiet and modest woman, she was a sound politician, as well as a fine wife. Her good judgment saved many situations, and her loss was serious for Wilson. Some of the letters that he sent to his friends in New Jersey, acknowledging messages of sympathy, are among the best of his writings. They were filled with expressions of warm friendship and affection. Mine is among the most prized of Wilson letters. A note that Tumulty

sent the night before the body was taken back to Rome, Georgia, for burial, shows the condition that Wilson was in. It said in part:

> Your letter touched the President to the very depths. He came over from the White House just now (11:00 P. M.) and took up the reading of the letters that have come to him from all over the country. When he read yours his lips quivered with emotion and, with eyes filled with tears, he turned to me and said "that is lovely." If you could have been with him during these trying days, you, too, would be overcome. I never have seen such real genuine grief. He is indeed a broken-hearted man. We leave at 4:30 on what I know will be the saddest journey of my life. In Mrs. Wilson I have lost one of my most loyal friends. We all loved her dearly.

It was a tragic blow at a tragic hour in his affairs. Ahead of him was the greatest fight of his life! Wilson was very lonesome and low in spirits. He isolated himself, and it became ever more difficult for those about him to stir his political interest. The World War was increasingly occupying his attention, and he gradually withdrew until even his cabinet members saw less and less of him. A daily round of golf with Grayson provided physical and mental relaxation; otherwise he preferred to go off by himself and "plow his lonely furrow." The dull routine of government and politics he was willing to leave to Tumulty and House, while he gave his attention to thinking of the more engrossing world tragedy.

CHAPTER XXI

A FIERCE AND UNLOVELY SIDE

THE hard vein in Wilson was rather unpleasantly displayed in his treatment of Record and Martine at Washington, and in the bitterness he manifested over his failure to have his friend and Princeton supporter, Thomas D. Jones of Chicago, confirmed as a member of the Federal Reserve Board. Record had exerted a great influence in the matter of shaping the Wilson ideas. Wilson frequently found himself confused. He was constantly battling with his earlier notions. In the main he was disposed to accept the radical theories, but he sometimes felt that Record was going too fast. At other times those around him would convince him that Record was politically dangerous. The eminent Charles W. Eliot, in a recent attempt at kindly analysis, said, "Wilson, like most reformers and pioneering folks, had a fierce and unlovely side."

Wilson, in the main, felt himself deeply obligated to Record for the part he had played in fashioning most of the legislative program that had brought fame in New Jersey. When in this mood he would profess a desire to do something handsome for Record. It was not surprising, therefore, to find the Washington newspaper despatches in the early part

of 1915 printing the inspired information that the Jerseyman was to be named for the Federal Trade Commission. Record was not in any sense a candidate, but, after years of buffeting, he naturally was complimented at the suggestion. As the time for the appointments approached the published statements became more definite. On Sunday, February 21, the White House called me by telephone at Trenton, and I was given the unpalatable task of notifying Record that the President was very sorry he could not make the appointment because he had learned that the Senate would not confirm it. When in turn I telephoned Record at his home in Jersey City, he said that inasmuch as he had not in any way sought the appointment he was being left in a rather embarrassing position. Nothing would be done, I had been assured, until some way could be found to give Record an easy exit.

Next day, accompanied by Matthias Ely—editor of the "Hudson Observer" and a friend of the President—Record came to my office to say that he had decided to go to Washington and see what was back of the shifting conduct of the White House. If confirmation by the Senate was alone involved, Record was confident there would be little trouble, as he had stanch friends among both regulars and progressives. Just as Ely and Record were starting for the railway station headed for Washington, one of the news-service telegraph wires brought the report to our office that the President had already appointed the

Trade Commission and that George Rublee of New Hampshire had been substituted for Record. While Wilson never gave any further explanation of his conduct, discovery was later made that he had been frightened off by reports emanating from McCombs and George W. Perkins and that he had been imposed upon in the notion that the Senate would reject Record. McCombs, still chairman of the Democratic National Committee, had a cordial dislike for Record growing out of some legal transaction in which they had been jointly engaged in New York. Senator Boise Penrose, Republican floor-leader, subsequently stated that he could not find any senator on either the Republican or Democratic side who knew anything about the Record matter with the single exception of Hughes of New Jersey, who was ardently in favor of the appointment.

Perkins had been very much frightened by the influence that Record exerted over Roosevelt. At that time Record was attempting to convince Roosevelt that the onward-Christian-soldier program of 1912, even with such admirable members of the old and ever young faith as Oscar S. Straus in the cheering-section, had been a failure and that "the so-called platform which we adopted for our new party does not have a single vital fundamental idea in it." Upon all vital questions, Record had argued, the leaders of the Progressive party were as badly divided as the leaders of the old parties. "It is in no proper sense of the word," Record maintained, "a

cause which leads men to sacrifice their time and their money." It had never been a real party anyhow but merely a Roosevelt bolt, and if it had been conducted as a bolt "we would now be in possession of the Republican party organization in most of the states of this Union." All these things and more Record put before Roosevelt, together with the outline of a speech which Record suggested Roosevelt should make at some gathering of Progressives, to serve as a foundation for discussion in getting the remnants of the Progressive party into some concrete form for radical action. Government ownership and the land tax questions were the outstanding features of the Record program, and he endeavored to convince Roosevelt that if he would come out for definite reforms and make the fight, there would be hope of capturing the nomination for Roosevelt in 1916 and there would be reasonable certainty of winning in 1920 and putting the program across. Roosevelt replied that he did not regard the program as feasible, nor himself as the man to lead the movement, if such a program were feasible.

It is not surprising that the Record suggestions were alarming to a recent convert to radicalism like Perkins. Record's argument on the government ownership question was that the railroads had been used by the big interests to destroy competition in the beef trade, the steel trade, the coal trade, and the Standard Oil Company, by means of advantages in transportation equivalent to rebates given to these in-



Copyright G. V. Buck, Washington, D. C.

UNITED STATES SENATOR JAMES E. MARTINE

terests and denied to their competitors. Regulation having failed, in Record's estimation, to break up these evils, government ownership was the only remedy. Domination of the markets by the coal and steel interests was due not only to railroad advantages but to the possession of the lands containing oil or the best deposits of coal and iron ore, most of which, according to the Record theory, had been purchased with the idea of keeping them out of use. Record wanted Roosevelt to uphold the policy that no natural resources of this kind should be kept out of use and that by a change in the tax laws or by some other device the ownership of natural resources should be dependent upon use.

When, in face of the telephonic assurances from the White House that nothing would be done regarding the Federal Trade Board appointment until some way had been found to provide an easy fall for Record, the news despatch brought the amazing information that Rublee had already been named, we were naturally somewhat shocked. I never saw a better sportsman than Record proved to be under these trying conditions. He was of course wounded, but he refused to get ruffled or excited. He had been battered too long, and he said the President was, after all, making a big fight for the common crowd and was doubtless doing the best he could with his appointments. When I wrote the President of Record's brave behavior, Wilson sent word that it brought tears to his eyes, referring to Record as

"that splendid fellow" and declaring "such tests of quality are conclusive and I am prouder than ever that he should be my friend." [1] Rublee was not confirmed by the Senate, and after several months Wilson named his old friend, former Governor Fort of New Jersey.

Almost immediately after he went to Washington, Wilson began ignoring Martine. Joseph R. Wilson, a brother of the President, had been put forward for secretary of the United States Senate on January 27, 1913. Martine had opposed the selection on the theory that it would be embarrassing for the President to have his brother in such a position. It would likewise be embarrassing, Martine insisted, for the Senate. The secretary is the only non-senator who attends executive sessions, to which all Presidential appointments go. Wilson was not a party to his brother's candidacy. The matter had been taken up by Senator Luke Lea of Tennessee, the President's brother at the time being city editor of a newspaper in that State. The frank opposition of Martine, however, was regarded as ungracious, and he subsequently got scant consideration at the White House.

[1] Record early in 1916 announced that he would be a candidate for the Republican nomination for governor at the fall primary in New Jersey. Wilson and Tumulty decided that inasmuch as he was openly fighting for the radical reforms in which the Democrats were interested, Record should be aided, and I was sent to Colonel House to suggest that Charles R. Crane be enlisted. House saw Crane and advised me that he was in sympathy with the movement, and Record later informed me that Crane had agreed to subscribe $7,250 toward putting a booklet containing Record's views in the hand of each of the 510,000 registered voters in New Jersey.

Martine, as a rule, voted for legislative measures supported by Wilson, including the Underwood-Simmons Tariff Bill, the Federal Reserve Bill, and preparedness. On principle he opposed Wilson's repeal of the tolls provision of the Panama Canal Act, insisting rather forcefully that Page and House were "turning the government over to England."

Martine was given shabby treatment in the matter of New Jersey appointments. He had divided the State, with Senator Hughes, into imaginary sections, Martine taking the southern portion. When it came to naming the internal revenue collector for South Jersey, Martine was ignored by Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo, and, according to Martine's version, it was intimated that the Senate would likewise ignore any protest that he might make. Martine appealed directly to the President to be saved not only from personal humiliation but from the humiliation of having to fight Wilson on appointments. Wilson only replied that the case was in the hands of McAdoo, and the upshot was that Martine became angry and, with the aid of Gallinger of New Hampshire, blocked the appointment. In return Martine stood with Gallinger against the confirmation of Rublee for the Federal Trade Board place that had been so surprisingly shifted from Record. Gallinger opposed Rublee on the ground that he had not confined his New Hampshire progressive fight to politics but had sought to drag in Gallinger's personal integrity, and the attempt to name him to a

federal office was a personal affront. Martine's support greatly helped Gallinger in having Rublee rejected by the Senate.

Martine also voted against the confirmation of Professor Winthrop More Daniels of Princeton, a personal friend of the President, for the Interstate Commerce Commission, and of Jones, one of Wilson's most ardent supporters in the Board of Trustees at Princeton, for the Federal Reserve Board. Daniels was confirmed; but Jones, who was opposed on the ground of affiliation with the International Harvester Trust and other big financial interests, was rejected. Wilson was especially incensed at the refusal of the Senate to confirm Jones.

When, after the passage of the Banking and Currency Bill, Wilson nominated the Federal Reserve Board, there was a great stir in the country. Newspapers insisted that three of the five selections were representatives of big business and that Wilson had gone back on his declarations that control of the new system "must be public, must be vested in the government itself," and by no means permitted to fall into the hands of the bankers. This position was in keeping with Wilson's utterances when, as a candidate, he made the striking declaration "the tyrannies of business, big and little, lie within the field of credit."

Wilson frankly declared that Jones "is the one man of the whole number who was in a peculiar sense my personal choice." The other selections were accredited to House and McAdoo, and one upshot of

the fight was the enforced retirement from the contest of Paul M. Warburg, member of a big New York banking house, whose corporations had figured in many financial transactions of the type against which Wilson had earlier warned the country. When the Senate opposition to Jones became so pronounced that there seemed little chance of his confirmation, Wilson went publicly to his defense. Jones was a practising lawyer in Chicago and a director in the Harvester Corporation, which was just then being sued by the Government as a monopoly. He was also a contributor to the Wilson pre-nomination fund, having given $10,500 of the $53,000 raised by Cyrus H. McCormick, another Princeton trustee and classmate of Wilson.

Wilson insisted that Jones had merely gone into the board of the Harvester Trust, of which McCormick was President, for the purpose of assisting "to withdraw it from the control which had led it into the acts and practises which have brought it under the criticism of the law officials of the government, and has been very effective in that capacity. . . . His connection with the company was a public service, and he has won additional credit and admiration for his courage in that matter."

George W. Perkins, a co-director in the Harvester Trust, at once issued a public denial that there had been any attempt on the part of Jones in any way to revolutionize the methods or conduct of the company. "There was no suggestion by Jones or any one else,"

declared Perkins, "that he should come on the board to assist in reforming the company. He came on at the invitation and through the votes of the very men who were responsible for the company's organization and subsequent management." Not a little of the uneasiness among party leaders was caused by the feeling that House was entirely too close to Wall Street, and Wilson's admission that Jones alone was a personal choice did not improve the situation. Martine joined in the refusal to accept the Jones confirmation as a matter of principle and thereby incurred further disfavor at the White House.

Wilson sought to punish Martine by preventing his renomination in the Democratic senatorial primaries of 1916. Wilson spent that summer at Shadow Lawn on the Jersey coast and took his own campaign for reëlection very easily. He summoned the Democratic State Committee in early September and suggested that the members should use every effort to prevent Martine's renomination, explaining that Martine had refused "to play on the team." Martine embarrassed the President by spreading broadcast a warm letter of indorsement from John W. Kern of Indiana, the party leader on the floor of the Senate and a close personal and political friend of Wilson. Kern urged the Democrats of New Jersey to indorse Martine for the splendid service he had rendered. "You have never failed," Kern wrote to Martine, "in your championship of the cause of the people and that 's what makes a genuine Democrat."

That the Wilsonian view of Martine was not shared by other party leaders is illustrated by the statement of Vice-President Marshall, in his recently published memoirs, that Martine was for him "the most interesting man in the Senate of the United States." Marshall says Martine was "another of those stanch, rugged souls who would not permit themselves to be swayed by either party advantage or personal interest."

The members of the Democratic State Committee realized that Wilson was making a serious mistake. Even Senator Hughes, while not coming into the open in advocacy of Martine, quietly passed the word to his friends that Martine had only acted toward Wilson as any other man would be likely to act under similar circumstances, and that he was much to be preferred to John W. Wescott, then attorney-general of the State, who had the support of Wilson. Wescott made the speeches nominating Wilson both at Baltimore in 1912 and at St. Louis in 1916. Martine gave Wilson a severe drubbing at the primaries, and at the election in November he ran less than twenty thousand behind Wilson, who lost the State to Charles E. Hughes by fifty-seven thousand plurality.

In the White House Wilson was mostly impatient with newspaper reporters. After he had been in Washington for more than two years he told the members of the National Press Club that he had never read an article about himself in which he recog-

nized himself. "I have come to have the impression," he added smilingly, "that I must be some kind of a fraud because I think a great many of these articles are written in absolute good faith." It was his habit at Trenton frequently to write to newspapers correcting news reports that irritated him. Wilson always preached pitiless publicity, but it was his very firm idea that it should be his own kind of publicity.

At Washington, he originated the system of news-gathering by conference; that is, daily or biweekly meetings with the President and cabinet officers for the correspondents. I was at the first gathering. Wilson, with a stenographer at his elbow to record all questions and answers, stood at his desk and awaited the firing. It did not prove a very fruitful way of news-gathering, and at the first opportunity he abandoned the idea. For the major portion of his two terms in the White House he was seen less by newspaper people and confided less in them than any President since Cleveland or Harrison. Wilson did not enjoy the conferences with the correspondents. They had to fence with him all the time, and whether they got any information was a matter of luck in pot-shotting. There was always a very cool reserve, and Wilson gave the impression that he was the best judge of what was good for the newspapers to have. He was saving mankind, and he would let the world know about it in his own good time. He certainly did not believe in government by newspapers, and it

was his policy that the newspapers should not know of any transaction until it was an accomplished fact. Back of his attitude of reserve there seemed to be a mistrust of newspapers, not so much the correspondents or reporters, but the owners, who already had too much power for selfish purposes and needed to be put back in their proper places.

For some of the Washington correspondents like Louis Seibold of the "New York World" and Arthur J. Sinnott of the "Newark Evening News" he had a fondness, but the great bulk meant nothing to him. His failure to give the correspondents that measure of confidence and help that had been usual with previous Administrations was doubtless very influential in setting the tides of sentiment against him at the time when he needed support most. Newspaper men after all are human beings. Those at Washington are the pick of the land. If Will Hays and the Republican poison squad did an effective political job between 1918 and 1920, when the Wilson ideals were so overwhelmingly snowed under, it was partly due to the resentment stirred in the newspaper men that Wilson had treated with reserve or disdain. They never had his confidence; they did not know his plans. Sometimes they believed he concealed things out of hidden motives, and they naturally resented the intellectual contempt that Wilson more than once showed toward the profession. Wilson shut himself up in the White House and gave his confidence to no one in the newspaper world.

He was relieved when the war brought him the opportunity to abandon the press conferences, and he abandoned them promptly and enthusiastically. There were one or two attempts to resume them, but Wilson was averse. His heart was not in it, and he wanted to be left alone. He never seemed to realize how difficult he made the situation for both the correspondents and himself.

CHAPTER XXII

SAD DAYS

THERE was never a time when Wilson so needed the steadying influence of Ellen Axson as the months that immediately followed her death. And the world needed it even more. She had laid out for herself a little garden along the covered passageway between the White House and the Executive Offices where she could have a gentle word with the nation's head as he approached the daily grind and the bigger problems. Just as at Lyme, when her prudent counsel had been the final word that took him into politics, and at Sea Girt, where at the opportune moment she had kept him from quitting the race for the Presidential nomination, so at Washington she had frequently kept the ship off the rocks. With her by his side, Wilson had come safely through his Congressional fights over currency and tariff reforms and the repeal of the Panama tolls. Who can say how the death of this modest, self-denying, and self-effacing woman affected the future of the world?

Wilson began to show increasing disgust for those who in any way disagreed with him, and the troubles of his Cabinet grew. He frankly declared, in an attempt at self-revelation at Indianapolis on January

8, 1915: "You know Jackson used to think that everybody who disagreed with him was an enemy of the country. I have never got quite that far in my thought, but I have ventured to think that they did not know what they were talking about." It was the most partizan speech that Wilson had made since his advent in the White House and stirred up something of a howl. He said it was his ambition to make every independent voter in the country a Democrat. "I want him to come in where there is a lot of good society, good companionship, where there are great emotions," said Wilson. "That is what I miss in the Republican party; they do not seem to have any great emotions. They seem to think a lot of things, old things, but they do not seem to have any enthusiasm about anything. There is one thing I have got a great enthusiasm about, I might almost say a reckless enthusiasm, and that is human liberty."

A few months later he sought to disclose what he regarded as the promptings of his combats. It was at the Associated Press luncheon in New York on April 20, where in an attempt to justify his interest in the neutrality of the United States he declared that he was not moved by any petty desire to keep out of trouble. "To judge by my experience," he said, "I have never been able to keep out of trouble. I have never looked for it, but I have always found it. I do not want to walk around trouble. If any man wants a scrap that is an interesting scrap and worth while, I am his man. I warn

him that he is not going to draw me into the scrap for his advertisement, but if he is looking for trouble that is the trouble of men in general and I can help a little, why, then, I am in for it." It was that idea of himself that led him to undertake so many battles. He was prone to convert his own quarrels into the troubles of mankind in general, and he was likewise given to taking great general issues and making them into personal quarrels. By nature stubborn and self-reliant, and with a masterful rhetoric, he was able to assemble in his own hands most extraordinary powers. He did not create favorable chances, but he quickly discerned and seized them when they came. None was so agile in grabbing another's ideas and making them his own. Dressed up in marvelous language, their source was soon forgotten.

The warning he gave at New York that he was not going to be drawn into the scrap for advertising purposes was a veiled shot at Roosevelt, who was stirring things up. In the early days of the war, Roosevelt and Wilson found themselves occupying similar positions on the question of neutrality. To a Belgian commission sent over by the Allies seeking American help, Wilson gave a cordial reception at the White House, but he likewise assured them that "it would be inconsistent with the neutral position of any nation, which like this, has no part in the contest, to form a final judgment." That was on September 16, 1914. Roosevelt, in an article published the following week, September 23, in the "Outlook," de-

clared, "It is certainly eminently desirable that we should remain entirely neutral and nothing but urgent need would warrant breaking our neutrality and taking sides one way or the other." Roosevelt's views then were rather curious, in the light of subsequent events and the passionate hatred that he afterward manifested toward both Wilson and the Germans. In the "Outlook" article, after arguing that we had not "the smallest responsibility" for what had befallen Belgium and that "only the clearest and most urgent national duty would ever justify us in deviating from our rule of neutrality and non-interference," Roosevelt said that "what has been done in Belgium has been done in accordance with what the Germans unquestionably sincerely believe to be the course of conduct necessitated by Germany's struggle for life." Almost all great nations had in times past again and again acted in accordance with the same plea, Roosevelt pointed out, and he expressed his great admiration and respect for the German people. "I am proud of the German blood in my veins," said Roosevelt. "When a nation feels that the issue of a contest in which, for whatever reason, it finds itself engaged will be national life or death, it is inevitable that it should act so as to save itself from death and to perpetuate its life."

These were heartening words for Wilson at the time. He found himself beset on all sides. Some of his intimates like Ambassador Page felt from the first that America's place was beside the Allies, and

others urged him just as earnestly to keep America out. Wilson confidently hoped that the United States would successfully keep out. When the army and navy preparedness agitation began under Roosevelt to take definite shape in 1915, it irritated Wilson greatly. The more ardent the propaganda grew, the more determined appeared to be his interest in the neutrality of the United States. His pride in coining fetching sentences furnished the opposition with a striking slogan when, in speaking at Philadelphia, in May, 1915, he used the phrase "too proud to fight." Stripped from the context of the speech, it was not the happiest language to flash to the country three days after the sinking of the *Lusitania,* when jingo Americans were lustily demanding German blood. The fondness for striking phrases did not always bring propitious results. "The new freedom" and "making the world safe for democracy" had a popular ring, but his "peace without victory" needed considerable explaining.

Wilson was very much annoyed at Garrison, who had joined with Roosevelt and others in urging Congress to take definite preparedness action. Garrison and Wilson did not appear to be far apart in their views as to how America should prepare. Wilson, however, did not want any one to speak for the Administration until he was ready to give the signal. Garrison, impatient at the continued delay, urged Wilson to use the same forceful methods in compelling action by Congress that he had always em-

ployed on the Legislature in New Jersey and that he had likewise used in forcing Congressional action on the Tariff Bill, the Federal Reserve Bill, and other measures. Garrison was easily the most aggressive member of the Cabinet, and it was partly at his insistence that the first *Lusitania* note was made so stiff.

That note, dated May 13, was written by Wilson in his private study at the White House. He devoted Sunday and Monday, May 9 and 10, to its preparation. It recited the fact that an American citizen lost his life when the British steamer *Falaba* was submarined on March 28 and that two other American citizens met death on May 1 when the American vessel *Gulflight* was submarined, and finally that the torpedoing and sinking of the *Lusitania* on May 7 had constituted "a series of events which the Government of the United States has observed with growing concern, distress and amazement." Wilson declared that the Government of the United States confidently expected the German Government to disavow these acts, to make reparation, and to take immediate steps "to prevent the recurrence of anything so obviously subversive of the principles of warfare for which the Imperial German Government have in the past so wisely and so firmly contended."

After the note had been presented and read to the Cabinet, Bryan signed it, although it concluded with

LINDLEY M. GARRISON
At the time of his selection for secretary of war in 1913.

what the country regarded as the equivalent of a declaration of war:

> The Imperial German Government will not expect the Government of the United States to omit any word or any act necessary to the performance of its sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the United States and its citizens and of safeguarding their free exercise and enjoyment.

In justice to Bryan it should be pointed out that while the note was in course of preparation he had sent to Wilson a letter urging that ships carrying contraband for the Allies be prohibited from carrying passengers. Bryan had insisted that the *Lusitania* carried ammunition valued at $152,400, and wrote:

> Germany has a right to prevent contraband going to the Allies, and a ship carrying contraband should not rely upon passengers to protect her from attack—it would be like putting women and children in front of an army.

The illuminating correspondence between Bryan and Wilson is to be found in Chapter XIV of the recently published "Memoirs of William Jennings Bryan."

When the second *Lusitania* note was sent, in answer to the unsatisfactory reply that had come from Germany, Bryan felt that Wilson was heading for war. "You have prepared for transmission to the German Government a note in which I cannot join

without violating what I deem to be an obligation to my country," Bryan declared in his letter of resignation to Wilson on June 8.

Wilson frankly did not want Bryan to leave the Cabinet and sent McAdoo to talk with him. Tumulty was of the opposite opinion. He felt that Bryan's usefulness was at an end, that the administration was fast losing caste with thoughtful people because of Bryan's conduct. Others on the inside agreed with Tumulty. Bryan stood his ground and insisted that "the issue involved is of such moment that to remain a member of the Cabinet would be as unfair to you [Wilson] as it would to the cause which is nearest my heart, namely, the prevention of war." When Wilson got the final word from Bryan that he felt it to be his conscientious duty to resign and have no official part in the promotion of war, Wilson hurried to Tumulty's home. It was Sunday morning, and Tumulty was at church. Wilson left word for Tumulty to come to lunch at the White House and there told him of Bryan's intention. Tumulty strongly urged against any delay in accepting Bryan's resignation. The next day, June 8, the formal resignation was handed in by Bryan, and it was accepted on Tuesday, June 9. Save with McAdoo, Bryan kept a close tongue in his head during that intense period of the nation's affairs. Even his intimate friend, Daniels, secretary of the navy, did not know of the secretary of state's resignation until the day it was formally accepted. There was

a regular meeting of the Cabinet that day. Early in the morning Bryan had telephoned to Daniels's residence that he would drive by the Daniels house and take Daniels to his office. On their trip down town to the building in which both the State and Navy Departments were located, Bryan told Daniels that he was retiring from the Administration. The resignation was made known to the Cabinet two hours later and was officially announced at the White House at six o'clock that evening. It came as a great surprise, even in the face of persistent rumors that Bryan was to quit.

In accepting the resignation, Wilson declared that he did so with a feeling of profound sorrow and that their judgment had "accorded in practically every matter of official duty and public policy until now." Bryan's childish simplicity had endeared him to Wilson, just as it had given him a tremendous popular following. His attitude toward war was strangely inconsistent. In the Spanish-American conflict, Bryan recruited a regiment in Nebraska and was always exceedingly proud of his rank as colonel. And this ardent pacifist, firmly insisting that war was not in keeping with Christian statesmanship, requested that he be buried among the military heroes in Arlington Cemetery! He is the only preëminent preacher of peace who has been laid to his final rest, with the pomp and ceremony befitting a soldier, in this sacred burial-ground of America's great warriors.

With his remarkable capacity for timely appeals, Bryan dominated a political party longer than any other single American. From the day in 1896 when he wrested the Democratic National Convention from the Cleveland conservatives, until his death, on July 26, 1925, he was the greatest individual force in the party. In three of the eight national conventions he captured the Presidential nomination for himself; twice Wilson—whose nomination at Baltimore was forced by Bryan—was the party's candidate; and once, in 1924, the fear of Bryan compelled the nomination of his brother, Charles W. Bryan, governor of Nebraska, for Vice-President, although Bryan had earlier in the convention bitterly assailed John W. Davis, the choice for President, as an agent of Wall Street. Only twice in twenty-nine years did the party get out of hand—in 1904, when Parker was nominated, and in 1920 when Cox was the Presidential candidate. Resulting disaster, in both instances, equaled any defeat that had come to Bryan personally as the party candidate.

After Bryan's resignation, there was an insistent demand in the newspapers that Robert Lansing, who had been counselor of the State Department since the retirement of John Bassett Moore, should be named as premier of the Cabinet. America was headed for war, and it was going in with both feet. Lansing got credit for having blocked Bryan's tempering of the original *Lusitania* note to Germany, a tempering to which Wilson was at first agreeable.

Circumstances made the appointment of Lansing desirable. Wilson, although yielding to the clamor, never warmed to Lansing. "All I want is a good clerk, and he 's a good clerk," Wilson said, recalling Seward's lament that he was "nothing but Abe Lincoln's little clerk." Lansing's penchant for drawing pictures while cabinet sessions were in progress did not enhance his standing with the President.

Tumulty induced Wilson to take his first advanced stand in favor of some form of preparedness in a speech delivered at the fiftieth anniversary dinner of the Manhattan Club in New York on November 4, 1915. That stand was really the Garrison stand, but circumstances produced one of those peculiar Wilsonian situations that made it impossible for a spirited and self-respecting man like Garrison to remain at the head of the War Department. There had been earlier differences with respect to handling of the Philippine problem. Wilson, who, despite Bryan's pleadings, had at first ignored the Filipinos, eventually urged upon Congress, when it reassembled on December 2, 1913, legislation that would give the island possessions a larger measure of freedom than they had been enjoying. The Jones Bill was introduced and was passed by the House. Senator Clark introduced a resolution which in effect carried out the Democratic platform pledge by giving complete independence in four years with the power, in the President, to make it operative in two years, at his discretion. It passed the Senate. In

the House Wilson had aroused bitter antagonisms by his Panama tolls fight. While that had nothing to do with Philippine independence, some of the disgruntled members, as is often the case, took it out on Wilson by defeating the Clark resolution. Wilson was supposed to favor the Clark resolution, and there was disagreement between Wilson and Garrison over the method of handling it, Garrison regarding the petty fiasco as a breach of trust toward the Filipinos.

Wilson permitted Tumulty to draft several paragraphs of the Manhattan Club speech. Tumulty frequently wrote passages for Wilson's speeches and papers. The Manhattan Club speech recommended the policy which had been agreed upon by Garrison and Wilson and which was to be recommended to Congress in December. Garrison had provided the data which Wilson accepted and concurred in, and Tumulty had incorporated in the address. Tumulty had Wilson say:

> Is the plan we propose sane and reasonable and suited to the needs of the hour? Does it not conform to the ancient traditions of America? Has any better plan been proposed than this program that we now place before the country? In it there is no pride of opinion. It represents the best professional and expert judgment of the country. . . . In the fulfillment of the program I propose I shall ask for the hearty support of the country, of the rank and file of America, of men of all shades of political opinion.

The plan, as outlined by the President in his speech and shortly afterward recommended to Congress, met with stiff opposition on the part of many Democrats. When it became apparent that scores of congressmen would refuse to support him in his program, and when Garrison had urged a resort to the old Wilsonian force methods employed so successfully at Trenton and in the earlier sessions of Congress, Wilson wrote Garrison on January 17, 1916, "It would never be proper or possible for me to say to any Committee of the House of Representatives that so far as my participation in legislation was concerned, they would have to take my plan or none." In this letter to Garrison Wilson stated that while, like Garrison, he believed that the chief thing necessary was a trained citizen reserve and that the "training, organization and control of that reserve should be under immediate Federal direction," he was not irrevocably or dogmatically committed to any one plan.

By a singular coincidence Tumulty had on that very day, January 17, sent Wilson a communication urging in forceful language the importance of an appeal to the country on the question of preparedness, and ten days later Wilson started on his trip to the North and Middle West. Another Presidential election was approaching, and the Democracy was in the dumps. In his letter to Wilson, Tumulty said he was getting word from all sources that there was no

enthusiasm in Congress for preparedness, while throughout the country there was great indifference arising out of two things: "first, the attitude of the Pacifists whose feelings have been nurtured by the preachings of Mr. Bryan; second, those in the country who believe in preparedness but who are frightened because of the talk of militarism as outlined by Mr. Roosevelt." Tumulty argued that the impression abroad in the country is "that we are drifting," and the great bulk of the people were yearning for leadership. "What is needed now," said Tumulty, "even from a political standpoint, is an appeal to the country. The situation which confronts you is just such an one as we had to cope with in the Smith-Martine fight. If you will recall the visit you paid me at my law office in Jersey City immediately after the election, you will be reminded that you made the statement that some of your friends advised you to allow the matter to drift, that Martine was incompetent and that the state would resent your interference. I remember very distinctly what my advice to you then was. I said that the state was yearning for leadership, that it felt that the decent people who needed to be aroused as a matter of honesty, were in favor of Martine, and I further made the statement to you that unless you led, some one else would take the leadership, very much to your injury and loss of prestige. . . . If your leadership is rejected, the Democratic party may as well go out of the business of government. Our all is staked upon a successful

issue in this matter. You can therefore afford to be most emphatic in stating what your attitude is."

Friendly newspapers joined in asking Wilson to employ his eloquence and logic in overcoming the apathetic indifference or unreasonable hostility to preparedness exhibited in Congress. It was pointed out that the military and naval committees of the House of Representatives, where the bills must originate, were wasting their time. The Tumulty communication was a favorite—and usually successful—method of arousing Wilson from his lethargy, and on January 27, he began his speech-making tour directing attention to the critical world situation and to the necessity that America "put her house in order." On this preparedness tour Wilson selected, as his early battle-grounds, the regions where he knew the deepest pitfalls lay. He had decided to resort to his old policy of taking his case to the people. Veterans who accompanied Wilson on the numerous campaign trips are convinced that he reached the high-water mark in his career as a campaigner on this tour. In order to have it appear that the appeal was strictly non-partizan, all political leaders along the line were excluded. At St. Louis he warmed up to his subject and placed himself on record as an advocate of "incomparably the greatest navy in the world." The frankly warlike utterances so frequently made by Wilson came as a great surprise to thousands. He boldly asserted that Congress would be compelled to "deliver the goods" and

urged more than one audience to "get up on your hind legs and talk," with a view to forcing his program through. He was plainly racked by the tugging and hauling that was being done by the British and by House and Page, and in talking at Des Moines on February 1 he rather pathetically said: "I call you to witness, my fellow-countrymen, that I have spent every thought and energy that has been vouchsafed me in order to keep this country out of war. It cannot be disclosed now, perhaps it never can be disclosed, how anxious and how difficult the task has been, but my heart has been in it." That reference was doubtless to the secret peace mission that Colonel House was then engaged in, and which, a few weeks later, met with such indifferent response on the part of the Allies, as is disclosed in Lord Grey's book, "Twenty-five Years," and the third volume of "The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page." Wilson was ready, on hearing from France and England, to propose a conference to put an end to the war and had even gone so far as to promise that should Germany refuse to participate "the United States would probably enter the war against Germany." Grey merely submitted the proposal to France, without any recommendation, and France ignored it, thus ending any hope of peace before the United States had been dragged into the conflict.

Despite his warlike speeches on the Western trip, when Wilson returned to Washington and found that

the House Military Affairs Committee would not accept the recommendations contained in the report of Garrison, which Wilson had previously been tacitly approving, he refused to lend his further support to the Garrison program, and Garrison resigned.

Wilson's battle with himself over taking America into the war was doubtless the hardest he ever fought. He was constantly endeavoring to ascertain the mind of the country. For months he struggled with the problem of discriminating between militarism and preparedness. When a committee of the American Union, including Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, Amos Pinchot, Herbert S. Bigelow, and others, interviewed him in the White House on May 8, 1916, Wilson, asked whether he believed in universal compulsory training, replied: "To use the phrase of a friend of mine, my mind is to let on the subject. I would say merely that that was not contrary to American tradition." It was pointed out to him that military training never failed to produce the military idea of discipline and obedience; that America was potentially more aggressive than other nations because our economic organizations were more active and powerful in reaching out for world trade; that the then recently organized International Corporation was one of the great trade factors of modern history; and that if this eager competition for trade was hitched up with a tendency to back up that trade there would be produced an aggressive nationalism. The President admitted that this sort of danger

might easily arise "unless some check was placed upon it by some international arrangement which we hope for."

"I do not need to tell you that I am just as much opposed to militarism as any man living—I think it is a deadly thing to get into the spirit of a nation," Wilson said to the committee, "and I do not think there is the slightest danger of its getting into the spirit of this nation—only I have to determine a very practical problem. I have to determine how large an army is not unreasonable for the United States. The largest army proposed, that of the Chamberlain Bill, is two hundred and fifty thousand men, and as compared with any European standard that is extremely small in a nation of a hundred million." When a member of the committee ventured to point out that at the time Cleveland wrote the Venezuelan message in 1895 war would unquestionably have ensued but for the very fact that America did not have a great navy so that the element of threat was automatically eliminated, the President replied:

But this is not the year 1895. This is a year of madness. It is a year of excitement, more profound than the world has ever known before. All the world is seeing red. . . . In the last analysis the peace of society is obtained by force, and when action comes—it comes by opinion but back of the opinion is the ultimate application of force. The greater body of opinion says to the lesser body of opinion, "We may be wrong but you have to live under our direction for the time being, until you are more numerous than we are." . . . If you say, "We

shall not have any war," you have got to have the force to make that "shall" bite. And the rest of the world, if America takes part in this thing, will have the right to expect from her that she contributes her element of force to the general understanding. Surely that is not a militaristic ideal.

When asked if he did not feel that this would logically lead to a limitless expansion of our contribution, Wilson replied that he had not "the least regard for logic" and then proceeded: "What I mean to say is I think in such affairs as we are now discussing, the circumstances are the logic. I remember a sentence of Burke which was something to this effect, 'if you ask me wherein the wisdom of a certain policy consists, I will say that it consists of the circumstances of that policy.' " Wilson expressed the belief that the spirit of the country in his judgment was not hostile to very wide-spread training "provided it does not lock people into a military organization and make it subject to autocratic use." When asked by Rabbi Wise, "Is it possible to avoid the sequel in the long run?" the President replied: "It may not be. That is the danger." Wilson went on to express the thought that if we had wide-spread training, with men merely volunteering, they would not thereby be bound to an organization, and they would only give six weeks out of each year to the work of discipline. When a member of the committee suggested that even six weeks of this military tendency was calculated to have its effect upon our

citizenry, the President dismissed the subject with one of his stories.

"You remind me of the story," he declared, "of the Irishman who had a million dollars left him. He took a room in a hotel and asked the boy to call him at seven o'clock in the morning and tell him that the boss wanted him. When he was called he said, 'Tell the boss to go to the devil; I don't have to come.' That was his idea of liberty."

It was a time of much indecision. Wilson wanted to make the world safe for democracy, but he could not become enthusiastic about putting the young blood of the country into the trenches of Europe. He frankly hated brute physical force. With his rigid Christian training, he found himself confronted by the problem that faces sincere clergymen who endeavor to make war holy and at the same time reconcile it with the peace teachings of the Nazarene.

While Garrison had never been politically active in New Jersey, the fact that he had made a very excellent impression in his campaign speeches caused Wilson's friends in the State seriously to discuss his availability for either the gubernatorial or senatorial nomination in 1916. Several conferences were held at Trenton and Washington. The fact that the last run of the organized Progressive vote had virtually disappeared in 1914 and that the Republicans had swept the State, carrying eight out of the twelve Congressional districts, gave the Democratic leaders considerable alarm. They felt that in order to make

a showing it would be necessary to induce some outstanding figure like Garrison to accept a place on the ticket. Before the program had taken definite form, however, the agitation for preparedness found Garrison out of step with Wilson. That ended all further discussion of his availability for leadership in the New Jersey Democracy.

CHAPTER XXIII

ROMANCE AND REËLECTION

WILSON, who made his 1912 Presidential campaign from the official cottage of the New Jersey governor at Sea Girt, was persuaded to return to the State for the 1916 campaign and to occupy the near-by mansion, known as Shadow Lawn, that John McCall, of New York Life Insurance fame, had built at Elberon. A few months after the death of Ellen Axson Wilson the President had met Mrs. Edith Bolling Galt, beautiful and charming widow of a Washington jeweler. It was a case of love at first sight. Dr. Cary T. Grayson, the President's physician and a friend of Mrs. Galt, had introduced her to Miss Helen Woodrow Bones, a cousin of Wilson, who, after the death of Ellen Axson Wilson, had acted as mistress of the White House. Miss Bones and Mrs. Galt walked much together, and Mrs. Galt dined at the White House and met the President.

When he set out to be, Wilson was especially fascinating to women, with a store of amusing anecdotes which he used with equal effect on the platform and in the drawing-room. He did not care for male company, but, like males in general, he enjoyed the

Photo by Arnold Genthe, N. Y.

EDITH BOLLING WILSON

admiration and adulation of women; and he might say in a measure what Goethe said of himself, "The Eternal Feminine is always beckoning us on."

In his courtship of Mrs. Galt, Wilson displayed all the ardor and intense eagerness of a boy. Coming so soon after the death of Ellen Axson Wilson, it gave the Democratic politicians a great fright. But none in the Cabinet dared to speak to the President of their misgivings. Tumulty intimated that it might be well to delay the marriage until after the 1916 Presidential election, with the result that he never again enjoyed the favor of the family circle.

In common with all who had come to know and appreciate the good sense and public usefulness of Mrs. Ellen Axson Wilson, Tumulty had a deep reverence for her memory. He was frequently depressed at the new order. The country, too, was somewhat shocked at Wilson's speedy courtship. The situation was not improved by Wilson's making his physician a rear-admiral, jumping him 117 numbers over the heads of other naval officers. Dr. Grayson married Miss Gordon, an heiress and ward of Mrs. Galt. These romances naturally attracted wide attention, and when a Washington wag, answering a query as to the ship Grayson was to command, remarked he was to be Admiral of the Boudoir, the country got a big laugh. But it did not produce increased political tranquillity.

Soon after the Bryan resignation, with all its incidental complications and adverse criticisms, Wilson,

accompanied by the family and Mrs. Galt, went to Cornish, New Hampshire, where he spent a gay summer, motoring over the beautiful country-side, golfing, and courting. At fifty-nine, he was in spirit a youth again, forgetting all else but the vision of loveliness that had crossed his path. Considering that he had been a frail lad in his adolescent days, his physical condition was astonishing. He was vivacious, and, in the presence of Mrs. Galt, his eyes sparkled as he cast frequent glances in her direction. He was plainly thrilled by it all, and the romance was enduring. In the five eventful White House years that followed their marriage on December 18, 1915, they were inseparable. During that momentous period Wilson kept himself more and more from the outer world, conducting the big affairs of government largely from his private apartment. His wife was his constant companion on the golf-links, at the theater, and on his trips. Wherever he journeyed, on his campaign forays at home and his glorious pilgrimage abroad, "in triumph and disaster," she never left his side. That devoted association, and the part it played in shaping the affairs of the world, will not be overlooked in the final appraisal.

That "all the world loves a lover" was not exactly true of most of the Democratic politicians during that summer of 1915, however. There was gloom on all sides over the prospects for the Presidential campaign of 1916, with the delicate war problems that gave America so much genuine anxiety. Then, to

add to the troubles, the Senate at first definitely declined to accede to Dr. Grayson's advancement to the rank of rear-admiral over the heads of seasoned officers who had earned promotion by active service. If the seniority precedent was to be violated, promotions should be made by the Naval Board, it was insisted; otherwise the morale of the navy would be badly disturbed. But a decision from Secretary of the Navy Daniels held that the action was quite permissible. What 's the merit system between friends? The Grayson incident furnished the hit for the current Gridiron Dinner and there was a mighty hubbub over the country. The Senate of the Sixty-fourth Congress refused to confirm Grayson's promotion, but immediately after the new Senate convened, Wilson again sent in the nomination, and after more wrangling it was eventually confirmed.

When Wilson came back to New Jersey in the summer of 1916, he only visited once during the entire season the official headquarters that had been set up for his personal use at Asbury Park. There were days at a stretch when he did not see his secretary. Wilson took little interest in the campaign. He was on his second honeymoon and usually made but a single speech a week, each Saturday afternoon. As late as August he appeared to be as adamant as ever to the clamor for war and gave utterance to the thought, "I wish some one would tell me what the Allies are fighting for." He was still pursuing his policy of watchful waiting. It was a policy that led

the President into many confusing conflicts of mind.

At the St. Louis convention, where Wilson had been renominated as a matter of course, his peace methods were easily the outstanding theme. All references to upbuilding the army and navy fell upon deaf ears, and the only genuine and spontaneous outbursts were reserved for Wilson's success in keeping America out of the war. At Wilson's special urging, former Governor Martin H. Glynn of New York had gone to the convention to make the key-note speech, and his promises for a continuing peace were so ardent that, so Bryan declared, the Democracy needed no other platform. Glynn at the time was not well and had demurred at attempting the oration, but Wilson pleaded with him to go to St. Louis. The paramount issue, Glynn said, was that the United States must save its citizens from participation in the European war and must continue the policy of strict neutrality toward all the warring nations.

"Neutrality is America's contribution to the laws of the world," Glynn insisted. Emphasizing Wilson's hostility to the conflict, Glynn added, "He stands where General Grant stood when he said there never was a war that could not have been settled better some other way." This Wilsonian policy, Glynn declared, while not satisfying the "fire-eater or the swashbuckler," did satisfy the mothers and all those who worship at the altar of the God of Peace. Next to the thrill that Glynn gave the delegates, the

biggest hit of the convention was a reference in the speech of Ollie James, permanent chairman, to Wilson the great peacemaker. The convention went so wild in its demand for a repetition that James had the novel experience of sending this sentence rolling a second time over the great throng:

> Without orphaning a single American child, without widowing a single American mother, without firing a single gun or shedding a drop of blood, he wrung from the most militant spirit that ever brooded above a battle-field the concession of American demands and American rights.

The specter of Bryan's preaching for peace hovered over the assemblage, and James, spurred on by such applause as comes to few convention orators, exclaimed, "I can see the accusing picture of Christ on the battle-field, with the dead and dying all around Him, with the screams of shrapnel and the roll of cannon, and I can hear the Master say to Woodrow Wilson: 'Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God.' "

The dramatic outbursts at the opening of the convention appeared to be a vindication for Bryan, who had received a tremendous ovation for a speech against preparedness he had delivered the day before at the City Club in St. Louis, and who was admitted on all sides to be the outstanding figure of the convention, although he was not a delegate. Bryan was there in his old capacity of newspaper reporter, but whenever he appeared in the press section the con-

vention rose and cheered him with much feeling. Introduced by James as "America's Greatest Democrat," Bryan fervently told the convention, "I have differed with the President on some points of his policy in dealing with the great war, but I agree with the American people in thanking God we have a President who has kept—who will keep—us out of war." Bryan was put to work in the Western country, where, night and day, he hammered home his hatred of war and played no small part in turning the tide to Wilson.

The Republicans, after much wrangling, named Charles E. Hughes for President, and the Western Progressives angrily turned from Roosevelt to Bainbridge Colby, who took the stump for Wilson and shared with Bryan the burden of winning the necessary Western states.

There was much bitterness in the campaign. Before the conventions the Wilson and Hughes families had enjoyed an intimate social relationship. Wilson was annoyed at the very abrupt manner in which Hughes tendered his resignation as an associate justice of the Supreme Court. Almost immediately after the word had come to Washington on July 10 of the nomination of Hughes at Chicago, a colored messenger appeared at the White House bearing a note containing the brief annouuncement, "I hereby resign the office of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States." There was no pleasant word of any kind, the resignation being merely ad-

dressed "To the President." From that moment the battle was on. Like most political warfare it did not always remain on a very dignified plane. Hughes attacked Wilson in a personal way for his vacillating policy toward the war. When the Hughes attacks compelled attention Wilson replied:

> If you will give that gentleman rope enough he will hang himself. He has forgotten many things since he closeted himself out of touch with the spirit of the nation. His speeches are nothing more or less than blank cartridges and the country, unless I mistake the people very much, will place a true assessment upon them.

Wilson was daring in his methods during the campaign, and, like most politicians, he spoke at times with some mental reservation as to the facts. The Republicans prodded him hard about his indecision, and Senator Lodge brought on a heavy storm by declaring that resignations from the Cabinet had been threatened. The expression, "the Imperial German Government will not expect the Government of the United States to omit any word or act," in the first *Lusitania* note was a distinct shock to Bryan, who felt that it might provoke war, and who argued with Wilson that it was not in keeping with Christian America to make any such threat. Bryan's plea had had such an effect that a supplementary memorandum was drafted, intimating that the United States was willing to submit the question at issue to a commission of inquiry such as was provided for in the

peace treaties that Bryan had been negotiating. Before its publication the supplementary note came to the attention of Robert Lansing, then counselor of the State Department. Lansing at once got hold of Tumulty in an effort to learn its significance, and word was quickly passed around to other members of the Cabinet, none of whom knew of the proposed action. Tumulty "went to the mat"—as was his picturesque manner of describing his method of vigorously reasoning things out with Wilson—and convinced the President that the supplementary memorandum was loaded with possibilities of misunderstanding that might cause Germany to feel the United States was weakening and would not fight for her rights. Wilson finally ordered the recall and suppression of the supplementary note.

During the campaign Lodge, in a speech at Boston, created a sensation by revealing that such a supplementary note had been prepared. The secret had percolated to him through one of the undersecretaries, and Lodge used it in an attempt to demonstrate that Wilson's strong words were not meant seriously. Wilson issued a denial in which he set forth that "no postscript or amendment of the *Lusitania* note was ever written or contemplated by me, except such changes as I myself inserted which strengthened and emphasized the protest." Wilson added this explanation of the situation:

It was suggested, after the note was ready for transmission, that an intimation be conveyed to the German

Government that a proposal for arbitration would be acceptable, and one member of the Cabinet spoke to me about it, but it was never discussed in Cabinet meeting and no threat of resignation was ever made, for the very good reason that I rejected the suggestion after giving it such consideration as I thought every proposal deserved which touched so grave a matter. It was inconsistent with the purpose of the note. The public is in possession of everything that was said to the German Government.

That historic rupture with Lodge, an unpleasant incident of bitter campaign partizanship, grew into intense hatred between two powerfully-minded and self-approving politicians. Save for a temporary reconciliation after our entrance into the war, they fought it out to the end. Each had a coldly critical contempt for the other, seeing only dangerously destructive defects and emphasizing faults. In the early days at Washington, Wilson had kept up a kind of friendly truce with Lodge, inviting him frequently to the White House for consultations. When Senator Bristow had assailed the President in connection with Panama tolls, Lodge had come to Wilson's defense; and in a letter of appreciation dated February 19, 1914, Wilson had said to Lodge, "I feel honoured by your confidence and your general comprehension of my motives." But the attitude of Lodge toward Wilson and of Wilson toward Lodge was not very different from the feeling that Roosevelt and Wilson bore to each other. Lodge had a natural desire to be President, and this doubt-

less colored his mind. When the Republicans and Progressives were holding rival conventions at Chicago in 1916, Roosevelt had sought to force the nomination of Lodge as a compromise, but without avail. Lodge had guided the filibuster against the Administration's attempts to buy the German ships interned in New York Harbor and had otherwise shown himself to be strongly pro-Ally, and the controlling Republicans were then endeavoring to appease the German Americans who were resentful of Wilson's actions. Eight days before his nomination for President, the "New York Tribune," leading Republican newspaper, had declared that the German Americans had proclaimed Hughes as their favorite. And so Hughes was nominated and the Lodge ambition for the Presidency frustrated. It did not make any more amiable the relationship between Wilson and Lodge. Their eternal dislikes for the balance of their days fed the flames of political discord and made impossible, while they were in power, any generally acceptable American peace settlement.

Wilson knew how to make a good political play, as was strikingly shown in the tart rejoinder he sent to Jeremiah O'Leary, one of the fire-eating Irish American leaders. The 1916 campaign was then going badly. The New Jersey primaries had rejected Wilson's indorsement of Wescott for senator and had renominated Martine, and the Maine election had gone so strongly Republican that Wilson's cabinet officers and others were in a panic. The

day after the result in Maine several of the cabinet officers came scurrying into the Wilson campaign headquarters at Asbury Park and vainly sought to have Tumulty find some method of arousing Wilson to action. The whole camp was in low spirits. It was almost impossible to get Wilson to permit even cabinet officers to see him at Shadow Lawn. O'Leary, cheered on by the New Jersey and Maine results, had written Wilson an offensive letter announcing that he was not going to vote for him. The so-called hyphen vote had been noisy. Wilson summoned the reporters from the Asbury Park headquarters and gave them for publication a copy of the reply which he was sending O'Leary, reading:

> I would feel deeply mortified to have you or anybody like you vote for me. Since you have access to many disloyal Americans and I have not, I will ask you to convey this message to them.

That scornful rebuke made the front page of every newspaper and thrilled the country. It was a high card played at the right time, although O'Leary blocked any further move in that direction by a telegraphic invitation to have his Americanism compared with that of Wilson, adding, "While three of my uncles were dying in defense of the union those of your kin who dared to fight were struggling to destroy it." Not only the Maine result and the Martine primary victory but a great reception that Hughes had received at the Trenton Inter-State Fair—Wilson's home ground—had all come in the one week and

shown the need of waking up the candidate. Wilson had declined to attend the fair with Hughes.

It was a singular campaign. Hughes was bombarded by a large part of the Republican press, friendly to the Allied cause, to take a firmer stand in repudiation of the support that had been given him at Chicago by the German American influences. Roosevelt, before the convention, in response to an invitation from former Senator W. P. Jackson to come to Chicago and address the convention, had replied in his usual vigorous style. "The professional German-Americans," said Roosevelt, "are seeking to terrorize your convention, for they wish to elect next November a man who shall not be in good faith an American President, but the viceroy of a foreign government." It required several weeks of hard work before Hughes, with protestations of his "undiluted" and "out-and-out" Americanism, could manœuver himself out of the position. And by that time the Democrats had virtually driven him into a corner, where he appeared to be opposing the Wilson peace program and favoring America's entrance into the war.

Wilson himself joined in forcing the issue. "The whole spirit and principle of militarism is abominable to me," Wilson wrote a committee of students arranging an anti-militarism demonstration in New York for September 30. On that same afternoon Wilson in a speech delivered at Shadow Lawn to a visiting host of young Democrats compared his own peaceful

methods with those of the Republicans. Said Wilson:

> Am I not right that we must draw the conclusion that if the Republican party is put into power at the next election our foreign policy will be radically changed? I cannot draw any other inference. All our present foreign policy is wrong, they say, and if it is wrong and they are men of conscience they must change it, and if they are going to change it in what direction are they going to change it?
>
> There is only one choice as against peace, and that is war. Some of the supporters of that party, a very great body of the supporters of that party, outspokenly declare that they want war, so that the certain prospect of the success of the Republican party is that we shall be drawn, in one form or another, into the embroilments of the European war. . . .

There is no question that the slogan, "He kept us out of war," was one of the determining factors in Wilson's favor in that election. New England and all of the war-fired East, including Wilson's home State of New Jersey, went strongly for the Republicans, while the Western States joined the South in returning Wilson to the White House. Much of the Western vote was undoubtedly influenced against Hughes because of the Republican rejection of Roosevelt and the complete repudiation at the 1916 convention of all the policies so dear to the Progressives. After Roosevelt had been side-tracked at Chicago and the ideals of the Progressives trampled upon, property-minded leaders induced Roosevelt to join in the effort to elect Hughes. Roosevelt's

hatred of Wilson was another factor. Up to the close of the campaign the Democrats kept pounding away with the catchy slogan, "Thank God for Wilson; he kept us out of war"; and a last-hour official campaign appeal, issued Monday, November 6, urging the workers of America to stand by Wilson, said:

> You are working, not fighting; alive and happy, not cannon fodder; Wilson and peace with honor, or Hughes with Roosevelt and war! If you want war vote for Hughes. If you want peace with honor and continued prosperity, vote for Wilson.

Wilson was, at the time, in a state of great indecision of mind. Page, who was home from London for a brief visit, spent several days with the President at Shadow Lawn, and found Wilson showing a degree of toleration for Germany and complaining of England. "There was a condescension in his attitude which was offensive," Page later wrote of the visit. Wilson more than once complained of Page as being pro-British. More and more, House was being despatched as a kind of super-ambassador to hold Page in check. That was no easy task. It was not in the House make-up to be aggressive, nor was it in the Page make-up to be neutral. The charming manner in which the British had treated Page had completely won his friendship. He was much like Robert Bacon and Myron T. Herrick, who, as former ambassadors at Paris, had become sincerely pro-French in their sympathies. That is human enough.

Viscount Grey in his memoirs says Page was able to advise the British foreign secretary how best to further the British cause in the matter of the blockade, even, it would seem, when the advice conflicted with the instructions from his own Government. Through him Grey learned whether or not the protests of Washington were to be taken seriously. The blockade was the most formidable weapon that the British could utilize against Germany; the British Admiralty was determined that the diplomatic protests of the United States should not interfere with success. "Page's advice and suggestions were of the greatest value in warning us when to be careful or encouraging us when we could safely be firm," writes Grey. "One incident in particular remains in my memory. Page came to see me at the Foreign Office one day and produced a long dispatch from Washington contesting our claim to act as we were doing in stopping contraband going to neutral ports. 'I am instructed,' he said, 'to read this dispatch to you.' He read, and I listened. He then said: 'I have now read the dispatch, but I do not agree with it; let us consider how it should be answered!' "

Wilson sought to guard himself against the Page pro-Ally partizanship. Bainbridge Colby, who served on the Shipping Board and subsequently as secretary of state, in reviewing the last Page book for the "Saturday Review of Literature," throws this illuminating side-light on the Presidential difficulties:

I had occasion, during one of the darkest hours of the war, to visit England on an official mission, and when I took my leave of the President at the White House he said to me: "Now be an American. Our men only last about six months in England and then they become Anglicized." The President referred to that subtle and encompassing and penetrating charm which is English. I think Page fell a victim to it. . . . His sincerity is beyond question and his popular success in England was unmistakable, but he had ceased to be a serviceable spokesman of the President or a dependable Ambassador of the United States.

Hence the estrangement of Page from the President—and a Presidential silence that was considerate but knowing; followed by a course that was independent of his Ambassador, but right.

In August and September, 1916, Wilson was occupied with the threatened railroad strike, involving the whole system of transportation in the country. The fact that great industrial concerns in America were busily engaged in producing supplies for the Allied Governments, and that this condition of unusual business prosperity made it desirable that the strike should be averted at any cost, militated in favor of Wilson and made it comparatively easy for him to force through Congress the Adamson Law, compelling the railroads to adopt an eight-hour working basis. This helped Wilson considerably with organized labor. Another factor was the blundering way in which Hughes was handled on his visit to California. The Republican organization there, dominated by the Southern Pacific Railroad

interests, insisted that Hughes ignore Hiram Johnson, the party candidate for senator, who had been fighting the railroads and who had been the candidate of the Progressives for Vice-President in 1912. The upshot was that the friends of Johnson slaughtered Hughes. It was several days before the final result in California was known, and in the early hours the election of Hughes seemed to be so certain that Wilson sent him a formal message of congratulation. The final vote of the electoral college was 277 for Wilson and 254 for Hughes.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE WAR PLUNGE

POLITICAL and business exigencies produce wars for spiritual leaders and young men to fight. In the calm of a later decade, the world is beginning more clearly to see and understand the part played by the European politicians and diplomatists in their efforts of 1914 to maintain or acquire the balance of trade power. Documents discovered since 1917 compel honest men to discard preconceptions. So far the most valuable light has come from the opening of the archives of Russia and Germany. While awaiting further documents, scholarly historians to-day tend to put the largest share of blame on Austria, the next on Russia, with Germany and France running fairly close for third place.

Wilson honestly and earnestly aimed at setting the world right. He dreamed of the time when every nation should be left free to determine its own policy, its own way of development, "unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little with the great and the powerful." But he wanted to do it alone and in his own way. He was not a superman. After the 1916 election he saw less of his early liberal friends. He had never been much of an entertainer in the White

House. Politicians were all very well, but they were not his sort of companions, and he did not bring them to his table. The natural barriers were increased. As Taft had pointed out in 1913 to Tumulty and me, the President is provided with every creature comfort. This makes possible the most complete personal isolation for a man like Wilson. Formal visits by accredited foreign diplomats, coming to the White House, at first amused Wilson, as did most of the other regal make-believe. I remember the day Bryce came as British ambassador, and how Wilson later told some of us that after the reading of the set speeches prepared by their respective State Departments, he had taken Bryce into a corner with the remark, "Now, Bryce, let 's have a comfortable chat like a couple of men." Bryce had frequently and favorably quoted from Wilson's early writings, and had been his guest at Prospect more than once during the Princeton University days.

Instead of abating, after the 1916 election, in which Wilson had been returned as the Persident "who kept us out of war," the demands of the jingos increased. American political life was filled with an intense bitterness. On December 18, 1916, after the transmission of Germany's offer to negotiate peace, Wilson considerably irritated the Allies by frankly asking all the parties to the war including Germany to give the world their view of a proper basis of peace. In this note he declared that "neither side had stated the object for which the war had been started." He

was in the driftway once more. And it was a hard fight he made with himself before accepting the methods of force.

In his message to Congress of January 22, 1917, he reached the heights of his political consecration in this language:

> I am proposing that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances which would draw them into competitions of power, catch them in a net of intrigue and selfish rivalry, and disturb their own affairs with influences intruded from without. There is no entangling alliance in a concert of power. When all unite to act in the same sense and with the same purpose, all act in the common interest and are free to live their own lives under a common protection.
>
> I am proposing government by the consent of the governed; that freedom of the seas, which, in international conference after conference, representatives of the United States have urged with the eloquence of those who are the convinced disciples of liberty; and that moderation of armaments which makes of armies and navies a power for order merely, not an instrument of aggression or selfish violence.
>
> These are American principles, American policies. We could stand for no others. And they are also the principles and policies of forward-looking men and women everywhere, and of every modern nation, of every enlightened community. They are the principles of mankind, and must prevail.

But preach as he would, American business had become so involved and the propaganda had worked so well that war was inevitable—that has always been

said since the days of Hannibal. "Militarism and armament made the world war inevitable," is the recently published belief of Lord Grey, the British foreign minister of 1914. And Lord Grey now frankly relieves "the Kaiser and the German people of the full odium of setting the torch that started the world conflagration."

"The Allied propaganda," says Bertrand Russell, "through British control of the cables, secured wider publicity than that of Germany, and achieved a notable success in winning the sympathy, and ultimately the coöperation of the United States." In spite of virtuous professions to the contrary, a state of war, as England's leading organ of liberal thought, the "Manchester Guardian," has frankly pointed out, is a license to lie as well as to kill; and the most effective war propaganda, for its immediate war purpose, may be that which is mostly widely false and which will be remembered with the most shame in after years by the nation which got the good of it at the time.

In the United States national security and defense leagues, amply financed, as well as numerous complacent agencies, including a large part of the pulpit and press, joined the hue and cry raised by clamorous politicians, university professors, and legal and literary hacks in the service of the patrioteers. The country was thoroughly inoculated with the virus of hate and of war. Patriotic lying became the order of the day, and the whole land was flooded with fanci-

ful accounts of German atrocities.[1] Passion was the only test of patriotism.

The artful stampede was irresistible. Wilson was much like the outstanding religious leaders of the world, none of whom was able to breast the onrushing tide. History is cluttered up with mighty fictions about the blood-stained paths to glory. And just so long as war is idealized, just so long will it be possible to stir the patriotic desire to fight.

It is certain that territorial realinements and geographical readjustments in Europe had no particular appeal to Wilson, who found himself floundering between his desire to give the world the golden rule and the increasing demands that had been stimulated by open and insidious propaganda of ambitious militarists, in and out of the army and navy. As the hysteria increased, the mystical Wilson, despising war, began to feel that the country was for it. Like the Maid of Orleans, he had a habit of hearing voices —the voices of the people—at critical junctures. The stupid German submarine policy furnished as good a popular excuse as any for our going in. Historians may successfully locate some other influencing and determining factor.

When Germany announced, near the close of January, 1917, that she was going to begin on February 1 unrestricted submarine warfare around the British

[1] See article by Admiral Sims in "Current History" for June, 1923, on U-Boat Atrocities; also C. J. O'Donnell's "The Lordship of the World."

Isles, and undertook to specify the route which a limited number of American ships might take through this zone, Wilson ceased to drift. Diplomatic relations were severed on February 4, and, Germany having proceeded with her attacks at sea, the President on April 2 delivered his address, which resulted on April 6 in the Congress's declaring that a state of war existed with Germany. "The right is more precious than peace," Wilson declared in his memorable address, "and we shall fight for the things we have always carried nearest our hearts, for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own government, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free."

Von Ludendorff, who at the Grand Headquarters of the German Army viewed the war from the attack on Liege to the signing of the Armistice, has told in his memoirs of the shattering of Austrian and German morale by the idealistic phrases of Wilson. The catchy "right of self-determination" made a strong appeal to Austria-Hungary, as did the promise of a peace of understanding that would end all war and make the world safe for democracy. "While her army was victorious on the field of battle," says Ludendorff, "Germany failed in the fight of intellects against the enemy peoples." That genius for telling phrases, scoffed at so much in America, may ulti-

mately prove to have been Wilson's greatest contribution to the victory.

Once Wilson had taken the country into war, he became the most ardent friend of the Allies. There was no further hesitation or halt. Ambassador Page, who had been pressing Wilson hard, has shown that the British Government owed four hundred million dollars to the bankers of the United States, and that the first loan of two hundred millions advanced by this Government was immediately turned over to the Morgan house on account. The British, who were the ablest diplomatists and propagandists, despatched the Balfour mission, which arrived on April 23 and conferred with Wilson the next day. Balfour dined informally with Wilson and did good work for the Allies. At the same time the French mission, with Marshal Joffre and Viviani at the front, arrived in Washington, and the White House was at fever heat thenceforward.

While, of course, many Republican politicians assailed Wilson throughout the war-time, the better Republican thought of the country backed him heartily. Joseph H. Choate, who had been sneering at Wilson as a minority President, but who as a former Republican ambassador to England was strongly pro-British, in an address to the Associated Press late in April, completely changed his tune from carping political criticisms to pæans of the highest praise.

"Let me say a word about our great President," declared Choate, "for he is entitled at every step to

the applause and support of every American citizen, man, woman, and child, and I believe that he has it. Some of us have long hesitated and doubted; some of us have thought that watchful waiting would never cease. But now we see what the President was waiting for and how wisely he waited. He was waiting to see how fast and how far the American people would keep pace with him and stand up to every action he proposed.

"From the day the President appeared before Congress and made that wonderful address of his—one of the greatest state papers since the formation of the government—from that moment all doubt, all hesitation, all unwillingness, was banished from the minds of all the people, and he is now our chosen leader for the great contest. By no possibility can we have any other, or think of any other, and we must uphold him through thick and thin from now until the end of the war."

Wilson took personal command of the Government. He isolated himself still further, remaining much in his private apartments and seeing few people. He was playing for the verdict of history. He had no objection to Tumulty's making use of the newspapers to help create sentiment, although he did not have a very high regard for the press. When the agitation was under way for a coalition Cabinet, he sent a note from his private White House apartments to Tumulty in the Executive Office expressing his disapproval of the plan and adding significantly:

You will know how to create the impression on the minds of the newspaper men that I regard it as merely a partisan effort to hamper and embarrass the Administration.

With the change in domestic surroundings, there naturally had come a considerable change in the family friendships. The first Mrs. Wilson was an idealist and dreamer, whose tastes for a lifetime had been developed much like those of her distinguished husband; the second Mrs. Wilson was of a more mature and practical turn of mind. As the wife of a rich and successful Washington merchant, to whose jewelry business she had succeeded at his death, she had a keen insight into the affairs of the national capital. Each brought to Wilson the fullest measure of devotion and adoration.

Knights-errant of big business are not shrinking violets, and, as the war developed, kings and near-kings of finance and industry were found more and more in the picture. Wall Street was no longer anathema. Wilson early recognized that the stupendous business side of war called for the highest caliber of business experts. It was idle to speculate as to the economic sources that had generated the spark in the powder-magazine; the thing to do was to win. In 'times of crisis the rigid axioms of the reformer are often flexed by the cold facts of life. Charles M. Schwab and James J. Farrell, of the great steel corporations, were pressed into service to help Edward N. Hurley rush the shipping program. Henry P.

Davison of J. P. Morgan & Company, who had come back from England in 1915 with authority to make all American purchases for the Allies, was placed at the head of the Red Cross, with its unrestricted spending of hundreds of millions of dollars abroad. "Some of us in America realized that this was our war from the very start," I heard Davison say at a luncheon given in his honor in Paris by the Anglo-American Press Club in early April of 1918. Edward R. Stettinius, another Morgan partner, already in direct charge of the Allied purchases, was made an assistant secretary of war, after the Morgan house had successfully recommended that Allied and American purchases be consolidated. Stettinius become surveyor-general for war supplies, the most powerful business job in the war. Dwight Morrow and Thomas W. Lamont, other Morgan partners, were among the Administration's confidential advisers on European finances. At every point of vital business contact abroad, some Morgan partner or agent—direct or indirect—was close at hand to inform and guide the American participation.

Wilson's dealing with some of the dollar-a-year magnates was not altogether happy. McAdoo, shrewd, able, and energetic, saw to it that none of the outsiders crowded into his operations, and he was especially fortunate in having treasury associates like Angus McLean and Russell C. Leffingwell, whose vast business experiences and ripe judgments were much depended upon by Wilson in the war financ-

ing. Wilson also relied greatly upon the counsel of Bernard M. Baruch and of Edward N. Hurley, head of the Shipping Board, Frank L. Polk and Norman Davis of the State Department. It was not altogether in fun that Wilson, at a Gridiron dinner, where all or nearly all of the big business volunteers were present, turned to them and said:

> My troubles with the war are slight compared with the difficulties of satisfying my distinguished dollar-a-year associates. Each thinks he ought to have all attention and is unhappy if any is given to others of his group. The result is that I am like an opera impresario, every member of whose troupe wants to be recognized and applauded as the prima donna.

Throughout most of the war period House, with his voluminous programs for secretly setting the world right, continued to be the trusted personal friend and adviser of the President. He superseded cabinet officers and ambassadors and had the Wilson confidence to a greater extent than any one else.

CHAPTER XXV

PERSHING, WOOD, AND ROOSEVELT

WHEN Woodrow Wilson was elected President he had little acquaintance with military affairs or military men. General Hugh L. Scott, who later served as chief of staff (laying down the bases for the war) and for a time as secretary of war *ad interim*—the only soldier to sit with the Cabinet since Sherman—was one of the few army officers known personally to Wilson. Scott was of an old Princeton family, a trained soldier who had given the best years of his life to service among the Indians, along the Mexican border, in Cuba, and in the Philippines. It happened that during the Christmas holidays of 1912, between the time of the Presidential election and Wilson's inauguration, Scott was visiting relatives in Princeton. Wilson had a long chat with him about army matters, as well as about Mexico and the Philippines. Wilson did not know whether Scott was a Republican or a Democrat, nor did he care. In the turbulent years that followed, Scott's judgment in military affairs weighed big with the President, and he had much to do with the selection of General John J. Pershing as commander-in-chief of the American Expeditionary Forces.

Wilson was determined that the fighting Americans who went to Europe should be under the direction of an experienced, practical soldier. His implicit confidence in Pershing's capacity and his unswerving support of the commander of the A.E.F. were among the biggest things of Wilson's career. Secretary Baker, despite his honest hatred of war, was equally insistent on having the fighting directed by trained soldiers, and he upheld Pershing at every turn. In a public address after the war Pershing declared that no commander-in-chief in American history had been so loyally supported by his superior. That same wise and courageous policy was followed in the navy, where Secretary Daniels displayed splendid qualities as an executive. It required first-class nerve to resist the clamor for favoring ex-President Theodore Roosevelt and General Leonard Wood, and the variety of other demands of the war-time, but it was the Wilson determination to stand by every act of Pershing that kept our army purely American and gave us a real individual part in winning the war. Wilson was disgusted with the British avarice in the transportation of our troops. Like Pershing, he made the best of a desperate situation. Without the Wilson vision and the Pershing determination the war could not have been so speedily won.

In Scott, Wilson recognized a loyal soldier, whose watchword was fidelity, and who never failed to obey orders. Scott was a big, kindly man, who preferred working among the Indians to working among the

politicans—favorite sport of so many army men—and he had a deep admiration and affection for Wilson, Garrison, and Baker. Scott was well known to be one of the strongest advocates of preparedness, but from the beginning he felt obligated, as a true soldier, to carry out the wishes of his commander, the President, upon whom devolved the responsibility for the national policy. Wilson invited Scott to sit with the Cabinet as secretary of war *ad interim,* between Garrison's resignation and Baker's appointment. He also sent Scott as a member of the American mission to Russia, headed by former Secretary of State Elihu Root. Three times Scott prevented war with Mexico. The only things that Wilson did against Scott's advice were the recognition of Carranza and the failure to give General Leonard Wood command of the proposed Mexican expedition that did not eventuate.

At the time of Wilson's inauguration, Wood was chief of staff at the War Department and was known to have his eye on the White House. Protégé and favorite of Roosevelt, Wood, although everywhere recognized as a fine soldier, was obsessed with the idea that he was a great politician, and was bent on becoming President. He was naturally under suspicion most of the time. Professional heroes and warrior politicians are always a problem in a democracy, and Wilson, like most wise statesmen, was definitely opposed to having the Government fall into the hands of the military power. He would not listen

to the suggestion that Senator George E. Chamberlain of Oregon, who had been placed in nomination for Vice-President at Baltimore, and who had served on the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, be made secretary of war. It was the Wilson notion then that the War Department's chief function was the proper management of Philippine affairs, and the job required judicial, not military handling. Chamberlain, although a Democrat, later became one of the Administration's most violent critics, seeking in the war-time to remove the direction of military preparations from the secretaries of war and of the navy. And he went so far, under the exuberant stimulation of followers of Roosevelt and Wood, as to declare at a Republican Club dinner in New York, January 19, 1918, that the military establishment of the United States had almost "ceased to function because of inefficiency in every bureau and in almost every department." Like all such ridiculous statements, made in the heat of passion, that Chamberlain charge, delivered at a time when America was bending every effort to save the Allied cause, fell by the weight of its own extravagance.

Although Wood was a harsh critic of Wilson, he was permitted to serve out his term as chief of staff. Scott might have had the post at any time after the change at the White House, but he was happier with the Indians and along the border than in Washington. Scott had served as chief of staff for Wood, when the latter was governor-general in Cuba, and

had made good. He entertained a strong personal friendship for Wood and had a very high regard for Wood's ability. Many were the kindly warnings that Scott issued to Wood against his aggressive political methods. But Wood, in association with Roosevelt, never lost a chance to pound the Wilson Administration. Plattsburg is always spoken of as the initial step in the movement for preparedness, and Wood is given the sole credit for establishing the training camp there. He is rightly entitled to much of the credit, but it must be apparent to every sensible person that without the cordial support of the President, the secretary of war, and the chief of staff there could have been no Plattsburg camp, because the men and the means were supplied by the Government under Washington authority. Had this been withheld, Wood, a subordinate commander, could have done nothing. Scott became chief of staff in November, 1914, and when it was decided to invade Mexico in 1916 he strongly urged that Wood, as the ranking major-general, be given command of the entire forces. But Wood and Roosevelt had kept up their political bombardment, and Wood had taken Roosevelt to the Plattsburg Training Camp, under Wood's command, to picture the defenselessness of the United States. It was August 25, 1915, a few days after the sinking of the *Arabic,* and while the *Lusitania* negotiations were still pending. At the close of his formal address, Roosevelt had given to the newspaper reporters a prepared statement con-

taining the following diatribe against the Wilson Administration:

> To treat elocution as a substitute for action, to rely upon high sounding words unbacked by deeds, is proof of a mind that dwells only in the realm of shadow and of shame.

Wood was publicly rebuked for the incident, but Roosevelt continued to hammer away at the Administration, employing his most rancorous invective, and Wood naturally suffered in his desire for advancement. No executive could be expected to place a subordinate, so entirely out of sympathy with his projects, in charge of a great policy—civil or military. It is neither good business, nor is it in human nature, to promote savage political enemies. Scott stuck to Wood, however, and after ten days Wilson directed that Scott should command the Mexican expedition himself. Pershing, who had been jumped over seven hundred officers, including Scott, by President Roosevelt, was given command of a smaller Mexican expedition. His selection naturally produced considerable jealousy, and from time to time reports from Mexico filtered through to the President that Pershing was saying sharp things about the Administration's dilatory course in the Mexican invasion. When Scott learned of these reports he immediately wrote a friendly personal note to Pershing, who replied with a very frank letter, disclaiming any such criticism. That letter was

placed in the President's hands and played an important part when the hour arrived for picking a commander-in-chief for the American Expeditionary Forces. After the refusal to consider Wood for the Mexican command, Scott realized that it would be futile to suggest the senior major-general (Wood, like Pershing, had been jumped over the heads of hundreds of old officers) for the European campaign. Pershing stood out in the Mexican expedition, and Scott took the view that under all the circumstances he was the best man the army had to command overseas. As chief of staff and as the friend of Wilson and Baker, Scott was able to build up the Pershing case, and Pershing was finally selected and ordered to Washington from El Paso. Scott took Pershing to the secretary of war. When they had finished their greetings, Pershing retired, and Scott said to Baker:

"Mr. Secretary, we are about to fight a war on the other side of the world. It will not be possible to direct all the details of that war from Washington. You will have to give your complete confidence to the officer chosen to command over there. You will have to give Pershing unstintingly everything he asks and do for him everything he wants, so long as he has your confidence. When he no longer has this, then I advise that you put somebody else in command who has this confidence. But in the meantime your commanding officer on the other side must be backed to the very limit."

The reply of the war secretary was, "That will be my policy."

Within five minutes Scott was in his office reporting to Pershing that this would be the policy of the War Department, and, in the opinion of Scott, this was the policy to a greater extent than in the case of any other army in history. By a curious twist of fate, that policy later prevented Scott from going overseas in command of the Seventy-eighth Division, which he had trained at Camp Dix after his retirement as chief of staff. Scott met all the physical and other tests, but a previous request of Pershing, fixing an age limit for commanding officers in the field, barred Scott's accompanying the division he had prepared for fighting.

In view of the enormous scale of subsequent operations, when obscure soldiers came to have not only limousines but private trains in France, a request that Pershing, after his selection as commander of the A.E.F., addressed to Scott, as chief of staff, is rather amusing.

"Do you believe I could get a Cadillac machine for my own use in France?" asked Pershing.

"You go out and buy ten," was the reply of Scott.

Some of the subsequent volumes of Parisian gossip, put out as diaries and reminiscences by self-glorified warriors, who evidently felt they had personally won the war, reveal petty difficulties that befell the President, the chief of staff, and Pershing. "We came into the war too late, and Wilson is re-

sponsible for it," was the stock wail of more than one army prima donna who had been given an opportunity, through Wilson, to go overseas and get into the "hero" class. Solemnly publishing that sort of stuff seven years after the war seems a bit ludicrous. But few professional soldiers are trustworthy historians, and many of the published memoirs seem to justify the merry prediction of a high staff officer when he received the order for the movement homeward after the Armistice: "In one year from now there will be two million liars about this war in the United States."

Two months before America entered the conflict Roosevelt had, on February 2, 1917, written to the secretary of war, asking permission to raise a volunteer infantry division with its accompanying brigade of cavalry, and the War Department had replied that the enlistment of volunteer divisions was not authorized by Congress, suggesting that a plan for a much larger army had already been proposed for the action of Congress, whenever it was required. Roosevelt was likewise informed that the "director for all our forces will be drawn from the regular army"; the President, his Cabinet, and the General Staff of the army were agreed that compulsory military service was essential if the inequalities, as well as the wastes and inefficiencies, of the volunteer system were not to be repeated. After the declaration of war Roosevelt rushed in person to Washington to urge acceptance of his plan. Wilson received him at the White House on April 11 and patiently listened to his plea

that he be permitted to go to France, agreeing to make the matter the subject of discussion with the secretary of war and the General Staff. Clemenceau, the tiger of French politics but not yet premier, in an open letter urged Wilson to give Roosevelt a command in the American Army in France. The political manœuverings to get the glory of the war were on full swing.

It was Wilson's idea that in a war so terrible, with its enormous cost of lives, the full responsibility for the actual fighting should be put upon the shoulders of a trained soldier, rather than a political warrior. Out of the Roosevelt ambition there came an unpleasant partizan scramble in Congress involving the Selective Draft Law, the Senate adopting an amendment that would have permitted Roosevelt to raise four divisions. War preparations were paralyzed for two weeks, and then a compromise was reached making it optional with the President to accept the Roosevelt volunteer division. After consulting with the Allied military authorities, Wilson met the issue squarely, deciding not to let personal or political considerations interfere with the conduct of the war by the General Staff. Despite the ungenerous attacks that Roosevelt had made on Wilson during 1915 and 1916, the President had an admiration for Teddy's grit, and in a statement he issued May 5, after announcing that Pershing would command the American Expeditionary Forces, he declared it would have been a pleasure

to pay Mr. Roosevelt the compliment of sending to their [the Allies'] aid one of our most distinguished public men, an ex-President who has rendered many conspicuous public services and proved his gallantry in many striking ways. But this is not the time or the occasion for compliment or for any action not calculated to contribute to the immediate success of the war. The business now in hand is un-dramatic, practical, and of scientific definiteness and precision. I shall act with regard to it at every step and in every particular under expert advice from both sides of the water. That advice is that the men most needed are men of the ages contemplated in the draft provision of the present bill, not men of the age and sort contemplated in the section which authorizes the formation of volunteer units, and that for the preliminary training of the men who are to be drafted we shall need all of our experienced officers. Mr. Roosevelt told me, when I had the pleasure of seeing him a few weeks ago, that he would wish to have associated with him some of the most effective officers of the regular army. He named many of those whom he would desire to have designated for the service, and they were men who cannot possibly be spared from the too small force of officers at our command for the much more pressing and necessary duty of training regular troops to be put into the field in France and Belgium as fast as they can be got ready. The first troops to France will be taken from the present forces of the regular army, and will be under the command of trained soldiers only. The responsibility for the successful conduct of our part in this great war rests upon me. I could not escape it if I would. I am too much interested in the cause we are fighting for to be interested in anything but success. The issues involved are too immense for me to take into consideration any-

thing whatever except the best, the most effective, and most immediate means of military action.

Dr. Herbert Adams Gibbons of Princeton, historian and writer on foreign affairs, who had been in France for a dozen years and was in as close touch with the spirit of the country and the government as any other American during the war-time, writing for the "Century Magazine" in June, 1917, gave the French point of view on the Roosevelt incident. The article of Dr. Gibbons has since been incorporated in his published volume of interpretative studies entitled "France and Ourselves."

"President Wilson, in the face of adverse criticism and pressure from all sides," says Dr. Gibbons on page 16 of his book, "declined Mr. Roosevelt's offer. He showed remarkable perspicacity. I have not the slightest doubt that Mr. Roosevelt and his friends were actuated by the sole motive of wanting to serve France; but their love of the French was greater than their knowledge of the French. Whatever their newspapers may have said, in the desire to avoid looking a gift-horse in the mouth, the people of France did not understand the Roosevelt scheme. It perplexed and worried them. They would have interpreted its adoption as a sign that our Government did not have sufficient prestige among the American people to help France in the *regular* way, or that the American people were so opposed to the war that President Wilson was compelled to fall back upon private initiative and enterprise for military co-

operation with the Entente powers. It was only when telegrams from Washington announced that General Pershing would command the first troops sent to France, and that these troops would be an *official* American army, that the French realized the significance of America's entry into the war."

General Wood, protégé of Roosevelt, also failed to get to France, because neither General Pershing nor the General Staff requested that he be sent there. George Creel, who, in the war days, as chairman of the Committee on Public Information, was on terms of intimacy with Wilson, seeing him almost daily, has fully set forth both the Roosevelt and Wood incidents in his book, "The War, the World, and Wilson." In the 1916 campaign Creel wrote "Wilson and the Issues," which had mightily pleased Wilson, who made a confidant of Creel during the war period. If Wood had been given a command in the A. E. F., his chance for the Presidency would have been enhanced.

Roosevelt, longing for a return to power, was not only a great politician but a great hater when his passions were aroused. The vials of his wrath were frequently turned on Wilson. In the war-time, however, most of the country's Republican leaders followed the course of Choate and supported Wilson until, as the war was ending in the fall of 1918, he issued the unfortunate call for the election of a Democratic Congress. As a result of that blunder rampant partizans began barking at Wilson's heels in

deadly earnest. James M. Beck, afterward Harding's solicitor-general, led the attacks, charging that from the time Wilson took the reins of office his foreign policy had "been a black stain of dishonor upon the American people." Beck branded the Wilson principles as a "crazy patchwork of contradictions," and declared that Wilson had been consistently loyal to but one idea, "that this great war, the greatest in the history of the world, must end in a peace without victory." Beck invoked the shades of Lincoln and Washington, who were represented as amazed at "Woodrow Wilson's work in the last four years . . . sapping the foundations of our government with a policy of universal, world-wide intrigue." George Harvey, who had started a Washington weekly in which he kept up a constant bombardment of Wilson, his old idol, and of the entire Administration, had a perfect field-day. The country resented the Wilson call and snowed the Democrats under completely. That smashing defeat proved of inestimable value to the European politicians, who, with the close of the war, were eager to shelve Wilsonian idealism and to go back to the old force methods. Roosevelt, bitter in his antagonism, served public notice that the Republican majority in the Senate was ready to repudiate the League of Nations. On November 27, five days before Wilson sailed on his ill-starred trip abroad, Roosevelt cried this message to Europe:

Our allies and our enemies and Mr. Wilson himself should all understand that Mr. Wilson has no authority

whatever to speak for the American people at this time. His leadership has just been emphatically repudiated by them. The newly elected Congress comes far nearer than Mr. Wilson to having a right to speak the purposes of the American people at this moment. Mr. Wilson and his Fourteen Points and his four supplementary points and his five complementary points and all his utterances every which way have ceased to have any shadow of right to be accepted as expressive of the will of the American people.

He is President of the United States. He is part of the treaty-making power; but he is only part. If he acts in good faith to the American people, he will not claim on the other side of the water any representative capacity in himself to speak for the American people. He will say frankly that his personal leadership had been repudiated and that he now has merely the divided official leadership which he shares with the Senate.

. . . America played in the closing months of war a gallant part, but not in any way the leading part, and she played this part only by acting in strictest agreement with our Allies and under the joint high command. She should take precisely the same attitude at the Peace Conference. We have lost in this war about 236,000 men killed and wounded. England and France have lost about 7,000,000. Italy and Belgium and the other Allies have doubtless lost 3,000,000 more. Of the terrible sacrifice which has enabled the Allies to win the victory, America has contributed just about 2 per cent.

It is our business to act with our Allies and to show an undivided front with them against any move of our late enemies. I am no Utopian. I understand entirely that there can be shifting alliances.

But in the present war we have won only by standing shoulder to shoulder with our Allies and presenting an

undivided front to the enemy. It is our business to show the same loyalty and good faith at the Peace Conference. Let it be clearly understood that the American people absolutely stand behind France, England, Italy, Belgium, and the other Allies at the Peace Conference, just as she has stood with them during the last eighteen months of the war. Let every difference of opinion be settled among the Allies themselves, and then let them impose their common will on the nations responsible for the hideous disaster which has almost wrecked mankind.

At home Hearst and Harvey kept up the fight against entangling foreign alliances. Oswald Garrison Villard, who had done such big work for Wilson in the early political days, was likewise a potent factor in warring on the Treaty of Versailles, and through the columns of the "Nation" stirred up a mightily effective opposition among the intellectuals. Throughout the war period, next to Hearst, there was no other such bold and potent critic of the Wilson policies as Harvey, and none that caused such irritation at the White House. His telling work for the Republicans in the League of Nations fight, and the part he played in the eleventh-hour nomination of Warren G. Harding for President at Chicago in 1920, brought him the ambassadorship to Great Britain. The appointment was duly accredited to New Jersey, where Harvey continues to maintain his voting residence.

CHAPTER XXVI

THE END OF A CABLE

JUST before President Wilson set out on his first European peace mission, I had a long chat with him in the White House. For eight months of 1918 I had been in Europe as director of American information, devoted primarily to broadcasting among our friends, as well as to the enemy, the idealism of Wilson and the magnitude and unselfishness of our war effort. Likewise it had been my business to keep an eye on the political side of the war. While the mouthpieces of the Allied nations and their associates in America, cleverly operating through the multitudinous business and professional propaganda agencies, had been stampeding and instructing us and molding the sentimentalism and hysteria that bred our war fever, those in control of government and national effort on the other side carefully handed out for home consumption such colorful information as best fitted their political needs. It would not be possible to fight wars if the people were told the whole truth.

"We can't hope always to know exactly what is transpiring at the end of a cable three thousand miles away," Wilson said to me in early February, when the suggestion was made that I go to France. Pershing had been having mighty troubles with the

politicians of both England and France, each seeking to head off a separate American Army and to force the splitting up of our units and amalgamating them into their armies, thus replacing and saving their own soldiers. The propaganda about Hun atrocities and Allied idealism was aimed at our hearts; behind the well guarded screen was the practical scheme of utilizing America as a great reservoir to supply the British and French armies and furnish replacements. There were intrigues against Pershing both at home and abroad. Clemenceau, then premier, had gone so far, in January, 1918, as to cable, over the head of Pershing, direct to Washington to urge that American regimental units be attached to French divisions, which request had been turned back to Pershing with full power. That action of President Wilson and Secretary of War Baker was in keeping with every act of the Administration relative to the conduct of the fighting forces. Pershing was given absolute control of the army, and, no matter what political or other pressure was brought to bear, there was no interference from Washington. Wilson and Baker had conceived and put over the national draft; it was their sacred purpose to keep faith with America by having the fighting men given the best of care. To Pershing was intrusted the difficult task of seeing that our troops were not needlessly sacrificed, and of seeing, too, that the politicians of Europe, in control of the armed forces there, did not side-track America. A less forceful man than Pershing, at a time when the

whole world had gone war mad, could not have survived the political intrigue. Pershing was a genuine leader of men, who ruled firmly but with human consideration, as well as a skilful diplomat unafraid of the scheming European politicians.[1]

Wilson's splendid loyalty to Pershing was never marred nor disturbed by the political gossips at home. Grant had reached the White House solely on his Civil War record. Roosevelt's Spanish War venture was equally efficacious. And within a few months after the landing of American forces in France there began to be persistent whisperings in Washington of Pershing as a Presidential candidate. Wilson knew the possibilities that war afforded for the hero with political friends. But he never let rumors interfere in his support of Pershing. There were plenty of politically ambitious American warriors in France, but I quickly discovered that Pershing was not of them.

On my return, in November, 1918, Wilson was good enough to say that the confidential reports I had sent home had been most helpful, and when I suggested that he would find himself up against some very hard-boiled political cunning and intrigue in Paris he seemed aware of what was ahead. "The terrible thing about war is that the young manhood of the

[1] George Pattullo, who was one of the ablest of the newspaper correspondents with the American forces, and who enjoyed the confidence of the high commanding officers, in a series of articles entitled "The Inside of the A. E. F." beginning in the "Saturday Evening Post" on April 29, 1922, has given an illuminating picture of the political troubles that beset General Pershing on all sides in Europe.

world is sacrificed to the stupidity of the politicians; it 's my business to see that that kind of thing is stopped," he bravely declared. Coupled with his supreme confidence in his persuasive eloquence, was an intense faith in his own lucky star.

Wilson was especially proud of the fact that Pershing had so completely justified the implicit faith that had been reposed in him by America. We talked of the remarkable variety of Pershing's knowledge and of his sound judgment in disposing of the many problems incidental to war. His military accomplishments are safely preserved; some other doings seem worth recording. When the Allies, with their backs to the wall, hoisted their distress signal in March, 1918, and declared that troops must come quickly if the war and world were to be saved, the chief ocular evidence we had over there was the Service of Supplies that Pershing had erected for the handling of his men in a wholesome American way. Pershing had firmly rooted ideas of his own regarding the comfort of his army; he was not going to permit any wintering in dugouts or barren billets. He taxed the war-racked European patience by insisting that life was not our cheapest, but our most precious possession, and was not to be wantonly wasted. Where his fighting men were concerned, he was what an old-fashioned New-Englander might term a good provider.

But the story of building great docks, railroads, storage warehouses, telegraph and telephone lines—

the making over of a land of unpreparedness—had not been spread in Europe. It was not even known, so far as publication was concerned, in the French

May 24.

Dear Mr. Burton -

I am handing this to Mr. Kerney with whom I have discussed the article. In consultation with him, will you please leave out any amendements, and after you both agree, you may let it go. J.J.P.

nitude of our preparations to practically all European centers was through the columns of the London "Times" owned by Lord Northcliffe. Restless about governmental red tape, Northcliffe had a British mission of his own in the United States as well as on the European continent. Sir Pomeroy Burton, old-time New York newspaper man, who had spent a dozen years Americanizing the Northcliffe publications in England, was the Northcliffe administrator on the Continent. Burton, eager to coöperate, had spent three weeks in going over the American construction

work. He put together, for European publication, the first newspaper story of our Service of Supplies. Burton's report was submitted to G.H.Q. at Chaumont for censoring. Next day, May 24, Pershing brought the manuscript to Paris. Those May days of eight years ago were not quite so placid as these. Although Pershing had been in Europe for a year, we still had no American Army. The British and French had urged that we send only infantry and machine-gun units; they would supply the rest. But Lloyd George and Clemenceau had successfully jockeyed and delayed until finally Pershing's insistence brought an agreement, on May 19, that the American Army should be set up on its own account and should take complete charge of the sector of the Woëvre, but the battle raging further west was so pressing that the agreement had no immediate result. Pershing was swiftly diverting and deploying American troops to help stem the enormous German onslaughts. The world seemed upside down. It was not uncommon for him to travel three hundred miles within twenty-four hours by automobile. The very comfortable Ogden Mills home at 73 rue de Varennes, in the fashionable old residence quarter of Paris, had been placed at his disposal. It was there, and in the midst of most critical hours, that he patiently revised the Burton résumé and passed it over to me, with this brief note annexed:

Dear Mr. Burton:

I am handing this to Mr. Kerney, with whom I have

discussed the article. In consultation with him will you please leave out any overstatements, and, after you both agree, you may let it go.

J. J. P.

That was the beginning of a more open policy in the printing of figures regarding America. Things were moving faster since the alarm had been sent up following the German early spring drive in Picardy. With the coming of 245,000 troops in May we had eighteen divisions in France. And how desperately they were needed none knew better than Pershing. The Germans were punching terrific holes in the British and French lines. There was great urgency to find ways to stiffen civilian morale, as well as bring cheer and comfort to the armies on the western front. "Our troops out here, as well as the people at home, must be told and told quickly of what America is doing," General Gouraud, grizzled hero of many wars, had said to me in his headquarters at the front in early May.

In Paris those were especially melancholy days. The bombardment of the Big Bertha and the nightly raids from the air had completely shattered the nerves of that gay city. A few days later came the break through the French at the Chemin des Dames, and the fall of Paris seemed imminent. All the worthwhile art treasures were hurried to the south; so were the bank valuables. Paris was ready for another get-away. Upward of a million of the population moved out, and ample provision was made for

every one in official life to go. I saw more than one fine Frenchman, high in the nation's affairs, weep great tears and declare that Paris could not be saved.

A special message that Wilson cabled, in response to an urgent request on my part, was spread over the front pages of all the French newspapers, and proved very heartening. The message read:

American Embassy, Paris,
May 17, 1918.

Copy of Telegram
Received
4049 Blue Code.

Washington, D. C.,
May 16, 6 P. M. 1918.

AMEMBASSY
PARIS
4049 May 16, 6 P. M., 1918. Your 3790, May 4, 3 P. M.

For Kerney. Following is message from the President requested by you:

"The people of the United States rejoice to find themselves comrades with the people of France in a war in which every man who loves the right must be proud to take part. For more than a hundred years, they have desired the opportunity which has now come to them, to give the French people some proof of their gratitude and friendship. There is added now in their hearts a deep and ardent admiration of the heroism and devotion which the people of France have exhibited in this terrible final grapple between liberty and cruel force. Their hearts go with their armies to the bloody fields of gallant France.

They are your brothers in a great and sacred common cause. Signed Woodrow Wilson."

LANSING.

JWC/JRG.

In those tragic hours it was interesting to witness the flitting about, in an open automobile, of Premier Clemenceau. His big car had two shiny-helmeted soldiers on front, while the hardy old politician occupied the spacious rear seat, a flat straw hat cocked jauntily on his brow. He raced over Paris, apparently headed for some highly important point, but in reality indulging in a fine piece of theatricals to ease the nerve-shot citizenry. All must be well; they had seen the Tiger. At Versailles one day he facetiously remarked that since discovering how easy it was, when in power, to hold the populace in check he had lost much of his admiration for the Napoleon legend. He missed no opportunity to appeal to the dramatic side so strong in the French character. He had declared, before assuming the reins, that at every critical juncture in history the government had failed the people; there was to be no slip-up in his administration.

Clemenceau left the heavy feasting to others in his official family, ate sparingly, retired about eight o'clock in the evening, and, then approaching seventy-eight, found seven hours' sleep about as much as he could comfortably use. It was a common practice with him to go to Marshal Foch's headquarters at the front and be back at the War Ministry by nine o'clock

in the morning. These spectacular trips provided the very best kind of propaganda both at home and abroad. Clemenceau's physical courage was of the best and, had it been necessary, he would gladly have put it to the supreme test; but the truth is that a Great Headquarters is never exactly a seriously dangerous spot.

I remember asking a staff officer, at British G.H.Q. at Montreuil, whether they had many air bombardments there, and he smilingly replied, "You know it 's a sort of unwritten law that G.H.Q. is never raided." The risk was about as great as in the observation-posts from which kings and princes, attired in gorgeous uniforms, look on at battles. Who ever heard of a royal personage getting scratched in war, or after a war for that matter? But they do make perfect stage-settings; the idea appeals to the imagination of even democratic peoples. Clemenceau knew all the tricks, and he did not overlook any.

"We have had the glory of saving the war; America will have the glory of finishing it, and we 'll both find it pretty expensive," he had said to me in late April. How prophetic! In those times of terrific upset, and later, Clemenceau saved the spirit of France just as much as the dough-boys in June and July physically saved Paris from German invasion.

No matter how depressing the news from the front, Pershing always appeared to be in the very pink of physical and mental condition. There was none cooler in France. "How does a man of fifty-eight,

with such enormous responsibilities and anxieties, keep so fit?" I asked Colonel Carl Boyd, his aide and intimate, whose sad death so soon followed the Armistice.

"Well, he takes a long run in the morning, grinds like a beaver all day, and not infrequently rounds it out by dancing with the Y. and Red Cross workers in the canteens in the evening," was Colonel Boyd's reply.

Pershing was an exceedingly patient listener; his mind worked with a remarkable consistency. He carried conviction that his logic was good. There was no waste of words; just a courteous argument. When the decision came, it was convincing and final. His handwriting was bold, and he had a habit of making notes on small squares of paper. That "J. J. P." was familiar to all who had occasion to serve directly under or in association with him. One thing he always had, supreme admiration for and confidence in the American fighting man.

When the complete story of the big things he did for America gets upon the open record, Pershing will bulk pretty large as a very courageous statesman, too. Usually most courteous and reserved, he could be quite emphatic when occasion demanded. "Your commander-in-chief is very plain-spoken at times," Lord Milner said to me one day at luncheon at the British Embassy in Paris—a sentiment in which other distinguished Europeans will doubtless concur. There were trying hours for America's cause over

there, when the mind and wit of Pershing were matched against the cleverest diplomats, politicians, business magnates, and soldiers of the Old World. He got a close-up of the intimate part European statesmen play in actually directing wars, as well as bringing them on.

Perhaps some day the history of history may be written and the whole frank story told of the rôles that propaganda and politicians play in getting the people stirred up sufficiently to permit wars. There is a lot of competitive exaggeration about it. The British and French propaganda in America was easily the best; it appealed to the sentimental side. The German propaganda was awkward and arrogant; it sought to terrorize, and America could not be terrorized. War has been characterized as all waste; there was doubtless enormous wastage in attempts to influence opinion throughout Europe. One time in Bordeaux I found that forty-seven separate pieces of literature, including costly pamphlets and booklets, were being put out by the British alone. In a later conversation with Clemenceau regarding the coordinating of the Allied enemy propaganda, that versatile observer declared that he regarded the millions that France and Great Britain had already expended in their efforts to upset morale in Germany had been wasted. He reorganized the service by placing Paul Chaix, a very clever business man, at its head, and in the summer of 1918 everything that was sent over the lines was set up by German pris-

oners and had the appearance of being German made.

Straight news reports, giving facts and figures concerning the magnitude of the American effort and the unprecedented speed at which our forces were functioning, together with the utterances of Wilson, showing that we were not trying to exterminate any peoples, but merely to crush the militaristic idea, proved exceedingly effective propaganda. The enemy had been fed up on diplomatic arguments and explanations; they had little faith in the political material that had been sent over to them. General Ludendorf has told of the disastrous effect on the morale of German troops of some of the Wilson messages, setting forth that America was not fighting the German people, that went over the lines in the summer and early fall of 1918.

To any one having even an outside glimpse of the difficulties Pershing encountered with European politicians, there was nothing particularly surprising about the treatment that Wilson received in Paris. There was little faith in our idealism among the governing classes of Europe. With them disinterestedness never played a part in politics or international relations. And so they were good-humoredly skeptical of a millennium under American leadership. Wilson's much heralded principles were looked upon as excellent strategy in the stress of the war, when, as Lloyd George had remarked, the race was between Wilson and Hindenburg. But that was all over now; what our European allies wanted was the last ounce

of flesh. Almost before the victory had come, the newspapers of England and France had cooled perceptibly toward America. There was persistent propaganda to belittle the American military effort, and there was a reversion to the original attitude that America had come into the war at the last moment in order to gather a fat share of the gains.

The shrewd politicians of Europe saw to it that the President of the United States had a great joy-ride when he came to put the finishing touches on his vision of everlasting peace. Wilson's disgust with Republicans made it impossible to have Elihu Root or any other outstanding man of that party accompany him, and his attempt to name only those whose "minds went along" with his own served to feed the opposition flames. It was but human that he should be carried away by the applause that the whole civilized world was showering upon him. There had never been any such wholesale worship of mere man. In the fullness of his glory and power, he would show Europe that he could walk with kings and keep his head. His recent rebuke by the home folks, when the electorate turned down his appeal for a Democratic Congress, was brushed aside, as were the crackling warnings of Roosevelt. Wilson was clearly fretted and fagged by the war; the ordeal of wholesale slaughter had not only worn him down physically but had been a tremendous shock to his Christian spirit.

And so Europe took on this confident idealist, and while the common people cheered and bowed and wor-

shiped, the seasoned political warriors delayed and juggled and wore him down. A great palace was provided in Paris, precious gifts were heaped upon the household, and the Wilson entourage lived in regal style. Wilson personally wearied of the royal entertaining, but he never found a way to get around the schemes devised by clever old-world rulers to block his peace plans. They were no altruists; they were plainly out for keeping the balance of power that had produced the war. From the United States, the Republicans saw to it that the proper kind of anti-Wilson news was despatched to Paris; one of the widely known Washington correspondents had been engaged for that particular task. The Paris press, always under political control in foreign affairs, readily fell in with the trick schemes, and Wilson eventually began to make mild surrenders here and there, until he found himself out-jockeyed by Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Sonnino. He took the best he could get in Europe, always striving to save his League idea, but when he came home he would take nothing in the way of reservations.

On his first hurried trip back to America, the Republican senators circulated a round robin, serving notice on the world that the Senate would not accept the League of Nations "in its present form." It was known, however, that with certain reservations there was a Senate majority in favor of the idea. But Wilson, embittered by the low political atmosphere he found in Paris, was more determined than

ever not to accept a single amendment at the hands of the Senate. Any suggestion to that end he came to regard as a personal insult. House, the ever faithful adviser in foreign affairs as well as the affectionate friend, was unceremoniously dropped at Paris. Wilson had never so sorely needed the practical counsel of Tumulty, who had remained in Washington to direct the Government. His frequent cablegrams to the White House for suggestions and advice, as amply set forth in the Tumulty book, tell something of the pathetic struggle Wilson encountered over there. It was not easy to keep the Wilson show functioning and in order "at the end of a cable." The tired President came home and, in a country-wide campaign to win support for the League, broke down. He never recovered his health, and his fighting and writing for peace will keep the historians writing and fighting for generations to come.

CHAPTER XXVII

GOVERNMENT BY PROXY

THERE had at no period of their association been any particular depth of feeling between President Wilson and Secretary Lansing, and Mr. Wilson treated his secretary of state with rather scant consideration in Paris. Although circumstances made necessary the appointment of Lansing to the peace delegation, Wilson emphasized the fact that it was not to be a "lawyers' peace," which voiced his disdain for the legal profession in general and seemed to be aimed at Lansing in particular.

After the President's complete breakdown on October 4, 1919, when he was found in a semiconscious condition prostrate on the bath-room floor of the White House, Lansing had suggested that arrangements be made to have the Vice-President assume command of the Government. Wilson had been paralyzed on his left side, and he was never able again to bear his weight on his left leg. No one entered the sick-chamber except his wife, his doctors, and his nurses; and he grew a mustache and whiskers. Those nearest the President, after the first cerebral stroke, believed death a certainty. There was a second and severer stroke, carrying premonition of a fatal termination.

Notwithstanding the critical situation, some who

were on the inside felt that it was not necessary to take official action. Others, however, took counsel among themselves as to their course. There was agreement among them that public interest demanded that the news that Wilson was precariously ill should not be disclosed to the country, but the question arose as to their duty toward Vice-President Marshall. He, like nearly everybody in official Washington, was without information of the extreme seriousness of the President's condition. Should the Vice-President be told, so as to prepare him for the assumption of the duties of the Presidential office?

The argument that prevailed was that it would be unjust to leave the Vice-President uninformed about what, from all appearances, impended. But the exchanges of opinion brought out for consideration the likelihood that any notice to Marshall might take on the aspect of an authoritative announcement. They did not wish to go that far. There was the possibility that the President might not die, although even in that event the indications were that he would be left in complete incapacity for the performance of his constitutional duties. In these circumstances, might not a notice to Marshall from official quarters that he should be prepared to assume the Presidential office on account of the likelihood of Wilson's death be equivalent to an intimation that he should take over the administration of executive functions even if the President survived?

Finally it was decided to give Marshall warning

through an unofficial channel. I am indebted to Richard V. Oulahan, editorial director of the Washington bureau of the "New York Times," whose responsible knowledge of national political affairs is unexcelled, for the details of this historic incident. J. Fred Essary, Washington correspondent of the "Baltimore Sun," who had been taken into the confidence of the inner official circle, suggested that it would be unfair and unseemly, in view of the tremendous importance it had for him, not to prepare the Vice-President for the expected eventuality. And so Essary was chosen as the unofficial spokesman to acquaint Marshall with the call that might be made on him, at any moment, to take the Presidential oath. Essary undertook the delicate task. He called on Marshall in the Vice-President's room, just off the Senate-Chamber, gave him the first exact information as to President Wilson's condition and as to the fears of those who were nearest, and advised Marshall to be prepared to succeed to the Presidential duties.

During the newspaper man's recital, Marshall, sitting at his desk, kept his head bowed, evidently in deep thought, profoundly moved. The visitor did not ask for a response, and when he had delivered the message he rose and walked to the door. Glancing back, he saw the Vice-President, still sitting with his head bowed, his eyes on the desk; he had not spoken a word during the recital. When the answer came, it was a firm declination, just as Marshall had once before declined to be lured into the office by

virtue of constitutional right. After the armistice of November 11, 1918, when it had become known that Wilson intended to go to Paris as the chief representative of the United States at the Peace Conference, insistent opposition was voiced. A feeling was expressed that Wilson would commit a grave error of judgment, for one thing, in leaving the country, and, for another, in being an active participant in the peace negotiations.

In some quarters the cry was raised that with the Chief Executive absent from America the duties of his office would necessarily devolve on the Vice-President. In a speech George W. Wickersham, attorney-general under President Taft, declared that Wilson had "abdicated" and that Marshall ought to assume his official function. Shortly before his departure for Europe in December, Wilson paid a personal visit to the Vice-President at his apartment in a Washington hotel and left with the assurance that Marshall would take no step to exercise the executive powers.

Because of the severe nature of his illness, it was four months before Wilson was made fully acquainted with the fact that after his collapse in early October Lansing had suggested that the Vice-President should take command, and that in the meanwhile the Cabinet had been conferring. There had been frequent open assertions in the Senate and elsewhere that the reins of government were actually being handled by Tumulty and a little group at the White House—

which was the fact—but Marshall persisted in his position that until the President resigned or until some properly constituted tribunal declared that the Government was without a head, he would make no move. Despite bitter partizan wrangling, the Government continued to function.

When the President had recovered sufficiently to be told of some of the things that had taken place, he was much agitated; and on February 7, 1920, more than four months after the beginning of his isolation, he wrote to Lansing, asking, "Is it true as I have been told, that, during my illness, you have frequently called the heads of the Executive Departments of the Government into conference?" Wilson added that no one but the President, under constitutional law and practice, had the right to summon the heads of the executive departments. Lansing, in answering, admitted that "certain members of the Cabinet, of which I was one, felt that, in view of the fact that we were denied communication with you, it was wise for us to confer informally together." He insisted that he had endeavored to carry out Wilson's policies at all times and in conclusion said:

> If, however, you think I have failed in my loyalty to you and if you no longer have confidence in me and prefer to have another to conduct foreign affairs, I am, of course, ready to relieve you of any embarrassment by placing my resignation in your hands.

Wilson promptly replied to Lansing, saying:

> This affair only deepens a feeling that was growing

upon me. While you were still in Paris, I felt, and have felt increasingly since, that you accepted my guidance and direction on questions with regard to which I had to instruct you, with increasing reluctance, and since my return to Washington, I have been struck by the number of matters in which you have apparently tried to forestall my judgment, by formulating judgments and merely asking my approval when it was impossible for me to form an independent judgment because I had not had an opportunity to examine the circumstances with any degree of independence.

Wilson added that he would take advantage of the suggested resignation as it would afford "an opportunity to select some one whose mind would more willingly go along with mine." Instead of the "faithfully and cordially yours" that usually ended letters to advisers, the letter to Lansing wound up with "sincerely yours." Lansing formally tendered his resignation, which was promptly accepted.

Wilson never returned to his offices in the White House, and while some attempt was made to resume cabinet meetings, the bulk of the country's business for seventeen months was carried on through Mrs. Wilson. Tumulty, the practical head of the nation, rarely saw the President, but kept up a daily interchange of correspondence with him. House had been dropped overboard in Paris.

Wilson's humor did not desert him. Senator Albert B. Fall of New Mexico, whose unhappy career as secretary of the interior has given him added prominence, insisted that a Senate committee per-

sonally visit the President to ascertain whether he was physically and mentally capable of performing his official duties. There was much pathos in that visit of inquiry. Standing by the bedside, Fall gazed on the recumbent figure of the distinguished invalid, and then, with tears in his voice, delivered himself piously and fittingly:

"I have been praying for you, Mr. President."

After Fall had left, Wilson turned to Tumulty, sighed heavily, and said:

"You heard what Fall said? Well, I have been wondering what I have done that he should be allowed to queer me with the Almighty."

After Lansing retired, Wilson seriously considered naming Newton D. Baker, the secretary of war, to head the State Department. Baker was one of Wilson's few personal cabinet selections and was in high favor. When the appointment was about to be made, however, rumors began to float into the White House that Baker had patted Lansing on the back and approved his course. Tumulty was sent for and told of the President's great distress at anything that implied disloyalty on Baker's part. Tumulty laid the rumors before Baker, who laughed them to scorn, and Tumulty was completely satisfied that Baker was, as always, devoted and loyal to Wilson.

It was Wilson's first idea to name Baker secretary of state and Bainbridge Colby secretary of war. On second thought, however, he put Colby in the State Department. The naming of Colby was in apprecia-

tion of his leaving the Bull Moose party in 1916 and coming out boldly for Wilson. Democratic leaders regarded the appointment of a Republican, or of a former Republican, to be secretary of state as a great tactical blunder, and as destructive of party morale in Congress. Tumulty urged the naming of Frank L. Polk, who had made an admirable record as acting secretary of state, but the President insisted on the Colby appointment.

Many of the documents that were issued in the name of the President during the last months in the White House were actually written by Colby. After the Republican landslide in 1920 Wilson sent word to Colby that there did not seem to be much for him to rejoice or give thinks for and suggested that Colby write the Presidential proclamation setting aside Thanksgiving day. The proclamation that went to the country that year was the work of Colby.

Colby was at the head of the State Department at a time when there were many delicate foreign problems to be handled, and while Wilson, in dismissing Lansing, had said he wanted "someone whose mind will go more willingly along with mine," Colby was himself the author of many state papers which Wilson approved. The note of August 10, 1920, laying down the American attitude toward the Russian problem, was Colby's work. Wilson regarded Colby so highly that he later formed a law partnership with him, but was only able to visit the law-offices in Washington once, and at the end of the first year the partnership was dissolved.

CHAPTER XXVIII

FRANK VIEWS FOR A DOMESTIC PROGRAM

WHEN Wilson came home from Paris on the first trip in February, 1919, he manifested real concern over the grave after-war problems, political and industrial, that the country must face. He was interested in George L. Record's government ownership and land theories, and it is part of the history of the times that, despite the all-engrossing peace program, he seriously talked over with Tumulty the possibility that Record might have the right solution for our domestic problems. Wilson was plainly anxious over the unrest of the workers everywhere. In his message at the opening of the Sixty-sixth Congress he had called attention to the necessity of making labor more effective in the process of sustaining populations and had suggested the advisability of a reorganization of industry. Wilson there referred to the "democratization of industry, based upon a full recognition of the right of those who work, in whatever rank, to participate in some organic way in every decision which directly effects their welfare or the part they are to play in industry." In a letter dated March 20, 1918, addressed to the New Jersey Democrats, Wilson had

said, "Men everywhere are searching democratic principles in their hearts in order to determine their soundness, their sincerity, their adaptability to the real needs of their life, and every man with any vision must see that the real test of justice and right action is presently to come as it never came before."

Tumulty, Record, and some of the other early liberal friends of Wilson felt that the time of the real test had arrived. At Tumulty's suggestion Record sent to Wilson at Paris by the embassy pouch, a letter dated March 31, 1919, embodying the Record views and suggesting, in outline, the form of an address to Congress, urging adoption of the program. In substance this program contained four main features: (1) public ownership of railroads, pipelines, public utilities, and all natural resources owned by trusts; (2) all patents to be open to use, manufacture, or sale by anybody on payment to owner of patent of royalty fixed by government; (3) no land to be held out of use for speculation or to aid monopoly; (4) limitation of great fortunes by inheritance and income taxes.

Wilson sent Record a cordial acknowledgment from Paris. To those who followed Wilson's career with interest, the letter Record sent to Paris contains much brutal candor, and later political events strikingly justified some of the premises.

I pay you the compliment [wrote Record to Wilson] of believing that you are big and broad enough to wel-

come frank speech from those who, like myself, are personally your friends and well wishers, and who are sincerely devoted to improving the living and working conditions of mankind. If I speak plainly, therefore, I know you will take no offense.

As condition are now, your political fortunes are at a low ebb, your prestige impaired, and your party demoralized.

What is the reason for this condition? There are many minor reasons, and one big one. I deal with the big one.

In my judgment nothing that you have done as President, and nothing that you are proposing in the League of Nations idea, will give you a place in history as a great man, because at the end of your term you will have rendered no great and lasting service that will lift you above the average of our Presidents, and you have ignored the great issue which is slowly coming to the front, the question of economic democracy, abolition of privilege, and securing to men the full fruits of their labor or service.

There is no glory, because there is little service, in standing as you have for the principles of political democracy. Political democracy is a good thing and a step in evolution, but the men who will stand high in history for services rendered to political democracy are those who rendered their services when it was dangerous to do so. Our fathers who established this Republic, as Franklin said, had to hang together or they would hang separately. In those days to stand for political democracy or any substantial application of it, was at the risk of life. To stand for political democracy in these days is like standing for the Ten Commandments,—it is a worthy thing to do, but there is nothing heroic or great about it.

No serious attempt is made to remove the existing ob-

stacles to political democracy in this country; viz., the two legislative chambers of state and national government, the state and national constitutions, and the power of courts to set aside laws, which on all important matters prevent or delay the majority from writing their will into law, and give us therefore most of the time a government by the minority. A conspicuous example of this fact is the recent decision by the Supreme Court (by a vote of 5 to 4) declaring unconstitutional the Act of Congress forbidding that relic of barbarism, the employment of little children in mills. If there is any wickeder practice prevailing in any state, civilized or barbaric, than our practice of stunting the bodies and ruining the lives of our little children in our industrial slave pens, I do not know what it is. The ancients had a saying that when injury is done to little children, the throne of the Almighty rocks from side to side.

In the next place, it is apparent from one hundred and thirty years of the application of the principle of political democracy, that it is not the solution that our fathers fondly hoped that it would be of the problem of social inequality. They thought by abolishing the nobility and titles and hereditary privileges, that the question was solved. For nearly a century the enormous extent of our territory, which enabled us to give land free to all comers, covered up the fact that by establishing political democracy we had not rid ourselves of privilege. Industrial conditions in this country, it is now plain, are approximating the conditions of the old country, mainly because the natural resources of the country have passed into the hands of comparatively few owners. The percentage of our people who own their own farms or their own homes in villages and cities is growing smaller every decade, as evidenced by our census reports.

The poverty in our great cities has become appalling, particularly in the winter season. While the cheers of street multitudes abroad are ringing in your ears, the teachers of New York City have shocked the public by revelations of the fearful privations inflicted upon the children of the poor, and the great milk trust is exposed, as it has often been before, in its monopoly of this necessary of life.

Thousands upon thousands of the operatives in our great industries are working long hours at monotonous toil for a wage which only provides barely sufficient food, clothing and wretched shelter to keep them in working condition, which have been the essential conditions of slavery in every age of the world. In bad times the wage does not provide even this, because the employer can get new workmen when the old ones are unable to stand the conditions any longer. At the same time, wealth has piled up in the hands of a few of our people at a rate and in quantities unexampled in human history. Steadily the trusts are controlling the essential businesses of the country. They were never so strong nor so powerful. Your own Federal Trade Commission has pointed out exactly how five meat firms are not only swindling the public annually out of enormous sums, but are daily violating the law and maintaining a monopoly in food products, than which no more odious crime against humanity can be conceived. These powerful criminals go unwhipt by the law, while our courts send to prison for long terms poor, weak socialists, who have been driven to intemperate speech by the contemplation of the monstrous injustice involved in the immunity of these wealthy criminals, and other similar iniquities of our social and industrial system.

These illustrations show that there is present in our

Republic a grave and menacing problem. It is steadily pressing upon public attention, exactly as slavery did in the years between 1830 and 1860. If you fail to attempt to solve this problem, you will stand in history in my judgment exactly as the leaders of the Whig and Democratic parties stood when they turned their backs upon the rising question of slavery.

The issue of political democracy has passed. The issue is now one of industrial or economic democracy.

The League of Nations idea will not help your position, either now or in history, because, like all your other policies, it does not go to the root of the problem. Wars are caused by privilege. Every modern state is governed by the privileged, that is, by those who control industry by owning railroads, lands, mines, banks, and credit. These men thus obtain enormous and unearned capital, for which there is no use in the country where it is produced, because the poverty of the workers limits the home market. Those who control this surplus capital must seek new countries and new people to exploit, and this clash of selfish interests leads to war. The cure for war is the reign of justice, i. e., the abolition of privilege, in each of the great nations. I do not believe that you can set up machinery which will maintain justice in international relations among governments which deny justice to their own people. If the League works, it will be when and to the extent that justice is established within the countries which are parties to the League. Indeed, it is entirely possible, if not probable, that such a league established by the present governments of the Allies, if it has any real power, is very likely to be used as an international bulwark of privilege. That danger looms large after you pass off the scene. The people here cannot be aroused to an active interest in the League idea. They favor the general principle, but do not understand

the details. They believe that the dreadful wastage of the war, and the destruction of German, Austrian, Russian and Turkish autocracy, will insure peace for at least a generation, which gives ample time for building up international treaties or machinery designed to substitute arbitration for war as a method of settling international differences. Whatever form the League takes, the whole subject disappears as a pressing issue upon the ratification of the treaty of peace.

I do not criticize your going abroad to fight for the League of Nations in the peace treaty; on the contrary I heartily approve of it. Something will come out of it which will mark an advance towards permanent peace. But my point is that you ought not to neglect the bigger domestic questions. If you are going to ride the storm, you have got to be big enough to handle the whole problem.

I quote from an article in the World (January 8th) from Herbert Bayard Swope, Staff Correspondent in Paris:

"Even President Is Silent

"A curious ostrichlike policy is being maintained by most leaders of public opinion on the question of a social uprising, evidence of which is seen on all sides, but which seemingly is to be checked by the mere denial of its existence. Nor is the President himself free from the criticism of ignoring the situation. He preaches a vast political reform, and is succeeding in substantiating his words by his practice, but he is silent upon the bigger social questions, which are, after all, the taproots of world politics."

The one real, big thing in the world today is the socialist experiments in government in Russia, Austria,

and Germany. You cannot fight this idea by ignoring it, or by denouncing its advocates, or putting them in jail. Nor can we deny the socialist statement that our system of political democracy has permitted the steady development of social injustice in the form of privilege. The only way to meet this menace of socialism, if menace it is, is by offering a better program for the removal of injustice in our industrial and social relations.

This is the political situation here as I see it now. It is likely to grow worse. You have thrown on the present Democratic Congress the responsibility for finding a workable solution of the great domestic problems of the day. They will fail to work out any adequate solution, which will further impair your prestige and that of your party. In the meantime, men and women are being discharged from factories in every part of the United States, and we are in for hard times, if not for a panic. The new Republican Congress will start investigations of the acts of the different departments of the government in carrying on the war, and will show up facts which, viewed in the light of hindsight, and with the critical period of the country's danger safely passed, will look very bad, and will create a vast amount of political capital for the Republicans and in the absence of any real issue will put you and your party upon the defensive.

The new issue of six billion bonds can only be floated by virtually compelling the banks to take most of them, the effect of which will be not only a tremendous inflation, resulting in another increase in the prices of all necessaries of life, but a contraction of credit by reason of the absorption of banking funds in this loan.

I offer you a political program which will change the entire situation.

You have the capacity of mind and the opportunity to

be one of the greatest men who have yet appeared in history. In fact, my main criticism of your whole public career is that you have been devoting talents of the very highest order to second rate tasks. You should now undertake a job worthy of your great abilities. You should become the real leader of the radical forces in America, and present to the country a constructive program of fundamental reform, which shall be an alternative to the program presented by the socialists, and the Bolsheviki, and then fight for it. Such a program I have outlined in the enclosed paper, which, to get a proper perspective, I have cast in the form of a proposed address to Congress by you. My plan would be that you should go before Congress at an extra session, and present this as your solution of the industrial and social problem. That you should then at some public dinner arranged by the Democrats, present it to the country as the leader of the Democrat party, and announce that you would go into the next Democratic convention, either as a delegate from New Jersey, or asking the privilege of the floor as President, and advocate the adoption by your party of this program as the party creed. That you should thereafter, at intervals of not more than a month, seek occasions in different parts of the country in which to educate the public to this program.

This program will gather around you at once, as if by magic, the forces of intelligent and orderly radicalism who have been looking in vain to you for leadership, and are now in a state of profound discouragement. In all human probability in one year, with a dozen carefully prepared speeches delivered in different parts of this country, you could so educate the public that you could force this radical program into the platform of the Democratic party.

This program would completely turn the flank of the Republican plan of attack, and put them on the defensive. Nobody would be interested in past mistakes, while you are offering a positive plan of relief from present ills, and the Republicans have no program, and cannot formulate one. You would thus split wide open the Republican party, and if you failed to capture your party, the split of both parties upon these vital questions would be so pronounced that a new party embodying these ideas would be spontaneously brought into existence, as was the Republican party, which would have a great historic career, and would be always identified with your leadership.

If you are defeated in this attempt, you will go down with colors flying, and when the ideas triumph, as they inevitably must, your place in history, and consequently your service, would be recognized as that of a truly great man.

Two months later Tumulty followed the Record suggestion in a letter to the President, who was still in Paris. Under date of June 4, 1919, Tumulty outlined a comprehensive plan and forwarded it to Wilson as the one man "whose leadership can unite the liberal forces of the world in favor of a great program of international and domestic reconstruction." The substance of the program was contained in the accompanying letter.

As a Democrat [wrote Tumulty to Wilson] I would be disappointed to see the Republican Party regain power. That is not what depresses me so much as to see growing steadily from day to day, under our very eyes,

a movement that, if it is not checked, is bound to express itself in an attack upon everything that we hold dear. In this era of industrial and social unrest both parties are in disrepute with the average man. The country realizes that everything of a constructive character which you succeeded in obtaining was given to it most reluctantly by Congress and that Congress has ceased to be a constructive instrument. It is, therefore, your duty as the leader of the liberal forces of the world to speak the truth about the whole situation and to propose the remedy.

If you will read the outline of the suggestions I have made you will find that I propose a definite thing in the idea of a *national industrial conference composed of employers who represent big and little business and of employees, to recommend a national plan for the improvement of the relations between capital and labor.* The Republican leadership of the Senate and House will scoff at this and refuse to make you an appropriation. Whereupon you will be in a position to call a national conference upon your own initiative and draw from the pockets of patriotic individuals enough to meet the needs of this conference.

This conference could outline certain steps to be taken in order to bring about a happier relationship between capital and labor. Out of it might come a programme similar to the Whitley programme.

They might adopt a profit sharing plan. They might also adopt a plan to give labor representation in the management of business. Whatever plan would be put forth by the conference would be the subject of sharp discussion throughout the country.

My suggestion is that in the same address to Congress on these matters of reconstruction, you ask Congress to avow its faith in the principles found in the Peace

Treaty with reference to the fundamental right of labor. I think this plan will do more than anything else to save the situation which now threatens us.

The idea of this conference would be to invite industrial peace by exposing the rainbow of promise rather than intensify the cloud of hopelessness.

This conference could also consider the large questions affecting business—the question of government ownership of railroads; the question of the readjustment of the affairs of street railways and all public utility companies; the question of what is reasonable return on industrial investments. If the employee is entitled to a reasonable return, industry is also entitled to like treatment. Another question that the conference could well consider would be the control of fundamental necessities like oil, steel and coal.

A programme of this kind, if given your hearty support, may result in a realignment of parties, and a fight between the Federalist and Anti-Federalist, between the Whig and Tory, between the Democrat and Republican, between the Bull Moose and Stand Pat. Now, in my opinion, is the time to strike.

But home problems were not for Wilson just then. His eyes were in the "ends of the earth," and he was battling for his Fourteen Points and the four supplementary articles, upon the basis of which the Armistice was signed. They were a magnificent addition to his Utopia. They thrilled the world, especially the weaker nations, because they issued not from a professor offering counsel of perfection but from the most influential of rulers. At last something like absolute justice was to control world policies. Unhap-

pily the principle of open covenants openly arrived at was not lived up to from the start of the Versailles Conference. Self-determination received a fatal blow from the Shantung episode. The man who refused to surround himself with a coalition Cabinet of great men was meeting quite his equals in the figures of Clemenceau and Lloyd George—the latter having urged Wilson to come to Europe, knowing that if he could be got to confer in person, trading would be sure to ensue. Wilson traded many things in order to keep his League of Nations intact. But the trading ceased as soon as he returned to the old environment of Washington. It was not in the nature of Wilson to do other than devote himself exclusively to the defense of his peace treaty on his return from Paris in early July. In that great task he broke down, giving to the fight the best that was in him, including his life.

CHAPTER XXIX

PARTY DISASTER

WILSON'S obsession for his own exclusive brand of an international conscience, and his failure to follow through with a definite post-war domestic program, mired the Democracy. He had gone far politically but had wrecked the party. Lloyd George has said that the countries "with the best politicians" won the war, and that Germany was run by "third-rate politicians" who did not know how to address themselves to the heart of the nation. The judgments of history may agree with that view. After all, the judgments of history are only the judgments of human beings, who differ about the past as they differ about the present. Wilson, like Lincoln, was in many respects one of the best politicians of his time. But he was a Wilson politician, who felt that he had great capacity to read the minds of his fellows, and to understand and anticipate the popular drift, just as he knew he had great powers to sway and manipulate masses of men. His was not party leadership but party dictatorship. When he got ready he made a complete reversal of policy, without any thought of its effect on the party's fortunes. It was only when partizanship served his

own idea of things, or when his disgust had been aroused by the opposition, that he became a "fierce partizan." Speaker Tom Reed once remarked that a statesman is a politician who is dead, which seems to be about as good a discrimination as any between the statesman and the politician.

Wilson believed that he had kept the war on the plane of loftiest statesmanship and idealism. On his first trip back from Paris, he declared at Boston on February 24, 1919, "I have uttered as the objects of this war ideals, and nothing but ideals, and the war has been won by that inspiration." But so intense was his hatred for Senator Lodge that any suggested reservation to the peace treaty, no matter how trivial, was frowned upon. Not to accept everything that Wilson wanted "would break the heart of the world." Among his peace mission experts, however, some of the best minds regarded the Lodge reservations as of a minor character, leaving the structure of the League of Nations intact and not interfering with its successful operation. Many Democratic senators stood ready to vote for the Lodge amendments.

Party chieftains, plainly worried at the disintegrating Democracy, hopefully awaited some word from the White House sick-chamber that might permit a ratification of the treaty with such Senate reservations as would be acceptable to the country. Vast armies of uneasy Americans, with the blood of many lands in their veins, looked askance at further en-

tangling European alliances, in view of the age-old rivalries about frontiers and balances of powers, and the internal intrigues, that had kept alive fears of national insecurity and produced so many wars.

But Wilson would not heed the rumblings. The confusion of his great emotions, his iron will, his human ambitions, and his historical studies produced a strange complex that frequently found righteousness at war with itself. When he got into a fight, nothing was relevant but the fighting; the serene judgment of balanced understanding was impossible. With the coming of increased power, he had walled himself in and completely departed from the old practice of common counsel. He was utterly deficient in gregarious instinct. "I rarely consult anybody," he said in an interview with Ida Tarbell published in "Collier's" on October 28, 1916. Thus isolated, he found it easy to convince himself that he had devised the correct pattern for human behavior, and that those who differed with him were "blind and ignorant." He had no patience with that part of the historical record that would seem to show that any progress that humanity has made through the ages has been painful and slow, and that progress of any permanent kind never comes at a gallop. No other leadership than his was permitted during his eight years in the White House. He had early made it plain that he was to do the guiding. On the night of October 3, 1913, when he signed the Simmons-Underwood Tariff Law, which he had forced through Congress, he had

exultantly declared, "I have had the accomplishment of something like this at heart ever since I was a boy," and frankly quoted, as fitting his own situation, the lines of Shakspere's Henry V, "If it be a sin to covet honour, I am the most offending soul alive."

Surpassing all other honors he had ever coveted was that of setting up the glorious kind of world that was to come with his League of Nations. And so, to the consternation of the leaders of Democracy, gathered for their annual Jackson day dinner at Washington, January 8, 1920, he sent a letter proposing as "the clear and single way out" that the League issue should be submitted to the people "to give the next election the form of a great and solemn referendum." It was a staggering blow to the party, already in the dumps from the discontent and mistakes that had followed the autocratic handling of the war, as well as the unrest provoked by the prohibition amendment, adopted during the war-time. Bryan boldly opposed the Wilson position, telling the Jackson day diners that "the importance of Article X has been very much magnified" and urging that the treaty be ratified with such reservations as the Senate might accept. Article X was Wilson's personal contribution to the League of Nations Covenant, and he firmly held to the position that it was "the heart of the Covenant." There was a widespread feeling that Article X took the issue of war or peace out of the hands of Congress, where the Constitution had placed it, and vested it in the hands

of the League, thus giving foreign powers, under certain conditions, the right to say when America should intervene. Bryan, in his Jackson day speech, boldly opposed the Wilson view by declaring:

> No person in the country has dared to say that Congress should have taken from it the right to declare war; and the Democratic party can never afford to go before the country on that issue. And if I know the American people, they will never transfer to any foreign nation the right to send our boys to war.

Bryan's stand against Wilson's pet policy was too marked to leave any doubt that politically the two men were definitely apart. In public addresses and statements Bryan continued his course of criticism, although frequently praising Wilson as a man. He openly objected to the President's effort to have the United States become mandatory for Armenia. In one statement he said:

> Broken down in health by the weight of cares and anxieties such as have fallen to no other occupant of that high office, the Chief Executive has been denied the information essential to sound judgment and safe leadership.

The differences between Wilson and Bryan over the covenant became an issue in the primaries held in Nebraska to choose delegates for the Democratic National Convention of 1920. Bryan, candidate for delegate-at-large, was bitterly attacked by Senator Gilbert M. Hitchcock, chief advocate of the Versailles Treaty in the Senate. But Bryan won, and as a

delegate to the San Francisco convention offered a League of Nations plank at variance with Wilson's position. He fought for it, futilely, without emotion. He contended that the League issue should be kept out of the campaign. His chief interest was in getting the party to give unqualified indorsement to the prohibition amendment.

For his pacifist stand, Bryan had suffered ostracism during the war period, just as any one does who seeks to breast the patriotic hysteria that stirs nationalistic passions. Wilson's failure to give him any recognition in the peace negotiations, in view of the part the Nebraskan had played in the Wilson fortunes, undoubtedly rankled in Bryan's breast. "You cannot call me an enemy of Woodrow Wilson; it was my treaty plan he took to Paris," Bryan declared in one of his oratorical flights at the San Francisco convention. "I have helped him to become immortal."

On the eve of their departure for the San Francisco convention several of the leading aspirants for the Presidential nomination visited Wilson in his private apartments at the White House. None, however, was given any encouragement, and it was the common belief that Wilson confidently expected that the convention might at least tender him a renomination. When the deadlock came and there seemed a likelihood that James M. Cox of Ohio might be agreed upon as a compromise, the Associated Press carried a story that Senator Carter Glass of Virginia, who had called upon Wilson on the eve of his departure

for San Francisco, had notified certain delegates that Cox would not be acceptable to the President. Cox telephoned Tumulty at the White House, from Columbus, and the facts were laid before Wilson in a detailed letter. Tumulty got Wilson to authorize the issuance of a statement that Wilson had not expressed an opinion to any one with reference to any particular candidate. Cox, after his nomination, visited Wilson in his sick-chamber and agreed to carry on the fight for the League of Nations. Most of the practical politicians among the Democratic leaders regarded this stand as hurtful. Wilson refused to take any open part in the campaign and, despite the repeated urgings of Tumulty, persisted in his policy of silence. "No answers to Harding of any kind will proceed from the White House with my consent," Wilson wrote Tumulty late in September. Only once in the campaign did he speak out, and that was in the form of a message to the people insisting upon the League of Nations as the paramount issue of the campaign.

There was never such party disaster. Wilson's doctrine of personal government and his increasing stubbornness in ignoring the Cabinet had produced a great revulsion among the voters. He was naturally irascible and subject to fits of bad temper; in the wake of his physical breakdown had come frequent lapses of memory, and he did many strange things. Soon after the San Francisco convention he summarily demanded the resignation of Post-

master-General Burleson, who had been most loyal. But Burleson had gone to San Francisco an enthusiastic supporter for McAdoo, feeling that such support would be pleasing to the White House. It required considerable strategy to get Wilson to recall the peremptory order for Burleson's retirement. Wilson doubtless fully expected that the convention would at least tender him another nomination. He did not, however, give any of his associates a chance to know just what he was brooding over. Another in his place would have consulted others and communicated with them more than he did, would have asked the cheer of comradeship along the road which he traveled alone. Then, too, up from somewhere within, rose a jealous obstinacy which ruled him when it least ought to have done so. He could not help it; he was made like that. The Republicans, directed by the nimble Will Hays, who had unlimited financial support, flooded the country with effective propaganda about the Wilsonian efforts to involve America in European wars. There was never a political campaign more heavily laden with exaggeration. War-weary, and equally weary of the wrangling over peace, the voters swallowed the misstatements, and Cox was defeated by an electoral majority of 277 and a popular majority of more than seven millions. All of the Northern, Eastern, and Western States, two of the old solid South—Tennessee and Oklahoma—as well as all the border States save Kentucky, were overwhelmingly Republican.

Three days after the election Bryan, in an interview at Chicago, said that the largest and most influential group at the San Francisco convention "was made up of idolators—office-holding and non-office-holding —whose chief object was to glorify the President and obey all his Commandments." But what world figure has not been thus idolized? That is what fills history so full of delightful fiction. Bryan was himself surrounded with worshipers; all men who attain great place attract the incense-burners who glorify the hero in order that they may themselves appear correspondingly glorious. In his Chicago interview, Bryan made the startling suggestion that Wilson resign, on condition that his successor, Vice-President Marshall, agree to appoint the Republican President-elect, Warren G. Harding, as secretary of state, and then himself resign, thus bringing Harding at once into the Presidential office. That, argued Bryan, would be the proper spirit of accepting the result of the "great and solemn" referendum for which Wilson had asked, and permit the country to proceed to normal business. Wilson paid no attention to the suggestion or the outcome, but kept fighting on for his League. His attempts to fit the parliamentary system of Europe into the framework of American government failed in practice. In his appeal of October 25, 1918, he had asked the people to vote for Democratic Congressmen "if you have approved of my leadership and wish me to continue to be your unembarrassed spokesman in affairs at home and

abroad." It was what he called "going to the country;" and he ended by saying, "I am your servant and will accept your judgment without cavil." Instead of heeding the crushing vote against a Democratic Congress, Wilson insisted on continuing to be the unembarrassed spokesman of America and upon taking with him a peace mission whose minds "went along" with his own.

Like the other major figures in the political altruism of his era, Wilson did not follow a consistent course. Reformers always have a hard fight to survive. And politicians do not retire voluntarily. When Bryan passed the crown of leadership in 1912, he doubtless sincerely felt that his star was setting. He had been on the fighting-line for sixteen years, and he would now quit. "I come with joy to surrender into the hands of Woodrow Wilson, the one chosen by this convention, a standard which I have carried in three campaigns; I feel a relief now that the burden has been transferred to another," said Bryan in casting aside the tender of the Vice-Presidential nomination at Baltimore. Yet a dozen years later he was savagely battling against the biggest cause of the very man whose nomination he had forced. Bryan, like Roosevelt, was a great revivalist, a convincing exhorter, who swept the crowd off its feet. He did not have a particularly well ordered intellect—his were heart emotions—but he had the most fascinating platform voice of his generation. He liked to mix with the bottom of the human heap;

his mental equipment was not quite up to comfortable direct contact with highly trained minds. Roosevelt, on the other hand, was an aristocrat, a Harvard show-piece, who specialized in the back-slapping, bully-boy attitude. He had an unpleasant but useful squeak in his voice. His oratory depended upon the punch that came with spectacular preachments such as his pleas for a larger participation by the common man in the choicer things of life—age-old doctrines picturesquely clothed in the vernacular. He knew every phase of politics and played the game from every angle.

Roosevelt, who unconsciously had such a stellar rôle in putting Wilson in the White House and keeping him there, found it necessary to make frequent shifts of base. He had ushered in the new order with his verbal assaults on "malefactors of great wealth." Wilson quickened and strengthened the spirit of revolt that had come down from the Populists and Greenbackers, and been given definite shape by Bryan, La Follette, and Roosevelt. They were all great men who did great things. After Wilson had been in the White House seven months, Roosevelt, on the eve of his departure for South America, passionately assured his followers that he was dedicated to their great program of righteousness and that while life lasted he would not abandon the Progressives. "I would continue this fight even if I stood entirely alone," said Roosevelt bravely. "I will never abandon the principles to which we Progres-

sives have pledged ourselves, and I will never abandon the men and women who drew around me to battle for these principles." That was on October 3, 1913. Three years later, at Chicago, Roosevelt, bitterly hating Wilson, failed in his attempt to get his dwindling band of Progressives to swallow the eminent stand-patter, Lodge, for President. It was the Roosevelt idea that if the Progressives took Lodge, the regular Republicans would be compelled to do likewise; but the earnest Progressives insisted on naming Roosevelt himself. He declined and sought to switch his followers to the regular Republican nominee, Hughes, whose speech of acceptance was devoted to patronage and partizan things in general. Many sincere Western friends of Roosevelt, disgusted and saddened by their hero's defection, would not follow him, and while they had no particular liking for Democracy, they voted for Wilson. Thus, for a second time, Roosevelt unwittingly helped give the victory to the man for whom he had such supreme contempt.

In their political professions Roosevelt and Wilson differed little. Roosevelt's New Nationalism, which he had so solemnly promised not to abandon while life lasted, but which got no mention in the Hughes program, was to guard the ordinary man from the greed of "aggrandized wealth" and included such reforms as the eight-hour day, abolition of child-labor, mothers' pensions, minimum wage for women, trade and tariff commissions to hold capital in check

and end monopolistic practices, remodeled currency to insure against panics, direct election of senators, initiative, referendum, and recall, direct primary, and the income tax. Wilson's New Freedom took them all over, differing only from Roosevelt in the idea that the program should be made effective and worked out as far as possible by the people in the various States rather than through a centralized control at Washington.

Wilson's failure to push the New Freedom reduced the Democratic party in many of the States of the North and Northwest to the condition of the Republican party in Mississippi. His success with tariff, income tax, and currency legislation had brought him solid fame, but gradually his radicalism waned and became an empty memory, just as the Seven Sisters and other New Jersey reforms had become little more than memories. The people themselves are not radical for long periods at a time. Wilson's course no longer appealed to the political dissenters, whose votes are necessary to success for the Democracy. He had no domestic program, no popular appeal such as might have come from a modification of the Record and Tumulty suggestions, outlined in their letters sent to him at Paris. It is never an easy task to hold the Democracy together as a cohesive national party. It functions best as a party of protest. Aside from Wilson, Cleveland alone had carried the party into the White House, and his victories, like those of Wilson, had been accelerated by

Republican blundering. Burchard's fatal Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion outburst had given Cleveland the first election by a close shave, and the impotency of the Harrison reign produced such utter disgust among Republicans that eight years later they defeated Harrison for reëlection, sending Cleveland back to Washington a second term.

Bryan's prohibition crusade brought a new problem for the Democracy. The hostile attitude of the industrial South on child-labor and other social policies is suggestive enough of the impossibility of unifying the party. Then, too, there is the sectarian clash—the strong Catholic element in the large cities, and the strongly anti-Catholic sentiment in the South and in parts of the West, each violently suspicious of the other and ready to "do battle for the Lord" and capture the good jobs. There is nothing the militant Christian voter so readily swallows as a moral issue, and, from the beginning, professional politicians have been able to convert religious quibbles into great—and sometimes savage—moral issues.

Bryan was an intense prohibitionist. He professed to believe that the only way to stop sin at its source was through the abolition of alcoholic stimulants. When he was secretary of state, he gave the world a joyous chuckle by serving unfermented grape-juice to thirsty diplomats. The Miracle of the Wedding Feast was like that; the Great Master had turned water into the choicest wine, but strictly unfermented. To a vast army what Bryan said

about Holy Writ was final; interpreting and defending the Bible was always paramount among his paramount issues. Wilson, enjoying good wine and whisky in moderation, despised prohibition, and Vice-President Marshall once publicly declared that "no man calling himself a Democrat could be a prohibitionist." But the stupid avarice of the liquor purveyors had made the corner saloon a stench in the nostrils of all decent folks. What had been the comfortable and congenial gathering-place of the workingman had largely degenerated into the brothel of the mercenaries. Industrial magnates gladly joined in the hue and cry of the honest prohibition fanatics and loftily financed the Anti-Saloon League on the solid ground that existing conditions were making labor inefficient. The fact that the old-fashioned saloon had been the only common rendezvous of labor, where inequalities and grievances were aired and out of which had chiefly come the early organized efforts to improve working conditions, was entirely obscured. So, too, was the fact that by keeping the electorate agitated and excited over prohibition the forward-looking programs of Roosevelt's New Nationalism and Wilson's New Freedom would be successfully side-tracked for another generation.

After the repudiation of the Democrats and the League of Nations, Wilson on March 4, 1921, took up his residence in a luxurious home on S Street, in the northwest section of Washington, where he quietly resided for his three remaining years. He had

been in public life exactly ten years, the shortest public career of any President. Every other occupant of the White House had put in a long period of hard training, either in political jobs or the army; none had ever made the quick spectacular rise of Wilson.

CHAPTER XXX

LAST TALKS WITH WILSON

TO the zero hour Wilson regarded himself as the spiritual leader of a cause only temporarily lost. Despite his shattered health, he never completely abandoned the hope that he might again become the standard-bearer of his party. Being human he loved the glory and the power of the White House. In no circumstances would he permit his intimates to commit him to any other candidacy. And he confidently expected to dictate the paramount issues in the 1924 Presidential campaign, which explains much of the nervous anxiety that existed, until Wilson's death, among Democratic candidates and chieftains, particularly those practical folks who felt that the debacle of 1920 had provided a decent burial for the League of Nations.

It was my privilege to spend the afternoons of October 23 and December 7 of 1923—he died February 3, 1924—with Wilson at his Washington home. On the occasion of these visits he made clear his belief that the liberals of the world were looking to him to lead them. Whatever historians may do, there can never be a doubt of his own intense conviction that his place was to fight what he was fond

of terming the spiritual battles of humanity and democracy. It was a passion with him. At the instance of Judge Charles F. Lynch of the federal bench, I had earlier suggested that in view of his physical breakdown he might find an easy way to emerge from his retirement and give effectual voice to his ideas by standing for the United States Senate from New Jersey—not a particularly new thought.[1]

We talked the senatorial situation over from all angles: the fact that Governor Silzer did not want to run; the possibility that the independent newspapers and state forces that had put over Wilson's first political program, and stood by him in his later fights, would line up again; the chance that even the solidly intrenched party machine would accept him. Senator Frelinghuysen, piqued at his own defeat at the polls the previous year, had opened up a savage attack on his old Republican colleague, Senator Edge, whom he was seeking to destroy, regardless of the effect on the Republican party. The factional split promised well for the chance of electing a Democratic senator. There had frequently been public discussion of having men who had served as President occupy places in the United States Senate so that the country might have full benefit of their ripe judgment. Wilson had determined to make Washington his permanent home and had acquired

[1] After his retirement from the Presidency, John Quincy Adams was elected to Congress, where for seventeen years he attracted attention and distinction by his fight against the slaveholders.

the handsome S Street residence. The idea at first struck his fancy, and at our meeting on October 23 he asked me to go to New York and canvass the ground with Norman Davis and Bernard M. Baruch, who, he said, "are my present political advisers."

But while appearing ready to consider the Senate as a remotely possible outlet for leadership, his thoughts seemed plainly elsewhere. He was bitter in his expressions of contempt for the Senate itself, and at one point he said, with a flash of the old-time vigor, "There is only one place, you know, where I could be sure of effectively asserting that leadership." That was the nearest I ever heard him come to a declaration of candidacy, but, as was the case in 1920, his intimates knew that he had not given up all hope that the 1924 convention might at least tender him a nomination. It is always difficult for men who have attained great place to retire voluntarily. As Bacon put it, they are "impatient of privateness even in age and sickness, which requires a shadow." During our conversation Wilson repeatedly emphasized his determination to prevent any temporizing with his League policies. The 1924 Democratic candidate, he declared, would not be agreed upon until the national convention was two or three days old; meanwhile he expected to lay before the delegates a program of principles that would bring vindication at the polls. There was to be no backing down. He was full of hope about giving his views to the world. It was impossible to pin him down to writing any-

thing, however. Frequently he spoke of finding a way of assisting liberal thought, but aside from a remarkable radio speech in November, he did nothing.

Upon leaving the S Street home in the afternoon of October 23, I promptly put into written form the substance of what the former President had said. He had been exceedingly generous in his expressions of friendship and declared that he was baring his soul.

"I am going to try and look at myself as though I did not exist," he said, "to just consider the whole thing in an impersonal way. From the messages I get I realize that I am everywhere regarded as the foremost leader of the liberal thought of the world, and the hopes and aspirations of that liberal thought should find some better place of expression than in the Senate. There is only one place, you know, where I could be sure of effectively asserting that leadership. Outside of the United States, the Senate does not amount to a damn. And inside the United States the Senate is mostly despised; they have n't had a thought down there in fifty years. You know and I know that I have a temper, and if I was to go to the Senate, I would get into a row with that old Lodge, who no longer counts for anything. The Senate would hardly provide the place for liberal leadership that the world is seeking so sadly. Think of the people of Poland and of Czechoslovakia and the other countries whose freedom we gave them—they know that they owe their very national existence

to me, and they are looking to me to lead them! When I think of that fine old fellow, Jan Smuts, for whom I have the greatest affection, and the others of liberal tendencies who are looking to me, I feel that I should do my part. My present political advisers are Bernard Baruch and Norman Davis, and I am going to ask you to see them in New York and talk the situation over and get the benefit of their views. Try and see them together. Perhaps we can yet find some way out."

We talked of many other things. When I entered the library he was seated in a big chair by the fireside. He was most cordial in his words of welcome, but remarked sadly, "I 'm helpless, Kerney; this left side is gone." By him stood the ever-faithful Edith Bolling Galt Wilson, mistress of the home, whose life and activities for four years had been devoted to the incurable invalid. After the exchange of greetings, Mrs. Wilson retired, and I took a seat beside the crushed form. Bruised and faded, he was still clinging to his rainbow. There would be flashes of hope that the vision of freeing mankind from storms and sorrows would yet come true, then sad periods of dejection. The hair was thin and white; the jaw drooped. He mostly looked straight ahead, not directly at you. A twisted half-smile occasionally softened lines carved deep by struggle and suffering; the pallor of long confinement was on the cheek. Gone was the upstanding figure that a dozen years earlier had so blithely and confidently met Smith,

Nugent, and me in the lovely old mansion at Princeton. Gone, too, was the simplicity of those happier times. The spacious rooms and formal furnishings of the S Street house were in marked contrast with the cozy atmosphere of the Princeton home. His spirit appeared to be badly shot that October day. The morning newspapers had printed official denials of one of those periodic news-ticker rumors of his death. I think the visit of David Lloyd George on the previous afternoon had been a bit of a disappointment, too. According to the former President, about all that Lloyd George appeared to want to hear was a repetition of some of the limericks with which Wilson had regaled the European statesmen at Paris and Versailles.

We shifted the conversation to old times in New Jersey, and his mood mellowed a bit. He smiled at the news that Nugent had again captured the Essex County Democratic organization. "Nugent is a strange fellow, and while we had some powerful disagreements I always had a sneaking feeling of regard for him," Wilson declared. He seemed tired of the credulous reformers and their endless demands that he fritter away his prestige by tying himself to the hopes, ambitions, or quarrels of politicians, content and malcontent, in the several States. Nugent, in the later years, had come to regard the Wilson leadership of the party as providential, although disagreeing with what he termed the surrender on woman-suffrage and other advanced ideas. It was the Nu-

gent organization in Essex County that gave Wilson his best latter-day support in New Jersey, and Wilson was pleased at the thought that the old politician, who in 1910 had forced his nomination for governor, had been big enough to forget the crushing blows of the intervening years.

Wilson was likewise keenly interested in the fights that George Silzer as governor had been making in New Jersey, notably the battle that had been waged to build good roads without any taint of graft. "Silzer is splendidly equipped for public service; he has vision and courage, and those veto messages of last winter were models," he added. When the time came for his afternoon automobile ride, I took my leave, assuring him that I would go to New York at an early date and talk over the senatorship, as well as the situation in general, with Baruch and Davis. "I hope God will bless you and your family with good health and every happiness," he said as we shook hands in parting.

During the thirteen years since Wilson had come conspicuously into public life, I had, from a friendly seat on the side-lines, been given an occasional glimpse of most of his confidential advisers. I doubt if any of them ever had his complete confidence; it was not the Wilson way. Not that there was no affectionate warmth for those with whom he came into personal relationship, but it was temporary, and not the old-fashioned continuing affection. As Wilson said of Lincoln, "That brooding spirit had no real famil-

Underwood & Underwood

WOODROW WILSON

At the door of his Washington residence, Armistice day, 1923.

iars." At Princeton he had been both the best loved and best hated member of the faculty. In his public career it was the same. By nature Wilson was a lonely man, a dreamer with the type of intellect that found it difficult to tolerate ordinary mortals. His supreme self-confidence was perhaps his biggest handicap, as well as his most outstanding virtue. His habit was to rely upon his own dominating personality and power of persuasion to put things across. It was his lack of flexibility, of accommodation of mind, that led to much of the bitterness and disappointment that came to him in life.

Few, if any, public men thrown into intimate association with Wilson made the whole political distance with him. Harvey, Watterson, Smith, Nugent, McCombs, Garrison, Bryan, House, Lansing, all fell by the wayside. Tumulty, worshipful secretary seeing no blemish in his idol, retained the favor longest and, aside from one or two old university friends like Cleveland Dodge, Henry B. Fine, and Stockton Axson, was the best loved. Tumulty, the playboy, reveling in the dramatics of it all, had given a dozen years of practical political experience, unstinted devotion, and joyous laughter to the great mind that so often found itself impatiently battling with a world that would not see freedom the Wilson way. He provided the human touch that Wilson lacked. But the Tumulty book, "Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him," furnished a powerful weapon for the enemies of Tumulty. Political

truths are often uncomfortable. That is why the pen of romance is so much safer than the mirror of reality. Notwithstanding semiofficial reports that Wilson had never read the book, he appeared to be well informed about it, and this, coupled with the seemingly harmless, if unauthorized, message of felicitation that Tumulty carried to a testimonial dinner to Governor Cox in New York, April 8, 1922, completely barred all further personal contact. Friends vainly tried to patch up the break. The thought that the complimentary message might be regarded throughout the country as an indorsement of Cox was too much for Wilson. He was not for Cox and was very definitely not ready even to appear to be committing himself to any of the candidates for the Presidency, although he frankly told me that "Cox was a very brave man to take up the League of Nations fight in 1920." He likewise wrote Cox a letter of gratitude for having stood out boldly for the League idea when the whole country was so hostile.

Despite the unhappy estrangement, Wilson never lost his admiration for Tumulty's public experience and service. A few days after he had asked me to go to New York and talk with Baruch and Davis about the wisdom of his considering the Senate possibility, I received a letter dated October 30, 1923, suggesting Tumulty for the senatorship as a man "whose political training has been more varied than that of any other man I know," and one who "would make some of the reactionary Senators sit up and

take notice of the arrival of modern times and circumstances." Tumulty, Wilson declared, had proved himself a redoubtable debater when he was in the New Jersey Legislature, and he declared he felt it to be a duty to suggest him for the senatorship. Wilson likewise suggested Winthrop M. Daniels, who, he declared, had won the reputation of being by far the ablest member of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and who would make, in the judgment of Wilson, a most serviceable member of the Senate.

November 1, 1923, the day after my receipt of the letter I have just mentioned, Baruch took me to the home of Davis in New York, where we spent several hours discussing the whole situation. The feeling of both men was that the former President would be merely hurrying his death by becoming a candidate for any office. That had been my own feeling, as I walked down town from the Wilson home in Washington. The suggestion of the names of Tumulty and Daniels was, of course, not practical. Neither had lived in New Jersey for a decade.

When I went back to see Wilson on December 7, he was in better spirits. His eyes was bright, his mind fairly flashed with sharp things, and he had some of the snap that characterized the earlier days at Trenton and Washington. He reclined in a big steamer-chair, wrapped comfortably in a blanket, on the upper sun-porch of his home. It was balmy as springtime in Paris, and we chatted for nearly an hour. He felt that the reception that had been given

his Armistice day radio speech showed the swing of the pendulum back in his direction; and he did not hesitate to say so. When I reminded him that there was something of an international furor over his radio reference to the "sinister climax" of France and Italy as having "made waste-paper of the Treaty of Versailles," he fired back, in a spirited voice, "I would like to see Germany clean up France, and I would like to meet Jusserand and tell him that to his face." The French tactics in the Ruhr had especially aroused his contempt, and the remark was, of course, an expression of his disgusted attitude at what he then regarded as the French bad faith, ingratitude, and avarice, in view of America's generosity in winning the war. When Marshal Foch made his triumphal tour of America in October and November, 1921, Wilson had not seen him. The former President was conveniently ill on the day that Foch visited the S Street home in Washington, although he had been motoring the previous day, and was able to be at Arlington for the burial of the Unknown Soldier a few days later. At Paris Foch had talked so much of force methods and had been such a persistent advocate of war machinery for France that Wilson had come to regard him as an excitable militarist, whose sole philosophy was, in Foch's own favorite war-time phrase, "to kill the boche."

Wilson was plainly disgusted with the French politicians when he talked with me in December. None among them, he said, save Louis Loucheur,

had told him the truth. Stanley Baldwin's recent defeat was a good thing not only for England but for its effect on Poincaré, "who is a bully," he added. Wilson was thoroughly displeased with President Raymond Poincaré, who had played such a mischievous part in bringing on the war.

The death of Bonar Law had saddened Wilson very much. He felt just then that the topsyturvy world was never so hard driven for wise statesmen; statesmen not devoted to self or nation but to mankind. While he was disappointed at the tricky manipulations of the French politicians, he was not unmindful of the shrewd moves that had been made by British diplomacy, during Harding's new benediction, to win the favor of America at the expense of France. Throughout his political career Wilson had conflicting emotions about British methods: at times he appeared to be as strongly pro-British as Page; at other times he was quite vehement in his denunciation of British intrigue. England, with its talent for high politics, with the cleverest diplomats never sleeping on the job, was shrewdly manœuvering America out of the chance of being the strongest power in the world. But Wilson appeared to feel that somehow and in some way his own scheme for saving civilization would yet prevail and America would get proper recognition. Despite the increasing and costly military preparations in Europe, with new phosphorus bombs and other "improved" methods of diabolical human destruction that had been developed out of

the World War to end wars, Wilson continued to believe in the magic of his own world formula. But he had no faith in the existing Republican régime.

"His master's voice has spoken," was his breezy comment on President Coolidge's message to Congress of the previous day. The message did not breathe one human hope, he said, but it would insure the renomination of Coolidge by the business crowd. The American farmer was not going to be cheated again on the European question; the farmer, he felt, was now fully aware that our unsettled foreign relations were playing havoc with business at home.

Of the Administration's World Court idea, he said, "They don't know where they 're drifting; Hughes is at sea, and they have no program." The Republican stupidity, he declared, would give the Democrats their great chance, and he meant to see to it that there was no surrender to "the pocketbook brigade." He was much disappointed at the enthusiastic way so many leading Democrats appeared to be abandoning liberal principles and ideals in what he termed their anxiety to get their income taxes reduced. "Wealth has its place," he said, "but it should not be the master; it should be made to serve the same as the rest of us." And he proceeded to express his complete disgust at the public indifference toward the low moral standards that were being uncovered in the Government. He always despised the traffic in prestige by those who had won the great prizes of governmental office; happily for him he

passed on before learning that the oil revelations had involved members of his own official household. There is no secret about the resentment he felt at the officials of his administration who resigned before their time was out in order to earn big fees. While their conduct might be within the law, he was strongly opposed to it on ethical grounds. He would not yield even to the pressure of those who felt he might with propriety accept some adequate compensation for his writings, as Roosevelt had done. His prestige was not for sale in any market.

It was an impossible task to pin him down to writing for publication. He did virtually none of it after he got into official life. There was a great deal of discussion between us, on that last December afternoon, regarding the method by which he was going to win adoption for his program for political regeneration, but he reached no decision. When I suggested that it would be desirable for him to draft an article for some friendly magazine, to be followed by others that might be broadcasted through one of the newspaper syndicates, he replied: "The kind of writing you suggest for me is the particular kind in which I have had no practice, and the kind least suited to what I believe to be my best literary method. I shall have to find—and no doubt I shall find—other means of assisting liberal thought."

"That was a very handsome thing, governor, that you said about Tumulty in your letter," I told Wilson.

"It's the way I felt; Tumulty would make them all sit up and take notice; he could render the country fine service in the Senate," was the Wilson reply.

But there was no opening that might encourage hope for a reconciliation. About Wilson there was an air of tragic loneliness. He was clearly missing the human touch that Tumulty provided. But, as was the Wilson custom, once having broken with a friend, there was no further personal contact. The hard vein would not permit any relenting. "Do you think President Harding died of overwork?" he inquired at one turn in the conversation, and there was an approving nod of the Wilson head when I suggested that Presidents were "more apt to die of over-fretting."

We talked of other days in New Jersey, and he repeated his oft-expressed belief that any one who could not learn all the tricks of the political game in short order in New Jersey had better seek some other field of activity. He was much interested in a recent speech that I had heard Alexander Meiklejohn, former president of Amherst, deliver at the Nassau Club at Princeton, in which the faculty got some refreshingly frank views on the relationship of alumni and trustees to educators. Meiklejohn's advanced theories had brought a new president to Amherst. Wilson told me that Meiklejohn had recently come to see him and had talked over his hope of starting a genuinely independent and liberal college in America.

"Why start a new one? Why not buy up one of

the old ones? They 're all for sale; Princeton was sold two or three times under my nose," was his reply to the Meiklejohn suggestion, as Wilson related it to me. "There are many splendid fellows in the Princeton faculty, but they are allowed no freedom of thought," Wilson continued, a tone of bitter sadness in his voice. And he added, "Candidly, Kerney, if I had a son, I would n't know where to send him for a liberal education in America; Princeton is exactly what they say of it, a fine country club, where many of the alumni make snobs of their boys."

Tumulty, full of the poetic, was fond of memorizing or clipping from newspapers heroic verses that he regarded as fitting the great picture. Wilson liked this sort of adoration and quoted to friends, on occasion, Kipling's "If." He carried a newspaper clipping, containing the poem, in his well worn wallet, and, after a strenuous combat in the early days, took delight in quoting the lines:

> If you can meet with triumph and disaster
> And treat those two impostors just the same.

Limericks, however, were always the favorites. Before I retired, on that last visit, Wilson recited a dozen or more jingles. This limerick of his own, which he had recently put together to amuse—or perhaps shock—a rather prim woman friend, he repeated with considerable glee:

> "There was a young girl from Missouri
> Who took her case to the jury.

She said, "Car Ninety-three
Ran over my knee."
But the jury said, "We 're from Missouri."

And he got a lot of fun out of repeating the revised version of the old Boston quatrain, "Where the Lowells talk only to Cabots, and the Cabots talk only to God."

"You recall," he said, "how that Jewish family of Kabotchiks tried to change the name to Cabot, and how the Cabots went to court seeking an injunction, and so the limerick had to be made over?" And then, with a merry twinkle, he repeated the revision, which substituted the Lodges for the Lowells:

I come from good old Boston,
The home of the bean and the cod,
Where the Lodges can't speak to the Cabots
'Cause the Cabots speak Yiddish, begod.

"I am full of limericks this afternoon," he declared with a smile, and he proceeded to quote the answer that Dean Fred S. Jones of Yale used in felicitating the Rev. Samuel C. Bushnell, whose version, recited at a Yale alumni dinner in Waterbury in 1915, had started the Cabot-Lowell rime on the road to fame:

Here 's to the town of New Haven,
The Home of the truth and the light,
Where God talks to Jones
In the very same tones
That he uses with Hadley and Dwight.

There was some yarning, and with considerable glee he repeated a couple of Alice Roosevelt's best stories about President Coolidge and General Sawyer. When I arose to go, he cordially urged me to "come back soon." It was my good fortune to have enjoyed a most happy relationship with him from the beginning. His letters always had a great charm of expression. Under date of January 13, 1922, he was generous enough to say to me, "You and I have been within sight of each other for so long that we can be sure of the genuineness of our comradeship."

Wilson never had a chance to put into concrete form the great dreams he was dreaming in his closing months and which he had discussed with me a few weeks before the end came. He passed off, still hungering not only for the leadership of his own party but for the leadership of the liberal thought of the world. He could not temper his demands and permit a consolidation of the gains already made so as to prevent an immediate lapse into the crooked diplomacy that brought on the war. He was bent on saving the whole world, and at once. Thoroughly disgusted with the trading that had been forced on him by Clemenceau and Lloyd George at Paris, he would not concede anything to the Senate. The solution of the practical after-war problems could wait until he had consummated his brand of world peace. It was the Wilson way. A Democratic senator, Shields of Tennessee, who refused to stay on the Wilson reservation was branded as "one of

the least trustworthy of my professed supporters"; and Senator Underwood, who had come in for the highest praise in the early Washington days because of his expert knowledge and assistance in framing and passing the tariff measure, was also an outcast. "If Underwood is a Democrat, then I am a Republican," was the Wilson verdict.

House and Tumulty must necessarily occupy much space in any accurate picture of the Wilson political adventure. In their methods of approach they were a strange contrast. Until the break at Paris, House looked all the cabinet candidates over before they were commissioned. He moved about softly. He might have had any cabinet place save that of secretary of state, which was early set aside for Bryan in return for the part played by the Commoner in naming Wilson at Baltimore. House delighted in secluded conferences with the great. For a long period his estimates of men and things went far with the President.

Tumulty was an ardent progressive, clean and wholesome. On occasion he was fond of going to the mat with Wilson, whom he never ceased to idolize. In return Wilson regarded him with such admiring affection as he was capable of, forgiving whimsical missteps until the final irritation over the telegram of felicitation to the Cox dinner in New York.

Breaking with intimates appeared inevitable with Wilson. His temper was difficult to keep in check,

and he forgot the feelings of others when he had his own purpose to serve. Yet, with his body shattered, Wilson, a few weeks before the end, had written me that he felt it a duty to suggest Tumulty for United States senator from New Jersey. He doubtless had the same sense of deep obligation for the cast-off House. These ruptures came when Wilson was in mental anguish and bordering on his last great affliction; he had become a mere shell of the hardy physical structure that had stood the strain through so many eventful years. Of all the insiders, no other ever reached the point of intimacy held by House and Tumulty, and of course no other so long had such close association with Wilson.

As a sick man, Wilson became a sincere object of friendly interest among the people of Washington, and he thoroughly enjoyed the adulation accorded him while motoring over the highways. The applause that invariably greeted his Saturday night visits to the theater, as well as when his pictures were thrown on the screen, added much to his happiness. He got a thrill out of the rollicking performances of knock-about comedians and never tired of the moving pictures. He had never mingled much in the White House days, being suspicious of social attentions. He would not accept honorary membership in the Metropolitan Club or the Chevy Chase Golf Club; he had no free-and-easy Bohemian friends such as were wont to gather at the popular Archie Butt's rendezvous in the Roosevelt days. There were no

gossiping substations in the Wilson régime. Until his second marriage, he rarely boarded the *Mayflower,* the luxurious yacht maintained for Presidential use.

"We live in our visions," Wilson truly said of himself. Frequently he quoted a couplet from the elaborate epitaph that has brought fame to the monument of James Louis Petigru at Charleston. In these lines he saw the ideal statesman-philosopher:

Unawed by opinion, unseduced by flattery, undismayed by disaster,
He confronted life with antique Courage, and Death with Christian hope.

But his own experiences with mankind and with life had shown how unattainable is that form of human perfection, in politics as elsewhere. With his single-track mind and his powerful temper, he had faults in common with the rest of men. He passed away at a time when the world was still racked by the bitter personalities that the World War had aroused. The verdict of history, at which he so diligently aimed, will not be hurried.

INDEX

Abbett, Governor Leon, 16, 20
Ackerman, Ernest R., 140, 141
Adams, John Quincy, 29, 467
Adamson Law, 384
Aguinaldo, 268
Alexander, Mrs. Caroline Stevens, 91
Alexander, Harry E., 93, 158, 162
Alexander, Joshua W., 299
American-Irish Historical Society, 152
Anti-Saloon League, 185 f., 464
Anti-trust laws, 258 f
Arabic, 401
Aristotle, i
Arlington Cemetery, 280, 355, 476
Asbury Park, 371, 379
Associated Press, 348, 392, 417, 455
"Atlantic City Review," 157
"Atlantic Monthly," 131, 218-9, 283
Austria-Hungary, 386, 391
Axson, Stockton, 277, 473
Bacon, Charles Reade, 132
Bacon, Sir Francis, 43, 468
Bacon, Robert, 382
Baird, David, 74, 92
Baker, Newton D., 153, 306, 398, 399, 403-4, 414, 417, 435
Baldwin, Stanley, 477
Balfour, Lord, 392
Ballinger, Richard A., 284
Baltimore Convention, 178, 207, 217, 220 f., 288
"Baltimore Evening Sun," 220, 431
Barnes, Harry Elmer, 63
Barnes, William, 32
Baruch, Bernard M., 396, 468, 470, 472, 474, 475
Bashford, Bishop J. W., 288 f
Beck, James M., 410.
Belgium, 314, 349, 350
Belmont, August, 24, 225, 226
Bermuda, 32, 251
Bigelow, Herbert S., 363
Birch, James H., 314
Birch, Thomas H., 163, 313-5
Blauvelt, James G., 116
Blockade, British, 383
Bones, Helen Woodrow, 368
Bourne, Jonathan, Jr., 98, 102 F., 135, 141f
Boyd, Colonel Carl, 423
Bradley, William J., 110
Brainard, Clinton T., 127
Brandeis, Louis D., 106, 246-7, 284-6
Brennan, George, 228
Bridges, Robert, 14, 238
Briggs, Frank O., 67, 70, 191, 194
British, 362, 382, 384, 392, 398, 477

"Brooklyn Daily Eagle," 28
Bryan, Charles W., 225, 356
Bryan, George, 40 f., 211
Bryan, John Stewart, 208, 211, 214
Bryan, William Jennings, iv, 15, 34, 35, 98, 99, 131, 162 f., 211, 217 f., 221 f., 234, 236, 246, 247, 263, 265, 286 f., 294, 314, 317 f., 322, 353 f., 360, 369, 372, 373, 374, 375 f., 453 f., 458, 459, 460, 463-4, 473
Bryce, James, 66, 387
Burke, Edmund, 365
Burleson, Albert S., 266, 295, 296, 456-7
Burlington, 163
Burton, Sir Pomeroy, 417 f
Bushnell, Samuel C., 482
Butler, Sir Geoffrey, 248
Cabinet, members of, 262 f., 283 f., 396, 397
California, 216, 384-5
Camden, 58, 73
Campaign of 1910, 64 f
Campaign of 1912, 220 f.
Campaign of 1916, 372 f
Campbell, John A., 279-80
Camp Dix, 404
Cannon, Speaker Joseph G., 61
Capps, Professor Edward, 311
Carnegie Foundation, Wilson's application to, 178 f
Caruso, 240
Catholics, 90, 120, 290-1, 320, 327, 463
"Century Magazine," 408
Chaix, Paul, 424
Chamberlain, George E., 400
Chatuauqua, 290
Chiva, 288-9, 292, 313
Choate, Joseph H., 41, 392-3, 409
Clark, Champ, 155, 166, 184, 195, 214, 219, 221, 223, 225 f., 231, 287, 294, 310
Clemenceau, Georges, 406, 414, 418, 421-2, 424, 427, 449
Cleveland, Grover, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 22 f., 35, 88, 89, 171, 181, 236, 276, 284, 344, 356, 364, 462
Cleveland, Ohio, 306
Colby, Bainbridge, 374, 383-4, 435-6
Colby, Everett, 95
Collector of the Port of New York, struggle over appointment, 319 f
"Collier's Weekly," 452
Commission government, 111, 322
"Commoner," 132, 289, 290
Congressional elections, 1914, 326 f
Conklin, Professor E. G., 311
Conservation, 296
Coolidge, Calvin, 17, 478, 483
Cornish, N. H., 370
Cottrell, William H., 309
Cox, James M., 356, 455 f., 474
Crane, Charles R., 221, 338
Creel, George, 409

Croker, Richard, 151
Crosby, Oscar Terry, 322 f
"Current History," 390
Dabney, R. H., 208 f., 214
Dale, James F., 124
Dana, Charles A., 60
Daniels, Josephus, 173, 292 f., 296, 299, 354, 355, 371, 398
Daniels, Winthrop More, 115, 311, 340, 475
Davis, John W., 356
Davis, Norman, 396, 468, 470, 472, 474, 475
Davis, Robert, 28, 37-8, 56, 72, 74, 89, 255
Davison, Henry P., 394-5
Dear, Joseph A., 94, 100
Dear, Walter, 94, 100
Declination of Presidential duties by Marshall, 431 f
Delaware, 260-1
Democratic defeat in 1914, 327-8; in 1920, 456 f
Democratic party, 12, 34, 45 f., 108, 122, 151, 174, 318, 347, 369, 370, 445, 451, 453, 462 f
Deserving Democreats, 291, 318
Devereux, William K., 54
Devlin, Martin P., 78, 84 f., 90-1, 93, 97, 98, 99, 136, 193, 195, 196, 248-9
Diaries of self-glorified warriors, 404-5
Dixon, Senator Joseph, 160
Dodge, Cleveland H., 132, 159-60, 238, 239, 240, 285, 473
Dosch, Arno, 111
Doubleday, Page & Co., 132
Drinker, Henry S., 199
Dullard, John P., 171
Durner, Will, 278
Edge, Walter E., 106, 129, 467
Edwards, Edward I., 123, 129, 139, 253 f., 261
Elberon, 19, 368
Election of 1912, results, 247
Election of 1916, results, 385
Elections bills in New Jersey, 106 f
Eliot, Dr. Charles W., ii, 289, 313, 333
Ely, Matthais C., 80 f., 334
Erdman, Rev. Charles R., 162-3
Essary, J. Fred, 431
Essex County, 19, 29, 56, 143, 144, 216, 254, 471
European campaign, 398, 403 f
Fall, Albert B., 434-5
Farrell, James J., 394
Federal Reserve Board, 333 f
Federal Reserve plan, 266
Fielder, James F., 110, 256 f., 270, 273
Filipino independence, 165, 268-9
Financing Wilson Presidential boom, 151, 154 f
Fine, Dean Henry B., 238, 311, 473
Flynn, Colonel, 72, 235, 274-5, 278, 281
Flynn, Thomas, 52
Foch, Marshal, 421, 422

Ford, Cornelius, 184-5
Ford, Henry Jones, 115, 311
Foreign service, Bryan's notion of, 316 f
Forster, Rudolph, 271
Fort, John Franklin, 83, 120, 196, 220, 338
Fourteen Points, 448
France after war, 476
Frelinghuysen, Joseph S., 106, 110, 129, 467
Friedman, Andrew, 151
Gallegher, Charles H., 150
Gallegher, Edward S., 240
Gallinger, Senator Jacob, 339-40
Garfield, Harry A., 238
Garfield, James A., 19
Garrison, Charles G., 195
Garrison, Lindley M., 294, 305-6, 326, 327, 351 f., 357 f., 363, 366-7, 399, 473
Gaynor, William J., 164
Georgia, 207 f
Gerard, James W., 310, 324
German-Americans, 120, 378, 380
Germans, 350, 424
Germany, 352 f., 362, 375 f., 382, 383, 387, 390 f., 450
G.H.Q. not dangerous, 422
Gibboney, Stuart, 325
Gibbons, Dr. Herbert Adams, 408-9
Gilbert, Clinton W., 130
Gilder, Richard Watson, 14, 15
Glass, Carter, 266, 297, 455
Glynn, Martin H., 290, 324, 325, 327, 372
Gouraud, General, 419
Grant, Ulysses S., 372, 415
Grayson, Dr. Cary T., 279, 304, 322, 332, 368, 369, 371
Greeley, Horace, 214
Green, Governor Robert S., 16
Gregory, Thomas W., 297, 303, 304
Grey, Lord, 362, 383, 389
Gridiron dinner, 371, 396
Griggs, John W., 58, 59, 68, 70
Grosscup, Edward E., 150, 254, 257
Hadley, Herbert S., 136
Hague, Frank, 129-30, 279
Hale, William Bayard, 131, 134, 312
Hanna, Dan R., 243
Hanna, Mark, 127, 243
Hardin, John R., 81
Harding, Warren G., 410, 412, 456, 458, 477, 480
Harmon, Justice John M., 191, 221
Harmon, Judson, 152, 166
Harper & Brothers, 14 f., 126
"Harper's Weekly," 14, 56, 126, 134, 168
Harriman, Edward H., 244
Harrison, Benjamin, 344, 463
Harrison, Francis Burton, 323
Harvey, Colonel George, ii, iv, 13, 27, 28, 32, 34, 37,

Harvey Colonel George—(Continued)
38, 43 f., 51 f., 54, 56-7, 81, 97, 131 f., 134 f., 168 f., 174 f., 177, 207, 229, 231, 293, 315 f., 326, 410, 412, 473
Havas Agency, 417
Hays, Will, 345, 457
Hearst, William Randolph, 195, 219, 320, 321, 323, 324, 412
Hebrews, 120, 155, 313
Hedges, Job, 132
Heney, Francis J., 221
Herrick, Myron T., 382
Hibben, John Grier, 12, 172, 204, 278
Higginson, Henry L., 285
Hill, David B., 20, 23
Hilles, Charles D., 270
Hitchcock, Gilbert M., 454
Hobart, Garrett A., 59
House, Colonel Edward M., 164 f., 176-7, 232 f., 242, 252, 253, 266, 286, 287, 288, 292, 293, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 303, 308, 316, 332, 338, 339, 340 342, 362, 382, 396, 428, 434, 484, 485
Houston, David F., 297, 298
Hudson County, 37, 45, 51, 56, 84, 255
"Hudson Observer," 49, 80, 334
Hudspeth, Judge Robert S., 45, 232
Hughes, Charles Evans, 103, 106, 199, 343, 374 f., 378, 379, 380, 381, 461, 478
Hughes, Senator William, 129, 185, 248-9, 293, 298, 300, 309-10, 335, 339, 343
Hurley, Edward N., 296, 394, 396
Illinois, 216, 326
Income tax amendment, 165
"Independent," 131
Iowa, 216
Jackson, Andrew, 174, 348
Jackson, Senator W. P., 380
James, Ollie, 223, 224, 279-80, 298, 373
Japan, 289, 292
Jersey City, 36, 37, 38, 65, 87, 91, 273, 305
"Jersey Journal," 94
Joffre, Marshal, 391
Johnson, Henry S., 152-3
Johnson, Hiram, 385
Johnson, Joseph, 325
Johnson, Tom, 306
Joline, Adrian, 162, 172-3, 288, 294
Jones, Dean Fred S., 482
Jones, Thomas D., 333, 340 f
Judges, pension law for, 121
Jusserand, J. J., 476
Kalisch, Samuel, 120
Katzenbach, Frank S., 37, 50, 256
Kean, John, 58, 74
Kearny, John Watts, 280
Kearny, General Phil, 280-1
Kearny, Thomas, 280
Keasbey, Lindley M., 167
Kendall, Calvin N., 121 f
Kentucky, 216

Kern, John W., 342
Kerney, James, as editor of "Trenton Times," x; visits from ex-Senator Smith, 24; meets Nugent, 36 f.; queries Richard V. Lindabury as to Wilson, 46-7; on Roosevelt, 60; has first interview with Wilson, 62 f.; helps Wilson in campaign, 64; hears Wilson challenge bossism, 71; discusses campaign with Wilson, 72-3; meets Wilson at football game, 80 f.; introduces Matthias C. Ely to Wilson, 81; learns of St. John's plan for converting Wilson, 82-3; tries to keep Martine quiet, 84 f.; helps Wilson select appointees, 116 f.; helps Tumulty handle personal side of campaign work, 146; unwittingly starts a Congressional inquiry, 159-60; conversation with Mrs. Wilson, 161-2; indorses Cornelius Ford for position, 185; helps win over Martine to support of Pitney, 193-4; urges Walker as chancellor, 196; visits Wilson at Sea Girt, 221, 228; acts as emissary in securing service for Smith from Wilson, 249-50; accompanies Wilson and Tumulty in visit to Washington, 270 f., 387; watches running of government by cable, 303; meets Harvey, 315; confers with Wilson, 320, and sees Mitchell, 321; acts for Wilson in conference with Tammany, 325 f.; letter from Wilson on death of Mrs. Wilson, 331; letter from Tumulty on same event, 332; asked to notify Record of failure to appoint him, 334; present at Wilson's first conference with newspaper men, 344; acts as director of American information, 413 f.; has chats with Wilson, 413 f.; confers with Pershing, 418 f.; has Wilson send cable, 420 f.; talks with Clemenceau, 422, 424; has last talks with Wilson, 466 f.; visits Baruch and Davis, 475
Kinkead, Congressman Eugene F., 45
Kipling, Rudyard, 481
Kuehnle, Louis, 92
Laffan, William, 44
La Follette, Robert M., 98, 99, 142, 143-4, 193, 211, 246-7, 460
Lamont, Thomas W., 395
Lane, Franklin K., 295, 296
Lansing, Robert, 295, 356 f., 376, 421, 429, 432, 433-4, 435, 473
Lauder, Sir Harry, 239, 240
Law, Bonar, 477

Lawyers in American government, 21-22; Wilson's opinion of, 118-9, 429
Lea, Senator Luke, 337
League of Nations, 410, 412, 427, 428, 439, 442 f., 449, 453 f., 456, 458, 466, 468, 474
Lee, Thomas, 2, 152
Leffingwell, Russell C., 395
Legislative Correspondents' Club, 271 f
Legislative session of 1912 in New Jersey, 191 f.
Letter from office-seeker, 117-8
Letters of Wilson, ix, 74, 87, 122, 134, 140, 165, 188-9, 209 f., 216-7, 256-7, 267-8, 276, 281, 320-1, 325, 331, 359, 378 f., 437-8, 474-5, 483
Lewis, James Hamilton, 312
Lewis, Vivian M., 67, 70, 85, 186, 196-7
Libbey, Professor William, 86
Limericks, Wilson's use of, 71 f., 239-40
Lincoln, Abraham, 68, 205, 243, 357, 410, 450, 472
Lind, John, 312
Lindabury, Richard V., 45 f
Lloyd George, David, 418, 425, 427, 449, 450, 471
Local option law, 185 f
Lodge, Henry Cabot, 6, 31 f., 375, 376, 377 f., 451, 461
"London Times," 417
Loucheur, Louis, 476
Love, Colonel Thomas B., 167
Ludendorff, General von, 391, 425
Lusitania, 351, 352, 353, 356, 401
Lynch, Judge Charles F., 467
Lyons, John M., 277
Lyons, Maurice F., 147
Madison, James, 29
Maine, 378-9
Malone, Dudley Field, 323 f
"Manchester Guardian," 389
Mann, Parker, 251
Marshall, Thomas R., 153, 229, 282, 291, 343, 429 f., 458, 464
Martin, William P., 203
Martine, James E., 77 f., 116, 129, 193-4, 239, 333, 338 f., 342, 343, 360, 378, 379
Maryland, 216
Massachusetts, 216
McAdoo, Eleanor Wilson, 280, 328 f., 340
McAdoo, William Gibbs, 148, 232, 252, 263, 285, 296, 299-300, 308, 319, 320, 322, 324, 325, 327, 328 f., 339, 354, 395, 457
McCall, John, 368
McCarter, Robert H., 237-8
McClellan, George B., 16-17
McCombs, William F., 133, 144, 146 f., 164, 223, 225, 227, 229, 230 f., 238, 252, 253, 262-3, 299, 311, 315, 324, 335, 473

McCorkle, Walter L., 132
McCormick, Cyrus H., 215, 341
McCormick, Vance, 304
McCoy, Walter I., 326
McCran, Thomas L., 199, 201
McCrea, James, 199, 200
McGraw, John B., 151, 290
McKinley, William, 59 f., 70
McLean, Angus, 395
McReynolds, James C., 296-7
Measday, Walter, 148, 171
Meiklejohn, Alexander, 480
"Menace," 291
Mercer County, 37, 51, 54, 63, 64, 150, 257
Meredith, E. T., 297
Mexico, 399, 401, 402, 403
Militarism, 363 f., 380-1, 389
Mills, Ogden, 418
Milner, Lord, 423
"Mirrors of Washington," 130
Mississippi, 215
Mitchell, Edward P., 43
Mitchell, John Purroy, 320-f, 323, 324
Monroe, G. Rowland, 186 f
Moore, John Bassett, 356
Morgan, J. P., 17, 18, 45, 49, 168, 225, 226, 392, 395
Morgenthau, Henry, 155, 242, 263, 294, 299, 313
Morley, Lord, 139
Morrow, Dwight, 395
Muck-raking, ii, 30 f
Mueller, Norman, 120
Munn, Joseph, 95
Murphy, Edward H., 61
Murphy, Franklin, 67, 74, 191
Napoleon, 207
"Nation," 412
National Democratic Committee, 230 f
National Press Club, 343
Nebraska, 216
Nervousness, Wilson's, before speaking, 42
Newark, 16, 35, 36, 89, 122, 273
"Newark Evening News," 16, 47, 48-9, 81, 265, 266-7, 278, 345
"Newark Star," 104, 105
New Freedom, 312
New Jersey, i, v, vi, vii, x, 15 f., 37, 38, 57 f., 66 f., 76, 128 f., 184 f., 191 f., 213, 216, 240-1, 253 f., 260 f., 280, 281-2, 326, 339, 366-7, 368, 371, 378, 381, 412, 437-8, 462, 471 f., 475, 480
New Jersey State Bankers' Association, 40
Newspaper men, Wilson's dealings with, 262, 263, 264, 271 f., 276, 328 f., 343 f. (See also names of newspapers).
Newton, Byron R., 148, 155
"New York Evening Post," 82, 83, 131 f
"New York Sun," 43, 44, 60, 171-2, 265, 266
"New York Times," 151, 431
"New York Tribune," 378

"New York World," 34, 215, 345
Nixon, Lewis, 291
"North American Review," 98
North Carolina, 215
Northcliffe, Lord, 417
Nugent, James R., 28, 35 f., 52, 53, 64, 65, 66, 70, 74, 143, 148 f., 186-7, 229, 231, 254 f., 273, 279, 294, 326, 471-2, 473
O'Donnell, C. J., 390
O'Gorman, James A., 316, 319 f., 323
Oklahoma primaries, 204
O'Leary, Jeremiah, 378 f
Olney, Richard, 285
O'Malley, Frank Ward, 265
Osborn, William Church, 325
Osborne, Edward B., 95
Osborne, Harry V., 111 f
O'Toole, Peter J., 48
Oulahan, Richard V., 43
"Outlook," 349-50
Pacifism, 355, 360, 372 f., 455
Page, Thomas Nelson, 311
Page, Walter Hines, 14, 131, 132, 133, 154, 164, 175, 236, 237, 251, 293, 311, 339, 350, 362, 382, 383, 384, 392
Palmer, A. Mitchell, 224, 229, 266, 267-8, 300 f., 303 f
Panama Canal Act, 339, 347, 358
Paris, 419 f
Parker, Alton B., 23 f., 221, 223, 224, 356
Passaic, 197
Paterson, 197, 201
"Paterson Guardian," 49
Patten, Congressman Thomas, 325
Pattullo, George, 415
Payne, John Barton, 296
Pence, Tom, 170, 173, 292 f
Penfield, Frederic C., 151
Pennsylvania, 216
Penrose, Boise, 31-32, 35, 303, 335
Perkins, George W., 159-60, 242, 244, 335 f., 341-2
Pershing, General John J., 397 f., 413 f., 422 f., 425
Petigru, James Louis, 486
Pettigrew, R. F., 287
"Philadelphia Record," 132
Philippines, 165, 268-9, 301, 322, 323, 357-8, 397, 400
Phillips, Ida, 122
Pinchot, Amos, 363
Pinchot, Gifford, 296
Pitney, Henry C., 193
Pitney, Mahlon, 58, 120-1, 191 f., 239
Plainfield, 84
Platt, Thos. C., 59 f
Plattsburg, credit for, 401
Poincairé, Raymond, 477
Politics, practical, 43, 58, 63, 94-5, 119, 144, 309, 375, 450
Polk, Frank L., 320, 396, 436
Pomerene, Senator Atlee, 316

Portugal, 314, 315
Prince, John D., 111, 141
Princeton, i, ii, v, vi, 3, 4 f., 29, 51, 52, 62, 79, 127, 128, 146, 147, 162, 163, 172, 178, 179, 180 f., 184, 187, 191, 219, 230, 231, 237, 251, 253, 266, 274 f., 277, 278, 279, 281, 290, 292, 309, 327, 387, 397, 471, 472, 480, 481
"Princeton Alumni Weekly," 182
Princeton clubs, 8 f., 182, 183
Procter, William Cooper, 12, 13
Prohibition, opposed by Wilson, 190; views of Bryan's grape-juice, 286-7, 463 f
Propaganda, 389 f., 413, 414, 424-5, 426
Public utilities, Wilson on, 33; other candidates on, 50, 67; Sommer's public utility law, 111
Pulitzer, Joseph, 34
Pyne, Moses Taylor, 7, 12, 13, 156
Quay, Matthew S., 59, 63
Railroad grade - crossings, 197 f
Record, George, 69 f., 71, 72 f., 93, 94-5, 97, 98, 99, 100 f., 105 f., 116, 136, 220, 333 f., 437 f., 462
Recreations of Wilson, outdoor, 235-6; indoor, 239-40
Red Cross, 395
Redfield, William C., 297-8, 298-9
Reed, Tom, 41, 451
Reed, Justice Alfred, 120
Reformers, 31, 125, 333, 459, 471
Republican party, 21, 57 f., 65, 204, 318, 347, 381, 392, 427, 446
Republican poison squad, 345
Rhode Island, 216
Rice, Melvin A., 239 f
"Richmond Times-Dispatch," 208 f
Roosevelt, Alice, 483
Roosevelt, Frankln D., 324
Roosevelt, Theodore, ii, 29, 69 f., 63, 65-6, 99, 102, 103, 125, 134, 135, 145, 160, 168, 193, 220, 221, 231, 234, 241 f., 256, 258, 259, 271, 295, 319, 321, 323, 324, 327, 328, 335 f., 349 f., 360, 377, 378, 380, 381 f., 398, 399, 400, 401-2, 405 f., 410 f., 415, 426, 459, 460 f., 464, 479, 485
Root, Elihu, 399, 426
Rosebery, Lord, 126
Ross, Millard F., 45
Rublee, George, 335, 337, 338, 339, 340
Russell, Bertrand, 389
Russia, 399, 436
Ryan, Thomas F., 17, 44, 170, 207, 214, 225, 226, 234, 293

Sadler, Adjutant - General Wilbur F., 83, 161
St. John, William W., 78 f., 93, 97, 98, 99, 136
St. Louis convention, 372 f.
Santo Domingo, 318
"Saturday Evening Post," 415
Schroth, Frank D., 78
Schurman, J. G., 179
Schwab, Charles M., 394
Scott, General Hugh L., 397 f.
Scudder, Edward W., 82
Scudder, Wallace M., 82
Seibold, Louis, 345
Senate, United States, 289, 308, 309, 338, 371, 427, 467 f.
Service of Supplies, 416 f.
Seven Sisters laws, 258 f., 462
Seward, W. H., 357
Sewell, Wm. J., 57 f, 186
Shadow Lawn, 342, 368, 379, 380, 382
Shakspere, x, 453
Shantung episode, 449
Sharp, William G., 316
Sheehan, William F., 88
Sherman, General, 397
Silzer, George S., 50, 467, 472
Sims, Admiral, 390
Sinnott, Arthur J., 266, 278, 345
Smith, James, Jr., ii, iv, 18 f., 27, 28, 36, 44, 45, 46 f., 56, 57, 62, 64, 71, 72, 74, 77 f., 93, 97, 104, 108, 109, 128, 134, 143, 156, 229, 231, 248 f., 254 f., 272, 360, 470, 473
Smith, Thomas F., 325
Smuts, Jan, 469
Sommer, Frank H., 111 f.
Sonnino, Baron Sidney, 427
South Carolina, 215
Spanish-American War, 355
"Springfield Republican," 215
Stetson, Francis Lynde, 88
Stettinius, Edward R., 395
Stockbridge, Frank Parker, 133, 147, 155
Stokes, Edward C., 74, 77, 95, 111, 204
Storer, Bellamy, 234
Storrow, James J., 285
Straus, Nathan, 291
Straus, Oscar S., 335
Sullivan, Mark, 91
Sullivan, Roger, 47, 56, 156, 228, 229, 231, 312
Swackhammer, Samuel, 187
Swanson, Senator Claude, 208
Swayze, Francis J., 191 f.
Swem, Charles, 122
Swope, Herbert Bayard, 443 f.
Taft, William Howard, 29, 143, 160, 162, 168, 169 f., 191 f., 220, 231, 234, 239, 241 f., 270, 271, 275-6, 387, 432
Taggart, Thomas, 47, 153, 229
Tammany Hall, 23, 57, 61,

Tammany Hall--(Continued) 63, 88, 130, 147, 151 226, 319, 321, 323 f
Tarbell, Ida M., 452
Tax laws, Record's view of, 336-7
Temperance in food, 287
Tennessee, 215
Texas, 167, 216
"The Beautiful Isle of Somewhere," 272
Thomas, Harvey, 47, 157 f.
Thompson, William J., 52, 53
Tilden, Samuel J., 99
Tillman, Senator Ben, 170.
Todd, Carroll, 303
Tracy, John J., 90
Trenton, 271, 273, 281, 292, 307, 322, 326, 327, 344, 379-80, 475
Trenton convention, i, iv, x, 51 f
"Trenton State Gazette," 78
"Trenton Times," x, 36, 51, 264, 265, 322, 323
"Trenton True American," 48, 93, 158 f., 162
Truesdale, W. H., 199, 200
Tumulty, Joseph, 65, 82, 83 f., 93, 97, 98, 116 f., 120, 146, 162, 185, 196, 197, 222, 223, 229, 252, 253, 264, 265, 270, 271, 279, 285, 287, 288, 292, 293, 294, 295, 298, 299, 300, 302, 303, 304, 308, 315, 316, 317, 319, 320, 322, 323, 332, 338, 354, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 369, 376, 379, 387, 393, 428, 432, 434, 435, 437, 438, 446, 456, 462, 473 f., 479-80, 481, 484, 485.
Turkey, 313
Twain, Mark, 15
Underwood, Senator Oscar, 166, 184, 214, 215, 221, 225, 484
Union labor, Wilson on, 34
United Press, 417
U'Ren, William S., 98, 101 f., 135, 142
Van Dyke, Henry, 6, 10, 12, 311
Van Syckel, Bennett, 259
Versailles, Treaty of, 412, 448, 449, 454, 476
Vick, Walter W., 318
Villard, Oswald Garrison, 131, 148, 412
Virginia, 207 f
Viviani, René, 392
Volstead Act, vetoed by Wilson, 190
Voorhees, Foster M., 58
Walker, Edwin Robert, 196, 259
Walker, John Brisbane, 205
Wall Street, 215-16, 293, 299, 300, 342, 356, 394
Warburg, Paul M., 341
War front, 416 f
Washington, George, 68, 410
Watterson, Colonel Henry, 27, 151, 156, 164, 168, 169, 170-1, 175, 176, 326, 473
Werts, George, 67
West, Dean Andrew, 11, 13, 43, 181 f

Westcott, John W., 53, 216-7, 343, 378
Whipple, Sherman, 302 f
White House, 271, 275
Whitney, William C., 17, 25
Wickersham, George W., 432
Wiley, Louis, 151
Williams, George Fred, 287
Williams, Jesse Lynch, 182
Wilson, Edith Bolling, 368 f., 394, 429, 434, 470
Wilson, Ellen Axson, 36, 40, 46, 91, 124, 161 f., 176, 207, 222, 223, 235, 236, 237, 240, 253, 260, 271, 274, 275, 276, 277, 282, 287-8, 311, 328, 331 f., 347, 378, 369, 394
Wilson, John, 307
Wilson, Joseph R., 338
Wilson, Margaret, 240
Wilson, William B., 294
Wilson, Woodrow, achievement of, ix, 127, 236, 398, 486; addresses by, 32, 33, 38 f., 40 f., 55, 65, 68, 69, 70, 73, 90, 108, 124, 135 f., 142, 155, 163, 174, 211 f, 215, 239 f., 241 f., 244, 245, 251-2, 272, 275, 281, 343-4, 347-8, 348-9, 357 f., 361 f., 371, 380-81, 388, 391, 396, 451, 476; advocates radical doctrines in 1911, 135 f.; aims of in diplomacy, 386, 388; anti-trust (Seven Sisters) laws, 258 f.; appearance of, in last years, 470 f.; appears before Trenton convention, 54 f.; applies for membership in American-Irish Historical Society, 152; applies for pension to Carnegie Foundation and is refused, 178 f.; appointments in New Jersey, 115 f., 195 f., to cabinet, 262 f., 283 f.; appoints first Hebrew to higher courts, 120; appoints Kerney director of American information, 413 f.; aristocratic outlook, iii, 35; articles by, 5, 6, 25, 33, 98, 131, 218-9, 283-4; as a politician, v, viii, 45-46, 54, 61, 63, 64, 92, 95-6, 104, 115, 117 f., 144-5, 235, 241 f., 309, 317, 328, 375, 378 f., 450; as a public speaker, 38 f., 40 f., 42, 92, 125, 317, 361 f.; as a radical, 73, 76, 80, 94, 127 f., 135, 191, 208, 215, 241, 333; as a student at Princeton, 3, 4-5; as president of Princeton, 4, 6 f., 15, 72, 180 f.; assisted in fight for Presidency by Walter Hines Page, 131 f.; at Davidson College, 3; at Johns Hopkins, 4; attacks Wall Street, 215-16; attitude on office-seekers, 115 f.; attitude toward Bryan, 317; attitude toward reformers, 125; attitude toward those who disagreed with him, 347 f.; at-

Wilson, Woodrow—
(Continued)
titude toward Smith's candidacy for senator, 24, 26, 27, 57, 71, 79 f., 89 f., 128, 248-50, and later service rendered to Smith, 249-50; at University of Virginia, 3; attends caucus of Democratic legislators, 108; autocratic rule, 452 f.; battle with himself on the World War, 362, 363 f.; becomes a national figure, 97 f.; boom for President, 14, 24 f., 28, 43 f., 95, 111, 115, 120, 123, 131 f., 204; buries the hatchet, 326; calls conference of advisers in 1911, 100; campaign for reëlection, 371 f.; carries on duties of office through Mrs. Wilson, 434; change in political principles, vi, vii, 32 f., 66, 97 f., 127 f., 207, 241 f., 333; character of, v, vi, vii, viii, ix, x, 8, 12, 63, 64, 71, 124, 191, 205-6, 288, 349, 368-9, 416, 450, 452, 457, 483 f.; charged with religious prejudice, 90, 320; command over language, vii, 39, 42, 122, 190, 349, 357, 416; commends Pitney appointment, 192; compared with Roosevelt, 61, 63, 461 f., and dislike for him, 247-8, 406-8; conferences with James Kerney, 62 f., 72 f., 80 f., 185, 196, 221, 228, 320, 413 f., 466 f.; conflict with Cleveland and West, 8 f.; conservation of physical strength, 123, 235-6; controversy as to League of Nations, 410, 412, 427, 428, 439, 442 f., 449, 453 f., 456, 458; controversy with Colonel Watterson, 170 f.; cuts loose from Smith, 77 f.; dealings with newspaper men, 262, 263, 264, 271 f., 276, 328 f., 343 f. (see also names of newspapers); decides to support Martine, 79 f.; defends inconsistency, 72; defends Taft, 246; democracy and, vi, vii, 97 f., 236-7; desire to avoid family influence, 308; desire to be President, 43 f.; difficulties in dealing with pro-British Page, 382 f.; diplomatic appointments, 310 f.; sustain test, 319; disagrees with Martine, 338 f., and tries to prevent his renomination, 342 f.; disastrous effect on Germans of his messages, 425; discards Colonel Harvey, 168 f., but expresses gratitude to him, 169; disgust on newspaper treatment of daughter's engagement, 328 f.; early conservatism, 14, 32, 34, 44, 50; early

Wilson, Woodrow—
(Continued)
life and education, 3-4; effect of death of Ellen Axson Wilson, 321 f.; endorses U'Ren plan of direct legislation, 101; engages in campaign of 1910, 62 f.; expresses gratitude to McCombs, 230; faces opposition to candidacy for gubernatorial nomination, 36 f., 49 f.; fails to receive encouragement from South in 1912, 207 f.; fails to reward Record, 333 f.; feeling as to New Jersey, 281-2; fighting qualities of, vii, 9, 10, 55, 71, 96, 108, 124, 309, 348-9, 449; fights for a new Utopia, 100, 448; financing Presidential booms, 156 f.; forces adoption of Adamson Law, 334; forms his cabinet, 262 f.; gains support in Texas for nomination, 166 f.; gives exclusive news to "Newark News" and "Trenton Times," 265; government by proxy during illness, 429 f.; handling of legislators at Trenton, 289; handling of military details, 397 f.; hard vein in, 333 f.; Henry Cabot Lodge and, 6, 451; his "History of the American People," 126 f.; home in Washington, 464 f.; hostile use made of his historical writings, 125 f.; in Congressional elections of 1914; 326 f.; in Europe, 426 f.; in White House renders service to Smith, 249-50; influence of Ellen Axson Wilson, 161; in Scotland, 93-4; interviews with "Newark News" reporters in 1910, 47, 48; introduces bills drawn by Record, 105 f.; in World War, 349 f., 356 f., 371 f., 386 f.; irritability in 1913, 262 f.; issues statement on senatorial situation in New Jersey, 1910, 89; lack of political training, i, 54; learns from John W. Westcott about Trenton convention methods, 54; legends about, ix, 264, 302; letters of, ix, 74, 87, 122, 134, 140, 165, 188-9, 209 f., 216-7, 256-7, 267-8, 276, 281, 320-1, 325, 331, 359, 378 f., 437-8, 474-5, 483; love of anecdotes, 40, 71, 93, 205, 245, 264, 366, 368, 482; love of praise, 264; love of the Bible, 272-3; *Lusitania* note, 352 f.; marriage to Edith Bolling Galt, 368 f.; meets Bryan and reaches accord with him, 162 f.; meets party disaster, 451 f.; meets Wittpenn, 50-1;

Wilson, Woodrow—
(Continued)
mollifies Bryan as to Joline letter, 172 f.; nominated at Baltimore Convention, 220 f.; nomination as governor, i, 13, 28, 36, 38, 43 f.; offers to debate George Record, 69, and answers Record's questions, 72 f.; on big business, 340; on bosses and bossism, 25-26, 47 f., 56-7, 70, 74 f.; on Federal Reserve plan, 266; on handshaking, 276; on initiative, referendum, and recall, 135 f., 208 f.; on liquor question, 185 f., 286-7, 464; on militarism, 363 f., 380-1; on obligation to vote, 125; on neutrality, 348-9; on office seekers, 307; on Philippines, 165, 268-9, 357-8, 400; on political "foolishness," 32-3; on preparedness, 351, 357 f., 401; on public utilities, 33; on railroad grade-crossings, 197 f.; on Roosevelt, 244-5, 247-8, 406-8; on single-term plank, 267-8; on union labor, 34, 183 f.; on woman suffrage, 138 f.; on writing for publication, 479; open-door policy, 125, 262 f.; originates conferences with Washington correspondents, 344; ousts Nugent as chairman of Democratic State Committee, 148 f.; partizanship, 114, 397; perplexed as to gubernatorial nomination, 46 f.; physical collapse, 283, 428, 429 f., 456 f.; policy of watchful waiting, 312, 393; political ambition, ii, 43, 46 f., 115; poor financial condition as president of Princeton, 179; power of idealistic phrases, 391; problems of 1911 and 1912, 178 f.; prosecutes war vigorously, 392 f.; ran one-man show, 283; receives Bryan's resignation unwillingly, 354 f; receives from Record outline of after-war program, 438 f.; receives news of Baltimore convention, 235, and gets many messages of good cheer, 236 f.; receives support of Brandeis, 246-7; recreations, outdoor, 235-6, indoor, 239-40, 370; refuses pledges to Democratic organization, 45-6; rejects Mrs. Wilson's view of Bryan, 288; rejects Roosevelt for army, 405 f.; relations with McCombs, 133, 144, 146 f., 262 f.; relations with the Senate, 308, 309; religious views, 272 f., 327; relinquishes governorship and leaves Princeton, 270 f.;

Wilson, Woodrow—
(Continued)
replies to attacks of negligence, 202 f.; responsible for Jersey reforms, 127; Roosevelt's part in electing, 241 f.; salary lost while touring, 139 f.; secures coöperation of New Jersey Republicans, 111 f.; shorthand system 122; Southern in temperament, 4; spends summer of 1916 in New Jersey, 342; statements issued by, 47, 48-9, 56, 329-30, 376-7, 406-8; strength and weakness at beginning of Baltimore Convention, 219; supports Bryan's views at Baltimore, 223; surrenders seal of office to Fielder, 273; the schoolmaster in politics, 55, 104, 128; triumph of at Baltimore, 229 f.; undergoes political reformation, 97 f.; unfortunate call for a Democratic Congress, 409 f.; 458-9; unswerving support of Pershing, 398, 415; use of limericks, 71 f.; 239-40, 471-482 f.; view of afterwar problems, 437 f.; view of public service, 119; visits Washington with Tumulty and Kerney, 270 f.; wins support of Colonel House, 164 f.; 176-7; reliance of Wilson on House, 316-7; wit of, 38 f.; 264, 434-5; writes speech of acceptance, 1912, 239 f
Wisconsin primaries, 197, 216
Wise, Rabbi Stephen, S., 363, 365
Witherspoon, John, 6
Wittpenn, H. Otto, 37, 50, 255 f., 273
Wood, General Leonard, 398 f
"Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him," by Tumulty, 473-4
"Woodrow Wilson Foundation," 278-9
"Woodrow Wilson Weekly," 159
World Court, 478
"World, New York," 443 f
World War, 332, 346, 351, 352 f., 356 f., 371 f., 386 f
World War, responsibility, 386
"World's Work," 112, 132, 134
Wyeth, Dr. John A., 44
Wyman, Isaac C., 13

B WILSON, W.
Kerney, James, 1873-
The political education of
Woodrow Wilson,

The political education of
Woodrow Wilson

DATE DUE